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Abstract 
The extent to which deregulation increases the competitiveness of retail electricity 
markets depends largely on consumer switching activity. The USA, UK, Norway, 
Sweden, and Australia have all implemented electricity market reforms but 
consumers have often been reluctant to switch suppliers. In New Zealand, most 
consumers have not switched suppliers despite potential annual power bill savings 
of $150. Campaigns promoting consumer switching rely on price differences and 
ignore the value of non-price attributes, including whether the electricity is 
generated from renewable energy sources.  
This thesis improves our understanding of consumer switching and the demand 
for green electricity by analysing consumer preferences for the attributes of 
electricity services, estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for non-price attributes, 
and explaining consumer switching in terms of eight attributes:- power bill, call 
waiting time, fixed rate contract, discount, loyalty rewards, renewables, ownership 
of supplier, and supplier type. The analysis is based on a panel choice dataset 
generated using a choice experiment which was administered in 2014 to an online 
panel of 224 electricity bill payers in New Zealand. The multinomial logit, 
random parameter logit and latent class models are used to analyse the choice data 
with psychological constructs included to explain heterogeneity of preferences. 
The effect of attribute non-attendance (AN-A) and hypothetical bias on WTP 
estimates is investigated. We also explore whether using shorter versions of the 
New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale to measure environmental attitudes (EA) 
affects estimates of WTP for green electricity. 
The results indicate that non-price attributes of electricity services are significant 
determinants of consumer switching. Three latent classes with distinct preferences 
for the attributes are identified. Class 1 (40%) is mainly concerned about the 
power bill, and would switch supplier to save at least NZ$125 per year in power 
bills, ceteris paribus. This value mainly captures the status quo effect. Class 2 
(46%) exhibits no status quo effect and values all the attributes offered including 
renewables, and particularly dislikes entrants from other sectors which have to 
charge at least NZ$135 less per year compared to a traditional retailer for a 50% 
chance of attracting customers. Class 3 (14%) consists of captive and loyal 
respondents who would not switch supplier for any realistic bill savings. 
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We find that failing to account for attribute non-attendance results in WTP 
estimates that are significantly lower for attributes that are not normally included 
in standard electricity plans. Also, respondents who claim to have ignored some 
attributes may not have done so; instead they assigned lower weights to these 
attributes. Respondents with low certainty scores are less sensitive to the power 
bill and are predicted to have significantly higher WTP. We find that using shorter 
versions of the NEP Scale to measure EA, increases bias in WTP for green 
electricity.   
We conclude that price differences in retail markets reflect, in part, consumer 
preferences for non-price attributes, and that providing consumers with 
information on the levels of non-price attributes could influence switching rates, 
the uptake of green electricity and potentially the level of competition in the retail 
electricity sector. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
1.0 Overview and background  
New Zealand, the USA, the UK, Norway, Sweden, and Australia have all 
implemented electricity market reforms since the 1980s aimed at replacing 
monopolies with efficient and competitive markets. In some cases these reforms 
have had limited success, particularly in the retail electricity sector. An important 
issue has been the apparent reluctance of consumers to consider changing their 
electricity supplier, leading to a lack of effective competition (Electricity 
Authority, 2010). Brennan (2007) reports that most jurisdictions have experienced 
very low switching rates, and attributes this to customers’ reluctance to move 
from their default supplier. A similar finding is reported by Defeuilley (2009), 
who attributes low switching rates and suboptimal behaviour of households to risk 
aversion, and other behavioural biases that encourage customers to stick with the 
status quo (SQ). In contrast, Littlechild (2009) asserts that most deregulated 
markets have experienced growing switching rates, and argues that low switching 
rates do not necessarily indicate that the markets are non-competitive, but could 
be a result of increased competition where retailers offer better packages and 
counter-offers to retain customers. However, under current market conditions, 
where seemingly unjustifiable large price dispersions are observed, Littlechild’s 
(2009) argument could be challenged.  
The willingness of consumers to change their supplier is an important factor in 
determining the extent to which deregulated retail electricity markets become 
competitive. Goett, Hudson, and Train (2000, p. 1) assert that “The power of 
competitive pressures to lower prices depends on the degree to which customers 
are willing to switch suppliers in response to offers of lower prices.” A better 
understanding of consumer preferences and switching behaviour is required to 
inform regulation and the effective promotion of switching in retail electricity 
markets, and this is what this thesis provides.      
New Zealand (NZ) introduced retail competition in 1998 under the Electricity 
Industry Reform Act 1998 (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment 
2
 
     
[MBIE], 2010). The main objective of the Act was “to increase consumer choice, 
encourage innovation, and ultimately result in lower prices than would otherwise 
be charged” (Electricity Authority, 2010, p. 3). However, a decade later, a 
ministerial review of the performance of the electricity market conducted in 2009 
determined that: (1) the current levels of consumer switching were insufficient to 
curb non-competitive behaviour by retailers; and (2) the full benefits of retail 
competition had not yet been realised, particularly for domestic customers who 
continued to face rapidly increasing prices (Electricity Authority, 2010). Based on 
price differences between retailers in each region, the total benefits of switching to 
the cheapest available retailer were estimated to be about $150 million per annum 
across all consumers (Electricity Authority, 2011a). To address the issue of 
customer ‘stickiness’, the government set up a $15 million consumer Switching 
Fund to promote switching, as recommended by the ministerial review (Electricity 
Authority, 2010)
1
. 
The Electricity Authority spent $15 million (2011-2014) on the “What’s My 
Number” (WMN) campaign promoting consumer switching by increasing 
awareness of the benefits of switching, and encouraging consumers to shop 
around for lower prices (Electricity Authority, 2011a, 2012b). Also, an 
independent complementary one-stop-shop website called “Powerswitch” was 
revamped to allow consumers to compare prices and switch to the supplier 
offering the lowest price (Electricity Authority, 2010). The benefits promoted 
under this campaign were based only on price differences between retailers. This 
ignored the value that consumers place on non-price attributes of electricity 
supply (or services) and any possible influence these attributes may have on 
switching behaviour and supplier choice. However, information on the values of 
non-price attributes has not been available in the past. Obtaining reliable estimates 
of these values or willingness to pay (WTP), and explaining the variability of 
consumer preferences for this class of goods remains a challenge for researchers 
and policy makers.  
                                                          
1
 Customer ‘stickiness’ was defined as the observed tendency of the majority of electricity 
customers to stay with their default or incumbent retailers, which were allocated all customers 
within a particular region at the time the market was opened up for competition. For example, 
Mercury Energy was allocated all customers in central Auckland, while Meridian Energy got all 
customers in Northland.  
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Results from international studies indicate that factors such as attitudes, loyalty to 
incumbent supplier, lack of information, perceived information search costs, and 
perceived low economic benefits from switching, among others, may prevent 
consumers from switching to the cheapest supplier (e.g., Gamble, Juliusson, & 
Gärling, 2007, 2009; Gärling, Gamble, & Juliusson, 2008; Giulietti, Price, & 
Waterson, 2005; Rowlands, Parker, & Scott, 2004). The WMN campaign and 
Powerswitch addressed some of these issues. 
A number of NZ studies and reviews were commissioned under the Switching 
Fund to provide the Electricity Authority and Ministry of Consumer Affairs with 
research that underpins the fund (see Electricity Authority, 2010), and to conduct 
market research to assess the performance of the WMN campaign and 
Powerswitch website (see Electricity Authority, 2011a, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 
2013c). Although the studies show an increase in switching activity compared to 
the pre-campaign period, they also show that more than 79% of consumers did not 
switch in any particular year despite high bill savings available in the market. The 
latter suggests that customer ‘stickiness’ remained despite improved access to 
information, increased awareness of the right and ability to switch, ease of 
switching and higher bill savings.  
These studies also report on consumers’ attitudes towards switching, barriers to 
switching, and retailer activity. They also identify important non-price attributes 
of electricity services and groups of customers with similar switching behaviour, 
and explain differences between groups in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics (SDCs). However, none of these studies attempt to value these 
attributes, but rather limit the analysis to a ranking of the attributes in terms of 
importance to consumers. Furthermore, it appears that no detailed analysis has 
been conducted to provide insight into the perceived customer ‘stickiness’ that 
may arise as a result of a number of unknown factors and the SQ effect – a 
tendency to stick with the current retailer.  
Although the rankings provided in the above studies convey the relative 
importance of the non-price attributes of electricity supply, they do not provide 
information on how consumers trade-off these attributes. This thesis provides 
information on the trade-offs consumers make among a sub-set of important 
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attributes of electricity services, and explains consumer “stickiness” in terms of 
SQ and “supplier type” effects2. Knowledge of the trade-offs consumers make 
amongst the attributes, including power bill savings, increases our understanding 
of consumer preferences and helps in explaining switching behaviour in the NZ 
retail electricity markets. For example, we are able to assess the likelihood of a 
given level of bill savings inducing switching, given differences in the levels of 
non-price attributes for different suppliers. This allows policy makers to more 
accurately predict likely outcomes of future campaigns promoting switching. 
Knowledge of the trade-offs also offers electricity retailers an opportunity to 
design offers that suit their customers, and to maintain or increase their market 
share. Retailers may be able to compensate customers for lower levels of some 
desirable attributes by changing the levels of other desirable or undesirable 
attributes. Furthermore, the dollar values estimated for the attributes allow for all 
attributes to be reduced to a common metric, which helps in evaluating policies 
that deliver different attribute levels, e.g., privatization of electricity companies, 
and renewable energy policy targets. 
Promoting switching on the basis of price differences (bill savings) appears to be 
based on the belief that: (1) consumers are price-sensitive, and small changes in 
price will induce switching, given the homogeneous nature of the product (Cai, 
Deilami, & Train, 1998; Price, 2004); (2) brand value and service factors are 
likely to be very small for electricity retailing (Electricity Authority, 2010); and 
(3) consumers are more likely to view suppliers to be the same except for the price 
(Gärling et al., 2008). Promoting competition then focuses on price instead of 
other dimensions, which reflects the belief that “only the price matters.” This 
belief seems to have been fundamental in the Switching Fund in NZ. The belief is 
echoed in a statement by the chief executive of the Electricity Authority that 
“When the Electricity Authority launched the What’s My Number programme in 
2011, it was with a strong belief that encouraging New Zealanders to shop around 
for their electricity – on a scale that had not been done before – had the potential 
to change the retail electricity landscape.” (Electricity Authority, 2012b, p. 1).  
The way switching has been promoted in New Zealand conforms to the practice 
that relies entirely on values based on market prices to evaluate welfare benefits. 
                                                          
2
 “Supplier type” effects are the preferences for different types of electricity suppliers  
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Such practice has been criticized and shown to deliver sub-optimal welfare 
outcomes, especially in the evaluation of public projects, by ignoring all welfare 
benefits and costs that are not priced in the market (Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001; 
Costanza et al., 1997). Non-market valuation studies have shown that ignoring 
non-market values in decision-making either under-states or over-states welfare 
benefits. Therefore, the benefits of switching, quantified as bill savings, advertised 
under the WMN campaign may not reflect the true welfare benefits, if consumers 
value non-price attributes.  
Switching rates have averaged about 20% per year over the period 2011-2013 
(Electricity Authority, 2013b). While this is a positive outcome of the WMN 
campaign, the authorities are still not satisfied with the level of switching, as a 
large proportion of consumers have not actively participated and continue to be 
passive or indifferent. This suggests that the strategy of promoting switching 
benefits based on price alone is not effective enough. Estimates of WTP for non-
price attributes provided in this thesis suggest that a more comprehensive 
approach that recognizes the values of these attributes may be required to induce 
higher switching rates.  
Non-market valuation techniques, particularly choice experiments (CEs) and the 
contingent valuation method (CVM), have increasingly been used to provide 
welfare estimates of the attributes of non-market goods. Many important policy 
decisions in NZ have been supported by estimates obtained from non-market 
valuation techniques, transforming them “from mainly an academic exercise, 
……. into a government decision support tool for policy decision making…” 
(Yao & Kaval, 2007, p. 7). However, CEs and the CVM rely on responses to 
hypothetical questions designed to elicit responses that are expected to convey 
information about the respondents’ true preferences for the specific attributes 
under consideration. These techniques have been criticised for their reliance on 
responses to hypothetical questions.  
Critics of non-market valuation techniques once argued that estimates based on 
these techniques should be rejected on the basis of unreliability of responses to 
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hypothetical questions (e.g., Diamond & Hausman, 1994; McFadden, 1994)
3
. 
Some studies have shown that responses to real and hypothetical questions may 
differ significantly (e.g., Brownstone & Small, 2005; Champ, Bishop, Brown, & 
McCollum, 1997; Hensher, 2010; Isacsson, 2007), while others find no significant 
differences (e.g., Carlsson & Martinsson, 2001; Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright, 
1996; Lusk & Schroeder, 2004). However, it has been shown that properly 
designed surveys and elicitation formats, and mitigating hypothetical bias in 
model estimation can reduce the gap between hypothetical and real choices 
(Arrow et al., 1993; Champ et al., 1997; Champ, Moore, & Bishop, 2009; 
Cummings & Taylor, 1999).  
The widespread use of non-market valuation techniques over the years has seen 
increasing attention paid to methods that seek to close the gap between WTP 
estimates obtained from hypothetical choices and those obtained from real 
choices. This increases the validity and acceptability of the welfare estimates. The 
gap between real and hypothetical WTP estimates is referred to as hypothetical 
bias (HB). Two important issues addressed by some of these methods are HB and 
attribute non-attendance (AN-A) in stated CEs. For example, a number of studies 
have developed statistical models that infer attribute processing rules supported by 
the choice data (e.g., Campbell, Hensher, & Scarpa, 2011; Hensher, Rose, & 
Greene, 2012; Scarpa, Gilbride, Campbell, & Hensher, 2009). AN-A identified in 
this manner is referred to as inferred AN-A. Other studies have incorporated 
respondent self-reported non-attendance, which is referred to as serial AN-A or 
choice task AN-A (e.g., Campbell, Hutchinson, & Scarpa, 2008; Carlsson, 
Kataria, & Lampi, 2010; DeShazo & Fermo, 2004; Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 
2005b; Scarpa, Thiene, & Hensher, 2010). These studies demonstrate that 
explicitly accounting for ignored attributes in model estimation improves model 
fit and results in WTP estimates that are significantly different. 
Another fairly recent development that has resulted from increased use of non-
market valuation techniques is the specification of discrete choice models that 
more realistically represent the choice process by incorporating respondents’ 
perceptions and attitudes in the utility functions of choice alternatives. The 
                                                          
3
 The criticism was mainly directed at the use of the CVM in estimating existence and non-use 
values in accessing environmental damage. Stated CEs were developed to address some of the 
major shortcomings of the CVM.  
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motivation behind this development is the increased realisation that preference 
heterogeneity is in part due to underlying attitudes and convictions (Alvarez-
Daziano & Bolduc, 2009; Hess & Beharry-Borg, 2011). This approach adds 
another dimension to explaining preference heterogeneity, where unobserved 
latent variables that influence choice behaviour are measured using carefully 
designed attitudinal questions aimed at eliciting responses that reflect the 
underlying latent variables. A number of attitude-behaviour theories such as the 
theory of planned behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1988, 1991), norm activation theory 
(NAT) (Schwartz, 1977), and the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale (Dunlap, 
Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000) offer non-market valuation practitioners an 
opportunity to use attitudinal questions that provide measurements with a valid 
theoretical foundation. However, only a limited number of valuation studies 
actually use these theories in the design of attitudinal question.  
The values of some of the non-price attributes of electricity services have been 
estimated in previous studies using non-market valuation techniques (e.g., 
Abdullah & Mariel, 2010; Amador, Gonzalez, & Ramos-Real, 2013; Blass, Lach, 
& Manski, 2010; Cai et al., 1998; Giulietti et al., 2005; Goett et al., 2000; 
Hensher, Shore, & Train, 2014; Kaenzig, Heinzle, & Wuestenhagen, 2013). These 
studies show that consumers place significant value on non-price attributes of 
electricity services. This suggests that a better understanding of consumer 
switching in retail electricity markets may be achieved through research that 
includes these attributes in the analyses. Benefit transfer of estimates of non-price 
attributes from international studies may be problematic. For example, the retail 
markets covered by these studies have different structures to that of NZ, and may 
not reflect local conditions and experiences of local consumers. Research 
specifically targeting the NZ retail market is warranted as it contributes a unique 
set of values for the attributes of electricity services.     
As discussed above, deeper insight into consumer switching in the retail 
electricity market in NZ may be gained by investigating consumers’ preferences 
for non-price attributes. We achieve this by applying the stated CEs approach to 
identify and estimate monetary values for non-price attributes that influence 
residential consumers’ choice of electricity supplier. Furthermore, we incorporate 
attitudes in model estimation to explain any heterogeneity of preferences 
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uncovered in the analysis. We focus attention on the residential retail electricity 
market because it has been identified by the authorities as the market worst 
affected by rapidly increasing prices. The authorities attribute the rapid increase in 
prices in this market to low switching activity, which is insufficient to induce 
competitive behaviour among retailers (Electricity Authority, 2010).    
The arguments introduced above spell out the need for better understanding of 
consumer preferences and switching behaviour. This motivates the overall 
question addressed in this thesis, namely: 
What are the determinants of supplier choice and how can preference 
heterogeneity be explained?   
The specific research questions are explained in the next section. 
1.1 Motivation and research questions 
The main objective of this thesis is to assess consumer preferences for the 
attributes of electricity services, estimate monetary values for non-price attributes, 
and to explain preference heterogeneity using psychological constructs based on 
valid attitude-behaviour theories in order to gain a better understanding of 
switching behaviour in retail electricity markets. To achieve this objective we: 
a. Identify the main factors that influence consumer switching in NZ retail 
electricity markets. 
b. Develop an appropriate instrument to generate the data that is required for 
the analysis. 
c. Develop a framework for modelling consumer switching.  
d. Estimate WTP for non-price attributes of electricity services, and explain 
preference heterogeneity using psychological constructs. 
e. Explore the effect of AN-A and HB on WTP estimates. 
1.1.1 Motivation and contribution 
So far, all annual reviews of the WMN campaign show that despite a simplified 
switching process, reduced information search costs, and the quantified and 
widely publicized economic benefits of switching to the cheapest available 
supplier, most consumers have not switched supplier. Currently, no detailed 
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research has been conducted to provide empirical evidence that sheds light on the 
underlying determinants of the observed customer ‘stickiness’ or inertia, and 
whether or not non-price attributes matter. This thesis identifies determinants of 
supplier choice, provides an explanation of the observed customer ‘stickiness’, 
and also provides the first set of New Zealand-specific monetary values of 
important attributes of electricity services.      
International literature investigating consumer preferences in retail electricity 
markets is relatively limited. For example, the literature estimating values of the 
attributes of electricity services consists of a handful of well-known American and 
British studies which are now dated (e.g., Cai et al., 1998; Goett, 1998; Goett et 
al., 2000; Revelt & Train, 2000). These early studies were conducted at the start 
of deregulation of the retail markets to evaluate the likely response of consumers 
to the entry of new suppliers in the market. As such, respondents in these studies 
had no previous experience of choosing an electricity supplier. Current conditions 
in deregulated markets differ from the pre-deregulation era as consumers have a 
choice and some have actually switched supplier before. This thesis provides 
current values for the attributes of electricity services and contributes to the 
academic literature on switching.      
Growing interest in consumer switching and valuation of non-price attributes has 
resulted in a small but increasing number of recent studies investigating the 
influence of attitudes on switching (e.g., Gamble et al., 2007, 2009; Gärling et al., 
2008); estimating WTP for supply reliability (e.g., Abdullah & Mariel, 2010; 
Blass et al., 2010; Carlsson, Martinsson, & Akay, 2011; Hensher et al., 2014); and 
estimating WTP for a small subset of attributes (e.g., Amador et al., 2013; 
Kaenzig et al., 2013; Zhang & Wu, 2012). This thesis contributes to this growing 
literature by explaining preference heterogeneity using psychological constructs 
based on specific attitude-behaviour theories, and evaluating a different subset of 
attributes. Furthermore, this thesis provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
application of the latent class model in the context of switching, to uncover latent 
segments with homogeneous preferences for the attributes.  
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1.1.2 Research questions 
The first research question that we answer in this thesis is: 
 Question 1: Do consumers perceive all electricity retailers to be the same 
except for the price? 
We question whether electricity prices should converge in NZ retail markets as 
implied by concerns over large differences in retail prices within regional markets. 
For a homogeneous product like electricity, small price differences or a single 
price is expected to prevail in a competitive market
4
. Our main hypothesis is that 
non-price attributes matter; hence price differences alone may not fully explain 
switching in electricity retail markets. The above question is broken down into the 
following components:     
(a) Are non-price attributes of electricity services important determinants of 
supplier choice? If so, what values do residential consumers place on these 
attributes? 
(b) What are the determinants of WTP for the attributes? 
(c) Do preferences for power bill savings differ across respondents? If so how 
do these preferences influence switching? 
(d) Do attitudes towards switching play a systematic role in explaining 
preference heterogeneity?   
Revealed preference (RP) data required to answer these questions are not 
available. We generate a unique stated choice dataset using an online CE survey 
administered to an online panel of residential bill payers in NZ. Advances in non-
market valuation techniques, particularly experimental designs (EDs) for stated 
CEs allow researchers to jointly estimate the values of multiple attributes of a 
good or service simultaneously. CEs can be used to investigate preferences and 
obtain WTP values for individual attributes of electricity service in a multi-
attribute setting. In the CE developed for this thesis, respondents were asked to 
make a series of choices (12 choice tasks) from a set of three alternatives 
described in terms of attribute levels. This produced a panel choice dataset with 
2,688 observations from 224 respondents, which is used for the analysis. 
                                                          
4
 In New Zealand, electricity prices are based on nodal pricing so that different locations or 
regional markets have different prices. The law of one price is expected to apply, to some degree, 
in each regional market.  
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Econometric analysis is applied to the choice dataset to tease out taste intensities 
or parameters for the individual attributes. These taste intensities are used to 
estimate marginal rates of substitution (MRS), which are ratios of these parameter 
estimates, and average marginal WTP estimated as the ratio of each parameter to 
the parameter for the power bill savings attribute. The MRS and WTP estimates 
reveal the trade-offs among the attributes, which are implied by the observed 
pattern of choices. The application of CEs and the specific models estimated are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Research Question 1 is the main focus of 
Chapter 4. The specific models estimated to provide answers to this question are: 
the multinomial logit (MNL) model, which is used as a base model; the latent 
class (LC) model used to identify latent groups with homogeneous preferences for 
the attributes of electricity services; and the random parameter logit with error 
components (RPL-EC) model, which estimates distributions for preferences.   
Previous studies show that the information processing strategies adopted by 
respondents in CEs, and the hypothetical nature of the choice questions have an 
effect on model fit and WTP estimates obtained using the models mentioned 
above. The next two research questions focus on these issues in the context of 
supplier choice.  
Question 2: Do respondents consider all the attributes of alternatives in 
making their choices? If not, how does this affect model fit and WTP 
estimates?       
This question is broken down into a set of related questions as follows. 
(a) Are non-price attributes of electricity services ignored in choice 
experiments of switching or supplier choice?  If so, which attributes are 
ignored? 
(b) Are attributes ignored individually or in combinations? 
(c) Are the choice responses of respondents who claim to have ignored the 
cost attribute consistent with their claim? 
(d) Do preferences of respondents who ignore an attribute differ from those 
who consider it? 
(e) What are the effects of attribute non-attendance on WTP? 
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It has been argued in the literature on customer switching that electricity 
consumers are more likely to perceive all electricity suppliers to be the same 
except for the price (e.g., Electricity Authority, 2010; Gärling et al., 2008). Given 
that switching in NZ has been promoted through the WMN campaign, it is likely 
that respondents, particularly those who were influenced by this campaign to 
switch supplier, ignored all non-price attributes and related their choices in the 
experiment to their recent experiences. Although care was exercised in the 
development of the choice tasks to make them as realistic as possible and to 
mimic real supplier choices, there were no guarantees that respondents would take 
the choice tasks seriously and/or consider all the information provided in making 
their choices
5
. Furthermore, hypothetical choices have no financial commitment.  
The second question relates to HB in stated CEs.    
Question 3: What are the effects of response uncertainty on WTP estimates?    
The problems of HB and AN-A in stated CEs bring to question the validity and 
reliability of WTP estimates obtained from data collected using this technique as 
reasonable estimates of consumers’ true preferences. It is therefore prudent for 
researchers employing stated CEs to investigate the influence of HB and AN-A on 
WTP estimates. None of the literature reviewed for this study estimating WTP for 
the attributes of electricity services explicitly addresses AN-A and HB, yet these 
are more likely to be present given the nature of the product and the way 
switching has been promoted so far.  
Questions (2) and (3) are answered in Chapter 5. The two main approaches that 
have been used in the literature to incorporate AN-A in model estimation are 
stated AN-A and inferred AN-A. Stated AN-A relies on self-reported non-
attendance, where respondents are asked to state the attributes they ignored, if 
any, in making their choices (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Carlsson et al., 2010; 
Hensher et al., 2005b; Lockwood, 1999; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009; Yao, 
2012). In this approach, ignored attributes are assigned zero weights in model 
estimation to reflect their assumed neutrality to the choices made. An alternative 
method of dealing with ignored attributes is to estimate different parameters for 
respondents stating non-attendance to specific attributes (e.g., Carlsson et al., 
                                                          
5
 Details of the ED and survey questionnaire development are provided in chapter 2. 
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2010). An unresolved issue in the literature on AN-A is which of the two methods 
is preferred. To make a contribution in this area, we use both approaches and test 
whether it is reasonable to assign zero weights to ignored attributes in the context 
of this study. The approach that uses inferred AN-A applies a statistical model 
based on a latent class framework to uncover latent classes of non-attendance to 
single or combinations of attributes that are supported by the data (e.g., Campbell 
et al., 2011; Hensher et al., 2012; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). Attributes that are 
inferred to have been ignored are assigned zero weights as in the first approach, 
while the parameters of considered attributes are constrained to be equal across 
the classes. A detailed discussion of these approaches is given in Chapter 5.  
A number of mechanisms for mitigating HB such as the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) panel’s suggested rule of thumb - ‘the 
divide by 2 rule’; cheap talk script (Cummings & Taylor, 1999; List, 2001; Lusk, 
2003); certainty statements (Bollino, 2009; Champ & Bishop, 2001; Ready, 
Champ, & Lawton, 2010); short opt-out reminders (Ladenburg, Olsen, & Nielsen, 
2007); and provision point mechanism (Poe, Clark, Rondeau, & Schulze, 2002)  
have been suggested and tested in previous studies. Evidence on the effectiveness 
of these mechanisms in mitigating HB is mixed, leaving researchers without any 
specific guidance in terms of selecting among the available mechanisms for 
mitigating HB.  
For this research we adopt the approach developed by Champ et al. (1997), which 
uses self-reported certainty statements to calibrate hypothetical choice responses 
to bring them closer to real world choices. Certainty statements are designed to 
directly mitigate against HB (Ready et al., 2010). The choices of respondents who 
state a high level of certainty are taken to be more likely to approximate real 
market behaviours. An unresolved issue, particularly in stated CEs involving 
multiple choices, is how to recode or calibrate responses from respondents with 
low certainty scores, and the certainty threshold or cut-off points used. For 
example, in dichotomous choice (DC) contingent valuation studies, “yes” 
responses for respondents with certainty scores below the threshold, typically 
below 7, are recoded as “no” responses (e.g., Champ & Bishop, 2001; Champ et 
al., 1997). However, recoding uncertain responses in choice experiments is 
complicated, especially where each choice set has more than two alternatives 
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and/or no “opt-out” or status quo alternatives are included. The question is to 
which alternative should the uncertain responses be recoded (Ready et al., 2010). 
The answer is clearer where an opt-out alternative is included in the choice set and 
an uncertain respondent selects one of the other two alternatives; the response is 
recoded as an opt-out choice (e.g., List, Sinha, & Taylor, 2006; Taylor, Morrison, 
& Boyle, 2010).  
To overcome the problem of choosing a threshold for recoding responses for 
respondents who are less certain about their choices, we apply an approach based 
on the assumption that respondents who are less certain about their choices select 
more expensive alternatives than they would in real market situations. We 
postulate that these respondents are less sensitive to the cost attribute (power bill) 
compared to those who are more certain, and that this lower sensitivity results in 
higher WTP estimates. To this end, we estimate different parameters for 
respondents with different levels of certainty and estimate WTP using these 
parameters as the denominator. This approach differs from the standard 
approaches of recoding uncertain responses as “no” or omitting these responses in 
model estimations.  
The next research question that we address relates to environmentally-related 
WTP and how heterogeneity of preferences may be explained using psychological 
constructs based on the NEP Scale and the NAT. The question also looks at the 
use of different versions of the NEP Scale in measuring environmental attitudes 
(EA) and how this impacts on welfare estimates. We apply this to WTP for 
changes in the proportion of electricity generated from renewable energy sources 
(green electricity).  
Question 4: (a) How much are electricity consumers willing to pay for green  
   electricity and how can differences in WTP be explained? 
   (b) Does the use of shorter versions of the NEP Scales influence  
  WTP estimates?  
The first part of this research question assesses the potential for a consumer-
driven renewable energy development through green marketing. NZ-specific 
information on consumer preferences for green electricity is currently limited and 
this thesis makes a contribution in this area. The second part of the research 
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question is motivated by concerns over the proliferation of measures of EA, which 
has been observed over the years (Dunlap, 2008; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010). An 
additional motivating factor is that relatively few studies in non-market valuation 
use well-established attitude-behaviour theories in constructing attitudinal 
questions, or use tried and tested scales such as the NEP Scale. In studies that 
estimate environmentally-related WTP, investigating the systematic role of EA in 
explaining preference heterogeneity requires the use of consistent and reliable 
measures of EA. To allow for comparisons across similar studies, the use of a 
standard measure of EA would benefit such endeavours.   
Question 4 is addressed in Chapter 6. Before EA is used in model estimation to 
explain preference heterogeneity, we conduct an analysis based on responses to 
the NEP Scale to provide insight into New Zealanders’ EA. An ordered probit 
model of EA is fitted to the data and the marginal effects of SDCs on EA are 
estimated. To identify latent environmental preference groups, an ordered latent 
class attitudinal (LCA) model of EA is estimated. A relatively small number of 
studies have used LCA models in analyzing responses to attitudinal questions to 
identify market segments for a variety of goods (e.g., Morey, Thacher, & Breffle, 
2006; Morey, Thiene, De Salvo, & Signorello, 2008; Scarpa, Thiene, & Galletto, 
2009; Ward, Stedman, Luloff, Shortle, & Finley, 2008). The MNL, RPL-EC and 
LC models of supplier choice are estimated for each version of the NEP Scale and 
WTP estimates from each model specification are tested for statistical differences 
across the versions of the NEP Scale. We provide a detailed discussion of the 
construction of the shorter versions of the NEP Scale in Chapter 6.   
1.2 Significance of this study  
Evidence from a number of previous studies indicates that all deregulated markets 
are experiencing the segregation of retail electricity markets into two segments; 
active and inactive customers. Consumer switching is seen as one of the main 
drivers for a competitive retail market. In NZ, about 79% of retail electricity 
customers have been found to be inactive or passive, which promotes non-
competitive behaviour among retailers. A better understanding of consumer 
preferences is required to inform policies targeted at promoting switching. The 
Electricity Authority is currently looking for ways to increase consumer 
propensity to switch. This thesis provides evidence that non-price attributes of 
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electricity services are important determinants of switching, which partly explains 
why some retailers are able to charge higher prices without losing significant 
market shares.  
This thesis also provides the first set of WTP estimates for non-price attributes of 
electricity services based on CEs in NZ energy markets, and highlights the 
importance of accounting for differences in consumer sensitivity to the level of 
power bill savings in models of supplier choice. The results help to predict 
willingness to switch supplier and may be used for comparison with other 
jurisdictions with deregulated markets.  
Most well-known non-market valuation studies that investigate supplier choice in 
electricity retail markets are now dated and this thesis contributes to a small 
number of recent studies in this area. Unlike most previous studies that have 
employed the mixed logit model, we apply the LC model in the context of 
consumer switching. This thesis provides valuable information on consumer 
preferences for the incumbent retailers and for three types of new market entrants. 
This identifies one possible source of the observed customer inertia and offers a 
window into the level of savings that are required to induce switching from 
incumbents to competitors. This information is important to both retailers and 
policy makers.  
The analysis of the influence of psychological constructs on welfare estimates 
conducted in this thesis differs from previous academic non-market valuation 
literature in a number of ways. First, we use constructs based on valid attitude-
behaviour theories and demonstrate how these may be integrated with choice data 
in a model of consumer switching. Second, the results show the impact of using 
shorter versions of the NEP Scale in classifying respondents into classes of 
homogeneous environmental preferences, and on WTP estimates. The results are 
important to researchers in that they provide guidance on the selection of the 
version of the NEP Scale. The NEP Scale is the most widely used measure of EA 
in the social sciences, but very few studies in non-market valuation studies have 
used it. We are not aware of any previous non-market valuation studies that have 
investigated the impact of using shorter versions of the NEP Scale on WTP 
estimates.  
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The thesis also contributes to the literature investigating HB by testing whether 
choice responses for respondents who are less certain about their hypothetical 
choices reveal less sensitivity to the cost attribute. We are currently unaware of 
previous similar studies.   
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the methodology 
used for this research. It provides details of the experimental design used to 
generate the choice sets and survey questionnaire development. The main models 
used to analyze data are developed and the hypotheses to be tested are stated.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the New Zealand electricity market to provide 
a context for the research. Chapter 4 presents results of the MNL and LC models 
of consumer switching in the residential electricity market. Sample statistics are 
also provided and an analysis of responses to questions assessing respondents’ 
attitudes towards switching is presented to highlight possible barriers to 
switching.  
Chapter 5 explores the effect of attribute non-attendance and hypothetical bias on 
WTP estimates. Two approaches of treating ignored attributes in model estimation 
are used to investigate whether assigning zero weights to ignored attributes may 
be justified in this case. In Chapter 6 we present results from MNL, RPL-EC, and 
LC models where different versions of the NEP Scale are used in model 
estimation to determine whether WTP estimates differ significantly when shorter 
versions of the scale are used. Chapter 7 provides a brief discussion of the 
research, conclusions and recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 2.  Methodology  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we describe the methodology employed for this research. We start 
by providing an overview of choice experiments. The standard MNL, LC, and 
RPL-EC models used in the analysis of responses to the choice questions are 
formally stated. Next, we present a conceptual framework developed for this 
thesis for integrating psychological constructs with stated choice. The 
experimental design used to construct choice tasks is outlined, and the structure 
and content of the survey questionnaire and sampling procedure are discussed.  
In this thesis, we use a family of discrete choice models which are based on 
random utility maximisation (RUM) to analyse consumer preferences for the 
attributes of electricity services. Preferences for the attributes of electricity 
services have important implications for promoting consumer switching required 
to achieve efficient and competitive retail markets, and for electricity retail 
marketing. The objective of using the above models is to assess how residential 
electricity consumers value the attributes of electricity services, characterise the 
heterogeneity of valuations or preference intensities, and explain heterogeneity of 
preferences using psychological constructs based on attitude-behaviour theories, 
and whether the use of different versions of the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) 
Scale affect welfare estimates.  
The MNL model is used as the base model in the analysis. The analysis is 
extended to capture preference heterogeneity by estimating LC and RPL-EC 
models. The LC model is used to identify groups with homogeneous preferences, 
which would assist policy makers and retailers as refining and targeting policies 
and marketing strategies often require sorting individuals into different groups. 
Furthermore, a comparison of the LC model with the MNL and RPL-EC models 
allows us to explore the effect of failing to account for groups with homogeneous 
preferences on WTP estimates. All the models are extended to capture systematic 
heterogeneity of preferences by including interaction effects of the NEP Scale and 
NAT scores. 
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The models are extended to capture systematic heterogeneity of preferences for 
green electricity by including interactions of EA and NAT constructs with a 
design attribute measuring the proportion of electricity generated from renewable 
energy sources. Results from these models explain heterogeneity of preferences 
for green electricity and allow for the testing of the null hypothesis that adopting 
different versions of the NEP Scale has no influence on WTP estimates. The 
results also explain preference heterogeneity for the attributes of electricity 
services using psychological constructs based on the TPB. The conceptual model 
for integrating psychological constructs with stated choice is presented in section 
2.3.   
The LC model specifies that the distribution of the stated preferences, estimated 
from responses to the choice experiments, is a mixture of a finite number of 
underlying distributions thus accommodating preference heterogeneity while 
allowing the number of segments to be determined endogenously by the data 
(McLachlan & Peel, 2000), i.e., the number of classes retained is the one that 
provides the best model fit for the data. One key advantage of using the LC model 
is that any continuous “distribution can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a 
discrete distribution with a sufficiently  large number of points” (McLachlan & 
Peel, 2000; Train, 2009, p. 356). On the other hand the MNL and RPL-EC models 
ignore the possibility of more than one class of utility representation (up to a 
probability) in the sampled population. The standard MNL model assumes 
homogeneity of preferences while the RPL-EC model assumes that preferences 
are heterogeneous and are distributed with a continuous distribution typically 
assumed to be triangular, normal, uniform, or lognormal over the population. 
RPL-EC models thus explicitly incorporate and account for heterogeneity by 
allowing model parameters to vary randomly over individuals. However, Boxall 
and Adamowicz (2002) point out that these models are not well-suited to 
explaining the sources of heterogeneity. For the LC model, the number of classes 
in the population is not known a priori and is determined based on information 
criteria. 
The LC model endogenously assigns individuals to classes with identical 
preferences and estimates class membership probability along with class-specific 
taste intensities (Scarpa & Thiene, 2005). Although there is no consensus on the 
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determination of the optimum number of classes, literature suggests the use of 
information criteria in determining the number of classes. Researchers typically 
use information criteria such as AIC, AIC3, crAIC, CAIC, BIC, HQC, and log 
likelihood to determine the number of classes (Andrews & Currim, 2003a, 2003b; 
Greene & Hensher, 2013; Lin & Dayton, 1997; Yang & Yang, 2007). A practical 
guidepost noted by Heckman and Singer (1984) is that if a model is fitted with too 
many classes, the estimates become imprecise and vary wildly, class probability 
estimates become very small, and estimated standard errors become huge. A 
detailed discussion of information criteria is presented in section 2.2.4. 
Greene and Hensher (2003) systematically contrast the mixed logit with the LC 
model in terms of criteria such as choice elasticities, distributions of predicted 
choice probabilities, and changes in absolute choice shares and conclude that no 
unambiguous recommendation can be made as to the superiority of either 
approach. However, they find stronger statistical support overall for the LC 
approach with three preference segments. In chapters 4 to 6, we apply both 
models to a choice data set and select the best model based on model fit and the 
ability of each model to address specific research questions.  
Louviere Hensher, and Swait (2000) argue that stated choice experiments closely 
simulate real-world purchasing decisions where a respondent has to select an 
alternative from a set of options. The methodology used for this thesis allows for 
the estimation of respondents’ trade-offs among the attribute levels of 
experimentally designed alternatives presented in a series of choice tasks. The 
main aim is to tease out marginal WTP estimates for the attributes and their 
relative importance and explore the implications of failing to adopt the proper 
NEP Scale on welfare estimates. This thesis therefore adds to the growing 
literature that investigates environmentally-related WTP, and also contributes to 
the current debate on the use of psychological constructs based on different 
versions of the NEP Scale, and competing theories in investigating consumer 
preferences. 
In recent research exploring preference heterogeneity, Campbell and Doherty 
(2012) and Greene and Hensher (2013) have estimated models combining discrete 
and continuous mixing distributions to identify additional dimensions of 
heterogeneity within latent classes (within-class heterogeneity). While allowing 
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for preference heterogeneity in a latent class framework,  Greene and Hensher 
(2013) add a second dimension of preference heterogeneity within each class by 
assuming that preferences within each class are distributed with a continuous 
distribution. This method allows for the analysis of heterogeneity between and 
within classes. The decomposition of, or systematic variation in, class 
membership probability is based on one of the attributes of the alternatives 
(‘freight rate’ – which is the unit cost of transportation). Campbell and Doherty 
(2012) adopt a similar approach when they allow for heterogeneity of preferences 
within the niche market segment by combining a discrete mixture and a RPL-EC 
model specification to simultaneously uncover the size of the niche market and 
the heterogeneity in preferences within these segments as well as substitution 
patterns.  
In the next section we state the main hypotheses that will be tested in chapters 4 to 
6 of this thesis. 
2.1.1 Hypotheses 
In this thesis we postulate that non-price attributes of electricity services are 
important determinants of supplier choice and argue that information on the levels 
of these attributes should be provided in campaigns aimed at promoting consumer 
switching. Environmentally-related WTP is an important input into both the 
policy decision-making process and policy evaluation. Using realistic and reliable 
WTP estimates is therefore important. If the selection of a version of NEP Scale 
influences WTP estimates, it is important for researchers to be aware of the effect. 
Knowledge of how attitudes influence demand for the attributes of electricity 
services is important. Electricity suppliers may use this knowledge for marketing 
purposes especially in evolving deregulated markets characterised by free 
movement of consumers. Empirical evidence shows that not all respondents in 
stated choice experiments adopt attribute processing rules that involve full 
attribute preservation in making their choices. How the violation of full attribute 
preservation is treated in model estimation, especially where the objective is to 
estimate marginal WTP is important. Therefore, we test the following hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis I: Non-price attributes of electricity suppliers are important  
    determinants of supplier choice. 
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 H0: β1 = β2 =
...
 = βK = 0 (non-price attributes are not significant determinants 
 of supplier choice)  
H1: βk ≠ 0 (non-price attributes are significant determinants of supplier  choice) 
 where k = 1, 2, …, K, and βk is the parameter estimate for the k
th
 attribute.  
Hypothesis II: Preferences of respondents who ignore an attribute differ from  
      those who attend to it. 
H0: βdk = 0 (respondents who ignore an attribute in making their choices and 
 those who consider it have similar preferences for the attribute).   
 Where, βdk is the parameter for the interaction between a dummy variable 
 indicating non-attendance to the k
th
 attribute and its levels.    
H1: βdk ≠ 0 (respondents who ignore an attribute and those who consider it 
 have different  preferences for the attribute) 
Hypothesis III: Environmentally-related WTP is sensitive to the versions of the 
        New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale. 
H0: WTPk_NEP5 = WTPk_NEP10 = WTPk_NEP15 (marginal WTP for the k
th
 
 attribute is invariant to the version of the NEP Scale used).  
H1: WTPk_NEP5 ≠ WTPk_NEP10 ≠ WTPk_NEP15 (marginal WTP for the k
th
 
 attribute is sensitive to the version of the NEP Scale used).   
 Where, the subscripts _NEP5, _NEP10, and _NEP15 indicate the length of the 
 version of the NEP Scale used, i.e., the number of statements used to 
 construct the scale.   
A likelihood ratio-test (LRT) statistic estimated as -2(LLR - LLUR) (Hensher, Rose, 
& Greene, 2005a) will be used to test Hypothesis I. LLR and LLUR are the log 
likelihood functions of the restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. For 
Hypothesis II, the t-test is used to test the significance of each βdk. For Hypothesis 
III, we test whether marginal WTP estimates are statistically different across any 
two models using the asymptotically normal test statistic (ANTS) suggested by 
Campbell et al. (2008). This test is based on comparing marginal WTP estimates 
of the same attribute across two models using different versions of the NEP Scale. 
It is important to note that the betas from the different models are confounded 
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with the scale parameter, hence it is only meaningful to compare MRS or 
marginal WTP estimates which are the ratios of the coefficients of the attributes to 
the coefficient of the cost attribute. Campbell et al. (2008) provide a formula for 
ANTS used to test for differences in WTP estimates from two models specified 
as: 
𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑆 =
(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
1−𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
2)
√(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
1)−𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
1))
   ,         (2-0)  
where, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
1  and 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
2are WTP estimates for attribute k obtained from 
competing models 1 and 2 respectively. 
2.2 Stated Choice experiments for the valuation of the attributes of 
electricity services 
2.2.1 An overview of stated choice experiments 
Stated choice experiments (CEs) are widely used to study consumer preferences in 
the fields of transportation, marketing, psychology, health economics, and 
environmental economics because of their ability to mimic real markets. The 
MNL model and other more advanced models such as the mixed MNL, LC, and 
RPL-EC have been estimated on data from stated CEs and applied for planning 
and policy purposes. Studies employing CEs provide insight regarding the 
determinants of consumer choice and allow researchers to introduce new 
attributes or to vary attribute levels beyond those available in the market. Stated 
preferences are elicited using constructed hypothetical choice situations in which 
two or more alternatives are described in terms of attribute levels and respondents 
are asked to select their preferred option (Adamowicz, Boxall, Williams, & 
Louviere, 1995; Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001; Louviere et al., 2000). The 
attribute levels of the alternatives, except the status quo or opt-out, are varied by 
the researcher, on the basis of an experimental design, over choice situations to 
provide the variation needed for estimating the underlying preference parameters. 
Burke, Harlam, Kahn, and Lodish (1992), Huber and Zwerina (1996), and List et 
al. (2006) provide evidence that experimental choice-based methodologies can 
provide accurate predictions of actual choice decisions.  
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In CEs, respondents are presented with a series of choice tasks consisting of two 
or more experimentally designed hypothetical alternatives described in terms of 
their attribute levels. Attributes included in the alternatives must be of relevance 
to respondents. The alternatives in each choice task may include a status quo or 
opt-out alternative to increase the realism of the tasks (Carson et al., 1994), 
enhance the theoretical validity of the welfare estimates and avoid the estimation 
of conditional demand (Kontoleon & Yabe, 2003), and improve the statistical 
efficiency of the estimated parameters (Louviere et al., 2000). To allow for the 
estimation of marginal WTP values for the attributes, a cost attribute is included 
in each alternative. By selecting the preferred alternative in each choice task, a 
respondent implicitly makes trade-offs between the attribute levels of alternatives. 
The series of choices made by respondents give rise to a panel of discrete choices.  
Unlike the contingent valuation method (CVM), CEs allow the researcher to 
uncover respondents’ preferences for the attributes of a scenario rather than a 
specific scenario as a whole, and the tradeoffs which respondents make between 
the attributes of the alternatives. Adamowicz et al. (1995) argue that the CE 
technique provides a richer description of the attribute trade-offs that individuals 
are willing to make compared to the CVM. As an alternative technique to the 
CVM, the CE approach: enables researchers to estimate multiple marginal WTP 
values or compensating surplus measures from a single experiment; requires a 
smaller sample since each respondent provides multiple responses; reduces 
strategic behaviour and “yea-saying” since respondents choose their preferred 
options from various choice sets and avoids an explicit elicitation of respondents’ 
WTP. Furthermore, CEs provide a natural internal scope test because multiple 
elicitations are obtained from each respondent (Hanley et al., 2001; Holmes & 
Adamowicz, 2003; Willis, 2006). However, the drawbacks of the CE approach 
include placing a heavier cognitive burden on the respondents as they are required 
to evaluate larger or more complex choice sets, and the high level of complexity 
involved in the experimental design. Placing a larger cognitive burden on 
respondents may affect the quality of responses which in turn affects the validity 
and reliability of the results. 
One of the major challenges of the CE approach involves the design of the CEs. 
Experimental design (ED) is the way in which the attribute levels of alternatives 
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are set and structured into the choice sets (Bennett & Adamowicz, 2001). ED is 
complex, time consuming, and can heavily influence the outcomes (validity and 
reliability) and conclusions of the research (Hensher et al., 2005a; Johnson et al., 
2013; Louviere et al., 2000; Louviere, Islam, Wasi, Street, & Burgess, 2008; Lusk 
& Norwood, 2005). Important decisions are made at the design stage, including, 
the number and levels of attributes to be included in the design, the number of 
alternatives, whether or not to include a status quo or opt-out alternative and the 
ED. A decision on the number and levels of attributes involves identifying and 
selecting relevant attributes, ascertaining their levels, and describing them in a 
clear manner to avoid ambiguity. Typically, literature review, expert opinion, and 
focus groups are used to address the issues highlighted above.  
The choice of ED is important because in a multi-attribute valuation the efficiency 
of the estimates depends on how the attributes and levels are combined to form 
the alternatives and the choice sets (Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007; Hensher et al., 2005a; 
Louviere et al., 2000; Louviere et al., 2008). Furthermore, the selected ED should 
allow for the estimation of the independent influence of each attribute on choice 
and also maximize the power of the model to detect statistically significant 
relationships (i.e., maximize the t-ratios at any given sample size). A design is 
said to be efficient if it results in parameter estimates with small standard errors 
and a smaller sample size compared to others. Hence, the main objective of any 
ED is to maximize the statistical efficiency for a given model. Other objectives of 
ED include attribute level and utility balance. Burgess and Street (2003, 2005) and 
Street and Burgess (2004) provide a formal definition of statistical design 
efficiency for stated CEs and also discuss strategies for creating optimal designs.  
The past twenty years has seen an increase in the number of studies advancing 
EDs (e.g., Bliemer, 2013; Bliemer & Rose, 2011; Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007; 
Kanninen, 2002; Kessels, Jones, Goos, & Vandebroek, 2009; Oppewal, Louviere, 
& Timmermans, 1994; Rose & Bliemer, 2009; Rose, Bliemer, Hensher, & 
Collins, 2008; Sandor & Wedel, 2001). All EDs are based on assumptions about 
the priors which can be zero, fixed non-zero values, or even distributions and 
specific model types, for example, MNL, mixed multinomial logit (MMNL), and 
nested logit (NL) (Johnson et al., 2013). Parameter priors are a priori parameter 
values which may include parameter estimates from similar previous studies, 
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estimates from pilot surveys or even information on the expected signs of the 
parameters (Bliemer & Rose, 2011; Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007). For an overview of 
advances in EDs and the influence of EDs on results the reader may refer to Rose 
and Bliemer (2009) and Bliemer and Rose (2011) respectively.  
There are no specific rules regarding which design approach a researcher should 
use. However, Ferrini and Scarpa (2007) evaluate EDs and advise that where good 
a priori information is lacking, which is typical in environmental valuation, the 
conventional factorial designs from linear models produce less biased estimates 
under misspecification than other designs that rely on broad priors. On the other 
hand Bliemer and Rose (2011) show that D-efficient designs result in lower 
standard errors in estimation thereby requiring smaller sample sizes, ceteris 
paribus, compared to orthogonal designs. Johnson et al. (2013) do not endorse 
any specific approach but provide a guide for choosing an approach that is 
appropriate for a particular study by summarizing the features of six approaches in 
terms of assumptions, accommodation of restrictions (e.g. implausible 
combinations), coding procedures, availability and cost of software.  
Another challenge with the CEs approach concerns the treatment of AN-A and 
HB in model estimation. HB and AN-A are important issues that researchers need 
to address when conducting CEs. A discussion of these issues is provided in 
Chapter 4, section 4.2. In the next section we provide a theoretical foundation of 
discrete choice models and show how they will be applied in this research.   
2.2.2 The discrete choice model 
The random utility maximization (RUM) model proposed by McFadden (1974) 
provides the standard framework for modelling an individual’s choice behaviour. 
RUM models combine random utility theory (RUT) and Lancaster’s (1966) 
characteristic theory of consumer demand. RUT assumes that the utility (Ui) of an 
alternative i is additively separable into a systematic (deterministic or observed) 
component (Vi) and a random (stochastic or unobserved) component (ɛi) (Manski, 
1977; Manski & Lerman, 1977; McFadden, 1974), whilst Lancaster’s (1966) 
characteristics theory postulates that consumers do not derive satisfaction from 
goods themselves but from their attributes and attribute levels. Utility (U) is a 
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latent variable representing true but unobservable indirect utility and the choices 
made by consumers reflect the underlying utilities.  
Under the RUM framework, an individual n evaluates a set of J competing 
alternatives in a choice task (s) in terms of their attribute levels and selects the 
alternative that yields the highest expected utility. From the choices that 
individuals make in all choice tasks (S), researchers are able to estimate a 1×K 
row of taste intensities or utility coefficients β for a column of vector X of K×1 
attributes of alternative i and individual n’s SCDs included as interactions in the 
indirect utility function Vi of the alternative. Specifically, in the CE developed for 
this research, each respondent is presented with twelve choice tasks (S = 12). Each 
choice task consists of three alternatives (J = 3) which includes a status quo 
(respondent’s current supplier) and two experimentally designed alternatives 
referred to in a generic sense as ‘Supplier A’ and ‘Supplier B’. A panel choice 
data set with 12 levels is generated from respondents’ choices.  In the following 
sections we present the models that we use to analyze the choice responses to 
obtain a 1×K row of taste intensities or utility coefficients β for the attributes of 
interest. Marginal WTP estimates are then calculated from these coefficients.  
2.2.3 Multinomial logit (MNL) model 
The MNL model is used for estimating the probability of choosing a specific retail 
supplier from a set of available suppliers (alternatives) as a function of the 
attributes of the suppliers and individual characteristics (SDCs including 
attitudes). Introducing interactions of SCDs with design attribute levels in the 
MNL allows for the detection of the presence of observable or systematic 
heterogeneity in preferences for the attributes describing the suppliers. In this 
thesis the MNL model is applied as a base model in the analysis of choice to 
estimate consumer preferences for the attributes of the electricity services. Details 
of the attributes and levels used to describe the suppliers are provided in section 
2.5.  
The core elements of the MNL model applied in this thesis are; (1) a set of utility 
equations for alternative electricity suppliers; (2) a measurement equation relating 
the preference indicator to the utilities via a utility maximization equation; (3) a 
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choice probability function; and (4) an appropriate likelihood function (Hensher et 
al., 2005a; Louviere et al., 2000; McFadden, 1974; Walker & Ben-Akiva, 2002).  
Following standard practice in discrete choice modelling, the utility which a 
respondent n derives by selecting an electricity supplier i from a choice set c = 
(Your current supplier, Supplier A, Supplier B) in choice situation s may be 
expressed as: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠                                                                      (2-1)  
The systematic component of utility Vins may be estimated from the information 
which the researcher can observe and collect about the respondent’s choices, and 
the characteristics of the electricity supplier and respondent (explanatory variables 
– X’s). The component ɛins is only known to the respondent, unobservable to the 
researcher, and represents the effect of all the factors that influence utility but are 
not captured in Vins such as individual idiosyncrasies of tastes and omitted 
variables. Assuming that utility is a function of the explanatory variables (X’s) 
describing electricity supplier i and the respondent n, and that utility is linear-in-
parameters (Hensher et al., 2005a; Holmes & Adamowicz, 2003; Lancaster, 1966; 
Louviere et al., 2000), we rewrite equation (2-1) as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑠 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠                         (2-2) 
where Xikns is the k
th
 attribute of electricity supplier i or the k
th
 characteristic of 
respondent n in choice situation s, βk is the coefficient of the k
th
 attribute, and εins 
are independently and identically distributed (IID) type I extreme value (EV1) 
error terms, with zero mean and constant variance of π2/6. The specification in 
equation (2-2) parameterises utility in ‘preference-space’. The systematic 
component or relative utility in equation (2-2) may be written out as: 
𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖1𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖2𝑛𝑠 + ……… . . . + 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝑖𝐾𝑛𝑠 ,                          (2-3a) 
where βi0 is the alternative-specific constant which represents on average the 
influence of all unobserved sources of utility. The utility specification for the three 
alternative electricity suppliers offered to respondents in a choice task may be 
presented as:  
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𝑉𝑛 = {
 𝑉𝑆𝑄𝑛 = 𝛽𝑆𝑄0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑆𝑄1𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑆𝑄2𝑛 + …… . . + 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝑆𝑄𝐾𝑛      
𝑉𝐴𝑛 =               𝛽1𝑋𝐴1𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑋𝐴2𝑛 + …… .… .… .+ 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝐴𝐾𝑛   
 𝑉𝐵𝑛 =                𝛽1𝑋𝐵1𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑋𝐵𝑛…………… .… . . . + 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝐵𝐾𝑛
,       (2-3b) 
When respondent n is presented with a choice among alternative electricity 
suppliers he/she will choose supplier i if and only if it yields utility greater than 
any other supplier j in choice set C; 
𝑉𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛 > 𝑉𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑗𝑛;               ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶,                                                 (2-4)  
Following McFadden (1974), we express the probability that supplier i is 
preferred to supplier j as the probability that the utility associated with supplier i is 
greater than the utility associated with supplier j as follows: 
𝑃(𝑖|𝐶) = 𝑃(𝑉𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛 > 𝑉𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑗𝑛 );             ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 𝜖 𝐶                             (2-5) 
Rearranging the terms in equation (2-5), the probability of choosing supplier i is 
expressed as:  
 𝑃(𝑖|𝐶) = 𝑃(𝜀𝑗𝑛 − 𝜀𝑖𝑛) < (𝑉𝑖𝑛 − 𝑉𝑗𝑛);   ∀𝑗 ≠  𝑖 𝜖 𝐶          (2-6) 
The specific form of this probability function depends on the assumptions made 
about the distribution of the error term. For the MNL model the choice probability 
takes on a closed form and is specified with Gumbel error scale λ > 0 as (Train, 
2009): 
 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠 =
exp (𝜆(𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠))
∑ exp(𝜆(𝛽′𝑋𝑗𝑛𝑠)) 
𝐽
𝑗=1
 ,          𝑗 = 1, 2, 3                                                    (2-7) 
The scale factor is inversely related to the variance of the error term and is usually 
assumed to be equal to 1 for CEs (Train, 2009). The scale factor cannot be 
estimated from a single dataset because of confounding with the vector of utility 
parameters (Swait & Louviere, 1993). However, this is not a problem in this thesis 
as the λ terms will cancel out when marginal WTP and MRS are estimated as 
ratios of the parameter estimates. 
The log-likelihood function may be written as (Train, 2009):  
log 𝐿 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
exp (𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑠)
∑ exp (𝑉𝑗𝑛𝑠)𝑗𝜖𝐶
) ,𝑆𝑠=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑛=1                   (2-8) 
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where yjns is a dummy variable (preference indicator), which takes the value of 1 if 
respondent n chooses supplier i in choice situation s, and zero otherwise.  
The objective of estimating equation (2-8) is to obtain the parameter estimates that 
maximize the log likelihood function conditioned on the X’s (attributes of 
suppliers and SDCs) and the observed choices y. Since the choice probabilities in 
the MNL model take a closed form, the parameters are estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method using NLOGIT 5 software. The MNL model assumes 
homogeneity of preferences and the parameters estimated are the average taste 
intensities in the sampled population of electricity bill payers in New Zealand. 
The MNL model assumes independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which 
states that for any individual, the ratio of choice probabilities of any two suppliers 
in a choice set is not affected by the introduction or removal of other suppliers 
from the choice set, given that both suppliers have non-zero probability of choice 
(Louviere et al., 2000). This is a restrictive assumption which is often highlighted 
in non-market valuation literature as one of the main weakness of the MNL. A 
discussion of the power and limitations of the MNL model is provided in Train 
(2009). Less restrictive models that address some of the shortcomings of the MNL 
model are presented in the following sections.  
2.2.4 Panel Latent class logit model  
To account for the panel nature of the choice data set, we use a panel latent class 
(LC) choice model based on RUM to identify latent groups with similar 
preferences, and tease out taste intensities (parameters) and estimate marginal 
WTP estimates for the attributes of electricity services. The underlying theory of 
the LC model postulates that individual choice behaviour depends on observable 
attributes of electricity suppliers and characteristics of the individual, and on 
latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobservable to the analyst 
(Greene & Hensher, 2003). The parameters of the LC model are modelled as 
having a discrete distribution with a small number of support points (Kamakura & 
Russell, 1989). In this application of the LC model we assume that the population 
consists of a finite number of preference classes (Q) with respect to the attributes 
of electricity services, where Q is exogenously defined and outside the space of 
estimable parameters. The application of the LC model in this thesis allows for the 
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partitioning of retail electricity consumers into relatively homogeneous groups 
that differ substantially in their tastes for the attributes of electricity services.  
The derivation of the LC logit model is based on a class-membership probability 
equation and a choice probability equation for a supplier in a choice set, both of 
which turn out to have a convenient logit formulation when two independent 
Gumbel-distributed error terms are assumed (Greene, 2008). The class 
membership probability equation explains the probabilistic assignment of 
respondents into Q classes whereas the choice probability equation explains a 
supplier’s probability of selection among competing suppliers. The class 
membership probabilities for a given class are defined parametrically using a 
multinomial logit as the membership equation. The multinomial logit formulation 
of class membership probabilities meets the restriction that the probabilities take 
on positive values in the range 0-1 and sum to 1 (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002). 
The parameters of the LC model are the share of the population in each preference 
class and the coefficients for each class.  
Since the number of classes Q that are supported by the data is determined by the 
researcher without the imposition of any restrictive functional form on the 
distribution of the preference parameters, the LC model allows for a wider range 
of preference heterogeneity. Each class represents preferences that are clearly 
distinct from those of other classes. Latent class models have been used in 
previous studies to investigate preference heterogeneity in various contexts (e.g., 
Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Greene & Hensher, 2003; Milon & Scrogin, 2006; 
Morey et al., 2006; Morey et al., 2008; Nocella, Boecker, Hubbard, & Scarpa, 
2012). 
Based on RUM, we specify a class-specific utility function consisting of a 
deterministic component related to the attributes of the supplier (𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑠) and a 
random component (𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠|𝑞) as follows (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Walker & 
Ben-Akiva, 2002):  
𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑠|𝑞 = 𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠|𝑞 ,           (2-9)  
where Uins|q is the utility of supplier i to individual n in choice situation s 
conditional on class q membership, Xins is a union of all attributes and 
characteristics that appear in all utility functions, εins|q is IID with Extreme Value 
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Type 1 (Gumbel-distributed) error component that captures unobserved 
heterogeneity for individual n and supplier i in choice situation s conditional on 
class q membership, and βq is a class-specific parameter vector to be estimated. 
An individual n is viewed as belonging to a latent class which is not revealed to 
the researcher. The probability of individual n choosing supplier i in choice 
situation s conditional on membership in class q (q = 1, 2, …, Q) is given by the 
MNL model (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Kamakura & Russell, 1989): 
𝑃(𝑛𝑠𝑖|𝑞) =
exp (𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠)
∑ exp (𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑗𝑛𝑠)
𝐽
𝑗=1
  ,                                (2-10)  
where for convenience, the scale parameter of the Gumbel error distribution has 
been normalized to 1 and the other variables are as defined in equation (2-9). 
The probability that an individual n is assigned to class q (q = 1, 2, …., Q) is 
expressed as an MNL model in which class membership is a function of class-
specific constants identified by ensuring that they sum to zero (Heckman & 
Singer, 1984; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009) as follows: 
𝑃𝑛(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞) =
exp (𝛼𝑞)
∑ exp (𝛼𝑞)𝑞
,              𝛼𝑄 = 0                                              (2-11)  
where α denotes class-specific constants identified by ensuring they sum to zero, 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑛(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞) ≤ 1 , and  ∑
exp (𝛼𝑞)
∑ exp (𝛼𝑞)𝑞
𝑄
𝑞=1 = 1. Equation (2-11) is the 
unconditional or prior probability of respondent n belonging to class q.  
To obtain the unconditional probability that individual n chooses supplier i, in 
choice situation s, the law of total probability is applied by summing the 
conditional probabilities over the finite set of membership probabilities expressed 
in equation (2-11) (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Kamakura & Russell, 1989): 
𝑃𝑛𝑖 = ∑ [
exp (𝛼𝑞)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝑄
𝑞=1 (𝛼𝑞)
] [
exp (𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑖𝑛)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝
𝐽
𝑗=1 (𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑗𝑛)
]𝑄𝑞=1  , q =1, 2, ….. , Q; 𝛼𝑄 = 0   (2-12)  
where s has been omitted to avoid clutter.  
The model represented in equation (2-12) permits class-specific constants and 
choice attribute data (X’s) to simultaneously explain choice behaviour.  
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For a sequence of choices 𝑦𝑛 =  {𝑦𝑛1, 𝑦𝑛2, …… . ,𝑦𝑛𝑆} the log likelihood for the 
sample may be expressed as:  
ln 𝐿 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝐽𝑗=1
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑛𝑠𝑗
𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑛=1 [∑
exp (𝛼𝑞)
∑ exp (𝛼𝑞)
𝑄
𝑞=1
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑞
′𝑋𝑗𝑛𝑠)𝑗∈𝐽
𝑄
𝑞=1 ]   (2-13)  
where ynsj = 1 if supplier j is selected in choice situation s, and zero otherwise. 
We maximize the likelihood with respect to the Q structural parameter vector βq 
and the Q-1 latent class parameter vector αq. Since the βq’s which include the 
coefficient of the cost attribute vary across classes, the LC model identifies 
heterogeneity in the consumers’ values of the attributes of the alternatives, which 
would be obscured in a single average measure with the MNL. The LC choice 
model accounts for heterogeneity in the data by allowing for different population 
segments (latent classes) to express different preferences in making their choices. 
We include covariates in the class membership model to increase the accuracy of 
prediction of membership probabilities.  
The number of latent classes cannot be determined a priori and there is no theory 
to guide the setting of the initial number of classes. Previous studies have relied 
on information criteria such as Akaike information criteria (AIC), AIC3, corrected 
AIC (crAIC), consistent AIC (CAIC) and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to 
determine the number of classes (Morey et al., 2006; Morey et al., 2008; Nocella 
et al., 2012).  Andrews and Currim (2003a), Morey et al. (2006), and Yang and 
Yang (2007)  discuss the performance of these criteria and also provide formulae 
for their calculation. 
The challenge in estimating LC models is the selection of the best model (the 
model that is closest to the true but unknown model) among a class of competing 
models based on suitable model selection criteria given the data set. The use of 
model fit statistics such as R
2
 and the log-likelihood (LL) are not appropriate in 
the case of LC models since both R
2
 and LL generally increase as the number of 
classes increases, which would result in over-fitting or over-parameterization of 
the model. The use of the log-likelihood ratio-test (LRT) statistic to determine the 
number of classes is also problematic because it does not allow the number of 
latent classes to be separated as its distribution is unknown and may not follow a 
χ2 (McLachlan & Peel, 2000; Yang & Yang, 2007). For example, McLachlan and 
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Peel (2000) show that the LRT is not an appropriate test for determining the 
number of classes as the regularity conditions do not hold for the LRT statistic to 
have its usual asymptotic null distribution of chi-squared with degrees of freedom 
equal to the difference between the number of betas under the null and alternative 
hypotheses. On the other hand, the disadvantage of using information criteria is 
that they do not produce a number that quantifies the confidence in the results, 
such as a p-value.   
For this study we use six widely applied information criteria listed below to select 
the most parsimonious best model among the competing LC models. The use of 
these criteria in this study allows us to compare their performance and to assess 
the suitability of each under different model specifications. For a summary of 
information criteria and how they can be related to each other, interested readers 
may refer to Yang and Yang (2007). 
 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = -2LL + 2k 
 AIC with a per-parameter penalty factor of 3 (AIC3) = -2LL + 3k 
 Corrected AIC (crAIC) = -2LL + k(2+2(k+1)(k+2)/(N-k-2)) 
 Consistent AIC (CAIC)6 = -2LL + k[ln(N)+1] 
 Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) = -2LL + kln(N) 
 Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC) = -2LL + 2kln(ln(N)) 
The above information criteria are forms of penalized log likelihoods. The second 
term in each formula may be viewed as a penalty for over-parameterization since 
likelihood ratio tests inherently tend to favour full models in contrast to reduced 
models. The merits and demerits of the various model selection criteria are 
discussed in the literature and the general consensus is that there is no single 
criterion that is best in all study contexts. AIC and AIC3 have been criticised for 
not being asymptotically consistent since sample size is not directly included in 
their calculation and they would not select the “correct” model as N moves to 
infinity (Yang & Yang, 2007). CAIC, BIC and HQC achieve asymptotic 
                                                          
6
 CAIC for latent class models may be estimated from the following formula (Rose & Hensher, 
2010): CAIC = -2LL- (CK - (C – 1)H -1)(ln(2N) + 1), where, C is the number of classes, K is the 
number of parameters in the class specific utility functions, H the number of parameters in the 
class allocation model and N is the number of respondents. 
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consistency by penalising over-parameterization by means of a logarithmic 
function of the sample size (N) whilst crAIC includes sample size (N) in the last 
term added to reduce bias when the sample size is small (Lin & Dayton, 1997; 
Yang & Yang, 2007). Although BIC and CAIC (which is equal to BIC + k) 
impose more severe penalties for over-parameterization and hence tend to select 
simpler models than those selected by the other criteria, their relative performance 
in selecting correct models is unpredictable (Lin & Dayton, 1997).  
Simulation studies suggest that the accuracy of commonly used criteria for 
determining the number of latent classes or market segments depends on the 
distribution used to describe the data, the characteristics of the market and model 
specification (Andrews & Currim, 2003a, 2003b; Lin & Dayton, 1997; Yang & 
Yang, 2007). Andrews and Currim (2003b) use simulation to investigate the 
performance of seven segment retention criteria including AIC, AIC3, CAIC and 
BIC commonly used with finite mixture regression models and find that the AIC 
with a per-parameter penalty of 3, (AIC3), is the best criterion to use across a 
wide variety of model specifications and data configuration. They find the AIC3 
to have the highest success rate in identifying the correct number of segments and 
producing very low parameter bias. CAIC and BIC were found to have a tendency 
of achieving lower over-fitting rates but lower success rates compared to the 
AIC3.  
Yang and Yang (2007) compare various information criteria and find that HQC 
and AIC3 had the best average accuracy rates by sample size and latent class 
structure but needed a sample size of 600 to stay above the 90% accuracy rate. 
Their results show that increasing the number of classes, holding other factors 
constant, increases the difficulty for information criteria to find a proper solution, 
with BIC and CAIC showing higher sensitivity to large numbers of latent classes. 
However, adding covariates to the latent structures showed positive effects in 
correctly identifying the number of classes by all information criteria. Rose and 
Hensher (2010) suggest that CAIC is probably a better measure. Lin and Dayton 
(1997) also used simulation to compare AIC, BIC and CAIC in terms of their 
accuracy in selecting correct models as opposed to selecting models that are over- 
or under-parameterized.  They find that BIC and CAIC are more accurate than the 
AIC when the true model is very simple or for relatively large sample sizes with 
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somewhat more complicated models. AIC was found to have a tendency to over-
fit. They suggest that BIC and CAIC would be satisfactory with relatively large 
sample sizes. 
The decision on the number of classes or segments most appropriate for our data 
set was also informed by other factors such as the pattern of significant parameters 
and relative signs, ease of interpreting the results, percentage reduction in 
information criteria across subsequent models, and the need to avoid over-fitting 
the model. Heckman and Singer (1984) note that when the number of classes 
becomes larger than appropriate, the estimator is likely to break down. By this 
they mean that the model fails to find a maximum. This may occur where the 
number of observations in a class is small and/or if the model is misspecified 
resulting in large standard errors for some parameters. For example, in the models 
we estimate in later chapters, when the classes are increased from three to four the 
optimiser breaks down in at least one of the models. A five-class model produces 
some estimates but a lot of the parameters are insignificant and there are no 
apparent differences in preferences between two classes with all insignificant 
parameters. 
 2.2.5 The panel logit with continuous mixing (MXL)  
The mixed logit model is highly flexible and can approximate any random utility 
model (McFadden & Train, 2000), as long as the researcher is able to specify the 
correct mixing distribution (Fiebig, Keane, Louviere, & Wasi, 2010) and the data 
are of adequate quality (Scarpa, Ferrini, & Willis, 2005). The mixed logit model 
allows for heterogeneity of preferences by assuming a continuous distribution of 
tastes in the population. Its advantage over the MNL model is that it allows for 
random taste variation among decision-makers, unrestricted substitution patterns 
between alternatives, and correlation in unobserved factors over time for each 
decision-maker (Train, 2009). The mixed logit model can be formulated using two 
behaviourally distinct specifications, random-parameters or error-components, 
which are mathematically equivalent, but provide different interpretations. For a 
detailed discussion of alternative specifications for the mixed logit model, 
interested readers may refer to Train (2009, pp. 137-141). The random-parameters 
specification is most widely used compared to the error-components and other 
specifications. Under the two mixed logit specifications referred to above, the 
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utility functions of an alternative i for individual n in choice situation s is 
specified as, respectively:  
𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝛼𝑛
′ 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠          (2-14)  
𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝛼
′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠  
where, 𝛼𝑛 is a vector of taste intensities for individual n, α is a vector of fixed 
taste intensities, 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑠 is the error-component, μ is a vector of random terms with 
zero mean, Zins is a vector of variables relating to alternative i,  and Xins and εins are 
as defined in equation (2-9). 
In view of the panel nature of our choice dataset and the presence of a status quo 
(SQ) option among alternatives in a choice set, a continuous mixing panel logit 
model with an error component is specified for this thesis, i.e. a panel random 
parameter logit model with error components (PRPL-EC) is specified (see, Scarpa 
et al., 2005). The error components specification allows flexible substitution 
patterns across the alternatives to be achieved through the relaxation of the IIA 
property (Train, 2009). In this study respondents are presented with choice sets 
consisting of a SQ or current supplier and two unlabeled alternative suppliers and 
asked to decide whether to remain with their current supplier or switch to one of 
the alternatives.  
The selection of the error components specification is motivated by the hypothesis 
that alternatives offering changes from the SQ do not share the same preference 
structure as the SQ alternative (Scarpa et al., 2005). Evidence from psychology 
and experimental economics indicates that respondents facing new alternatives 
tend to disproportionately prefer the SQ (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). 
Furthermore, when making choices, respondents are faced with changing attribute 
levels of the non-SQ alternatives in different choice situations whereas the 
attribute levels of the SQ remain the same throughout. This increases the 
uncertainty of the utility of the non-SQ alternatives which induces correlations 
between these alternatives. Scarpa et al. (2005) suggest that the error component 
captures variance associated with the cognitive effort of evaluating the utility of 
alternatives whose attribute levels change across choice tasks. Examples of studies 
that have used the mixed logit model with error components specification in 
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various contexts include Brownstone and Train (1999), Scarpa et al. (2005) and 
Thiene and Scarpa (2008).  
A correlation structure that accommodates differences in correlations between the 
utilities of alternatives in each choice set can be incorporated in the RPL model by 
specifying an additional error component for the non-SQ alternatives (Train, 
2009). Following Brownstone and Train (1999) and Train (2009) the utility which 
a respondent n derives from selecting supplier i from a choice set with three 
competing suppliers (SQ, A, and B) in choice situation s is specified as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑠 = {
𝛼′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝛼𝑠𝑞 +  𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠,        𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒;   
𝛼′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠,     𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐴;                          
𝛼′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠,     𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐵                          
      (2-15)  
where Xins and Zins are vectors of observed variables relating to supplier i, α is a 
vector of fixed coefficients, μ is a vector of random terms with zero mean, αsq is 
the alternative-specific constant for the SQ alternative, and εins is IID extreme 
value. The terms in Zins are error components that define, along with εins, the 
stochastic component of utility. The stochastic component of utility ηins is equal to 
𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠 which is correlated over alternatives depending on the specification 
of Zins (Train, 2009): 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖𝑛, 𝜇𝑗𝑛) = 𝐸[(𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑍𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛)(𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑍𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑗𝑛)] = 𝑍𝑖𝑛
′ 𝑊𝑍𝑗𝑛,                  (2-16)  
where W is the covariance of μn. The non-SQ alternatives are modelled as sharing 
a common error component which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and variance σ2. The correlation between the non-SQ alternatives is 
revealed by a significant estimate of the standard deviation of the error 
component. The test is based on the null hypothesis that the error component is 
not there, hence no correlation exists between the utilities of the non-SQ 
alternatives.  
Given the value of μ, the conditional choice probability is logit since the 
remaining error term is IID extreme value: 
𝑃𝑛(𝑖|𝜇) =  
exp (𝛼′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠+𝜇𝑖𝑛)
∑ exp (𝛼′𝑋𝑗𝑛𝑠+𝜇𝑗𝑛)𝑗
        ,                                 𝑗 = 𝑆𝑄, 𝐴, 𝐵      (2-17) 
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Since μ is not given, the unconditional probability is obtained by integrating the 
logit formula over all possible values of μ weighted by the density of μ as follows 
(Brownstone & Train, 1999):  
𝑃𝑛(𝑖) = ∫
exp(𝛼′𝑋𝑖𝑛+𝜇𝑖𝑛)
∑ exp(𝛼′𝑋𝑗𝑛+𝜇𝑗𝑛)𝑗
𝜙(0, 𝜎2)𝑑𝜇,            𝑗 = 𝑆𝑄, 𝐴, 𝐵
+∞
−∞
                   (2-18)  
where 𝜙(·) is the normal density, and μjn = 0 when j = SQ. It should be noted that 
the error component is the same for all choices made by the same individual and 
this avoids the restrictive assumption of independence in the error structures 
across choices by the same respondent. The above integral does not have a closed 
form solution and the choice probabilities are estimated through simulation using 
NLOGIT 5 software. The simulation involves taking draws of μ from its 
distribution and using these draws to evaluate the logit formula. This is repeated 
many times and an average for the choice probability is approximated as: 
𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑛 = (
1
𝑅
)∑𝐿𝑖𝑛(𝜇
𝑟)
𝑅
𝑟=1
 ,                                                                                 (2 − 19) 
where SPin is the simulated probability that respondent n will choose supplier i, R 
is the number of replications or draws of μ, Lin is the conditional choice 
probability presented in equation (2-17), and μr is the rth draw from the assumed 
distribution of μ. By construction, SPin is an unbiased estimate of Pin and it is 
strictly positive for any R such that ln(SPin) is always defined (Brownstone & 
Train, 1999; Train, 2009).  
The joint probability of the sequence of choices is a product of the simulated 
probabilities. The log likelihood function Ʃnln(Pin) is approximated by the 
simulated log likelihood (SLL) function: 
𝑆𝐿𝐿 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝑛
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑆
𝑠=1 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑃𝑗𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1                                                               (2-20)  
where djn = 1 if respondent n chooses supplier j and zero otherwise 
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2.3 Conceptual model for integrating psychological constructs with 
stated choice  
In this section we provide details of the latent class framework developed for the 
integration of psychological constructs with stated choice. The formulae for the 
choice probabilities and log likelihood functions are the same as those for the LC 
model presented in section 2.2.4 and will not be repeated in this section.  
2.3.1 Background of the conceptual model 
The conceptual framework developed in this research for integrating 
psychological constructs based on the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale, the 
theory of planned behavior (TPB) and the norm activation theory (NAT) with 
stated choice extends on the framework developed by Nocella et al. (2012) and 
incorporates some aspects of the causal model of environmental concern proposed 
by Stern, Dietz, and Guagnano (1995) and cognitive process for decision making 
by McFadden (1999). The NEP Scale, TPB and NAT are discussed in section 2.4. 
Nocella et al. (2012) combine constructs based on the TPB with the theory of 
consumer demand to explain heterogeneity of preferences in a latent class 
framework. They hypothesize that psychological characteristics of individuals 
affect purchasing behaviour. Their model links the TPB constructs with stated 
choice by substituting behavioural intentions (BI) with a stated choice experiment, 
and the results indicate strong support for the inclusion of the TPB constructs in 
identifying heterogeneity of preferences. McFadden (1999) argues that the 
identification of groups of consumers with homogeneous preferences and 
corresponding behavioural intentions can be enhanced by measuring appropriate 
psychological constructs. McFadden also asserts that when psychological 
constructs are incorporated in economic models, choice behaviour becomes a 
decision process which is explained not only by economic and social factors but 
also by affect
7
, attitudes, motives, and preferences.  
                                                          
7
 “Affect refers to the emotional state of the decision-maker and its impact on cognition of the 
decision task. Attitudes are defined as stable psychological tendencies to evaluate particular 
entities (outcomes or activities) with favour or disfavour. ……….Preferences are comparative 
judgements between entities….. Motives are drives directed toward perceived goals.” (McFadden, 
1999, p74)  
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Stern et al. (1995, p. 727) propose a theoretical model of environmental concern 
which places the NEP Scale in the context of social-psychological theory of 
attitude formation or attitude-behaviour relationships by embedding it in the 
model at the level of what they describe as “general beliefs, worldview and folk 
ecological theory” (see Figure 2-1). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Stern et al., 1995) 
 
According to Stern et al. (1995), the major flow of causation is from top to bottom 
as indicated by the arrows in Figure 2-1. They argue that the NEP Scale, as a 
measure of generalized beliefs about the nature of human-environment 
interactions, constitutes a set of beliefs that influence attitudes, beliefs and 
behavioural intentions regarding specific environmental conditions. On the other 
hand TPB and NAT are placed at a lower level in the model and focus on the 
attitude-behaviour links but do not link specific environmental attitudes and 
beliefs they measure to broader worldviews and other variables higher up in the 
 
Position in social structure 
Institutional constructs 
Incentive structure 
Values 
General beliefs    
Worldview                         
Folk ecological theory 
 Specific beliefs                   
Specific attitudes 
Behavioural commitments and intentions (BI) 
Behaviour 
NEP Scale (EA) 
TPB (ATT, SN, PBC) NAT (AC, AR) 
Figure 2-1: Schematic causal model of environmental concern  
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model. Thus, according to Stern el al.’s (1995) model of environmental concern, 
NEP Scale, TPB and NAT are hypothesized to influence behavioural intentions 
and ultimately behaviour. Although Schwartz (1977) did not provide a link 
between the NAT constructs and behavioural intentions, Stern et al (1995) and 
other studies, for example Wall et al. (2007), provide such a link 
Stern et al.’s (1995) schematic causal model of environmental concern suggests 
that constructs developed from the NEP Scale, TPB and NAT influence 
behavioural intentions, hence the justification for their inclusion in our model of 
consumer choice. The argument for including psychological constructs based on 
more than one theory in a single model is supported in literature. For example, 
Wall, Devine-Wright, and Mill (2007) argue that combining NAT and TPB 
constructs accounts for a range of influences on BI that neither individual theory 
fully captures. Meyerhoff (2006) develops a composite attitude-behaviour model 
which includes three types of attitudes and recommends their inclusion in model 
estimation. This is supported by Liebe, Preisendoerfer, and Meyerhoff (2011) who 
conclude that studies using single theories omit crucial explanatory variables, and 
hence might be misleading. Furthermore, the NEP Scale, TPB and NAT focus on 
different aspects of social behaviour. NAT emphasizes on altruism whilst TPB 
stresses personal utility and captures behavioural control, and the NEP Scale 
captures the general beliefs about the relationship between humans and nature 
(Ajzen, 1991; Dunlap et al., 2000; Schwartz, 1977; Stern et al., 1995; Wall et al., 
2007). We therefore postulate that the NEP Scale, TPB and NAT constructs 
influence electricity consumers’ decisions to contribute financially towards the 
reduction of environmental impacts of electricity generation such as C02 
emissions and also influence consumers’ choice of electricity supplier.  
2.3.2 The model    
The model developed for this research allows for the individual or joint 
integration of the NEP Scale, TPB and NAT constructs with Lancaster’s (1966) 
theory of consumer demand into a single model of consumer choice. The 
integration of the four models is achieved via the introduction of the interaction 
effects between the attributes of alternatives and the psychological constructs in 
the indirect utility of each alternative. This is based on the hypothesis that 
heterogeneity of preferences among electricity consumers can be better identified 
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when the indirect utility functions of alternatives include interactions between the 
design attributes describing the alternatives and the NEP Scale, TPB and NAT 
constructs as shown in Figure 2-2. Alternatively, the constructs may be used 
individually in the class membership model and/or choice model. We also 
postulate based on Figure 2-1 that behavioural intention (BI) is a function of the 
NEP Scale, TPB and NAT constructs: 
𝐵𝐼 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐴, 𝐴𝑇𝑇, 𝑆𝑁, 𝑃𝐵𝐶, 𝐴𝐶, 𝐴𝑅),                                                          (2-21)  
where EA is environmental attitude as measured using the NEP Scale, ATT, SN, 
and PBC are attitude, social norm and perceived behavioural control respectively 
based on TPB, and AC and AR are ‘awareness of the consequences’ of a 
behaviour, and ‘ascription of responsibility’ for the behaviour. These concepts are 
discussed in detail in section 2.4.   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Nocella et al., (2012)) 
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Figure 2-2: Conceptual framework integrating NEP Scale, TPB, NAT and stated choice 
analysis  
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The right-hand side of Figure (2-2) provides a schematic for the economic 
analysis of stated preferences in which econometric techniques are used to 
estimate the marginal utilities derived from specific attribute levels and, in the 
case of latent class analysis, the identification of consumer segments with 
homogeneous preferences. The constructs from the NEP Scale, TPB and NAT are 
represented by ovals inside boxes. The links between constructs have been 
omitted because our objective is not to investigate the relationships between them, 
but how these constructs influence choice behaviour. The double-lined arrows 
indicate how the four models may be combined into a single integrated choice 
NEP/TPB/NAT model via the introduction of interaction effects between the 
attributes of alternatives and the psychological constructs in the indirect utility of 
each alternative. BI, assumed to be causally antecedent to behaviour – “including 
the behavior paying money for a good” (Ajzen, Brown, & Rosenthal, 1996, p. 45), 
has been replaced with a stated choice experiment. 
Different approaches to incorporating psychological constructs in discrete choice 
models have been adopted in previous studies. One approach takes responses to 
attitudinal questions as direct measures of attitude and uses them as explanatory 
variables in a latent class model. In this approach, class membership probability is 
a function of SDCs and responses to attitudinal questions. Studies that have used 
this approach include Boxall and Adamowicz (2002), Morey et al. (2006), Morey 
et al. (2008), and Breffle, Morey, and Thacher (2011). Boxall and Adamowicz 
(2002) assume that class membership probability is a function of responses to the 
attitudinal questions while Morey et al. (2006) argue that causality is in the 
opposite direction, i.e. responses to attitudinal questions are a function of one’s 
group membership.  
In another approach, Morey et al. (2006) and Breffle et al. (2011) estimate latent 
class attitude (LCA) models with attitudinal data only, latent class choice (LCC) 
models with choice data only, and joint latent class (LCJ) models which use both 
sets of data to estimate the models simultaneously. In all these models there are no 
interaction terms between attitudinal responses and the attributes of the 
alternatives. However, attitudinal and choice responses are conditional on class 
membership, therefore the two are correlated and the joint estimation results in 
more consistent and efficient parameter estimates than the single models (Milon & 
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Scrogin, 2006). The direct incorporation of responses to attitudinal questions as 
explanatory variables implies that they are direct measures of the underlying 
attitudes. This may lead to measurement error and endogeneity bias as the 
responses may be correlated with the error terms (Ben-Akiva, Walker, 
Bernardino, Gopinath, & Morikawa, 2002; Walker & Ben-Akiva, 2002). 
Cluster analysis which deterministically assigns individuals to groups based on 
their responses to attitudinal questions has also been used (e.g., Aldrich, 
Grimsrud, Thacher, & Kotchen, 2007). In such applications, a two stage approach 
is adopted. Cluster analysis is used in the first stage to determine the number of 
clusters or groups with similar attitudes. The second stage involves the estimation 
of a choice model for each group to obtain group-specific parameter estimates. 
Since each stage does not use all available information, the parameter estimates 
may not be consistent and/or efficient. 
A recent approach to integrating psychological constructs or latent variables with 
stated choice is the estimation of hybrid choice models referred to in the literature 
as integrated choice and latent variable (ICLV) models. The ICLV model 
recognizes that responses to attitudinal questions are not direct measures of 
attitude but are driven by unobserved underlying attitudes that also drive the 
responses to choice questions (Ben-Akiva et al., 2002; Hess & Beharry-Borg, 
2011; Walker, 2001). The ICLV model explicitly models the latent variables 
(LVs) that influence the choice process through structural equations relating 
responses to attitudinal questions to the LVs, thus modeling the behavioural 
process by which the LVs are formed. By simultaneously estimating the latent 
variable model and the choice model, the ICLV model uses all the information 
available and parameter estimates are consistent and efficient. The ICLV model 
differs from the LCJ models estimated by Morey et al. (2006), and Breffle et al. 
(2011) in that a latent variable model is jointly estimated with a choice model as 
opposed to jointly estimating a latent class model and a choice model. The ICLV 
model overcomes the problems associated with the approaches discussed above 
but it is difficult to estimate as its likelihood function includes complex multi-
dimensional integrals. As the number of latent variables increases, the dimensions 
of the integrals increase and numerical integration method quickly becomes 
infeasible (Walker 2001). 
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Despite the advantages of the hybrid models, they are complex and difficult to 
estimate. While some previous studies suggest that ICLV models tend to result in 
significantly higher WTP estimates (e.g., Hess & Beharry-Borg, 2011), others 
have found no significant differences in WTP estimates and only small gains in 
model fit which do not justify the estimation of hybrid models (e.g., Klojgaard & 
Hess, 2014). Given the forgoing, we do not adopt this approach in this thesis but 
leave it for future research. Furthermore, the ICLV model does not identify latent 
preference classes or distributions of preferences as the LC and RPL models, 
respectively; hence it is not necessarily better than the latter models in addressing 
the research questions.  
Although Nocella et al. (2012) adopt a latent class framework, their approach 
differs from previous studies by including interaction of psychological constructs 
with the attributes of the alternatives in the utility function and it also provides a 
theoretical framework for incorporating such constructs. This approach may be 
criticized for ignoring the argument that using responses to attitudinal questions as 
direct measures of the underlying attitudes results in measurement error and 
possible endogeneity bias. Despite the above shortcomings, we adopt a similar 
approach in this study. Our main focus is not on the selection of the best approach 
but to demonstrate, given a particular approach, how the choice of a version of the 
NEP Scale influences WTP estimates and how TPB and NAT constructs may help 
in explaining preference heterogeneity. 
2.4 Measuring psychological constructs based on attitude-behaviour 
theories   
In this section we discuss and present the psychological constructs (latent or 
internal variables) developed for use in this study to explain preference 
heterogeneity. The constructs are based on three established attitude-behaviour 
theories from the field of social psychology: the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) 
Scale (Dunlap et al., 2000), the theory of planned behaviour (TPB)  (Ajzen, 1988, 
1991, 2005; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), and the norm activation theory (NAT) 
(Schwartz, 1977).  NEP, TPB and NAT focus on different aspects of social 
behaviour. The NEP captures the generalized beliefs about the relationship 
between humans and nature whilst the TPB stresses personal utility and captures 
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behavioural control, and the NAT emphasizes on altruism  (Ajzen, 1991; Dunlap 
et al., 2000; Schwartz, 1977; Stern et al., 1995; Wall et al., 2007). The constructs 
were developed and applied in the context of consumer choice of electricity 
supplier 
The selection of psychological constructs was based on literature review and the 
objectives of this thesis. The literature identifies two types of attitudes - general 
and specific attitudes (Meldrum, 2015; Meyerhoff, 2006). General attitudes relate 
to broad evaluative beliefs or opinions whilst specific attitudes relate to evaluative 
beliefs about the good or issue in question (Meldrum, 2015). We selected latent 
constructs which could explain consumer switching and/or demand for green 
electricity. For the latter, a suitable measure of environmental attitudes (EA) or 
environmental concern was the most appropriate. The NOAA panel (Arrow et al., 
1993) and others (e.g., Spash, 1997) recommend the incorporation of general EA 
in economic valuation. The NEP Scale fits this category and has been used in 
previous economic valuation studies (e.g., Clark, Kotchen, & Moore, 2003; 
Cooper, Poe, & Bateman, 2004; Kotchen & Reiling, 2000). The literature also 
suggests that consumer switching behaviour may be explained by specific 
attitudes, which can be measured using the TPB and NAT constructs (e.g., Ajzen, 
1988, 1991, 2001, 2005; Schwartz, 1977).  
Since we model consumer switching using hypothetical scenarios, and the 
responses are assumed to represent intentions, the TPB and NAT constructs are 
appropriate for this study as they are linked to behavioural intentions (BI). Both 
theories postulate that BI is an antecedent of behaviour (i.e., switching and/or 
paying for green electricity). Furthermore, these theories are well-known and have 
also been widely used to explain and predict behaviour in the social psychology 
literature. In this study, the TPB constructs are “specific attitudes” since the 
questions we developed to measure these constructs relate specifically to 
switching behaviour. The NAT constructs are also “specific attitudes” and relate 
to WTP for green electricity. Some contingent valuation studies show that general 
attitudes tend to be poor predictors of WTP compared to specific attitudes (e.g., 
Cooper et al., 2004; Meldrum, 2015; Meyerhoff, 2006).      
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2.4.1 The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale 
The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale is the most widely used measure of 
environmental attitude (Dunlap, 2008; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010). The NEP 
Scale is a 5-point Likert-type scale consisting of 15 items or statements about the 
human-environment relationship. The scale was developed by Dunlap et al. 
(2000) as a revision and extension of the original 12-item New Environmental 
Paradigm (NEP) Scale to measure an individual’s environmental concern or 
degree of endorsement of an ecological worldview. The original 12-item NEP 
Scale had become outdated and needed an extension to cover more facets of 
ecological worldview whilst achieving a better balance between pro- and anti-
NEP statements. Dunlap et al. (2000) hypothesise the existence of five facets or 
dimensions of ecological worldview which focus on beliefs about: humanity’s 
ability to upset the balance of nature (balance); the reality of limits to growth 
(limits); human domination of nature (anti-anthropocentrism); the idea that 
humans, unlike other species, are exempt from the constraints of nature (anti-
exemptionalism); and the possibility of an eco-crisis (eco-crisis). Dunlap (2008, p. 
9) argues that the NEP Scale is grounded in social-psychological theory because 
the NEP items measure “primitive beliefs about the relationship between human 
beings and their environment.” 
Dunlap et al. (2000) show that the items of the NEP Scale can be treated as an 
internally consistent summated rating scale and argue that the scale has been 
shown to be able to realistically differentiate between environmentalists and non-
environmentalists. However, they admit that the dimensionality of the scale still 
needs to be investigated further especially across different populations. Dunlap 
(2008) points out that although the NEP Scale is viewed in various ways by 
researchers, who treat it as a measure of environmental concern, environmental 
values, and environmental attitude or environmental beliefs, he prefers ecological 
worldview because it measures the degree to which respondents view the world 
ecologically.  
Each facet of ecological worldview is measured using three items which are 
interspersed with items measuring other facets. Table 2-1 presents the 15 items 
comprising the NEP Scale. Responses are recoded on a 5-point scale as “strongly 
agree” (SA), “mildly agree” (MA), “neither agree nor disagree” (NAND), “mildly 
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disagree” (MD) and “strongly disagree” (SD) and are coded as 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 
respectively. Agreement with the eight odd-numbered items and disagreement 
with the seven even-numbered items indicates pro-NEP responses (Dunlap et al. 
2000). The seven even-numbered items are reverse coded. An individual’s score, 
which indicates the degree of endorsement of an ecological worldview, is the sum 
of the scores on the 15 items and has a range of 15 to 75 with higher scores 
indicating pro-NEP attitudes. Before the item scores are combined into a single 
summated scale, they are checked for internal consistency. 
Table 2-1: The New Ecological Paradigm Scale items 
Code Statement 
NEP1 1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. 
NEP2 2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. 
NEP3 3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. 
NEP4 4. Human ingenuity will ensure that we do not make the earth unlivable. 
NEP5 5. Humans are severely abusing the environment. 
NEP6 6. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them. 
NEP7 7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 
NEP8 8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern   
industrial nations. 
NEP9 9. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature. 
NEP10 10. The so-called ‘ecological crisis’ facing human kind has been greatly         
exaggerated. 
NEP11 11. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. 
NEP12 12. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. 
NEP13 13. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 
NEP14 14. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to    
control it. 
NEP15 15. If things continue on their present course we will soon experience a major 
ecological catastrophe. 
 
For this study we used the same wording and order for the statements as in 
Dunlap et al. (2000), and respondents were asked to indicate their responses on a 
clearly marked scale. 
The NEP Scale statements were tested on a sample of 70 electricity bill payers as 
part of a pilot survey. Results of the pilot survey showed that respondents tended 
to have pro-NEP attitudes with respect to most items. This finding is consistent 
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with results of previous studies using the NEP Scale (e.g., Aldrich et al., 2007; 
Dunlap et al., 2000; Ek & Soderholm, 2008). Following standard practice in 
previous studies, we tested for internal consistency of the NEP constructs using 
the corrected item-total correlation (ri-t), Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α), and 
principal components analysis (PCA) (e.g., Clark et al., 2003; Dunlap et al., 2000; 
Kotchen & Reiling, 2000). Internal consistency describes the extent to which all 
15 items of the NEP Scale measure the same concept or construct. The corrected 
item-total correlation is the correlation coefficient between each item’s score and 
the sum of the scores of the other 14 items. A good candidate for inclusion in the 
final index should correlate well with the item-total score. Although there is no 
rule on the acceptable level of ri-t, the literature suggests that a minimum value of 
0.3 is acceptable. Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of reliability used to test 
whether items are sufficiently inter-related to justify their combination in an 
index. Previous literature suggests that α ≥ 0.70 can be taken to indicate 
“acceptable” reliability (e.g., Clark et al., 2003). We provide a detailed discussion 
of the results of the pilot survey in Appendix 2.  
2.4.2 The theory of planned behaviour (TPB): Application to consumer 
switching  
The TPB postulates that a person’s intention to perform a behaviour (BI) is the 
immediate determinant of any behaviour (Ajzen, 1988, 1991). Behavioural 
intention is assumed to be a function of three independent determinants: the 
individual’s positive or negative evaluation of performing the behaviour in 
question [attitude towards the behaviour (ATT)]; the individual’s perception of 
the social pressure exerted on him/her to perform or not perform the behaviour in 
question [subjective norm (SN)]; and, self-efficacy or the perceived ease or 
difficulty of performing the behaviour [the degree of perceived behavioural 
control (PBC)] (Ajzen, 1988, 1991, 2005; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). We express 
the relationship postulated in the TPB as follows: 
 
𝐵𝐼 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑇𝑇, 𝑆𝑁, 𝑃𝐵𝐶)                                                                                (2-22) 
 
Based on the TPB an electricity consumer’s intention to switch supplier (BI) is the 
immediate determinant of switching (i.e. behaviour). In the context of supplier 
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choice, ATT measures a consumer’s positive or negative evaluation of switching 
supplier; SN measures a consumer’s perception of social pressure to switch or not 
to switch supplier; and PBC measures self-efficacy or the perceived ease or 
difficulty of switching supplier.  
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), Ajzen (1988), and Ajzen (2005) provide a detailed 
discussion of the TPB. We follow the procedure recommended by Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980) and Ajzen (1988) in developing the questions used to measure the 
TPB constructs for this study as indicated below.  
1. Define the behaviour of interest in terms of action and target  
 The action is “switching” 
 The target is “electricity supplier” or just “supplier”  
2. Define the corresponding behavioural intention 
 The behavioural intention (BI) is “intention to switch supplier”  
3. Define the corresponding attitude, social norm, and perceived behavioural 
control  
 Attitude (ATT) is “attitude towards switching supplier” 
 Social norm (SN) is “social norm with respect to switching supplier” 
 Perceived behavioural control (PBC) is “perceived behavioural control 
with respect to switching supplier” 
Based on the above steps we constructed direct measures of ATT, SN, PBC and 
BI in the format suggested by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, pp. 261-262) as follows:   
 ATT: by using evaluative semantic differentials to obtain a direct measure 
of the same attitude (Ajzen, 2005; Ajzen et al., 1996; Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980; Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008; King, 1975; Meyerhoff, 2006). 
A semantic differential scale is composed of polar opposite adjectives, e.g. 
good and bad, separated by a 7-point rating scale. 
 SN: by asking respondents to judge how likely it is that most people who 
are important to them would approve or disapprove of their switching 
supplier (Ajzen, 2005).  
 PBC: by asking respondents whether they believe that they are capable of 
switching electricity supplier and whether doing so is completely under 
their control (Ajzen, 2005). 
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 BI: by asking respondents how likely it is that they will switch supplier in 
the next 12 months (Ajzen, 2005). 
Obtaining direct measures of the TPB constructs is attractive as it involves fewer 
questions and therefore a shorter questionnaire and also avoids the concern 
associated with the expectancy-value model or belief-based measures, whereby 
the assumed product (belief x evaluation) may misrepresent the cognitive process 
involved in attitude formation (Ajzen, 2001; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
The wording of the statements or questions designed to directly assess the TPB 
constructs was developed by analogy with Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), Ajzen 
(2001, 2005) and King (1975). A sentence stem (or two statements) and two 
evaluative semantic differential scales, for example, “good – bad” and “rewarding 
– punishing” for the attitude (ATT) construct, were used to assess each TPB 
construct (see Table 2-2). The statements for each construct were interspersed 
among the statements for other constructs. The response categories are points on a 
7-point bipolar Likert scale indicated as “extremely good”, “quite good”, “slightly 
good”, “neither good nor bad”, “slightly bad”, “quite bad” and “extremely bad” 
and are coded as 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2 and -3 respectively. For each construct an index 
(the average of the two scores e.g. ATT is the average of ATT1 and ATT2) is 
calculated as a measure for that construct. The index for each construct obtained 
from the pilot study is shown in Table 2-2. High positive scores indicate a higher 
possibility of switching whilst low and/or negative scores indicate a low 
possibility or likelihood. 
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Table 2-2: Description of the TPB constructs and average scores: pilot survey
1
  
Variables Sentence stem Evaluative Semantic differential scale 
Attitude [ATT = (ATT1 + ATT2)/2)] = 2.02 
ATT1 
For me switching to a supplier offering a better 
package of price and services would be: 
good - bad 
ATT2 
rewarding - 
punishing 
Social Norm [SN = (SN1 + SN2)/2] = 0.83 
SN1 
How likely is it that most people who are important to 
you think that you should switch to a supplier offering 
a better package of price and services? 
likely - unlikely 
SN2
* 
How likely or unlikely is it that most people who are 
important to you would approve if you switch to a 
supplier offering a better package of price and 
services? 
likely - unlikely 
Perceived behavioural control [PBC = (PBC1 + PBC2)/2] = 1.38 
PBC1 
I believe that I can switch to a supplier offering a better 
package of price and services if I want 
Agree - disagree 
PBC2 
For me switching to a supplier offering a better 
package and services would be: 
Easy - difficult 
Behavioural intention [BI = (BI1 + BI2)/2] = 0.59 
BI1 
How likely or unlikely is it that you will switch to a 
supplier offering a better package of price services in 
the next 12 months? 
likely - unlikely 
BI2
** 
 I intend to switch to a supplier offering a better 
package of price and services in the next 12 months 
likely - unlikely 
   
1
N = 70 for the pilot survey. 
*
The original statement and the corresponding evaluative 
semantic scale in the pilot survey were “How far do you think most people who are 
important to you would approve or disapprove of your switching to a supplier offering a 
better package of price and services: approve-disapprove.” **The original statement in the 
pilot survey was “All things considered I would be willing to switch to a supplier offering 
a better package of price and services in the next 12 months.”  
54
 
     
As in the case of the NEP Scale discussed in the previous section, the TPB 
constructs were tested in the pilot survey which allowed us to address any issues 
before the final survey. Since only two statements were used for each construct it 
was not possible to carry out tests for internal consistency using item-total 
correlation, Cronbach’s alpha and principal components analysis. Instead we 
performed a correlation analysis to assess the correlation between each pair of 
statements measuring the same construct. All the correlations were high and 
significant at the .05 level suggesting that each pair of statements could be 
combined into a single index. A detailed discussion of the pilot survey results is 
presented in Appendix 2. 
2.4.3 Norm activation theory: Application to consumer switching 
Schwartz’s (1977) norm activation theory (NAT) was originally developed to 
explain altruistic behaviour. The theory postulates that personal norms (normative 
self-expectations experienced as feelings of obligations) are the immediate 
antecedent of altruistic behaviour. Personal norms are activated by awareness of a 
behaviour’s consequences (AC) and beliefs about personal responsibility or 
ascription of responsibility (AR). 
According to this theory, people who are aware of the consequences of choosing 
an electricity supplier offering a higher portfolio of renewables and who also have 
feelings of personal responsibility to choose such a supplier are more likely to do 
so compared to those who do not. 
Two statements were used to assess respondents’ “awareness of consequences” 
(AC) of switching supplier and another two statements were used to assess 
“ascription of responsibility” (AR). Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale with response categories “strongly agree” (SA), “somewhat agree” (SWA), 
“neither agree nor disagree” (NAND), “somewhat disagree” (SWD), and 
“strongly disagree” (SD). These were coded from 1 (SD) to 5 (SA).  
The statements used to measure AC and AR in the final survey and a summary of 
the results of the pilot survey are presented in Table 2-3. Correlation between the 
AC statements was 0.285 whilst that of the AR statements was 0.704. Although 
both correlations were significant at the 5% level, the AC statements were refined 
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in the final survey.  A discussion of the pilot survey results is provided in 
Appendix 2. 
Table 2-3: NAT constructs and distribution of response: pilot survey (N =70) 
How far do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements 
SA SWA NAND SWD SD 
 
Awareness of the consequences of a behaviour (AC) 
 
AC1 I believe that switching to a supplier that 
produces electricity from renewable 
sources would be good for the 
environment. 
23.94 47.89 25.35 4.23 2.82 
AC2 My switching to a supplier that 
generates electricity from renewable 
sources will not make a difference to the 
environment. 
 
4.23 22.54 26.76 40.85 5.63 
Ascription of responsibility (AR) 
 
AR1 I feel morally obliged to switch to a 
supplier that generates most of its power 
from renewable sources. 
4.23 30.99 40.85 14.08 9.86 
AR2 I feel personally  responsible for helping 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 
switching to a supplier that generates 
electricity from clean energy sources 
4.23 29.58 42.25 14.08 9.86 
 
2.5 Experimental design and survey questionnaire development 
The experimental design (ED) process is an important aspect of choice 
experiments. It involves a number of stages which include: identifying and 
defining the important attributes relevant to the research; selecting the type of 
experimental design to use in generating choice sets; model specifications; 
generating the design and deciding whether to use main effects only or include 
interaction effects; and including the choice sets in the survey questionnaire. 
Hensher et al. (2005a, p. 102) provide a summary of the ED process used to 
generate stated preference experiments.  
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2.5.1 Selection of decision-relevant attributes of electricity suppliers 
Previous studies investigating consumer preferences for the attributes of 
electricity suppliers have relied on literature reviews, focus groups, expert advice 
and pilot surveys in identifying and defining important attributes and their levels. 
For this research we relied primarily on three New Zealand national surveys on 
consumer switching and focus groups for the identification of important attributes. 
The three surveys, by the Electricity Commission (2008) and Electricity Authority 
(2011a, 2012a) were conducted by a professional market research company on 
behalf of the Electricity Authority. The surveys were conducted at a national level 
with sample sizes of 1000 respondents who were responsible for paying the 
electricity bill or had a say in choosing their electricity supplier. All the surveys 
included focus group interviews and discussions conducted by trained staff. 
Results from these studies have been adopted by the Electricity Authority in its 
policy on consumer switching, which provides reasonable grounds for their 
acceptability in this research.  
The above studies identified 15 incentives used by retailers to attract customers. 
Respondents in the national studies were asked to rate each incentive for 
switching on a 11-point scale with endpoints marked as 0 (not at all important) 
and 10 (a very important). The ratings provided a ranking of the incentives for 
switching at a national level. To explore if the inclusion of any additional 
incentives or reasons for switching was warranted, we conducted a Delphi type 
focus group consisting of electricity bill payers.  
For our first focus group, 10 respondents were intercepted at random and 
interviewed by the researcher whilst they were waiting to collect their children 
from school. Each participant was given a questionnaire in which they were asked 
to list the reasons for choosing their current supplier, after which they were asked 
to rate them on a 11-point scale as in the national surveys. Respondents were then 
provided with the 15 incentives identified in the national surveys and asked to 
provide their own rating, after which they were shown the ratings from the 
national survey and asked if they would want to adjust their ratings given the 
national results. This procedure is similar to the Delphi method in that the focus 
group members did not meet but got an opportunity to react to the responses of 
the participants in the national survey. The advantage of this approach is that it 
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costs less and avoids the influence of dominant individuals in the group. The 
ratings and rankings from the focus group were similar to those of the national 
surveys and no important additional reasons were identified. The final attributes 
used in this research were therefore drawn from the 15 incentives identified in the 
national surveys. 
To avoid a large ED we selected seven attributes from the list of 15 incentives 
based on a minimum rating of 6. In addition to these we included supplier type as 
an additional attribute to allow for investigation of how different types of supplier, 
particularly new entrants, influence choice. The selected attributes, their levels 
and design codes are presented in Table 2-4. The attribute ranges were based on 
extensive searches of the electricity suppliers’ websites and the Powerswitch 
website. The attributes are quantified based on criteria similar to recent studies on 
consumer preferences for the attributes of electricity suppliers. For example, the 
share of generation from renewables was measured as a percentage (e.g., Amador 
et al., 2013; Bollino, 2009; Borchers, Duke, & Parsons, 2007; Goett et al., 2000; 
Kaenzig et al., 2013), cost was measured as monthly power bill (e.g., Amador et 
al., 2013; Bollino, 2009; Kaenzig et al., 2013), and discount as a percentage 
(Goett et al., 2000).  
In generating all the designs used in this research we considered the coding 
scheme recommended by Hensher et al. (2005a) and used attribute-level labels for 
all quantitative attributes and dummy codes for qualitative attributes. Hensher et 
al. (2005a) suggest that an appealing feature of using attribute-level labels directly 
when dealing with quantitative attributes is that one can meaningfully predict over 
the entire range of attribute-level labels from models estimated specified with 
such attributes. 
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Table 2-4: Attributes, attribute levels and the design codes used in the ED 
Attributes Description Levels Pivot design codes 
Time Average time for telephone calls to be answered by a customer service 
representative 
0, 5,10, 15 (minutes)  -5, 0, -5, -10  
Fixed Length of time over which prices are guaranteed 0, 12, 24, 36 (months)  0, +12, +24, +36  
Discount Discount for paying electricity bill on time including online prompt payments 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% -10, 0, +10, +20 
Rewards Loyalty rewards such as Fly Buys, Brownie points, prize draws, and annual 
account credits (excludes annual network dividends) 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
-1 
 0 
Renewables Proportion of electricity generated from wind, hydro, geothermal, bioenergy 
and solar. 
25%, 50%, 75%, 100% -25, 0, +25, +50 
Ownership %NZ ownership of supplier 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% -25, 0, +25, +50 
Supplier type Type of supplier (dummy coded) New electricity company 
New non-electricity company 
Well-known electricity company 
Well-known non-electricity company 
1 
2 
0 
3 
Bill Average monthly electricity bill before GST, levy and discounts.  $150, $200, $250, $300 -100, -50, +0, +50 
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The attribute-level range for Time was based on timed calls that were made by the 
researcher to electricity suppliers to determine how long it took to talk to a 
customer representative. Some calls were answered immediately while some took 
as long as 15 minutes, so the range was set as 0-15 minutes and split into four 
levels. This was further refined by taking into account responses from the pilot 
survey where each respondent evaluated their current supplier on the basis of all 
the attributes used in the experimental design. The length of time over which 
prices were fixed (Fixed) was based on the various pricing plans offered by 
suppliers which ranged from 0-36 months. This range was split into four levels 
representing actual levels available in the market.  
Discounts (Discount) available in the market ranged from 0 to 22% but we raised 
the upper limit to 30% to provide a range that could be split into four levels that 
are equidistant in spacing, and also provide an opportunity to stretch the range 
beyond what is currently available in the market but is still within reasonable 
bounds. Loyalty rewards (Rewards) were assessed on the basis of whether a 
supplier offered these or not, so the variable took on two levels; 0 or 1. Electricity 
generation from renewable sources (Renewables) ranged from a low of 24.7% by 
Genesis Energy to 100% by Meridian Energy and TrustPower. The range for 
Renewables was therefore set at 25-100%. The lowest level for local ownership 
(Ownership) that could be established was 48% for Contact Energy (52% owned 
by an Australian company) and the highest was 100% for Meridian and Genesis 
before their partial privatisation. For suppliers listed on the stock exchange, it is 
difficult to ascertain the levels of local ownership from publicly available 
information. The range for Ownership was set at 25-100%, which includes all the 
levels that were identified.  
For supplier type (Supplier type) we considered the possibility of existing well-
known non-electricity companies diversifying into electricity retailing, and new 
companies (not well-known) entering the market. We set four levels for Supplier 
type to include the incumbent – ‘well-known electricity supplier’. The range for 
monthly power bill (Bill) was based on the annual estimates from the “Provider 
cost table” available on the Consumer Powerswitch website. The table provides 
annual estimates for small, medium and large households based on prices from 
each retailer.   
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2.5.2 Experimental design for pilot survey  
A major challenge with the CEs technique is the experimental design (ED) of the 
choice sets used to generate choice datasets, which is fundamental in the 
development of stated choice surveys. ED is the way in which the attribute levels 
of alternatives are set and structured into the choice sets (Bennett & Adamowicz, 
2001). The ED process is complex, time consuming, and can heavily influence the 
outcomes (validity and reliability) and conclusions of the research (Hensher et al., 
2005a; Johnson et al., 2013; Louviere et al., 2000; Louviere et al., 2008; Lusk & 
Norwood, 2005). The choice of ED is important because in a multi-attribute 
valuation the efficiency of the estimates depends on how the attributes and levels 
are combined to form the alternatives and the choice sets (Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007; 
Hensher et al., 2005a; Louviere et al., 2000; Louviere et al., 2008).  
The selected ED should allow for estimation of the independent influence of each 
attribute on choice and also maximize the power of the model to detect 
statistically significant relationships for a given sample size. An efficient design 
produces parameter estimates with small standard errors from a smaller sample 
size compared to others. Hence, the objective of any ED is to maximize the 
statistical efficiency for a given model. Burgess and Streets (2003, 2005) and 
Street and Burgess (2004) provide a formal definition of statistical design 
efficiency for stated choice experiments and also discuss strategies for creating 
optimal designs. Louviere et al. (2000) provide a detailed discussion of the 
theoretical aspects of experimental designs.  
A sequential orthogonal design with three unlabelled alternatives was developed 
as a starting design using NGENE 1.1.0 software. Sequential orthogonal designs 
do not require any prior information about the parameters of the model. This 
design strategy has been criticised for its failure to utilize information that may be 
available to the researcher, such as estimates of betas from related studies (Ferrini 
& Scarpa, 2007; Huber & Zwerina, 1996; Scarpa & Rose, 2008), and assumptions 
about the signs of the betas e.g. negative sign on the cost coefficient or positive 
(negative) signs on betas for desired (undesired) attributes (Ferrini & Scarpa, 
2007). Furthermore, using a design that assumes zero values for all the betas may 
be unrealistic given that the attributes used in the experimental design are those 
identified as important to consumers in choosing their preferred electricity 
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supplier. However, we do not view this as a major issue since this was the first 
stage of ED.  
The initial design consisted of 16 choice tasks which were administered on a 
convenience sample of 6 students providing a total of 96 responses. A base MNL 
model was fitted to the data. All the coefficients had the expected signs. Only 
Discount, Ownership and Bill were significant at the 5% level. The parameter 
estimates from the first stage were used in a D-efficient homogeneous pivot 
design for an MNL model. A pivot design with specified levels for the reference 
alternative was selected as opposed to a ‘no choice’ option as it most closely 
approximated the choice setting experienced by individuals in real retail 
electricity markets. In a homogeneous pivot design each respondents faces the 
same reference alternative or status quo (SQ) (ChoiceMetrics, 2012; Rose et al., 
2008).  
Although a supplier’s customers on the same electricity plan face similar attribute 
levels except Bill which depends on the unit price and power consumption level, 
perceptions of these levels may vary among customers. With 18 electricity 
suppliers in the retail electricity market in New Zealand a heterogeneous pivot 
design would have entailed designs for 18 sub-groups using attribute levels 
specific to each supplier. To avoid multiple designs, a homogeneous pivot design 
was generated using the average attributes for all suppliers as recommended in the 
literature (ChoiceMetrics, 2012; Louviere et al., 2000). The MNL efficiency 
measures are provided in Table 2-5 and an example of the choice card is provided 
in Figure 2-3. 
Table 2-5: MNL efficiency measures for ED for the pilot survey 
Measure Value 
Dp-error 0.0563 
Ap-error 2.7130 
B estimate 74.3971 (this falls in the range of optimal values (70-90) for utility 
balance  
S estimate 360 (for Renewable: coefficient was insignificant). 
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The design consisted of 12 choice tasks and was tested in May 2013 on a sample 
of 70 electricity bill payers sampled from an online panel managed by a marketing 
company. The sampling was stratified based on quotas for gender, age groups, and 
income groups built into the ‘survey flow’ to ensure that a representative sample 
was obtained. The pilot sample of 70 respondents provided 840 responses that 
were used to estimate MNL, LC, and RPL-EC models presented in Table 2-6.  
Although experimental designs are generally expected to reduce multicolinearity 
among the attribute levels in stated CEs, we checked for collinearity before model 
estimation for both the pilot and final surveys. None of the correlations were 
greater than the frequently used cut-off point of 0.8 (see, Hensher et al., 2005a), 
suggesting that orthogonality may not have been lost in the data. Collinearity in 
SP data may be induced by missing SP observations and/or different numbers of 
respondents presented with different blocks of the ED (Hensher et al., 2005a). In 
both the pilot and final surveys, all respondents were presented with the same 
choice tasks since the ED was not blocked, and the online surveys were only 
terminated when the target sample sizes of fully completed questionnaires were 
achieved.   
In the scenarios that follow please only consider the information provided in deciding 
whether to switch supplier or not. Assume that any information not provided is the 
same for the three suppliers. Which supplier would you prefer? 
    ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time     15 minutes 15 minutes 0 minutes     
Fixed rate guarantee      0 months 36 months 0 months     
Prompt payment discount      10% 0% 20%     
Loyalty rewards      Yes No Yes     
Electricity supplied from Renewable 
sources 
50% 100% 75%     
NZ ownership      100% 100% 50%     
  
Supplier type      
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company 
Well-known  
non-electricity 
company     
Average monthly electricity bill      $250 ($225 
after discount) 
$250 $200  ($160 
after discount)    
 Which supplier would you prefer? ○             ○ ○ 
Figure 2-3: Stated choice scenario and example of a choice task. 
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     Table 2-6: Regression results for the pilot survey (z values are in parentheses) 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Denote significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively. 
*
Standard deviation 
2.5.3 Experimental design for the final survey 
Based on the results from the pilot survey a Bayesian D-efficient homogeneous 
pivot design for an MNL model was generated for the final survey. Setting 
realistic levels for the pivot or reference alternative is very important. We relied 
on levels reported by respondents in the pilot survey and information on 
generators/retailers’ actual output and market shares in 2012 to set the levels for 
the reference alternative. The level for Renewable was set at 50% because the two 
suppliers accounting for nearly 50% of the retail electricity market, Contact 
Energy and Genesis Energy, generated only 48.6% and 32% of their electricity 
 
Variables 
MNL 
model 
LC model RPL-EC model 
 Class 1 Class 2 parameters SD
* 
ASCSQ 0.4336
b
         
(2.06) 
0.1087          
(0.26) 
1.2017
c
       
(3.40) 
0.4403
a
 
(1.80) 
 
Time (minutes) -0.0239
a
        
(-1.91) 
-0.0227         
(-0.97) 
-0.0307         
(-1.56) 
-0.0261
b 
(-1.80) 
0.0377
a
 
(1.68) 
Fixed (months) -0.0089         
(-1.57) 
-0.0028         
(-0.27) 
-0.0093         
(-1.05) 
-0.0115 
(-1.50) 
0.0322
c
 
(3.96) 
Discount  0.0378
c
       
(4.75) 
0.0109          
(0.58) 
0.0517
c
       
(4.38) 
0.0423
c
 
(4.27) 
0.0336
c
 
(2.60) 
Rewards 0.2434          
(1.33) 
0.5593         
(1.60) 
0.6559
b
        
(2.42) 
0.2573 
(1.00) 
0.976
c
 
(3.51) 
Renewable 0.0099
c
       
(3.43) 
0.0045          
(0.77) 
0.0205
c
       
(4.60) 
0.0114
c
 
(3.53) 
 
Ownership 0.0144
c
       
(4.90) 
0.0185
c
      
(3.74) 
0.0126
c
       
(2.60) 
0.0153
c
 
(4.74) 
 
New electricity company -0.5961
b
       
(-2.48) 
0.2275          
(0.45) 
-1.2395
c
      
(-3.33) 
-0.5711
b
 
(-2.08) 
 
New non-electricity company  -0.6760
c
      
(-2.71) 
-0.0357         
(-0.09) 
-1.3336
c
      
(-3.08) 
-0.8014
c
      
(-2.82) 
 
Well-known non-electricity 
company  
-1.0210
b
       
(-2.24) 
-2.4548
b
      
(-2.12) 
-0.9195
a
        
(-1.69) 
-1.3299
b
     
(-2.56) 
 
Bill -0.0140
c
     
(-17.42) 
-0.0323
c
     
(-9.55) 
-0.0079
c
      
(-6.83) 
-0.0163
c
 
(-15.05) 
 
Error Component    0.0 -0.1909 
(-1.23) 
Estimated Latent Class Probabilities 0.6381
c
 
(10.69) 
0.3619
c
 
(6.065) 
  
Model Fit 
Pseudo R
2 
0.39 0.49 0.406 
χ2 [p-value] 
 
592.35 (11 d.f.) 
[ .0001] 
755.30 (23 d.f.) 
[.0001] 
624.79 (16 d.f.) 
[.0001] 
LL(β) -466.24 -391.38 -456.63 
AIC   962.7   828.8   945.3 
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from renewable sources in 2012 (MBIE, 2013). In the pilot survey 51% of 
respondents were customers of Contact Energy and Genesis Energy. However, 
74% of respondents were not sure about the proportion of electricity generated 
from renewables by their supplier. The selected level of 50% reflects the average 
market condition and may likely be perceived as realistic.  
Genesis was the only supplier that was 100% state owned but there were plans to 
sell 49% to the general public. Contact Energy is 52% owned by an Australian 
company Origin Energy; 48.22% of Mighty River Power is listed on the stock 
exchange; TrustPower is listed on the stock exchange with 50.7% of its shares 
held by Infratil Ltd, an NZ-based public company; recently 49% of Meridian 
Energy was sold to the public and the company was listed on the stock exchange. 
Based on this information, an average level of 50% for Ownership seemed to be 
reasonable. The level for Bill was set at $250 as in the pilot survey. The sample 
median power bill in the pilot survey was $200 but it is not clear whether 
respondents were reporting the net bill after the discount or the gross bill before 
the discount.  
The level for Discount rate was set at 10% as 47% of the sampled respondents 
indicated that their current supplier provided this level of discount. Half the 
sample indicated that their supplier offered loyalty rewards. The level selected for 
Supplier type is ‘Well-known Electricity Company’ as 87% of respondents 
indicated this level for their current supplier. About 74% of respondents were not 
on any fixed rate plan, and 83% indicated 5 minutes or less call waiting time, so 
the levels for Fixed and Time were set at zero and 5 minutes, respectively. The 
selected levels for the SQ or reference alternative turned out to be the same as in 
the pilot survey. 
Although the LC model is our main model for the analysis of responses to the 
stated choice experiments, the ED generated was for an MNL model. Design 
strategies specifically for LC models are not available and NGENE cannot yet 
generate efficient designs for LC models (Bliemer, 2013). However, previous 
studies employing the LC model have used EDs for MNL models and experience 
from empirical applications is that designs for MNL models perform quite well 
(Rose, 2013). Conceptually the problem with using designs for MNL models for 
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LC models is that the analyst may run out of degrees of freedom as the number of 
parameters increases rapidly with the number of classes. 
Our design consists of seven attributes with four levels each and one attribute with 
two levels, giving a total of 4
7
x2 = 32,768 treatments, which is too much for any 
individual to handle. A fractional factorial design was employed to reduce the 
number of treatments to manageable levels. For fractional factorial designs, a 
value for the “rows” property for the experimental design must be set. This 
requires the determination of the degrees of freedom required for the ED, which 
depends on the utility specification (Hensher et al., 2005a). The value for the 
“rows” property or the number of choice situations in the experimental design 
must be equal to or greater than the degrees of freedom. Hensher et al. (2005a, p. 
122) define the degrees of freedom for an experimental design as “the number of 
observations in a sample minus the number of independent (linear) constraints 
[i.e. the β’s to be estimated] placed upon it during the modelling process.”  
For main effects-only MNL models, the degrees of freedom required for the ED 
are determined as the number of parameters to be estimated over all alternatives 
excluding the constant terms, plus one additional degree of freedom for the 
random error component of the model  (Hensher et al., 2005a). The number of 
parameters to be estimated in our MNL model, excluding constants, is 10, hence a 
minimum of 11 degrees of freedom were required for the design. However, when 
the value for the “rows” property was set at 11, NGENE warned that one or more 
attributes would not have level balance with the number of rows specified. Setting 
the number of rows for the ED at 12 overcame this problem.  
Although some of the models to be estimated include interactions of design 
attributes with psychological constructs and SDCs, these interaction effects were 
not included in the ED for practical and financial reasons. Including these 
interaction effects would have entailed many designs, ideally one for each 
respondent, using a two-stage approach where information on each individual’s 
scores for psychological constructs and SDC are obtained in the first stage and a 
specific design generated taking into account this information. Although such an 
approach is possible, it is expensive, time-consuming, and beyond the scope of 
this study. Despite the exclusion of interaction effects, Hensher et al. (2005a) 
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suggest that the analyst would still be able to estimate some of the interaction 
effects of interest although this would come at a cost in terms of lost information. 
The parameter estimates from the pilot survey were used as priors in a Bayesian 
D-efficient main effects design consisting of seven attributes with four levels each 
and one attribute with two levels as in the pilot survey. Bayesian efficient designs 
use random priors described by random distributions to account for uncertainty 
about the true parameter values. Ferrini and Scarpa (2007) contend that Bayesian 
efficient designs are less sensitive to misspecification of the priors compared to 
designs which used fixed priors. To generate a Bayesian efficient design, 
simulations are required for evaluating the design over the parameter distributions. 
This is achieved by taking draws from the parameter distributions. Following 
Bliemer and Rose (2011) we generated a Bayesian D-efficient design using priors 
drawn from Bayesian normal distributions β N(μ,σ2) where the means (μ) were 
assumed to be the parameter estimates from the pilot survey, and the standard 
deviations (σ) the standard errors of the parameter. The number of draws was set 
at 350 and was taken using an intelligent sequence called Halton Sequences.  
An experimental design is efficient if it yields data with minimum correlation that 
enables estimation of the parameters with the lowest possible standard errors. The 
most widely used efficiency measure is the D-error, which takes the determinant 
of the asymptotic variance-covariance (AVC) matrix of the parameter estimates 
assuming only a single respondent. A design with the lowest D-error is called D-
optimal and a design which has a sufficiently low D-error is called a D-efficient 
design. Finding an efficient design given a feasible set of attribute levels, a 
number of choice situations, and prior parameter values (or probability 
distributions), involves determining a level balanced design that minimizes the 
efficiency error.  
The efficiency measures and probabilities for the experimental design are reported 
in Tables 2-7 to 2-10. The results indicate considerable improvement in efficiency 
in terms of D-error, A-error, B-estimate and S-estimate compared to the ED for the 
pilot survey. For example, the D-error and minimum sample size were reduced by 
82% and 61% respectively in the final ED. Utility balance of 76.34 is in the 
recommended range (ChoiceMetrics, 2012). This highlights the benefits of 
adopting a sequential updating Bayesian design approach.  
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Table 2-7: MNL Bayesian experimental design efficiency measures 
Efficiency measure Fixed Bayesian Mean 
Db-error 0.010925 0.011492 
Ab-error 0.607957             0.640720 
Bb-estimate 76.347688           70.03800 
Sb-estimate 42  
 
Table 2-8: MNL probabilities 
Choice situation Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
1 0.301005 0.342824 0.35617 
2 0.304624 0.294842 0.400534 
3 0.320927 0.351339 0.327734 
4 0.752135 0.124689 0.123176 
5 0.370232 0.316948 0.312820 
6 0.30223 0.193160 0.504611 
7 0.826006 0.097969 0.076025 
8 0.856243 0.055814 0.087943 
9 0.343993 0.414164 0.241844 
10 0.305436 0.429426 0.265138 
11 0.30381 0.408978 0.287212 
12 0.295387 0.358897 0.345716 
 
Table 2-9: Minimum sample estimates for individual priors 
 Time Fixed Disc Rew Ren Own D0
 
D1 D2 Bill 
Prior -0.24 -0.01 0.04 0.24 0.01 0.01 -0.59 -0.67 -1.02 -0.01 
Sp-estimate 29.7 38.6 4.6 41.6 7.9 5.2 14.9 16.0 7.9 2.2 
D0, D1, and D2 are dummy variable levels for Supplier type indicating ‘New Electricity 
Company’, ‘New Non-electricity Company’ and ‘Well-known Non-electricity Company’, 
respectively. Disc, Rew, Ren and Own are Discount, Rewards, Renewable, Renewable and 
Ownership, respectively. 
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Table 2-10: MNL D-efficient design summary of iteration history 
Evaluation  Time Mean Bayesian 
MNL D-error 
Invalid 
designs 
Improvement 
1 12:55:25 PM, 20/01/14 0.023139 0 - 
103 12:55:29 PM, 20/01/14 0.017599 0 0.005540 
87,788   1:52:37 PM, 20/01/14 0.011492 0 0.006107 
833,394   3:41:05 AM, 21/01/14 (stopped) 0.011492 0 Nil 
 
2.5.4 Simulation of experimental design for the final survey 
The ED described in the previous section was simulated in Microsoft Excel. The 
objective was to explore whether the design was capable of generating choice 
response data that could result in significant parameter estimates with expected 
signs for a financially feasible sample of 200 respondents. The minimum sample 
required for all parameters to be statistically significant was 42 for an MNL model 
(see Table 2-9). However, the estimation of LC models would require larger 
sample sizes due to the proliferation of parameters as the number of classes 
increase.  
The design was simulated using a sample of 200 virtual respondents. Each virtual 
respondent faced a single replication of the ED which consisted of 12 choice 
tasks. Based on the priors used in the ED, the observed utility (𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑠) for all 
alternatives was computed. A random error term (𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠) is required to estimate 
each Uins but this is not observable to the researcher. To estimate 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠 for each 
data point, we took random draws (ηins) from a standard normal distribution, 
which is equivalent to taking draws directly from a cumulative density 𝐹(𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠) =
𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑠, and computed the errors as: 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑠 = −ln (− ln(𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑠)) which is obtained by 
taking the double natural log of the cumulative density 𝐹(𝜀) = 𝑒−𝑒
−𝜀
 (Train, 
2009). The estimated random error terms were then added to the observed 
components of utility. We then assumed that each virtual respondent chose the 
alternative with the highest utility. This provided simulated choices for the data 
set. 
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An MNL and LC model were estimated from the data, which included simulated 
choices for the 200 virtual respondents. The results are presented in Table 2-11. 
All the parameters for the MNL model were significant at the 0.01 level and had 
the expected signs suggesting that the sample size of 200 was adequate and that 
the design was capable of generating responses that would allow for the 
estimation of the independent influence of each attribute on choice. LC models 
with two and three preference classes were estimated but the probability of the 
third class was statistically insignificant. The results suggested that the design 
could generate responses that would allow us to estimate LC models. The 
simulation results provided a degree of confidence that the choice data that would 
be generated by the ED would be adequate to achieve the objectives of the 
research.     
Table 2-11: Experimental design simulation results 
c
, 
b
, 
a 
Significant at .01, .05, and .1, respectively 
 
Variables 
MNL model LC model 
Class 1 Class 2 
 Parameter | z | Parameter | z | Parameter | z | 
ASCSQ     0.4637
c
 5.50  0.3835 1.47  0.5531
c
 3.47 
Time (minutes)    -0.0201
c
 4.25 -0.0093 0.52 -0.0248
c
 2.96 
Fixed  Term (Months)    -0.0064
c
 3.21  0.0014 0.24 -0.0098
b
 2.42 
Discount      0.0394
c
 13.21  0.0258
c
 2.71  0.0463
c
 7.32 
Rewards     0.1999
c
 3.51  0.5823
a
 1.82  0.0368 0.31 
Renewable     0.0100
c
 9.84  0.0205
c
 3.15  0.0052
a
 1.91 
Ownership     0.0125
c
 10.40  0.0146
c
 3.41  0.0112
c
 4.67 
New electricity 
company  
   -0.6725
c
 8.05 -1.0274
c
 2.82 -0.5263
c
 3.51 
New non-electricity 
company  
   -0.7483
c
 7.68 -1.1390
c
 3.18 -0.56299
c
 3.10 
Well-known non-
electricity company  
  -1.1505
c
 10.99 -1.4645
c
 4.30 -1.0052
c
 5.51 
Monthly Power Bill    -0.0143
c
 18.88 -0.0146
c
 6.36 -0.0143
c
 10.97 
Class probabilities   0.371 1.81   0.629 3.06 
Model Fit 
Pseudo R
2 
 0.13 
χ2   690.14762 
LL(β) -2298.77733 -2291.59568 
AIC  4629.2 
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2.5.5 Survey questionnaire 
Data required for this research was generated using an online survey administered 
to an online panel of domestic electricity bill payers in New Zealand in January 
2014. The survey questionnaire was developed and programmed using Qualtrics, 
a software package provided by Qualtrics.com. The online panel was provided by 
a market research company called Research Now Pty Ltd. An online survey was 
preferred to a mail survey based on cost considerations and a literature review on 
online surveys discussed below.  
With a target of 200 completed responses and a typical response rate of 20% for 
mail surveys, a sample size of 1000 would have been required. A mail survey 
consisting of an initial mail-out of 1000 questionnaires, 800 reminder/thank you 
post cards, 800 first follow-up letters, and 500 second follow-up letters with 
survey questionnaire and return envelope would have cost a minimum cost of 
$5170. On the other hand the cost of 200 completed responses from an online 
panel provided by a marketing company was $1900 (plus GST) for a 15-25 
minute survey questionnaire, which was within the budget.  
The advantages of using online surveys to collect data often cited in the literature 
include the speed of distribution, reduced cost, reduced errors in compiling the 
data from the responses, interactivity, and the possibility of randomizing and 
customizing the questions (Fleming & Bowden, 2009; MacKerron, 2011). The use 
of online panels allows the target sample size to be achieved relatively quickly; in 
our case the target was achieved over night. A growing number of studies using 
online surveys show that reliable data may be collected through such surveys 
(Börjesson & Algers, 2011; Lindhjem & Navrud, 2011; MacKerron, 2011; Tonsor 
& Shupp, 2011). However, the main drawback for online surveys is an incomplete 
and biased sample frame as panel members are originally recruited through non-
probabilistic methods and individuals who have no access to the internet are 
excluded. An increase in internet penetration rates over the past few years has 
reduced the proportion of people with no internet access. With an internet 
penetration rate of 84.5%, New Zealand is ranked 12
th
 in the world (Internet 
World Stats, 2012), which may justify the use of the online survey for this study. 
However, despite the high internet penetration rate in New Zealand, some 
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population segments, especially low income groups in rural or remote areas, may 
still not have access to the internet. 
A review of literature on the possible survey mode effects of internet based 
surveys lends support to the decision to use an online survey for this research. 
Denscombe (2006) investigates survey mode effects using “near-identical” web-
based and paper survey questionnaires administered to “near-identical” groups in 
the context of voluntary risk-taking and health-related behaviour of young people 
in the UK. The study finds very little evidence of survey mode effects in terms of 
completion rates and data content. In contrast, Dolnicar, Laesser, and Matus 
(2009) compare an online and a paper (mail) survey on tourism and find 
significant differences in responses to tourism-related questions. Respondents in 
this study were asked to choose their preferred survey format, which may have 
resulted in self-selection bias with younger and more educated respondents opting 
for the web-based survey. It is not surprising that the results of the two survey 
modes are statistically different since socio-demographic characteristics (SDCs) 
were not controlled for in the surveys. Fleming and Bowden (2009) also compare 
results from a web-based and a mail survey on tourism but find no statistical 
differences in SDCs, response rates, and consumer surplus estimates. Respondents 
for the two survey modes were recruited onsite, hence the profiles and preferences 
of respondents in the two samples are likely to be similar,  in contrast to the study 
by Dolnicar et al. (2009) where recruitment was off-site (i.e. at respondents’ 
residences). It would appear that if representative samples are used in both web-
based and mail surveys, survey mode effects may be reduced or eliminated.  
The survey questionnaire developed for this study consisted of an introduction 
and questions arranged into seven blocks or sections. An example of a completed 
final survey questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1. The introduction explained 
the purpose of the survey and solicited participation. Respondents were advised 
that participation was voluntary and that anonymity would be maintained. This 
was followed by three screening questions which asked if respondents consented 
to participating, were at least 18 years old, and whether they were responsible for 
paying the electricity bill or had a say in choosing their electricity supplier. 
Respondents providing a ‘NO’ response to any one of these questions were 
automatically screened out. The next section consisted of questions on age, gender 
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and income, which were used to set quotas to ensure that a representative sample 
was achieved. The quotas reflected the population breakdown based on the 2006 
Census. The quota for gender was 49% males (51% females). Table 2-12 presents 
the quotas used for age and income. Additional questions on socio-demographic 
characteristics followed the questions used to set the quotas. 
Table 2-12: Quotas used for age and income groups 
Age  Personal Income 
Age group Quota Income group Quota 
19 and Under 9% ≤ $15 000 34% 
20-24 9% $15 001 - $30 000 24% 
25-29 8% $30 001 - $40 000 14% 
30-34 9% $40 001 - $50 000 9% 
35-39 10% $50 001 - $70 000 10% 
40-44 10% $70 001 - $100 000 4% 
45-49 9% ≥ $100 000  4% 
50-54 8%   
55-59 7%   
60-64 6%   
65+ 16%   
 
The third section included questions soliciting information on respondents’ 
switching behaviour, reasons for switching or not switching, and their current 
supplier. This was followed by a section consisting of attitudinal questions. These 
included the NEP Scale statements and questions measuring constructs based on 
the TPB and NAT. The fifth section included questions that asked respondents to 
evaluate their current supplier in terms of the attributes used in the ED by 
indicating the levels perceived to apply to their supplier. The next section 
introduced respondents to the choice tasks. The design attributes were defined and 
an example of a completed choice task was provided. To ensure that respondents 
did not skip this section, the page was timed and the ‘next button’ was disabled 
for 25 seconds. The next section presented the twelve choice tasks. The final 
section of the survey questionnaire included debriefing questions. Respondents 
were asked to indicate the attributes they ignored in making their choices, if any. 
Likert-type scales were used to rate how certain respondents were in their choices, 
their understanding of the choice tasks, and how easy it was to make choices. 
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The online survey questionnaire was first tested on a convenience sample of 10 
friends and relatives on my e-mail contacts list to identify any possible glitches in 
the survey-flow. A survey link was also sent to Research Now Pty Ltd, who tested 
the survey for the screen-out and quota questions. A second pilot test was 
conducted on a sample of 70 respondents from the online panel of electricity bill 
payers. The second pilot proceeded smoothly, which led to the final launch of the 
survey. 
2.5.6 Choice data 
The data set used in this research is constructed from responses obtained from an 
online survey described in the previous section. In total 477 respondents started 
the survey; 38 (8%) dropped out at various stages of the survey questionnaire and 
/or were timed out once the target sample was achieved, 76 (16%) were screened 
out because they were not responsible for paying the electricity bill or did not 
have a say in choosing their electricity supplier, and 138 (29%) were screened out 
because the quotas set for gender, age group and income had already been met. Of 
the dropouts, only one respondent went as far as completing three choice tasks. A 
total of 224 completed and useable responses were achieved.  
A panel data set was constructed from the 224 completed survey questionnaires. 
The data was formatted for NLOGIT 5 software. Each observation is represented 
by a block consisting of three rows, one for each alternative in a choice set. Since 
each respondent faced twelve choice tasks, the data set consists of 2688 (12 x 224) 
blocks or observations with each respondent being represented by 36 rows of data, 
resulting in a dataset with 8064 rows. All categorical levels were coded using 
dummy codes. This data set is used in model estimation in chapters 4 to 6.   
2.5.7 Summary 
In this chapter we have formally stated the standard discrete choice models (MNL, 
LC, RPL-EC) that are applied in this research. An extension of the LC model 
developed specifically to integrate psychological constructs with stated choice is 
also described. We have provided an overview of stated choice experiments 
highlighting the state-of-the-art. The main hypotheses tested in this thesis are 
stated. The models described in this chapter are used as the main tools in the 
analysis of data in chapters 4 to 6.  
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Chapter 3. The New Zealand electricity market 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a context for this research. We provide 
an overview of the electricity markets in New Zealand to highlight aspects of the 
markets that are relevant to this thesis. A discussion of the current debate on 
whether market reforms have worked in creating efficient and competitive 
wholesale and retail markets is provided towards the end of the chapter.    
3.2 The New Zealand electricity market (NZEM)  
The Electricity Authority (EA) is an independent Crown entity established under 
the Electricity Industry Act 2010 to provide regulatory oversight of the electricity 
sector. Its statutory objective is to promote competition, reliable supply, and 
efficiency in the electricity industry for the long-term benefit of consumers 
(Electricity Authority, 2011b). The New Zealand electricity market is a stand-
alone closed market with no means of importing or exporting electricity. 
Therefore, generation and investment in new capacity are driven by local demand 
conditions. Any supply shortages result in demand rationing and/or price spikes.  
Electricity generation in NZ is dominated by hydro which accounted for 57.6% of 
total generation in 2011 (Ministry of Economic Development, 2011c). However, 
generation from hydro is highly dependent on hydro storage levels and inflows 
into rivers and lakes with, a total storage capacity sufficient to cover demand for 
only seven weeks (Ministry of Economic Development, 2012). Generation is 
highly vulnerable to weather conditions. For example, in the dry winter periods 
(March-June) in 2001, 2003 and 2008, hydro storage levels were critically low 
and public awareness campaigns were used to reduce demand by encouraging 
consumers to conserve electricity. In 2003, the Whirinaki 155 MW oil-fired power 
plant was built specifically to provide reserve generation during dry periods and to 
cover major breakdowns in other generation plants (MBIE, 2010). The isolation of 
the NZ electricity market and the heavy reliance on hydro generation, which is 
affected by weather conditions and storage levels, pose serious challenges for the 
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Electricity Authority in fulfilling its mandate of ensuring security and reliability 
of supply and delivery of electricity to consumers at least cost. 
According to MBIE (2015), net electricity generation in 2014 was 42,231 GWh or 
152 Pj. Demand for electricity for the same period was 39,210 GWh. Residential 
electricity demand accounted for 32.1% (12,374 GWh) of total annual demand. 
Residential connections as at March 2011 were 1,683,089, accounting for 87.2% 
of total nationwide connections (Ministry of Economic Development, 2012).  
 3.3 Reasons for deregulating the electricity markets 
The current deregulated electricity market in New Zealand is the result of a series 
of reforms which started in the mid-1980s. Before the reforms, electricity 
generation and transmission were operated as a state-owned monopoly, whilst 
distribution and retail were under publicly owned territorial monopoly franchises 
(Bertram, 2006). Investment and pricing decisions were influenced by political 
factors and the electricity supply system was operated with social rather than 
commercial goals. According to (MBIE, 2010), the market was characterized by 
inefficiency, lack of customer choice and cross-subsidies
8
. The electricity reforms 
were part of economy-wide reforms triggered by increasing concern about New 
Zealand’s overall economic performance. At the same time, a wave of electricity 
market reforms was sweeping across many countries including the USA, 
Australia, and the UK.  
The main objective of the reforms was to stimulate economic growth through 
efficient resource use, driven by clearer price signals, and where possible, by 
competitive markets (MBIE, 2010). Specifically, the electricity reforms were 
aimed at establishing competitive and efficient wholesale and retail electricity 
markets, and regulating monopoly in transmission and distribution for the long-
term benefit of electricity consumers. Competition was expected to drive a search 
for greater production and service delivery efficiency, drive average prices down, 
and remove the regulator’s role of setting the prices. Consumer switching and/or a 
high propensity to switch were expected to exert pressure on retailers to offer 
competitive prices. 
                                                          
8
 Prices were set to recover costs, with price discrimination in favour of domestic consumers (low 
price) relative to commercial customers (high price) and industrial customers (in between). 
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Over the past 28 years, the electricity reforms have resulted in the partial 
privatization of the electricity sector, and the establishment of “workably 
competitive” wholesale and retail markets. According to Hansen (2014), a market 
is “workably competitive” if it ensures that prices broadly reflect cost of supply, 
drives costs towards efficient levels, spurs innovation and allows customers 
greater freedom to choose among competing retailers. The issue of whether the 
reforms so far have achieved efficiency in the wholesale and retail markets has 
been the subject of heated debate. We discuss this issue later in section 3.7. A list 
of key dates in the development of the electricity sector in New Zealand is 
provided in Appendix 3. Bertram (2006), Electricity Authority (nd),  Rowlands et 
al. (2004) and MED (2010) provide details of the reforms. 
3.4 Current market structure 
A summary of the current electricity sector in New Zealand is presented in Figure 
3-1. Participation in the electricity markets is governed by the Electricity Industry 
Participation Code 2010 (Code) which specifies the duties and responsibilities that 
apply to industry participants including the Electricity Authority. Key players 
other than the Electricity Authority include generators, a system operator 
(Transpower), an independent market operator (NZX Energy), lines or distribution 
network companies, retailers, and large consumers. The Code allows for buying 
and selling wholesale electricity through a compulsory pool or power exchange. 
Generators offer to sell while retailers bid to buy electricity to on-sell to 
consumers, and some large industrial consumers bid to buy electricity for their 
own use. The main components of the electricity industry activities governed 
under the Code that are relevant to this research are: generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail. We will show later how retail is linked to the other 
activities, and thus their relevance.   
The Electricity Industry Act 2010, which replaced the Industry Reform Act 1998, 
provides for a monopoly of transmission and requires full ownership separation of 
distribution (lines) businesses from retail and generation businesses. Transmission 
is a natural monopoly and is provided by Transpower – a state owned enterprise 
which owns and operates the national grid or high voltage transmission lines. The 
separation of ownership of distribution from retail and generation is meant to 
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promote competition in the retail and generation activities and to prevent cross-
subsidization of generation and retailing from lines customers.    
Today the wholesale electricity market is an oligopoly in which five major 
generators dominate the market. During the period 2003-2014, Meridian Energy, 
Contact Energy, Mighty River Power, Genesis and TrustPower jointly accounted 
for 92-96% of total generation (Bertram, 2014), with eight smaller grid-connected 
generators and other smaller distributed generators accounting for the balance. 
There are 22 retail brands and consumers are free to choose their preferred 
supplier from the 8 to 18 retail brands available depending on the region 
(Electricity Authority, 2013b). However, the electricity market is characterized by 
a high degree of vertical integration, with the five major generators (often referred 
to as ‘gentailers’ or the ‘Big 5’) dominating 95% of the retail market. The retail 
market structure thus leans towards oligopoly despite the existence of many small 
or fringe retailers, who account for only 5% of the market. This, according to 
some commentators, reduces the competitiveness of the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electricity Industry Summary for 2011 
Generation 
Wholesaling  
Transmission 
Distribution 
Retailing 
Consumption 
Meridian (32%)  Contact (22%)  MRP (17%) 
Genesis (15%)  TrustPower (6%) Other (8%)  
Clearing Manager (NZX) 
Transpower 
Local Distribution Network 
Genesis/Energy Online (27%). Contact/Empower (23%). 
(MRP): Mercury/Bosco Connect/Tiny Mighty Power (20%).  
Meridian/Powershop (15%). TrustPower (11%). Nova/BoP 
(3%). Other-mainly King Country Energy & Pulse (2%) 
Direct Supply Customers (e.g. 
NZ Steal, Rio Tinto, KiwiRail) 
General Consumption (All 
Sectors) (Residential 33%) 
         Primary electricity flows  
             Secondary electricity flows                
            Primary financial flows 
             Money flow for physical 
electricity and transaction/distribution   
Figure 3-1: A schematic of the NZ electricity industry (Source: NZ Energy Data File 2012) 
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Although there are no regulatory barriers to entry into the wholesale market, the 
high cost of new generation plants and the length of time required for feasibility 
studies, resource consent, and construction of the plant may prevent new entrants 
into the wholesale market for considerable lengths of time. The captive residential 
customer base in the retail markets limits the extent to which new entrants may 
penetrate the market. For example, the Electricity Authority (2012a, p. 4) observes 
that “consumer inertia is still strongly in play.” From March 2010 to March 2012 
about 47.5% of respondents were not happy with the ‘value for money’ from their 
current retailers yet the average switching rate was only 15% per year, indicating 
that the majority of unsatisfied customers did not switch despite the nation-wide 
campaign promoting switching. 
Bertram (2014) argues that vertical integration of generation and retail in the NZ 
electricity markets offers large synergies to the Big 5 because they can match 
generation with their customer base, allowing them to conduct most of their 
wholesale transactions in-house rather than in the open market. This reduces the 
Big 5’s exposure to the wholesale spot market price compared to small retailers 
and new entrants who do not own generation plant and have to buy their hedges 
from a market serviced by the Big 5. These conditions may not be conducive to 
the development of a competitive and efficient market especially if the Big 5 are 
able to collude or withhold available supply from the market.  
NZX Ltd is currently contracted as an independent market operator providing 
functions such as the management of reconciliation, pricing, clearing and 
wholesale information trading system (WITS). Transpower, as owner and operator 
of the transmission system, is responsible for the scheduling and dispatch of 
generation.  Electricity is supplied to consumers by 29 distribution companies and 
105 embedded networks (Electricity Authority, 2011b). To overcome the limited 
investment opportunities in competing distribution infrastructure, local 
distribution networks are owned either by trusts that return profits to their 
consumers, or companies under Commerce Commission price control but 
allowing for a reasonable rate of return on assets (Electricity Authority, 2011b). 
Bertram (2014) argues that distribution companies have been able to justify 
increases in charges based on upwards asset revaluations which reduce the rate of 
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return on assets or equity and therefore allow for increases in prices or revenues to 
bring the rate of return back to a reasonable level. The increase in charges is 
passed on to the consumers. This is seen as a loophole in the system and such 
behaviour is viewed by Bertram (2014) as violating the regulatory compact. A 
regulatory compact is a social contract and represents a combination of 
constitutional rights, laws and regulations, franchise agreements, regulatory 
commission rules and policy statements. A regulatory compact may be defined as 
follows: first, in return for a monopoly franchise the distribution company accepts 
an obligation to serve all consumers in the locality; and second, in return for 
agreeing to commit capital to the business, distributors are assured a fair 
opportunity to earn a reasonable return on that capital.    
3.5 Retail electricity prices 
Retailers sell electricity purchased from the wholesale market to residential, 
commercial and industrial consumers. Details of how the wholesale spot market 
price is determined are provided in Appendix 3-1. The retail price for residential 
consumers covers the total cost of supply which includes the following 
components: wholesale price, transmission, distribution, metering, market 
services, market governance, retail, and GST (see Figure 3-2). Commercial and 
industrial consumers do not pay GST and currently face lower retail prices than 
residential consumers. Although retail prices differ by consumer type they also 
differ by location or grid-exit point (node), reflecting the total cost of supplying 
electricity to the consumer’s installation control point (ICP), the metered point for 
transacting the delivery of electricity between the distribution network and the 
retailer.  
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Figure 3-2: Components of the residential retail price in 2010 (Source: NZX Ltd, 2014) 
In Figure 3-3 we present real annual average retail prices by consumer type (based 
on 2013 prices) for the period 1975 – 2010. Figure 3.3 shows that since 1985, 
residential retail prices have risen sharply in real terms whilst retail prices for 
commercial and industrial consumers have fallen. A number of explanations have 
been suggested for the observed trends in retail prices. One explanation is that 
with the onset of market reforms in the mid-1980s the removal of cross-
subsidization from commercial to residential consumers resulted in price 
corrections leading to increases in residential retail prices and a fall in retail prices 
for commercial consumers. Increased competition for commercial customers also 
exerted downward pressure on commercial retail prices leading to lower prices. 
Another explanation given for the increase in residential retail prices is the 
introduction of a 10% GST on residential retail prices in 1988 which was 
subsequently raised to 12.5%, adding 5.4% to the price rise that year (Evans & 
Meade, 2005). A possible third explanation for the sharp rise in residential retail 
price is the inelastic demand curve for residential consumers and the fact that 
consumption is mainly concentrated during peak periods when prices are highest. 
However, residential consumption has been flat over the past decades, only 
increasing at an annual average of less than 0.1%.  
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3.6 Promoting consumer switching in NZ retail electricity markets 
The introduction of retail competition in 1998 was meant to increase consumer 
choice and encourage innovation in service delivery, which would lead to lower 
retail prices. A decade later, a review of the performance of the markets revealed 
that switching levels had not met expectations and had been insufficient to induce 
competitive behaviour among retailers (Electricity Authority, 2010). Retail prices, 
particularly residential, had increased rapidly contrary to expectation (see Figure 
3-3 in previous section). To promote consumer switching, the government 
adopted a programme that addressed some of the major barriers to switching 
identified in the literature on consumer switching (e.g., Gamble et al., 2007, 2009; 
Gärling et al., 2008; Giulietti et al., 2005; Rowlands et al., 2004). The barriers 
include, lack of information, perceived search costs, perceived low economic 
benefits from switching, and loyalty to the incumbent. The campaign used to 
promote switching is discussed further in the next chapter. 
Figure 3-3: Real retail electricity prices by consumer category (NZ$2013)  
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A key rationale for the programme promoting consumer switching is that 
increased switching activity or increased propensity to switch alters the demand 
curve facing each retailer. With increased propensity to switch, the authorities 
argue that each retailer faces a more elastic demand curve in the short term and 
can attract customers if it lowers its price or lose customers if it prices above its 
competitors. An elastic demand curve provides incentives to lower retail prices 
and drives a search for increased efficiency and risk management strategies to 
mitigate price swings in the wholesale market. Lower retail prices and increased 
efficiency in the retail electricity market provide less ability for generators with 
market power to increase wholesale prices (NZX Ltd, 2014). The critical aspects 
of an efficient retail electricity market are: that consumers should be able to make 
choices about how much electricity they want to consume at a given price, and the 
market should promote least-cost production in electricity generation and delivery 
to consumers. A competitive retail market is therefore crucial for achieving a 
competitive wholesale market. The link between an efficient retail electricity 
market and the wholesale market is further obviated, in the case of NZ, by the 
vertical integration of generation and retail, where the main generators are the 
main retailers so that the behaviour of the same players influences both markets. 
3.7 Debate on the competitiveness of the New Zealand electricity 
market 
The electricity market in New Zealand continues to evolve as governments seek to 
improve competition and efficiency to achieve lower power bills for New 
Zealanders. However, concerns have been raised over the sharp rise in retail 
prices especially for residential consumers. For example, Statistics NZ figures 
show that despite weak demand, electricity prices rose 3% in 2013, nearly double 
the 1.6% rate of inflation. For the year ended March 2014, average residential 
electricity prices were 2.3% higher compared to the previous year. In April 2014, 
further retail price hikes were justified by retailers and lines companies as 
reflecting increases in operating costs. However, Statistics NZ’s producer price 
index shows that input costs for the sector have fallen in the last two years. As a 
result of the sharp rise in retail prices over the years, some commentators have 
questioned the competitiveness of the current market structure and the 
effectiveness of the regulations in ensuring lower prices. On the other hand, 
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proponents of the current market structure still argue that high prices don’t 
necessarily indicate the exercise of market power. Instead they suggest that the 
observed price increases may be due to other factors such as constraints in the 
transmission system, increasing cost of production and new capital, depletion of 
Maui gas fields and low hydro storage levels, which some critics fail to recognize.     
A single buyer model proposed by the Labour-Greens coalition during the 2014 
election campaign promised to reduce retail prices by 10-14%. The coalition 
argues that the current market structure is inefficient and uncompetitive as it 
allows the major power companies to exercise market power and charge 
unjustifiably high prices. They suggest that generators should be paid according to 
their offer schedules, which would provide incentives for the true revelation of 
marginal cost and elimination of any possible collusion
9
. Under the proposed 
single buyer model, NZ Power, a state owned company, would buy all electricity 
offered in the wholesale market, offer same the terms to all retailers, enter into 
long term contracts with generators and retailers to ensure stable prices, and hold 
tenders for the provision of new capacity (Bertram, 2014). The single buyer 
model, it is argued, would result in reductions of 10-14% in annual power bills. 
Opponents of the single buyer model argue that the model would install a 
monopsony arrangement on the buy-side of the market after the industry has 
worked hard to minimise the monopoly that had characterised the supply side of 
the industry for many years. Furthermore, the single buyer model would not 
facilitate transparent pricing in the market. Instead it would encourage contracting 
arrangements similar to transfer pricing between generators and their retailers. 
Layton (2013) and Evans (2013) argue that adopting this model would be 
tantamount to returning to central planning which has failed in the past and would 
lead to higher prices. They suggest that the single buyer model is based on 
conclusions drawn from inadequate research that assumes, among other things, 
that dams have been paid for, and fails to recognize that water is not free since it 
has an opportunity cost.    
Some New Zealand studies indicate that under the current market structure and 
regulations, the four largest players in the market (Meridian, Contact, Genesis and 
                                                          
9
 Currently, generators are paid at the cost of the marginal plant irrespective of their bids for the 
previous plants.  
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Mighty River Power) have, in the past, been able to exercise market power 
leading to higher wholesale and retail prices  (see, Bertram, 2014; Browne, 
Poletti, & Young, 2012; Wolak, 2009). For example, the Wolak Report concludes 
that generators exercised market power in the wholesale spot market especially in 
dry years and, over the period 2001 – 2007, overcharged consumers by a 
cumulative total of NZ$4.3 billion (Wolak, 2009). Proponents of the current 
market structure have criticized Wolak’s findings and argue that the results are 
based on wrong assumptions of the market structure used in the analysis and the 
benchmark for competitive prices used in the estimation of the overcharging 
(Electricity Technical Advisory Group, 2009; Evans & Guthrie, 2012; Hogan & 
Jackson, 2012). Browne et al. (2012) use an alternative method to Wolak (2009) 
which addresses some of the criticisms of the latter and finds evidence of the 
exercise of market power by the major power companies which resulted in 
overcharging of $2.6 billion in 2006 and 2008.  
The Electricity Authority argue that the current electricity market is a “workably 
competitive” market in which prices broadly reflect the cost of supply (Hansen, 
2014; Layton, 2014). They state that the reforms from 2009 have reduced the 
ability of generators to exercise market power from 18% to only 2% of the time 
and small retailers have expanded rapidly, resulting in significant decline in retail 
concentration
10
. Furthermore, competition for customers has increased and more 
residential customers have reported having been approached by retailers enticing 
them to switch on more than two instances in the past three years. They also argue 
that since the spot price is based on the market clearing price, there is 
transparency in price discovery in the market; that is, the current wholesale market 
provides incentives for generators and retailers to reveal their true preferences and 
profits earned on low cost plants provide incentives for efficiency and promote 
investment. All this would be lost to the detriment of consumers if a single buyer 
model is adopted. However, they acknowledge that more still needs to be done to 
address concerns about the competitiveness of the retail market.  
                                                          
10
 Retail market concentration measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was 
between 0.4 and 1 in 2004 but by 2013 it had declined to between 0.2 and 0.6   
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3.7.1 Study contribution to the debate 
The Electricity Authority (2010, p. 4) contends that “The benchmark for 
successful retail electricity market competition therefore requires that price 
differences between retailers reflect brand value and service factors (which are 
likely to be small for electricity retailing).” Defeuilley (2009) argues that the 
homogeneous nature of electricity makes it difficult to differentiate and the 
potential to create value-added services is therefore limited. This implies that only 
small price differences are expected within retail markets, and therefore, an 
examination of changes in price differences over time may provide an indication 
of whether the markets are becoming more competitive or not.  
An important assumption of the introduction of competition in retail electricity 
markets is that innovative new entrants undercut incumbent prices and also offer 
better services (Defeuilley, 2009; Electricity Authority, 2010; Littlechild, 2009). 
This would exert downwards pressure on prices as incumbents are forced to 
innovate and reduce prices to retain market share. The expectation is that, in the 
short run, prices should fall towards new entrants’ prices. However, evidence 
from some countries suggests that these expectations may not have been met. For 
example, Defeuilley (2009) argues that in many cases new entrants in the British 
retail markets failed to be innovative, did not offer consumers anything new or 
better than incumbents, and failed to capture significant market share. He notes 
that in most European countries incumbents’ market shares lie between 85 and 
95%. This is supported by a review of retail electricity markets in Great Britain 
which revealed that the six traditional power companies control 99% of the 
market and all new entrants were insignificant (see, Giulietti, Grossi, & Waterson, 
2010). Insignificant market shares held by new entrants, increasing retail prices, 
and price differences ranging between 12-17% cast doubts on the competitiveness 
of the retail markets (see, Defeuilley, 2009; Giulietti et al., 2010). It is therefore 
interesting to see how New Zealand compares to these markets. 
We assess the competitiveness of a number of retail electricity markets across 
New Zealand based on the assumption that new entrants undercut incumbents and 
that prices fall towards new entrants’ prices. Specifically we look for evidence 
that new entrants’ prices are the lowest at entry or any other time, and for 
evidence of a reduction in price differences between highest- and lowest-priced 
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retailers. The data used is compiled from price trend graphs available from the 
Consumer NZ website
11
. The price trends graphs provide data on average annual 
expenditure on electricity consumption for a medium sized household from July, 
2012 to July, 2015 for each regional market. The price trends graphs use prices for 
the most common electricity plan type. We calculate percentage differences in 
price between the highest and lowest priced retailer in each region in July each 
year, and also note the behaviour of new entrants in terms of where their prices lie 
in the market.   
The percentage differences in prices in selected regions are presented in Figure 3-
4. All but one market included in our analysis recorded a sharp decline in price 
difference from 2012 to 2013. This reduction in price differences is due to 
increases in the lowest prices rather than a decline in the highest prices and does 
not reflect an improvement in competitiveness. The opposite is expected in a 
competitive market. In the majority of cases, the differences in prices increase 
from July 2013 to July 2015 which may indicate non-competitive behaviour by 
retailers. In some instances the increase in price differences is due to new entrants 
providing the lowest prices whilst traditional incumbents do not appear to respond 
to these lower prices. For example, in Northland, Nova Energy (a non-traditional 
retailer) was the cheapest and did not change its price from July 2014 to July 
2015, but the most expensive retailer, TrustPower, increased its price during the 
same period. At the same time other entrants’ prices (Pulse Energy and Energy 
Online) were wedged between those of traditional retailers.  
Only one new entrant, Fick Electric, appears to have consistently behaved as 
expected by offering the lowest price on entry into the market. Other new entrants 
or non-traditional retailers price in the middle of the pack, contrary to expectation. 
In the Waikato region, a non-traditional retailer, Nova Energy was the most 
expensive retailer in July 2015. This unexpected behaviour by most new entrants 
does not put pressure on incumbent traditional retailers to lower their prices. In 
the main we find that where price differences decline it is due to the lowest price 
creeping towards higher prices, and where price differences increase due to the 
entry of lower-priced retailers, there is no apparent immediate counteraction by 
the incumbents.  
                                                          
11
 https://www.powerswitch.org.nz/powerswitch/price-trends 
87
 
     
 
Figure 3-4: Price differences between highest- and lowest-priced regional retailers  
 
Based on the benchmark for successful retail electricity market competition 
suggested by the Electricity Authority (2010), the large price differences in all the 
markets included in our analysis suggest that, in the main, retailers are not 
behaving competitively. Although the number of new entrants has increased, the 
five traditional retailers still control more than 90% of the market. The price 
differences observed in these markets are at least of the same magnitude as those 
observed in some European countries where such differences have cast doubt on 
the competitiveness of the retail markets (see, Defeuilley, 2009; Giulietti et al., 
2010).   
However, what is still lacking in the current debate is defensible empirical 
evidence indicating retail prices would have been higher if reforms were not 
introduced in the electricity markets. Since the focus of this thesis is not on 
whether or not the reforms have worked so far, we leave this question for possible 
future research. A problem that may be encountered with an analysis of this kind 
would be the lack of data on retail prices that have been measured in a consistent 
manner since the beginning of the reforms. For example, MBIE now uses “sales-
based electricity cost” to estimate residential retail prices and a revision has been 
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made back to 2009 data; similar data prior to this period is not currently 
available
12
.   
3.8 Electricity as a product 
Compared to other products, electricity is unique in the sense that it is 
homogeneous, cannot be stored on a significant scale given current technologies, 
its supply and demand are instantaneous, and demand is highly volatile (Evans & 
Guthrie, 2012; Evans & Meade, 2005). Actual demand for electricity at any 
instant is difficult to predict as it is a combined effect of instantaneous decisions 
of multiple users. In a gross pool system, once electricity has been generated and 
dispatched to the grid, individual electricity consumers have no information about 
the actual source of generation for the units they consume.  However, at the retail 
level, consumers may view electricity as a differentiated product if retailers offer 
different levels of non-price attributes of electricity services described in section 
2.5 of Chapter 2. 
3.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we have provided an overview of the New Zealand electricity 
markets. We highlighted the main objective for the reforms as the creation of 
efficient and competitive markets for the long-term benefit of New Zealanders. 
The important role of consumer switching in achieving the objective of the 
reforms was explained, and how price played a central role in the campaign used 
to promote switching was emphasized. The reason for the authorities’ belief that 
the law of one price would apply in the retail markets was that consumers 
perceive all suppliers to be the same except for the price, because of the 
homogeneous nature of the product. The implication of this belief is that 
consumers in any one particular retail market would switch to the cheapest 
available supplier, which would force retailers to reduce costs and offer 
competitive prices. We also identified the major players in the markets and how 
the market structure works in determining market prices. A summary of the 
current debate on the success of the reforms was given and we highlighted the 
main differences from the two main camps. The authorities argue that the market 
is workably competitive because prices broadly reflect the cost of supply, but 
                                                          
12
 Sales-based cost is estimated by dividing the dollar value of residential electricity sales by the 
number of kilowatt-hours sold to residential consumers.  
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concede that more still needs to be done particularly in the retail markets. The 
opponents argue that the major players are manipulating the market and have been 
able to overcharge consumers by billions of dollars. They advocate for a single 
buyer model and some changes in the regulations concerning asset revaluations 
and wholesale prices based on ‘pay-as- bid’.  
Our findings from an analysis of price differences and the behaviour of new 
entrants from 2012 to 2015 cast doubt on the competitiveness of the retail 
electricity markets in New Zealand. We have also suggested an area for future 
research, which may provide some empirical evidence that is currently lacking. 
In the next chapter, we use the multinomial logit (MNL), random parameter logit 
with error components (RPL-EC), and latent class (LC) models to analyze choice 
data in order to determine whether non-price attributes matter. This is expected to 
shed light on whether the belief that the law of one price should apply is 
justifiable.          
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Chapter 4. Consumer switching: Is price all that 
matters?  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we assess whether consumers perceive all electricity retailers to be 
the same except for the price (Question 1). Our main objective is to gain a better 
understanding of switching behaviour in retail electricity markets in New Zealand 
by identifying important determinants of switching and estimating the value of 
non-price attributes using the random utility models described in Chapter 2. We 
start by providing a brief background and stating the research question. This is 
followed by a brief discussion of the ‘What’s My Number’ (WMN) campaign that 
has been used to promote consumer switching in New Zealand. An overview of 
the local and international literature on consumer switching and valuation of the 
attributes of electricity services is provided to highlight the gaps in the literature. 
We then discuss the contribution of this chapter and show where it fits within the 
current literature. Finally we present results from an analysis investigating the 
factors that influence consumer switching in the residential retail electricity 
markets in New Zealand.  
Deregulated electricity markets offer consumers freedom to choose their retailer 
and provide opportunities to regularly review current retailers and switch 
suppliers when better offers are available. Opening formerly regulated retail 
markets to competition allows new entrants into the market, which increases 
supplier options available to consumers. Currently, New Zealand consumers are 
free to choose among 8 to 18 retail brands available depending on their region 
(Electricity Authority, 2013c). Consumers benefit from increased choice through 
improved conditions of supply and lower power bills by switching to cheaper 
retailers. On the other hand, switching to cheaper retailers exerts downward 
pressure on retail prices as retailers compete for customers. To retain or increase 
market shares in markets characterized by high mobility of customers, retailers are 
expected to offer lower prices, search for innovative ways to reduce costs and 
offer customers new value-added services.  
Consumer switching has been touted as one of the key drivers for achieving 
efficient and competitive retail electricity markets. The idea that customers may 
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perceive all supplier deals to be the same, except for price (since electricity is a 
homogeneous product) leads to an expectation of price convergence within 
regional markets (e.g., Defeuilley, 2009; Electricity Authority, 2010). The 
expectation of price convergence seems to rely on the assumption of low 
information search cost, low transaction (switching) costs, an easy switching 
process, and consumers actually switching to cheaper retailers. As a consequence, 
the promotion of switching has seen the setting up of independent price-
comparison websites in various jurisdictions
13
. Significant price differences are, 
therefore, expected to induce switching to lower-priced retailers.  
Evidence from previous studies indicates that a majority of customers rarely 
search for alternative retailers and that substantial price differences exist within 
retail markets (e.g., Brennan, 2007; Defeuilley, 2009; Electricity Authority, 
2011a, 2012a, 2013b; Hortaçsu, Madanizadeh, & Puller, 2015). Defeuilley (2009) 
argues that the proportion of active switchers is fairly small in many countries and 
the expected results of introducing retail competition do not always materialize. 
He attributes low switching rates in the British electricity markets to risk aversion, 
and behavioural biases encouraging customers to stick with the “status quo.”  The 
low switching rates have allowed incumbent retailers in most European countries 
to continue dominating 85-95 percent of the markets. Littlechild (2009) argues 
that the observed persistent price dispersion in retail markets should not be taken 
as evidence that market prices generally are not tending to the costs of new entry, 
but should be seen as a feature of any competitive market in the real world.  
In this chapter we challenge the perception that “only price matters” and 
hypothesize that non-price attributes of electricity services are also important 
determinants of switching and that preferences for non-price attributes may, in 
part, explain the price dispersion currently observed in retail electricity markets in 
New Zealand. Therefore, the following set of questions is addressed. 
Question 1: Do consumers perceive all electricity retailers to be the same 
except for the price? 
                                                          
13
 Examples are: www.powerswitch.org.nz in New Zealand, www.powertochoose.com in Texas 
(USA), and www.energywatchuk.com in the UK.   
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(a) Are non-price attributes of electricity services important determinants of 
supplier choice? If so, what values do residential consumers place on these 
attributes? 
(b) What are the determinants of WTP for the attributes 
(c) Do preferences for power bill savings differ across respondents? If so how 
do these preferences influence switching? 
(d) Do attitudes towards switching play a systematic role in explaining 
preference heterogeneity?   
4.2 What’s My Number campaign 
New Zealand introduced retail competition in 1998 under the Electricity Industry 
Reform Act 1998. The main objective of the Act was “to increase consumer 
choice, encourage innovation, and ultimately result in lower prices than would 
otherwise be charged” (Electricity Authority, 2010, p. 3). However, in 2009, a 
ministerial review of the performance of the electricity market determined that: 
(1) the current levels of consumer switching were insufficient to curb non-
competitive behaviour by retailers, and (2) the full benefits of retail competition 
had not yet been realised, particularly for domestic customers who continued to 
face rapidly increasing prices (Electricity Authority, 2010). It was observed that 
the majority of electricity customers exhibited a tendency to stay with their default 
retailers even when cheaper competitors were available. The review determined 
that consumers could be better off by as much as $150 million per annum, in total 
savings, if they switched to the cheapest available retailer (Electricity Authority, 
2011a). The estimated welfare benefits from switching were considered large 
enough to justify the establishment of a public funded consumer switching fund 
(Electricity Authority, 2010). However, it should be noted that the welfare 
benefits estimate is based on the seemingly unrealistic assumption of price 
convergence. 
The Electricity Authority spent $15 million (2011 to 2014) on the WMN 
campaign promoting consumer switching. Consumers were made aware of the 
ability to switch and the benefits (bill savings) from switching which averaged 
$150 per customer per year, and were encouraged to shop around for lower prices 
(Electricity Authority, 2011a, 2012b). An independent one-stop-shop website 
called “Powerswitch” was revamped to provide consumers easy access to a single 
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central switching service (Electricity Authority, 2010). The benefits promoted 
under this campaign were based only on price differences between retailers. This 
ignored the value that consumers place on non-price attributes of electricity 
supply and any possible influence these may have on switching behaviour and 
supplier choice.  
International studies show that factors such as lack of information, perceived 
information search costs, perceived low economic benefits from switching, 
attitudes, and loyalty to incumbent suppliers, among others, may prevent 
consumers from switching to the cheapest supplier (e.g., Gamble et al., 2007, 
2009; Gärling et al., 2008; Giulietti et al., 2005; Rowlands et al., 2004). The 
WMN campaign and Powerswitch appear to have been targeted at addressing the 
first three issues. 
A number of local studies and reviews were commissioned under the Switching 
Fund to provide the Electricity Authority and Ministry of Consumer Affairs with 
research that underpins the fund (see, Electricity Authority, 2010), and to conduct 
market research to assess the performance of the WMN campaign and 
Powerswitch website (see, Electricity Authority, 2011a, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 
2013c). The studies suggest that since 2009, switching rates in NZ have increased 
from an annual rate of 10.5% in 2009 to 20.8% in 2013 (e.g., Electricity 
Authority, 2013c). New Zealand switching rates were the second highest in the 
world after Victoria, Australia, in 2011, and were the highest in 2012-2014 
(VaasaETT, 2013). Authorities attribute this increase in switching to the WMN 
campaign and related regulation. Although the studies show an increase in 
switching activity compared to the pre-campaign period, they also show that a 
large number of consumers, more than 79%, did not switch in any particular year 
despite high average savings available in the market (see Table 4-1). Furthermore, 
the combined market share for the Big 5 has remained high at 95% and is similar 
to most  jurisdictions in Europe (see, Defeuilley, 2009; Giulietti et al., 2010). 
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Table 4-1: Switching rates and benefits (2011-2013)
1
  
 Year 
2011 2012 2013 
Average annual household savings   $165 $175 $155 
Switching rate  20.7% 19.1% 20.8% 
National savings if all customers 
switched to the cheapest retailer in 
their region  
$280 million $295 million $267 million 
1
 Source: Electricity Authority, (2013c) 
4.3 Overview of the switching literature and the contribution of this 
chapter   
The non-market valuation literature on consumer switching in retail electricity 
markets is relatively limited and has, for some time, been dominated by a few 
American and British studies conducted around the late 1990s (e.g., Cai et al., 
1998; Goett, 1998; Goett et al., 2000; Revelt & Train, 2000). Switching rates 
observed in most countries seem to be lower than expected, and have not placed 
sufficient pressure on incumbent retailers to induce competitive behaviour (see, 
Brennan, 2007; Defeuilley, 2009; Electricity Authority, 2010). It is not surprising 
that interest in studying consumer switching in retail electricity markets is 
increasing as regulators seek a better insight into the determinants of switching. 
This chapter contributes to this small but growing body of literature by identifying 
and valuing non-price attributes of electricity services and identifying market 
segments with homogeneous preferences. 
The focus of studies of consumer choice of electricity supplier varies depending 
on the main objective. In some studies the focus is on identifying important 
determinants of supplier choice or switching by valuing the attributes of electricity 
services (e.g., Abdullah & Mariel, 2010; Amador et al., 2013; Cai et al., 1998; 
Goett et al., 2000; Hensher et al., 2014; Kaenzig et al., 2013; Revelt & Train, 
2000). Some studies focus on identifying the attitudes that motivate or prevent 
consumers from switching (Gamble et al., 2009). An increasing number have 
focused on barriers to switching (Electricity Authority, 2010, 2011a, 2012a, 
2013b; Electricity Commission, 2008; Gamble et al., 2007; Gärling et al., 2008; 
Giulietti et al., 2005). Others focus on the determinants of WTP for the attributes 
of electricity services (Abdullah & Mariel, 2010; Amador et al., 2013). Whilst 
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results from these studies show that attributes of electricity suppliers such as 
price, length of contract, reliability of supply, share of renewables, discounts, and 
type of supplier, among others, are important determinants of supplier choice, 
other factors such as attitudes, past experience, perceived barriers, and socio-
demographic characteristics of consumers have also been found to play an 
important role in supplier choice or switching.  
Different approaches have been adopted in previous studies estimating WTP for 
the attributes of electricity services. The studies also target different sets of 
attributes. For example, Amador et al. (2013) use a mixed logit panel model with 
error components to estimate Spanish households’ WTP for supply reliability, 
share of renewables, availability of a complementary energy audit service, and 
supplier type. The study used a labelled experimental design (ED) in which the 
status quo alternative is labelled as ‘current supplier’ and the other two 
alternatives are labelled as ‘supplier from the electricity sector’ and ‘supplier from 
another industry’. Estimates of the alternative specific constants for the non-status 
quo alternatives are used to measure the values of the respective supplier type. 
Kaenzig et al. (2013) use a hierarchical Bayes model to investigate German 
consumers’ preferences for fuel mix, type of supplier, location of generation plant, 
green certification, cancellation period, and monthly power bill. In both studies 
consumers were found to be willing to pay significant amounts for the non-price 
attributes of electricity services.   
In a US study, Goett et al. (2000) use a sample of small and medium businesses to 
investigate customer choice among retail electricity suppliers based on a set of 40 
attributes of suppliers which were grouped into five clusters described as: 
pricing/discounts, value added services, green energy choices, customer services, 
and community services. An unlabelled experimental design with four alternatives 
was used to generate the choice tasks. This study was conducted prior to the 
introduction of competition in the retail market to provide insight on the attributes 
that would influence consumer switching and how the entry and behaviour of new 
entrants would affect the incumbent retailer’s market share. Cai et al. (1998) use 
double bounded questions on price discounts on separate samples of residential 
and business customers in the USA to estimate the share of customers that would 
switch to a competitor under various discounts and service attributes such as 
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renewable energy sources, reliability, energy conservation assistance and 
customer service.  
New Zealand studies have mainly focused on tracking consumer switching 
activity and evaluating the effectiveness of the WMN campaign in promoting 
retail competition (e.g., Electricity Authority, 2011a, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 
2013c). Although these studies identify the factors that influence switching, assess 
the importance of the attributes of electricity services using Likert-type rating 
scales, and identify consumer segments using cluster analysis, none of these 
studies attempt to estimate WTP for the attributes of electricity services. However, 
Daglish (2015) differs from these studies by applying the MNL model to analyze 
household switching decisions in a regional market dominated by a single 
gentailer. This study uses revealed preference data for the period 2007-2012 to 
measure the extent to which customers switched from incumbent supplier in 
response to the WMN campaign, and information about incumbent’s directors’ 
bonuses and a competitor’s local ownership. Results from this study indicate the 
presence of strong status quo effects which work in favour of the incumbent. 
However, the WMN campaign was found to have been successful in reducing 
loyalty to incumbent, and publicity about local ownership by one of the 
competitors attracted significant switches. Although the study does not estimate 
WTP per se, estimates of what the author terms “discount equivalent,” which are 
equivalent in magnitude to specific price differentials, are provided.      
This chapter contributes to the literature on consumer switching in electricity 
retail markets and increases our understanding of consumer preferences for the 
attributes of electricity services. It differs from previous literature in this area in a 
number of ways. First, we extend the application of one of the advanced discrete 
choice models to consumer switching. Although the latent class (LC) model has 
been applied to analyse consumer preferences in a number of contexts, it has not 
been applied in the context of switching in retail electricity markets
14
. Second, we 
extend on previous studies by examining a different subset of attributes which 
include: call waiting time, length of fixed rate contract, discounts, loyalty rewards, 
local ownership of supplier and supplier type. Third, we target a different 
                                                          
14
 At the time of writing the author is not aware of any previous applications of the latent class 
model in the context of supplier choice. 
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consumer type from studies that targeted small to medium size firms (e.g., Goett 
et al., 2000; Kaenzig et al., 2013). Fourth, we estimate a model that explicitly 
accounts for differences in marginal utility of income for respondents who exhibit 
different sensitivities to the level of savings that would induce a switch. Fifth, this 
chapter also contributes to non-market valuation literature by providing the first 
WTP estimates for the attributes of electricity services in New Zealand.  
4.4 Consumer switching in the retail electricity market in New Zealand 
In this section we provide sample statistics on consumer switching and present 
results of the analysis of responses to attitudinal questions that provide insight into 
consumer switching behaviour in the retail electricity market in New Zealand. 
Unlike previous New Zealand studies commissioned by the Electricity Authority, 
in addition to general attitudinal questions we use constructs based on the theory 
of planned behaviour (TPB) to give the responses theoretical validity and increase 
accuracy in measuring consumers’ attitude towards switching. A discussion of the 
theory of planned behaviour and the construction of the questions was presented 
in Chapter 2.  
The dataset used in this chapter is derived from responses to an online survey 
which was conducted in 2014. Details of the survey were provided in Chapter 2. 
Sample statistics are provided in the next section, followed by analysis of 
responses to questions about switching activity, and attitudinal questions relating 
to switching behaviour including the TPB constructs.     
4.4.1 Sample statistics 
A summary of the sample statistics is presented in Table 4-2. In general the 
sample closely resembles the New Zealand population in terms of most variables. 
Females are slightly over-represented by 2%, whilst males are under represented 
by the same percentage. Quotas set in the survey for age groups allowed us to 
perfectly match the age distribution in the population.  
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Table 4-2: Summary statistics of SDCs and attitudinal covariates for sample and national 
populations 
Characteristics Sample
1
 National
2
 
Gender (%) Male 47 49 
Female  53 51 
Ethnicity (%) NZ European  77 70 
Maori  5 12 
Asian 9 10 
Other 9 7 
Age Group (%) 18 – 24 yrs. 13 13 
25 – 34 yrs. 17 17 
35 – 44 yrs. 20 21 
45 – 54 yrs. 18 18 
55 + yrs. 32 31 
Income Group (%) 0 - $15,000 13 34 
$15,001 - $30,000 20 24 
$30,001 - $40,000 10 14 
$40,001 - $50,000 13 9 
$50,001 - $70,000 15 10 
$70,001 - $$100,000 14 4 
$100,001 and above 5 4 
Not stated 11 1 
Average annual personal income  $45,000 $37,500 
Highest level of education (%) High School and below 39.3 - 
Vocational/Trades 5.8 - 
Diploma or Certificate 24.6 - 
Bachelors 17.4 12.1 
Honours Degree/PG Certificate 7.6 2.7 
Masters or PhD 5.3 3.2 
Property ownership (%) Property owner 75 68.2 
Renter 25 31.8 
Average household size 3.2 2.7 
Households with children below the age of 18 years (%). 40.6 41.3 
Average monthly power bill $174 $190* 
  
Retailer  Market share 
 Sample  Actual 
Contact Energy and Empower 23 23 
Genesis and Energy Online 30 27 
Meridian Energy and Powershop 18 15 
Mercury Energy, Bosco Connect, and Tiny Mighty Power** 14 20 
TrustPower   9   11 
Other (mainly Energy Direct, Just Energy, Nova Energy, King Country)    6    4 
1
Sample size = 224. 
2
Data source: NZ Statistics – 2006 Census Data and NZ Income 
Survey June 2012 Quarter. *Source: MED Energy Data File 2012. **Mighty River Power 
retail brands 
The average personal income of respondents ($45, 000) is higher than the national 
average of about $37, 500. The difference may be attributed to the exclusion of 
minimum wage earners in the 15 – 17 years age group in the sample average, 
which are included in the national average.  Furthermore, a sizeable proportion 
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(11%) of respondents in the sample did not disclose their income compared to the 
general population (1%). Maori are under-represented by more than 50% whilst 
NZ-Europeans are slightly overrepresented. The sample average monthly 
electricity bill is lower than the national average. This is expected as the national 
average includes high winter bills whereas the sample average is based on 
respondents’ most recent power bill for a summer month.  
In addition to the above statistics we also collected information on respondents’ 
current electricity retailers, which allows us to compare sample and actual market 
shares for the major retailers (see bottom part of Table 4-2). The sample and 
actual market shares for the major retailers are, in the main, similar except for 
Mighty River Power’s retail brands, Mercury Energy, Bosco Connect, and Tiny 
Mighty Power, which are under-represented in the sample (14% vs. 20%). The 
sample statistics suggest that apart from being closely representative of the 
population, the sample is also closely representative of the market as all major 
retailers are reasonably represented. 
4.4.2 Reasons for choosing current supplier 
A summary of the reasons given for choosing the current supplier is presented in 
Table 4-3. The most popular reason given for choosing the current supplier is 
“offered a better package of price and service” (49%), followed by “well-known 
power company” (36%). About a quarter of respondents did not choose their 
current supplier as the power company was already supplying power to the 
premises when they moved in. This represents a group of consumers who appear 
not to care who their supplier is. Approaches by power companies (16%) seem to 
be more effective than advertising (9%) as a way of attracting customers.  
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Table 4-3: Reasons for choosing current supplier (N = 224) 
What were your reasons for choosing this company? Please select 
all relevant reasons from the list below. 
Number of 
responses 
% 
Offered a better package of price and service 110 49 
Well-known power company 79 36 
Power company was already supplying power to the premises 56 25 
Approached by supplier 35 16 
Recommended by friends or family 24 11 
Responded to an advertisement or visited a price comparison 
website 21 9 
Other (please specify) 20 9 
 
Most respondents (at least 73%) are at least “somewhat satisfied” with their 
current supplier in terms of “general overall service” and “value for money” (see 
Figure 4-1). This may indicate an improvement in customer satisfaction from 67% 
and 51% for “general overall service” and “value for money” reported for 2012 by 
the Electricity Authority (2012a). The improvement in satisfaction with current 
supplier may be a result of dissatisfied customers switching to preferred suppliers 
and/or suppliers improving their offerings in the face of increasing competition. 
An alternative explanation could be the differences in sampling methods. About 
26% of respondents are either neutral or dissatisfied with their current supplier in 
terms of the above criteria. This group of respondents is more likely to switch, and 
direct approaches by retailers offering better packages may induce switching. The 
majority of respondents (67%) have occupied in their current residence for at least 
three years which provides a large sample of respondents who would have 
switched supplier in the past two years for reasons other than “moving house.”  
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Figure 4-1: Distribution of ratings of satisfaction with current supplier 
4.4.3 Switching activity 
In the past two years, only 21% of respondents switched supplier. This is lower 
than the 30% reported in Electricity Authority (2013b). However, it should be 
noted that there is a one-year difference in the two studies and the switching rates 
may not be directly comparable. Of those who switched supplier, 75% switched 
once, 23% switched twice and only 2% switched three times. The proportion of 
respondents who switched supplier twice in the past two years is nearly double 
that reported for 2012 suggesting increased activity among switchers. Figure 4-2 
presents a summary of the search activity of electricity consumers. About 44% of 
respondents are more or less passive participants as 22% have never looked for 
opportunities to switch and an equal proportion have only looked for opportunities 
to switch once every two years or more. This group represents respondents who 
are less likely to be influenced by any short term advertising campaigns which 
may, in part, help to explain the observed customer inertia.  About 28% of 
respondents look for opportunities to switch once a year whilst 26% look for 
opportunities once every six months.    
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Figure 4-2: Search activity: (Question: How often do you look for opportunities to switch 
supplier?) 
4.4.4 Reasons for switching supplier 
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of a list of reasons often given for 
switching supplier. A 5-point Likert-type scale with points marked as “Not at all 
important’ (NAI) (1), “Not really important” (NRI) (2), “Somewhat important” 
(SI) (3),”Quite important” (QI) (4), and “Very important” (VI) (5) was used for 
the ratings. Response summaries are presented in Table 4-4. The distribution of 
responses is spread over all response categories showing that respondents have 
different views on these issues. The most important reason for switching supplier, 
rated by 96% of respondents as “somewhat important” to “very important”, is 
high power bills followed by discounts (93.8%) and poor customer services 
(90.7%). The least important reasons include bundled services and a combined gas 
and electricity account with the same supplier. These are rated as important by 
about 38% of respondents. The distribution of responses suggests that the most 
important information required for switching decisions is the price and whether a 
discount is offered. Financial incentives, which are currently used by some major 
retailers, are rated as less important than customer service. It is interesting to note 
that although some reasons are rated less important than others, none are rated as 
“not at all important” or “not really important” by 100% of respondents, which 
suggest that retailers can still attract some customers based on any of the reasons 
for switching. For example, a retailer offering a gas and electricity account may be 
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attractive to 38% of the market and it might be worthwhile for such a retailer to 
promote itself as offering such a service.       
Table 4-4: Distribution of ratings on the importance of reasons for switching retail 
supplier (N = 224) 
Below is a list of reasons often given for switching electricity supplier. Please rate how 
important each reason would be for you if you were to consider switching supplier. 
 NAI
*
 
(%) 
NRI 
(%) 
SI 
(%) 
QI 
(%) 
VI 
(%) 
Mean 
Rating 
Rank 
High power bills  1.3 2.7 13.4 32.1 50.4 4.28 1 
Prompt payment /on-line 
payment discounts offered by 
other suppliers 
2.2 4.0 23.2 39.7 30.8 3.93 2 
Poor customer service by 
incumbent 
1.3 8.0 28.6 30.4 31.7 3.83 3 
Financial incentives offered by 
other electricity suppliers 
1.8 6.3 31.7 34.4 25.9 3.76 4 
Fixed power rates offered by 
other electricity suppliers 
4.5 16.1 44.6 25.9 8.9 3.19 5 
Electricity supplier is 100% 
NZ-owned 
12.5 20.1 31.3 24.6 11.6 3.03 6 
Prefer to buy from a retailer 
producing electricity from 
sustainable sources 
13.4 23.2 37.5 20.5 5.4 2.81 7 
To have other services e.g. 
broadband services with the 
same electricity supplier 
24.6 37.5 22.3 11.6 4.0 2.33 8 
To have a gas and electricity 
account with the same company 
41.5 21.0 14.3 16.5 6.7 2.26 9 
*NAI, NRI, SI, QI, VI, are “not at all important”, “not really important”, “slightly 
important”, “quite important”, and “very important” respectively  
4.4.5 Reasons for not switching supplier in the past 24 months 
Respondents who did not switch supplier in the past two years, accounting for 
79% of the sample, were asked to indicate if each reason for not switching listed 
in Table 4-5 was applicable to them or not. The results show that about 86% of 
this group of ‘non-switchers’ were “happy with service from current supplier” and 
77% “did not trust there would be real gains from switching”. These appear to 
have been the main barriers to switching in the past two years. Furthermore, a 
sizeable proportion of respondents (64%) were happy with the price charged by 
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their retailers and believed their retailers could match any deals offered by 
competitors. About 53% believe that switching is a hassle whilst 43% were too 
busy to shop around for better deals. Fixed term contracts prevented about 16% of 
respondents from switching.  
These responses seem to suggest that non-switchers are in the main uncertain 
about the benefits of switching, that is, how long the benefits could last and if they 
would be better-off in the long run with the new retailer, and whether they would 
be able to switch if they are not happy with the new retailer. To promote future 
switching by this group of ‘non-switchers’ the Electricity Authority needs to 
convince these customers that they can get better services from competitors, that 
the benefits of switching to the cheapest available supplier are real, and that 
switching is no longer a hassle as a simpler and more efficient switching system 
has been set up. 
Table 4-5: Reasons for not switching supplier in the past two years (N = 177) 
Please indicate which of the following reasons for not 
switching in the past 24 months apply to you. 
Applies Does not 
apply 
Happy with service from current retail supplier 86% 14% 
Did not trust there would be real gains from switching 77% 23% 
Happy with price of current supplier plus current supplier 
will match any deals 
64% 36% 
Switching seemed too much hassle 53% 47% 
Too busy to investigate the best deals available 43% 57% 
Was already locked into a contract 16% 84% 
 
4.4.6 Consumer sensitivity to the level of savings (power bill savings) 
Respondents were asked if they would have switched supplier in the past two 
years if they could have saved certain amounts per year on their power bills. All 
respondents were first presented with an annual power bill saving of $100 and 
asked if they would have switched supplier in the past two years if they would 
have achieved this level of savings. Those who said “No” were then presented 
with an amount of $200 and asked if they would have switched at this level of 
savings. For all “No” responses, the amount was increased to $300, then to $400 
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and those who still said “No” were asked to state the minimum amount at which 
they would have switched supplier. Responses are summarized in Table 4-6.  
Table 4-6: Level of savings and stated switching rates 
Question Yes No 
Would you have switched supplier in the past 24 months if it could 
have saved you $100 per year on your power bill? 
139 
(62%) 
85 
(38%) 
Now suppose you could have saved $200 per year, would you have 
switched supplier in the past 24 months? 
45 
(20%) 
40 
(18%) 
How about a saving of $300 per year, would you have switched 
supplier in the past 24 months? 
18 
(8%) 
22 
(10%) 
What about saving $400 per year, could this have been enough to 
make you switch supplier in the past 24 months? If not please state the 
minimum amount of savings per year that would have been enough to 
persuade you to switch 
11 
(5%) 
11 
(5%) 
Respondents stating $500 as their minimum are recoded as “yes” to 
$500 and the rest as “no” 
6 
(3%) 
5   
(2%) 
 
The results show that the majority of respondents (62%) would have switched 
supplier in the past two years if they had believed they could save $100 per year 
in power bills. This is nearly three times the switching rate for this sample and 
twice the national rate reported in Electricity Authority (2013b) where average 
savings were $150 per year. Of those who indicated that they would have 
switched at $100 only 31% had actually switched supplier in the past two years. 
These results indicate a difference between stated behaviour and actual behaviour. 
Disparities between hypothetical and real behaviour are well documented in 
previous literature investigating WTP in various contexts (e.g., Champ & Bishop, 
2001; Champ et al., 1997). We do not believe that lack of awareness of the 
potential savings from switching is a significant factor in explaining the difference 
between stated and actual switching behaviour in our sample. Although we did 
not collect information on awareness of potential savings from switching during 
the past two years, it is reasonable to assume that most respondents were aware 
based on results from the Electricity Authority (2013b) which indicate that 82% of 
electricity consumers in New Zealand were aware of the WMN campaign used to 
promote awareness of the benefits of price comparison and switching.  
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Of those who switched supplier in the past two years, about 90% said “Yes” to 
savings of $100 per year and the remaining 10% said “Yes” to $200 which 
indicates that switchers are generally more sensitive to savings than non-
switchers. The difference between stated and actual switching behaviour for the 
majority of respondents in our sub-sample may be explained in terms of the 
hypothetical nature of the survey questions, which may have induced “yea 
saying”. Another factor could be that the majority (69%) of respondents in the 
sub-sample may not have believed that the average level of savings suggested in 
the WMN campaign was achievable as shown in the previous section (see Table 
4-5). A logit regression of the “yes” response to the savings level of $100 
indicates that respondents who have switched supplier before and those with at 
least a bachelor’s degree are most likely to switch at this level of savings. This 
makes intuitive sense as switchers have the experience and respondents with 
higher educational qualifications may perceive the cost of switching to be low.    
About 18% of respondents are not willing to switch supplier at savings below 
$300, and 2% would not switch supplier based on savings even at the level of 
$500. The results from this analysis suggest that the current level of average 
savings of $150 have a potential of achieving switching rates of at least 62% 
provided consumers are convinced that such savings will be achieved and that 
switching is easy. The implication of the latter for the Electricity Authority’s 
future activities is that more effort should focus on convincing consumers that the 
benefits of switching are real if higher rates are to be achieved.  
4.4.7 Attitudes towards switching  
In this section we present the results of the analysis of responses to questions or 
statements measuring the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) constructs. The 
results from this analysis are used in model estimation in the next section to 
explore the influence of consumers’ attitudes towards switching on supplier 
choice and valuation of the attributes of electricity services. 
We use psychological constructs based on the TPB to measure attitudes towards 
switching electricity supplier. The TPB and its application in the context of 
consumer switching in the retail electricity market in New Zealand were discussed 
in section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2. To recap, the TPB postulates that an individual’s 
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intention to perform a behaviour [behavioural intention (BI)] is assumed to be a 
function of three independent determinants: the individual’s positive or negative 
evaluation of performing the behaviour in question [attitude towards the 
behaviour (ATT)]; the individual’s perception of the social pressure exerted on 
him/her to perform or not perform the behaviour in question [subjective norm 
(SN)]; and self-efficacy, or the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the 
behaviour [the degree of perceived behavioural control (PBC)]. In this context the 
behaviour is “switching supplier.” Each construct is measured using two questions 
or statements, namely, ATT1 and ATT2, SN1 and SN2, PBC1 and PBC2, and BI1 
and BI2 for ATT, SN, PBC, and BI, respectively.  
The distribution of responses to the statements measuring TBP constructs is 
presented in Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4, and Table 4-7 presents the sample average 
scores for each construct. The results show that the majority of respondents (about 
80%) have a positive attitude towards switching supplier, as indicated by selecting 
at least “slightly good or slightly rewarding” on the Likert scale. About 17% of 
respondents are neutral whilst 3% have a negative attitude towards switching. The 
bar charts for ATT1 and ATT2 show a definite negative skew. The average 
sample score for attitude towards switching (ATT) is approximately 2, which is 
equivalent to “quite good” on the Likert scale. These results suggest that the 
majority of New Zealanders have a positive attitude towards switching. Perhaps 
this is one of the reasons why New Zealand has the highest switching rates in the 
world.  
The distribution of responses to the statements measuring subjective norm (SN) 
show that only 41% of respondents feel social pressure to switch supplier, 39% 
are neutral, and 20% do not feel any social pressure. The average sample score for 
SN is 0.33 (approximately zero), which is equivalent to the neutral point (“neither 
likely nor unlikely”) on the Likert scale. This suggests that social norms may not 
play a significant role in influencing switching behaviour. About 62% of 
respondents believe that switching supplier is easy and that they can switch if they 
want to (PBC), 24% are neutral, and about 14% believe that switching is difficult 
and that their ability to switch is limited. The average sample score for PBC is 
0.95 (approximately 1), which corresponds to “somewhat easy” or “somewhat 
agree” on the Likert scale indicating positive but low PBC.   
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[ATT1] For me switching to a supplier 
offering a better package of price and 
services would be 
[ATT2] For me switching to a supplier 
offering a better package of price and 
services would be 
  
[SN1] How likely is it that most people 
who are important to you think that you 
should switch to a supplier offering a better 
package of price and services? 
[SN2] How likely or unlikely is it that most 
people who are important to you would 
approve if you switch to a supplier offering 
a better package of price and services? 
  
[PBC1] I believe that I can switch to a 
supplier offering a better package of price 
and services if I want 
[PBC2] For me switching to a supplier 
offering a better package of price and 
services would be 
  
 
Note: “Neither Good nor ……”. The missing word is “Bad.” For the other midpoint 
response categories the missing words are the opposites. 
Based on responses to the statements measuring behavioural intention (BI), only 
38% of respondents expressed an intention to switch supplier in the next 12 
months, 31% were neutral and 31% had no intention of switching. The average 
Figure 4-3: Distribution of responses to the TPB constructs 
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score for BI is -0.02 (approximately zero), which corresponds to the neutral point 
on the Likert scale. These results suggest that New Zealand may achieve even 
higher switching rates in future if authorities implement policies targeted at 
influencing neutral consumers and those who have no intention of switching 
supplier. The Electricity Authority is currently reviewing options for promoting 
retail competition by increasing consumers’ propensity to compare and switch 
retailers (Retail Advisory Group, 2013, April 9), which may influence BI 
especially if ‘stickier’ consumer segments are targeted.     
                                                                                                                                                           
  
                        
            
Note: Neither Likely …., and Neither Agree ….: missing words are “nor Unlikely, and 
nor Disagree” 
 
Table 4-7: Average scores for the TPB constructs (N = 224) 
TPB construct Sample 
average score 
Attitude towards switching supplier (ATT): ATT = (ATT1 + ATT2)/2 1.57 
Social norm (SN): SN = (SN1 + SN2)/2 0.33 
Perceived behavioural control (PBC): PBC = (PBC1 + PBC2)/2 0.95 
Behavioural intention (BI): BI = (BI1 + BI2)/2 -0.02 
 
Figure 4-4: Distribution of responses for behavioural intentions (BI)  
[BI1] How likely or unlikely is it that you 
will switch to a supplier offering a better 
package of price and services in the next 
12 months? 
[BI2] I intend to switch to a supplier 
offering a better package of price and 
services in the next 12 months. 
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To assess whether each pair of statements measuring each TPB construct could be 
combined into a single index, a correlation analysis is carried out on each pair of 
statements measuring the same construct. Table 4-8 presents a summary of the 
results. The pairs of scores measuring ATT, SN, PBC, and BI have correlations 
ranging from 0.428 for the PBC items to 0.738 for the ATT statements and are all 
significant at the 5% level. The results suggest that each pair of items could be 
combined into a single index for each construct as presented before in Table 4-7.   
Table 4-8: Correlation matrix (Pearson (n)) for the TPB constructs (N = 224) 
Variables ATT1 ATT2 SN1 SN2 PBC1 PBC2 BI1 BI2 
ATT1 1 0.738 0.292 0.399 0.400 0.345 0.386 0.489 
ATT2 0.738 1 0.338 0.422 0.355 0.321 0.283 0.418 
SN1 0.292 0.338 1 0.533 0.189 0.155 0.346 0.489 
SN2 0.399 0.422 0.533 1 0.220 0.213 0.258 0.390 
PBC1 0.400 0.355 0.189 0.220 1 0.428 0.311 0.387 
PBC2 0.345 0.321 0.155 0.213 0.428 1 0.236 0.262 
BI1 0.386 0.283 0.346 0.258 0.311 0.236 1 0.718 
BI2 0.489 0.418 0.498 0.390 0.387 0.262 0.718 1 
 
Since the TPB assumes that behavioural intention (BI) is a function of attitude 
(ATT), social norms (SN), and perceived behavioural control (PBC), we test this 
assumption using correlation analysis, linear regression, and factor analysis. The 
correlations of ATT, SN, and PBC with BI are all significant at the 5% level and 
are 0.455, 0.460, and 0.382, respectively. Factor analysis of the mean scores 
measuring ATT, SN, and PBC shows that all three measures load heaviest on the 
first unrotated factor, which appears to represent BI as postulated in the TPB. This 
suggests that BI may be used in model estimation instead of the individual items. 
Linear regression results of BI on ATT, SN, and PBC are presented in Table 4-9. 
The coefficients of the constructs have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The results indicate that ATT, SN, and PBC are 
significant determinants of BI as postulated in the theory of planned behaviour. 
However, we note that the value of 0.32 for the model R
2
 is rather low for 
predictive purposes i.e., the explanatory variables are rather poor predictors of the 
dependent variable.   
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Table 4-9: Linear regression results for BI on ATT, SN, and PBC (N = 224)
 
  Coeff. S.E | t | p-value 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Intercept -0.8449 0.1451 5.82 .0000 -1.1308 -0.5589 
Attitude (ATT) 0.3056 0.0892 3.42 .0007  0.1298   0.4814 
Social norm (SN) 0.3342 0.0676 4.94 .0000  0.2009   0.4674 
Perceived behavioural 
control (PBC) 
 
0.2498 
 
0.0789 
 
3.16 
 
.0018 
 
 0.0941 
 
  0.4055 
R
2
 = 0.3212              Adj.R
2
 = 0.3119 
 
4.5 Preferences and WTP for the attributes of electricity services 
In this section we apply the MNL, LC, and RPL-EC models to the choice data set 
to provide answers to questions addressed in this chapter. The models are 
described in detail in Chapter 2. The main objectives of estimating the supplier 
switching models are to: (1) determine whether non-price attributes play a 
significant role in switching; (2) explore the influence of consumers’ 
responsiveness or sensitivity to levels of power bill savings on switching; (3) 
estimate WTP for the non-price attributes and identify the determinants; and (4) 
explore the systematic role of attitudes in explaining preference heterogeneity.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Electricity Authority’s programme for 
promoting switching provided a central switching system to reduce search costs 
and quicken the switching process. It also provided a regulatory environment 
allowing free switching. The benefits of switching promoted under the programme 
were based on price differences in each region. Although more consumers 
switched supplier than ever before as a result of the programme, the majority of 
consumers, at least 79%, did not switch and significant price differences still exist. 
The lack of recognition of the role of non-price attributes on supplier choice has 
resulted in scant attention to consumer preferences for these attributes, with an 
associated paucity of evidence of their influence on switching or supplier choice. 
Estimating the above models may provide valuable insights into consumers’ 
preferences for power bill savings and non-price attributes.  
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In the sections that follow we provide a description of the variables used in the 
models, and regression results. 
4.5.1 Description of variables 
In this section we provide an example of a stated choice scenario (see Figure 4-5) 
used to elicit choice responses that we analyze in this and following chapters. This 
is followed by a discussion on how new variables and interaction terms used in 
the models have been created.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the main objectives in this chapter is to estimate consumer preferences for 
power bill savings. In section 4.4.6 we presented evidence suggesting that the 
minimum level of power bill savings that would induce switching varies across 
consumers. Therefore, assuming a single parameter for power bill savings, which 
implies homogeneous preferences, would be counterintuitive. Furthermore, 
evidence from literature on consumer switching in retail electricity markets 
indicates the presence of two market segments – switchers and non-switchers at 
prevailing savings levels (e.g., Defeuilley, 2009). In the case of New Zealand, 
about 30% of retail customers switched supplier over a period of two years when 
average annual savings from switching to the cheapest available retailer were 
In the scenarios that follow please only consider the information provided in deciding 
whether to switch supplier or not. Assume that any information not provided is the 
same for the three suppliers. Which supplier would you prefer? 
    ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time     15 minutes 15 minutes 0 minutes     
Fixed rate guarantee      0 months 36 months 0 months     
Prompt payment discount      10% 0% 20%     
Loyalty rewards      No No Yes     
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 100% 75%     
NZ ownership      100% 100% 50%     
  
Supplier type      
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company 
Well-known  
non-electricity 
company     
Average monthly electricity bill      $250 ($225 
after discount) 
$250 $200 ($160  
after discount) 
 Which supplier would you prefer? ○             ○ ○ 
Figure 4-5: Stated choice scenario and example of a choice task. 
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estimated at $150 (Electricity Authority, 2013c). The Electricity Authority 
(2012b, p. 38) identifies “five clusters each with its own distinct attitudes, traits, 
demographic profile, media preferences and propensity to switch”. Three of these 
clusters, accounting for 65% of respondents, were identified as being less likely to 
switch supplier. About 77% of respondents in our sample expressed uncertainty 
about achieving meaningful benefits from switching whilst 53% indicated that 
switching is a hassle, implying a higher perceived cost of switching.  
The weight of evidence presented above seems to point to significant differences 
in preferences among consumers and provides strong support for the approach we 
adopt. We create four indicator variables, Switch1, Switch2, Switch3 and Switch4 
for the respective minimum level of savings of $100, $200, $300, and $400+ 
required to induce a switch as presented before in Table 4-6. A variable referred to 
as Savings is created as the difference between the net power bills (after discount) 
of “Your Current Supplier” (status quo [SQ]) alternative and the other 
alternatives. The level of Savings for the SQ alternative is zero since this is the 
reference point. The SQ represents the traditional or incumbent supplier and the 
non-status quo (non-SQ) alternatives represent new suppliers or new market 
entrants or other traditional competitors. In the choice tasks, the selection of a 
non-SQ alternative represents a switch from the incumbent to an entrant or other 
traditional competitor.  
The indicator variables described above are interacted with the Savings variable to 
create four interaction terms referred to as Switch1_Savings, Switch2_Savings, 
Switch3_Savings, and Switch4_Savings, respectively. This effectively splits the 
sample into four groups of customers, each characterized by the level of power 
bill savings at which they would switch supplier and allows for the estimation of 
different coefficients for Savings for each group. The proportion of respondents in 
each group is indicated under the “Yes” column in Table 4-6. The variables used 
in model estimation are described in Table 4-10. Note that discount is not 
included in the variables used in model estimation as it is accounted for in the 
savings variable
15
. This is consistent with the current practice in New Zealand 
where the estimation of power bill savings takes into account the various 
                                                          
15
 Preliminary estimation produced insignificant parameter estimates for the discount variable 
indicating that its effect was fully captured in the savings variable.  
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discounts offered by retailers. Furthermore the literature suggests that the 
aggregation of common-metric variables is one of the information processing 
strategies that individuals in real or choice experiments may adopt in making 
choices as a form of cognitive rationalization (Hensher & Greene, 2010).  
Table 4-10: Variable description 
Variable Description 
Time Continuous variable measuring the average time for telephone 
calls to be answered by a customer service representative (0, 
5,10, and 15 minutes)  
Fixed Continuous variable indicating the period over which prices are 
guaranteed (0, 12, 24, and 36 months)  
Rewards Dummy variable indicating that a supplier offers loyalty rewards 
(1, 0)  
Renewables Continuous variable measuring the proportion of electricity 
generated from renewable sources (25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%) 
Ownership Continuous variable measuring local ownership of supplier 
(25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%) 
New electricity 
company 
Dummy variable (1 if supplier is a new electricity company, 0 
otherwise 
New non-electricity 
company 
Dummy variable (1 if supplier is a new non-electricity company, 
0 otherwise 
Well-known 
electricity supplier 
Dummy variable (1 if supplier is a well-known electricity 
company, 0 otherwise 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
Dummy variable (1 if supplier is a well-known electricity 
company, 0 otherwise) 
Savings Continuous variable measuring implied savings from switching 
from current supplier to a competitor   
Switch1_Savings Interaction term between Savings and Switch1  
Switch2_Savings Interaction term between Savings and Switch2 
Switch3_Savings Interaction term between Savings and Switch3  
Switch4_Savings Interaction term between Savings and Switch4  
Behavioural intention  This variable is the average score for BI as defined in Table 4-8 
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4.5.2 Utility function 
The systematic effect of consumer sensitivity to the level of savings on switching 
behaviour is captured by employing an indirect utility specification similar to that 
suggested by Morey, Sharma, and Karlstrom (2003), which uses a piecewise 
linear formulation for the bill savings parameter. In this formulation, the utility of 
savings is assumed to be a step function of bill savings. This approach allows us 
to explore differences in preferences for consumers with different bill savings 
sensitivities instead of estimating a single parameter for the savings variable, 
which would imply homogeneous preferences among customers. Nonlinear 
effects of continuous variables such as income have been studied in the past and 
the evidence suggests that incorporating such effects in random utility 
maximization (RUM) models improves model fit and provides estimates of 
marginal utility of income (MUI) that are more intuitive than assuming constant 
MUI (see, Goett et al., 2000; Herriges & Kling, 1999; Layton & Lee, 2006).   
The indirect utility function of alternative i is specified in equation (4-1). 
𝑈𝑖𝑛 =
{
 
 
𝛼1𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ1−𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑛 + 𝛃
′𝐱𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛   𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ1 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑑 = 0
𝛼2𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ2−𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑛 + 𝛃
′𝐱𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛  𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ2 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑑 = 0
𝛼3𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ3−𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑛 + 𝛃
′𝐱𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛  𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ3 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑑 = 0
𝛼4𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ4−𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑛 + 𝛃
′𝐱𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛  𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ4 = 1; ∀ 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑑 = 0
     (4-1)  
where 𝛼1, … , 𝛼4 are the marginal utilities of savings for respondents who would 
switch supplier at $100, $200, $300 and $400+ levels of savings, respectively, x is 
a K×1 vector of non-price attributes including x = 1 for the alternative specific 
constant for the status quo alternative, βʹ is a 1×K row vector of associated 
population parameters to be estimated, εin is a random term that is i.i.d. extreme 
value Type 1 distributed as described in Chapter 2, and d = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
4.5.3 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are tested. 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): Non-price attributes are important determinants of 
switching. This hypothesis relates to question 1(a) on whether or not non-price 
attributes of electricity services are important determinants of supplier choice.  
We test the null hypothesis that all β’s (betas) are equal to zero; that is, non-
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price attributes are not important determinants of switching, against the 
alternative that at least one beta is not equal to zero.   
 Hypothesis 2 (H2): Respondents’ SDCs determine WTP for the attributes of 
electricity services. This hypothesis relates to research question 1(b) on the 
determinants of WTP for the attributes. The null hypothesis is that SDCs of 
respondents do not explain observed heterogeneity of preferences for the non-
price attributes of electricity services. 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3): Respondents with different bill savings thresholds for 
switching have different preferences for power bill savings. This relates to 
research question 1(c), which deals with preferences for power bill savings. 
Specifically, we test whether respondents with lower savings thresholds have 
higher taste intensities for power bill savings than those with higher 
thresholds, that is, 𝛼1 > 𝛼2 > 𝛼3 > 𝛼4. The utility function specified in 
equation (4-1) allows for the estimation of these parameters. NLOGIT 
command for the Wald test of linear restriction is used to test for equality of 
the alphas from the MNL model, and the LRT, AIC and BIC are used to 
compare the restricted and unrestricted models.  
 Hypothesis 4 (H4): The TPB constructs play a systematic role in explaining 
preference heterogeneity. This hypothesis relates to question 1(d). The null 
hypothesis tested is that none of the TPB constructs (ATT, SN, PBC, and BI) 
play a systematic role in explaining preference heterogeneity, i.e., all the 
parameters are equal to zero. 
4.6 Models  
 We apply five specifications of logit models, M1, M2, M3, M4, and M5 to a 
supplier choice dataset with 2,688 choice observations of 224 respondents to 
provide formal answers to the research questions stated at the beginning of this 
chapter.  M1 and M2 are the standard MNL models that we use as base models for 
comparison purposes. In model M1 we assume that preferences for power bill 
savings are homogeneous across respondents, this implies 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼4, 
hence a single parameter α is specified for the bill savings variable. M2 is 
specified to reflect the hypothesis of heterogeneous preferences across savings 
thresholds (H3) as presented in the utility function in equation (4-1). M3 is a 
latent class model in which the class membership sub-model is the basic Heckman 
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and Singer (1984) model, which assumes that all parameters are the same across 
classes except for the class-specific constants. M4 extends on M3 by using 
psychological constructs based on the TPB to sharpen class membership. Both M3 
and M4 choice models are based on the utility function specified in equation (4-1) 
and are used to test hypothesis 4 (H4). Model M5 is a random parameter logit 
with error components and is estimated to provide additional support and evidence 
of preference heterogeneity for the attributes of electricity services. All the 
parameters are specified as generic except for the alternative specific constant for 
the status quo. Since the non-SQ alternatives are unlabelled, they share the same 
constant which is normalized to zero for identification purposes. A panel 
specification is used in all the models to take into account the correlation among 
choices by the same respondent. Preliminary estimation showed that accounting 
for the panel nature of the choice dataset improves model fit. 
The MNL models M1 and M2 impose the restrictive IIA assumption and 
homogeneity of preferences for non-price attributes across respondents as 
discussed in Chapter 2. To relax the assumption of homogeneity of preferences, 
the LC and RPL-EC models are estimated. The LC models (M3 and M4) allow 
for the identification of latent classes in which preferences are homogeneous 
within but heterogeneous across classes. The assumption of the LC models is that 
preferences in the sampled population can be characterized with a discrete 
distribution (Boxall & Adamowicz, 2002; Greene & Hensher, 2003). As such, the 
LC model provides additional insights into consumer preferences in terms of the 
number and respective sizes of market segments with distinct preferences. On the 
other hand, the panel RPL-EC model (M5) accounts for individual heterogeneity 
and allows for more flexible substitution patterns induced by correlations in the 
error terms of non-status quo alternatives (Scarpa et al., 2005).           
4.7 Results   
In this section we present and discuss the results from the models illustrated in the 
previous section. We relate the findings to the specific research questions and 
hypotheses. All the models presented in this section are estimated using NLOGIT 
5 software.  
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4.7.1 Regression results 
All the models are estimated with data coded for attribute non-attendance (AN-A) 
in order to account for ignored attributes as recommended in the literature 
(Hensher et al., 2005b; Hensher et al., 2012; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). A 
detailed discussion of AN-A and the different approaches to accounting for it is 
provided in Chapter 5. The estimation of the MNL models is straightforward once 
the utility functions are specified. However, the estimation of the RPL-EC and LC 
models may be a lengthy process. For example, for the RPL-EC model, Hensher 
et al. (2005a) suggest that the researcher should investigate different distributional 
assumptions for each attribute, especially where the sign is important
16
. On the 
other hand, the challenge in estimating LC models is in identifying the optimum 
number of latent segments supported by the choice dataset.  
Selection of the number of latent classes  
The number of classes retained in a latent class model “is exogenously defined 
and outside the space of estimable parameters” (Scarpa & Thiene, 2005, p. 434).  
To determine the number of classes retained in the latent class models we follow 
standard practice and use information criteria (IC), and other factors such as the 
pattern of significant parameters and relative signs, ease of interpreting the results, 
parsimony and the need to avoid over-fitting the model.  
The pros and cons of using each IC in determining the number of classes or 
segment retention was discussed in section 2.2.4 of Chapter 2. Table 4-11 and 
Figure 4-5 present the information criteria used in segment retention for the 
preferred model. The information criteria indicate the presence of three or four 
classes with clearly distinct preferences for the attributes of electricity services. 
The CAIC and BIC indicate that only three classes may be retained whilst HQC, 
AIC, crAIC and CAIC3 indicate four classes. However, when the number of 
classes is increased from 5 to 6, HQC, AIC, crAIC, and CAIC3 improve slightly 
but the number of insignificant parameters increases and all parameters in the last 
class are statistically insignificant. The model with three classes is selected based 
on CAIC and BIC, which have been found to have a tendency of lower over-
fitting rate (Andrews & Currim, 2003a), and the need for parsimony.  
                                                          
16
 We discuss this issue further in Chapter 6 
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Table 4-11: Criteria used to determine the number of classes for model M4 
Number 
of classes 
Number of 
Parameters 
lnL AIC crAIC AIC3 CAIC BIC HQC 
1 13 -2075 4176.1 4176.2 4189.1 4265.8 4252.8 4203.8 
2 28 -1816 3688.9 3689.5 3716.9 3882.0 3854.0 3748.6 
3 43 -1681 3448.1 3449.5 3491.1 3744.6 3701.6 3539.8 
4 58 -1636 3387.8 3390.4 3445.8 3787.8 3729.8 3511.5 
5 73 -1622 3390.4 3394.5 3463.4 3893.9 3820.9 3546.1 
6 88 -1591 3357.2 3363.2 3445.2 3964.1 3876.1 3544.9 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Information criteria and segment retention for M4  
Comparison of models 
We estimated a number of LC models in which the TPB constructs, ATT, SN, 
PCB, and BI are used in the class membership sub-model to predict class 
membership. Only model M4 results are reported as it is preferred over the 
competing models using ATT, SN, and PBC to sharpen class membership based 
on better model fit. Furthermore, a comparison of M4 with another competing LC 
model with a single coefficient for the bill savings variable indicates that M4 
performs better based on the LRT (χ2(9 d.f.) = 35.14 > χ
2
(9, α = 0.05) = 16.92). This 
supports our hypothesis of different parameter estimates for respondents with 
different savings thresholds for switching. We provide further discussion of this 
issue later as it relates to research question 1(c).  
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The least performing model is M1 whilst M4 is the best. In terms of AIC, BIC, 
pseudo- R
2
 and the likelihood ratio test (χ2(3 d.f.) = 123.82 > χ
2
(3, α = 0.05) = 7.81), the 
MNL model (M1) with a single coefficient for the savings variable performs 
worse than M2, which provides support for the utility specification presented in 
equation (4-1). The null hypothesis (H3) of a single coefficient for the savings 
variable is rejected based on the Wald test of linear restrictions with χ2 = 123.62 
and p-value = .0001. However, the parameter estimates of the non-price attributes 
are all significant at the 0.05 level and of similar magnitude in both M1 and M2. 
However, a direct comparison of betas across the models is inappropriate due to 
confounding with the Gumbel error scale.   
The three models fit the data well with pseudo-R
2
 values ranging from 0.294 for 
the MNL model M2 to 0.431 for the LC model M4.  Hensher et al. (2005a, p. 338) 
suggest that “a pseudo-R2 of 0.3 represents a decent model fit for a discrete choice 
model”. All the models presented here meet this criterion. Model M4 performs 
better than M2 and M3 in terms of LL, AIC, pseudo-R
2
, and the likelihood ratio 
test (χ2(30 d.f.) = 788 and χ
2
(2 d.f.) = 10.30 against M2 and M3 respectively), but 
performs marginally worse than M3 based on BIC. The difference of 0.002 in 
normalized BIC (BIC/N) between M3 and M4 is very small, hence overall M4 is 
preferred. The overall goodness-of-fit for both latent class models M3 and M4 is 
significantly better (-1681.05 and -1686.19 respectively) than the RPL-EC model 
M5 (-1848.69). Furthermore, the LC model allows for the identification of market 
segments, which is not possible with the other models. 
The assumption of IIA in M2 is rejected based on Hausman and McFadden’s 
(1984) test for IIA (χ2(13 d.f.) = 38.49, Pr(C>c) = .00024). This supports the 
estimation of more advanced models such as M3, M4, and M5, which allow for 
flexible correlation structures for the stochastic component of utility thereby 
allowing for heterogeneous preferences. Despite the rejection of the IIA 
assumption we still retain model M2 as our base model for comparison purposes 
as recommended by Hensher et al. (2005a).   
Summary and discussion of regression results 
A summary of the regression results for models M2, M3, and M4 is presented in 
Table 4-12 while those for M1 and M5 are reported in Appendix 4.   
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Table 4-12: MNL and LC model regression results (t values are in parentheses) (N= 224) 
MNL (M2) LC Model (M3) LC Model (M4) 
  Class Class 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
ASC_SQ 0.608
c
  
(7.97) 
0.832
c 
(2.58) 
0.088 
(0.77) 
2.854
c 
(6.36) 
1.053
c
 
(2.60) 
0.102         
(0.90) 
2.549
c
     
6.68) 
Time -0.041
c
          
(-5.50) 
-0.090
c 
(-2.83) 
-0.027
c 
(-2.89) 
-0.074
b 
(-2.06) 
-0.096
c
       
(-2.80) 
-0.029
c
             
(-2.96) 
-0.033     
(-1.12) 
Fixed 0.005
b
   
(2.46) 
0.023
b 
(2.41) 
0.007
b 
(2.20) 
-0.023
a 
(-1.91) 
0.021
b
 
(2.11) 
0.009
c
       
(2.97) 
-0.028
b
    
(-2.25) 
Rewards 0.409
c
   
(5.67) 
0.142
 
(0.59) 
0.491
c 
(4.53) 
0.881
b 
(2.42) 
0.035 
(0.15) 
0.479
c
       
(4.51) 
1.076
c
 
(2.85) 
Renewables 0.009
c
  
(7.29) 
0.006 
(1.45) 
0.013
c 
(7.81) 
0.016
c 
(2.58) 
0.004  
(0.95) 
0.013
c
       
(7.84) 
0.013
b
 
(2.19) 
Ownership 0.009
c
    
(6.96) 
0.020
c 
(4.36) 
0.012
c 
(6.35) 
0.033
c 
(3.83) 
0.019
c
 
(4.01) 
0.012
c
       
(6.46) 
0.025
c
 
(3.31) 
New electricity 
company 
-0.364
c
            
(-3.77) 
-0.317 
(-0.94) 
-0.221 
(-1.60) 
-1.158
b 
(-2.32) 
-0.483        
(-1.29) 
-0.172              
(-1.24) 
-0.641
a
    
(-1.67) 
New non-electricity 
company 
-0.667
c
            
(-5.35) 
-0.052 
(-0.13) 
-0.745
c 
(-4.34) 
-2.397
c 
(-2.94) 
-0.135        
(-0.33) 
-0.663
c
             
(-3.85) 
-1.538
b
    
(-2.49) 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
-0.386
c
            
(-3.32) 
0.250 
(0.48) 
-0.336
b 
(-2.18) 
-1.080
b 
(-2.01) 
0.154  
(0.26) 
-0.271
a
             
(-1.74) 
-0.573     
(-1.16) 
Switch1_Savings [α1] 0.033
c
  
(30.02) 
0.097
c 
(9.37) 
0.024
c 
(13.91) 
0.025
c 
(4.01) 
0.101
c
 
(8.69) 
0.024
c
   
(14.23) 
0.021
c
 
(3.60) 
Switch2_Savings [α2] 0.025
c
  
(16.86) 
0.083
c 
(7.15) 
0.016
c 
(7.76) 
0.038
c 
(5.43) 
0.084
c
 
(6.78) 
0.013
c
     
(5.95) 
0.045
c
 
(7.53) 
Switch3_Savings [α3] 0.019
c
    
(9.10) 
0.057
c 
(5.43) 
0.009
b 
(2.17) 
0.028
c 
(3.13) 
0.072
c
 
(3.91) 
0.013
c
     
(3.54) 
0.022
c
 
(2.73) 
Switch4_Savings [α4] 0.013
c
    
(7.18) 
0.052
c 
(6.11) 
0.011
c 
(3.00) 
0.004 
(0.52) 
0.054
c
 
(5.31) 
0.012
c
    
(3.09) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Class probability model 
Constant 1.240
c              
(4.71) 
1.339
c
   
(5.04) 
0.0 
(Fixed) 
Behavioural Intention (BI)  0.372
b
 
(2.06) 
0.569
c
   
(3.05) 
0.0 
(Fixed) 
Class Probability 0.416 0.459 0.125 0.405 0.456 0.139 
K 13 41 43 
LL -2075.05 -1686.19 -1681.04 
AIC 4176.1 3454.4 3448.1 
BIC 4252.8 3696.1 3701.6 
McFadden Pseudo-R
2 
0.294 0.429 0.431 
c
, 
b
, 
a 
Significant at .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively 
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All parameters are significant at the 0.05 level in M1, M2, and M5. In the LC 
models M3 and M4, the parameters of all the experimentally designed attributes 
are significant in at least one of the latent classes. Furthermore, all significant 
parameters have the expected signs. This provides a general affirmative answer to 
the first part of question 1(a) [Are non-price attributes of electricity services 
important determinants of supplier choice?] and provides empirical support for 
hypothesis 1 (H1) that non-price attributes are important determinants of 
switching. Even for the worst-performing model M1, the hypothesis that the 
starting values (zeros) are not significantly different from the maximum likelihood 
estimates (MLEs) is rejected based on the Lagrange multiplier statistic of 1752.76.  
The results from M1, M2, and M5, show how each attribute contributes to 
explaining the variation in choices observed within the sampled population. Since 
all the parameters are significant, we can conclude that all non-price attributes 
included in the models are significant determinants of switching. Relating the 
specific results of the LC models M3 and M4 to the research questions and 
hypotheses requires further discussion since the models identify groups with 
different preference structures. For example, each group has its own set of utility 
functions which differ from other groups in terms of the values and/or signs of 
parameter estimates and the variables that enter the utility functions; that is, 
choices are determined by different sets of variables with their corresponding 
group-specific parameters. We provide an interpretation of the parameter 
estimates and a detailed discussion of the results of the LC models below.   
As discussed in chapter 2, the parameter estimates for the switching models are 
interpreted as taste intensities or average marginal effects on the non-stochastic or 
deterministic component of indirect utility. The parameters of the non-stochastic 
component of the indirect utility function, which is specified as linear in 
parameters, are also the parameters of the nonlinear logit probabilities of 
alternatives. As such, the parameter estimates have no straightforward behavioural 
interpretation beyond the signs, which indicate whether a variable of interest has a 
positive or negative influence on choice probabilities (Hensher et al., 2005a). The 
order or size of parameter estimates also matter, but only for dummy variables.  
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For the best model (M4) the taste intensities for savings decrease as sensitivity to 
savings falls except in class 3, where α2, the coefficient of Switch2_Savings, is 
larger than that of Switch1_Savings (α1), and α4 is highly insignificant. An α2 > α1 
(and 95% confidence intervals don’t overlap) is counter-intuitive as it implies that 
respondents with a higher savings threshold ($200) for switching are more 
sensitive to power bill savings than respondents with lower savings thresholds 
($100). This result may be an indication that responses of respondents in class 3 
who answered “yes” to switching at $100 may have been influenced by “yea 
saying”. However, their choices over the choice tasks indicate lower sensitivity to 
savings as evidenced by a lower value estimate of α1. As discussed earlier, one of 
the appeals of LC models is their ability to identify groups with similar response 
patterns. Recall that 62% of respondents indicated that they would have switched 
supplier in the past two years if they could have achieved savings of $100, yet 
only 31% actually switched supplier at average savings of $150. This suggests the 
presence of “yea saying” or hypothetical bias.   
An insignificant α4 for respondents who would not switch supplier for power bill 
savings is consistent with expectation. However, α4 also captures the preferences 
of respondents who would only switch at $400 and above. This indicates that, on 
average, respondents in this group have a marginal utility of savings which is not 
significantly different from zero, and are likely to have ignored savings in their 
switching decisions in most or all choice scenarios. It should be noted that class 3 
represents only 14% of the market, and it is also possible that this class includes 
some respondents who made choices that are inconsistent with their indicated 
savings threshold given the unexpected α1 < α2 for this class. For classes 1 and 2, 
accounting for at least 86% of the market, the relative magnitudes of the four bill 
savings coefficients suggest that respondents’ choices are consistent with their 
responses to the question probing the level of savings at which they would switch 
supplier. So, in classes 1 and 2 we find evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that 𝛼1 > 𝛼2 > 𝛼3 > 𝛼4; that is, respondents with lower savings thresholds for 
switching have higher marginal utilities of power bill savings than those with 
higher savings thresholds (H3). 
The MNL model results indicate that consumers have a negative preference for 
service attributes such as call waiting time; a negative preference for the three 
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supplier types relative to the traditional supplier (well-known electricity 
company); and positive preferences for fixed rate contracts, loyalty rewards, 
renewables and local ownership of supplier. In model M4, class 1 represents about 
40% of the market. Respondents in this class have positive preferences for the SQ 
(current supplier), local ownership of supplier, fixed rate and savings, and a 
negative preference for call waiting time. This group exhibits a strong preference 
for local ownership of supplier and loyalty to the incumbent retailer and would 
only likely switch to a competitor for substantially lower power bills with longer 
fixed term price guarantees. Respondents in this class are more likely to respond 
to campaigns like the WMN for higher savings and price guarantee but would 
require information on local ownership of supplier to make optimal switching 
decisions. Respondents in class 2, representing 46% of the market, exhibit no 
loyalty to their current supplier. They dislike longer call waiting time and non-
traditional power companies, and have positive preferences for fixed rate 
contracts, loyalty rewards, renewables and local ownership of supplier.  
Class 2 represents a more mobile market segment that may offer challenges to 
retailers wanting to retain or increase market shares as more factors influence 
switching behaviour. This class offers retailers an opportunity to compete in 
different ways based on marginal rates of substitution between attributes. For 
example, a supplier may price above competitors and still retain market share by 
offering commensurate increases (decreases) in non-price attributes for which 
respondents have a positive (negative) preference. In this class, all the design 
attributes influence switching which provides an answer to question 1(a).  
On the other hand, class 3 represents the smallest market segment characterized 
by a large inertia or strong preference for the SQ. Unlike the other two classes, 
this class exhibits a negative preference for fixed rate contracts and doesn’t care 
about call waiting time. The large inertia exhibited by this group implies that only 
large changes in non-price attributes or unpleasant experience with the incumbent 
may induce switching. Recall that some respondents in this class will not switch 
supplier for any level of power bill savings, i.e. α4 = 0. This creates a challenge 
for regulators and an opportunity for retailers to behave non-competitively.   
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We observe significant SQ effects in M2 and M4 (classes 1 and 3) whereby 
respondents show a strong positive preference for the status quo. The observed 
preference for the SQ compared to the other alternatives in the choice set implies 
switching inertia and is consistent with reference-dependent utility theories 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988), or risk aversion. In the context of this study, the status quo 
(SQ) may have been preferred by some respondents for a number of reasons. One 
reason may be choice task complexity (see, Boxall, Adamowicz, & Moon, 2009) 
if some respondents found it hard to fully evaluate all alternatives in any given 
choice task and opted for the SQ as a coping strategy. Although less than 2% of 
respondents rated their understanding of the choice tasks below “fair”, about 13% 
rated “How easy was it to make your choices in scenarios 1 to 12?” as either 
“difficult or somewhat difficult”, but none rated it as “very difficult”. A second 
reason may be protesting where respondents select the SQ throughout as a way of 
registering their protests. We did not collect information on protest responses but 
only 13 respondents (5.8%), for whatever reasons, selected the SQ throughout. 
Other reasons for the SQ effect often proffered in the literature include loss 
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), regret avoidance (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1988), and loyalty to the incumbent (Gamble et al., 2009; Gärling et 
al., 2008).  
Class membership sub-model and TPB constructs 
Now focusing on the class membership sub-model in the previous table, we 
observe that all the parameter estimates are significant at the .05 level. For 
identification purposes, all parameters in class 3 are normalized to zero as this 
class is used as a reference point. The constants in classes 1 and 2 are positive 
indicating the average influence of unobserved effects on class membership 
relative to class 3. The coefficient for BI is positive in classes 1 and 2 indicating 
that respondents who intend to switch supplier (potential switchers) have a higher 
likelihood of belonging to these classes compared to class 3. This makes sense as 
class 3 is characterized by large inertia and less sensitivity to power bill savings. 
Furthermore, the coefficient for BI is largest in class 2 implying that potential 
switchers have the highest likelihood of belonging to this class, and we can 
compute marginal probabilities.  
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Recall that class 2 was identified as representing a mobile segment of the market. 
We find that the results of the class membership model are consistent with the 
results of the choice model. Apart from improving model fit, the inclusion of BI in 
the class membership model influences the relative sizes of the market segments. 
For example, class membership probabilities of classes 1 and 2 fall slightly by 
2.64% and 0.65% respectively whilst that of class 3 increases by 11.2%. A 
conclusion that may be drawn from these findings is that the inclusion of BI, a 
psychological construct based on the TPB, improves the characterization of 
heterogeneity of preferences. This addresses research question 1(d) [Do attitudes 
towards switching play a systematic role in explaining preference 
heterogeneity?]. Based on the significant parameter estimates of BI we reject the 
null hypothesis that the TPB constructs do not help in explaining preference 
heterogeneity. 
A summary of the latent preference classes  
Before we move to the next section, which deals with WTP for the attributes of 
electricity services, we provide a summary of the three latent preference classes 
and the characteristics of respondents in each class. Table 4-13 presents a 
summary of the latent preference classes whilst Table 4-14 provides average 
characteristics of the respondents in each class. Identifying the SDCs and attitudes 
of respondents in each segment is important for policy targeting and marketing 
strategies for product differentiation.  
Class 1 respondents may be described in general as “bargain hunters” since their 
main interest seems to be on securing better price deals, which implies 
information gathering, hence a strong dislike for call waiting time. We will show 
in the next section that although this group cares about local ownership, they have 
the weakest preference for this attribute compared to the other classes. The class 
consists of younger retail customers (44 years) with the highest average personal 
income ($48,200), highest switching rate (28%) and highest likelihood of having 
dependent children (48%). This class has the highest proportion of customers with 
at least a bachelor’s degree, and has the largest average household size, which 
may explain the observed high sensitivity to power bill savings and high 
switching rate. The group has the lowest environmental attitude score, which may 
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explain why they don’t care about renewables. It is interesting to note that class 
1’s average BI score of -0.08, which is basically zero and hence indicating 
neutrality, is consistent with a positive but relatively weaker preference for the 
status quo.  
We describe class 2 respondents as “mobile and discerning” since they exhibit no 
loyalty to the incumbent, express a positive intention to switch supplier (BI = 0.3), 
and would choose a retailer based on the value of all attributes. This group is 
dominated by females, has lower average income ($43, 800) than class 1, and the 
highest average environmental attitude score (54.03) hence a liking for 
renewables. This is consistent with findings from previous studies that women 
tend to be more pro-environmental than men (e.g., Clark et al., 2003; Ek & 
Soderholm, 2008).  Class 3 respondents may be described as “captive and loyal 
patriots” since they exhibit very strong preferences for the SQ, loyalty rewards, 
and local ownership of supplier. They have the highest average age, lowest 
income, smallest household size and are least sensitive to power bill savings.         
Table 4-13: Summary of preference classes 
Attributes Class 
 1 (Bargain 
hunters) 
2 (Mobile and  
discerning) 
3 (Captive and 
loyal patriots) 
Status quo  + 0 ++ 
Time - - - 0 
Fixed price guarantee + + - 
Loyalty rewards 0 + ++ 
Renewables 0 + + 
Local ownership + + ++ 
New electricity company 0 0 - 
New non-electricity company 0 - - - 
Well-known non-electricity company 0 - 0 
Power bill savings strong moderate weak 
Segment size 40.5% 45.6% 13.9% 
Notes: +,-, 0, indicate positive, negative, and neutral preferences. Double signs = stronger 
preferences 
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Table 4-14: Summary of characteristics of respondents in each class 
SDC and attitudinal characteristics of 
respondents in market segments 
Class 
1 2 3 
Segment size 92 (41%) 101 (45%) 31 (14%) 
Gender (proportion of males) % 50 46 42 
Average age (years) 44 45 47 
Average Income (NZ$) 48,200 43,800 39,100 
Ethnicity NZ-European (%) 74 78 84 
Maori (%) 2 6 6 
Other (%) 24 16 10 
Child (% with at least one child) 48 38 29 
Average Household size 3.4 3.2 2.9 
At least Bachelors (%) 37 28 19 
Switched supplier in the past 2 years (%) 28 17 13 
Behavioural intentions (%) -0.08 0.30 -0.89 
Environment attitude score 50.18 54.03 51.94 
Said “yes” to switching at savings of:  $100 68% 64% 32% 
$200 17% 20% 29% 
$300 7% 8% 13% 
$400 +  8% 8% 26% 
 
In the next section we estimate WTP for non-price attributes of electricity services 
and discuss their implications for retail competition.  
4.7.2 WTP estimates 
We follow standard practice and calculate average marginal WTP for each non-
price attribute (k) as the ratio of the marginal utility of the attribute to the marginal 
utility of power bill savings as indicated below: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 =
𝑑
𝑑𝑥𝑘
𝜆𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘
𝑑
𝑑𝑥𝑠
𝜆𝛼𝑖𝑆
=
𝛽𝑘
𝛼𝑖
 ,       𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4                                                     (4-2)   
where S is the bill savings interaction term as defined previously and λ is a scale 
parameter. The marginal utilities of the attributes are the first partial derivatives of 
the utility function with respect to each attribute, which turn out to be the 
parameter estimates in Table 4-12 since the non-stochastic component of indirect 
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utility is specified as a linear function. Note that WTP is scale free and can be 
compared across models and datasets. 
Table 3-15 presents marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates for the MNL 
model and the latent class model (M4). The columns under each model and/or 
class heading labelled as α1, α2, α3, and α4 represent the four groups of respondents 
who would switch supplier at savings levels of $100, $200, $300, and $400+ 
(includes those who indicated they would not switch for any level of savings), 
respectively. Since there are four parameters for the savings variable, we estimate 
WTP for each attribute based on each parameter estimate. The standard errors for 
the WTP estimates are computed using the delta method. We first discuss WTP 
estimates based on the MNL model M2 before moving on to the LC model M4.   
For the MNL model all WTP estimates are significant at the 0.05 level, indicating 
that irrespective of the level of sensitivity to savings level, respondents value all 
the attributes of electricity services. Preferences for the attributes of electricity 
services become stronger as sensitivity to bill savings falls, i.e. respondents who 
are only prepared to switch supplier when the savings level is at least $400 and 
those who stated they would not switch based on any of the investigated level of 
savings value non-price attributes of electricity services the most, followed by 
those who would switch at $300. The absolute values of WTP for all attributes 
increase as we move from α1 to α4. The results of the MNL model suggest that 
respondents who value the attributes of electricity services more are less likely to 
switch supplier on the basis of savings alone. This has important implications for 
policies designed to promote switching in the retail electricity market. For 
example, an effective strategy to encourage switching should include information 
on non-price attributes if consumers are to make decisions that maximize utility. 
Marginal WTP estimates for fixed rate contract, loyalty rewards, renewables, and 
ownership are positive, implying that retailers offering higher levels of these 
attributes may attract customers compared to similar retailers offering lower levels 
of the attributes.  All new entrants in the retail electricity market are perceived 
negatively by customers and have to charge between $10.04 and $52.05 less per 
month compared to incumbent retailers (well-known electricity companies) to 
attract customers, ceteris paribus. New non-electricity companies are the least 
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preferred supplier type. These results offer one possible explanation why the rapid 
increase in the number of new retailers in recent years has not resulted in a 
significant decline in market shares for the traditional retailers and why some 
customers have not switched supplier when average savings have been as high as 
$150. For example, respondents (with α = α1 ) who would normally switch 
supplier if savings are $100 would not switch to a “New non-electricity company” 
for savings of $100 per year because, other things being equal, this company 
should charge $20.26 less per month or $243.12 less per year compared to 
incumbent traditional suppliers. To attract this group of customers the new 
company must therefore charge $343.12 ($243.12 + $100) less per year compared 
to traditional suppliers. In this case, the negative preference for “New non-
electricity company” relative to traditional retailers far outweighs the average 
savings of $150 currently available in the market and customers would not switch 
to this supplier type at current average savings. We discuss this issue further in the 
next section. 
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Table 4-15: WTP for the attributes of electricity services (NZ$2014)
1 
 MNL (M2) Latent Class Model (M4) 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 𝛼4 𝛼1 𝛼2 𝛼3 
Time -1.24 
(0.22) 
-1.61 
(0.31) 
-2.16 
(0.45) 
-3.17 
(0.72) 
-0.95 
(0.31) 
-1.14 
(0.43) 
-1.34 
(0.53) 
-1.78 
(0.72) 
-1.20 
(0.41) 
-2.14 
(0.81) 
-2.29 
(1.01) 
-2.47 
(1.14) 
NS
2 
NS NS 
Fixed 0.16 
(0.07)  
0.21 
(0.09) 
0.28 
(0.12) 
0.42 
(0.18) 
0.21 
(0.10) 
0.25 
(0.13) 
0.30 
(0.16) 
0.39
a
 
(0.22) 
0.39 
(0.14) 
0.70 
(0.28) 
0.75 
(0.33) 
0.81 
(0.37) 
-1.36 
(0.67) 
-0.64 
(0.27) 
-1.30
a
 
(0.70) 
Rewards 12.42 
(2.17)  
16.22 
(3.00) 
21.73 
(4.44) 
31.91 
(7.01) 
NS NS  NS NS 19.87 
(4.45) 
35.61 
10.01) 
38.07 
(14.06) 
41.04 
(16.80) 
51.32 
(22.84) 
24.17 
(9.35) 
49.26 
(24.59) 
Renewables 0.28 
(0.04)  
0.36 
(0.05) 
0.48 
(0.08) 
0.71 
(0.14) 
NS NS NS NS 0.53 
(0.08) 
0.96 
(0.19) 
1.02 
(0.32) 
1.10 
(0.38) 
0.60 
(0.31) 
0.28 
(0.13) 
0.58
a
 
(0.32) 
Ownership 0.29 
(0.04) 
0.38 
(0.06) 
0.51 
(0.09) 
0.75 
(0.14) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
0.23 
(0.05) 
0.27 
(0.09) 
0.36 
(0.09) 
0.51 
(0.08) 
0.91 
(0.19) 
0.97 
(0.30) 
1.05 
(0.37) 
1.17 
(0.37) 
0.55 
(0.15) 
1.12 
(0.43) 
New electricity 
company 
-11.04 
(2.88)  
-14.41 
(3.81) 
-19.30 
(5.30) 
-28.35 
(8.23) 
NS NS NS NS NS NS  NS NS -30.57
a
 
(18.59) 
-14.40
a
 
(8.39) 
-29.35
a
 
(18.00) 
New non-electricity 
company. 
-20.26 
(3.84)  
-26.46 
(5.16) 
-35.44 
(7.57) 
-52.05 
(12.16) 
NS NS NS NS -27.50 
(7.27) 
-49.28 
(14.81) 
-52.68 
(20.17) 
-56.78 
(23.72) 
-73.36 
(33.73) 
-34.54 
(13.93) 
-70.40 
(35.13) 
Well-known non-
electricity company. 
-11.74 
(3.51)  
-15.33 
(4.65) 
-20.53 
(6.44) 
-30.15 
(9.95) 
NS NS NS NS -11.24
a
 
(6.46) 
-20.15
a
 
(11.99) 
NS NS NS NS NS 
 
Class Probability 40% 46%                            14% 
 
 1
NZ$1 = US$0.8389. 
2
NS indicates that WTP is not statistically different from zero based on the respective parameter estimates which are insignificant even at the 10% 
level.  
a
Significant at .1 level. Note: figures in parentheses are the standard errors.  The column for α4 is omitted in class 3 as the coefficient of Switch1_Savings is highly 
insignificant and WTP may not be estimated.  
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WTP estimates based on the latent class model provide insight into the 
preferences of consumers in three segments of the retail market and allow for 
possible product designs or offerings and policies targeted at specific market 
segments. For example, any supplier type offering low call waiting time, longer 
fixed rate contracts and higher local ownership may target the market segment 
represented by class 1. However, class 1 has the lowest WTP for the attributes of 
electricity services. Respondents in this class are willing to pay between $4.75 and 
$9.00 more per month to a retailer offering 25% more local ownership compared 
to between $12.75 and $26.25 for respondents in class 2, ceteris paribus
17
. It 
should be noted that the upper value for each range of WTP values for each class 
only applies to a small proportion of the market, which consists of customers who 
would only switch supplier at annual savings level of at least $400 and those who 
would not switch for any level of savings.      
Respondents in class 2 are willing to pay on average between $19.87 and $41.04 
more per month to a supplier offering loyalty rewards and between $5.30 and 
$11.00 to secure a 10% increase in renewables in their fuel mix. For an increase of 
10% in local ownership these respondents are willing to pay on average between 
$5.10 and $10.05 more per month. A retailer offering a 24 months fixed rate 
contract may charge between $9.36 and $19.44 more per month compared to 
similar retailers offering no fixed rate contract without losing its customers to 
competitors. Informing consumers in class 2 that switching from this supplier to 
similar competitors would save them between $112.32 ($9.36 x 12) and $233.28 
($19.44 x 12) per year would not result in any switches if the competitors are not 
offering at least 24 months fixed rate contracts. To attract customers, non-
electricity companies entering the retail market have to charge between $11.24 
and $56.79 less per month compared to traditional electricity companies. A 
retailer able to reduce call waiting time by 5 minutes may charge between $6 and 
$12.35 more per month without losing its market share, other things being equal.     
                                                          
17
 The WTP amounts are obtained by multiplying the marginal WTP estimates presented in Table 
4-15 with the respective changes in the level of the attributes. This is based on the assumption of 
constant marginal WTP which may be criticised as evidence of lack of scope sensitivity, an issue 
that is well documented in the literature. However, we use relatively small changes which are 
likely to be realistic and less likely to be seriously affected by lack of scope sensitivity if any.   
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The absolute values of marginal WTP estimates for respondents in class 3 tend to 
be higher than those of respondents in other classes except in the case of 
renewables in class 2. This is expected as class 2 has a higher average 
environmental attitude score than class 3 as shown previously in Table 4-14. The 
negative preference for fixed rate contract means that retailers offering 24-month 
fixed rate contracts have to charge between $15.36 and $32.64 less per month to 
retain customers in this market segment. A new non-electricity company has to 
charge between $34.54 and $73.36 less per month in order to attract customers in 
this class compared to traditional retailers. 
The marginal WTP estimates for supplier type clearly indicate that incumbent 
traditional retailers enjoy large premiums in the market and this offers one 
possible explanation for the observed price dispersion in the retail electricity 
markets in New Zealand and why new entrants have difficulty making significant 
inroads in the retail market. We explore this issue further in the next section. 
4.7.3 Supplier type and switching inertia 
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the current practice of 
estimating the benefits from switching using exclusively power bill savings based 
on price differences may be inappropriate. Potentially it may under- or over-
estimate the true benefits based on expected or perceived savings which take into 
account differences in the levels of non-price attributes of competing retailers. 
The significant WTP estimates presented in the previous section suggest that 
consumers would be more likely to switch supplier if the expected savings are 
positive, ceteris paribus. The difference between the two measures may in part 
explain the perceived ‘stickiness’ of customers. We show that based on a measure 
of benefits from switching, which takes into account the values of non-monetary 
attributes as well as price differences, the minimum amount of savings required to 
induce indifference (i.e., a 50-50 chance of success) between staying with an 
incumbent traditional retailer and switching to a competitor varies depending on 
the type of retailer, market segment, and stated savings threshold for switching. 
These amounts differ from the $150 advertised during the WMN campaign.  
We use the model parameters presented previously in Table 4-12 to simulate the 
likelihood of a switch when a typical customer of a traditional retailer is 
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approached by a new entrant or other traditional competitor at various levels of 
power bill savings. For each supplier type we use the logit probability formula to 
estimate choice probabilities over a range of savings assuming that all other 
attribute levels are the same across retailers. We focus on supplier type and 
savings for two main reasons. First, a new market entrant and other traditional 
competitor trying to attract customers from an incumbent traditional retailer 
cannot change its “type”. However, it may be possible to offer other non-price 
attribute levels to match the incumbent. Second, the perceived customer 
‘stickiness’ relates to lack of response to power bill savings, which have been 
used as the main instrument for promoting switching.  
The plots for the predicted probabilities of switching for each level of sensitivity 
to power bill savings are shown in Figures (4-7) to (4-14). Table 4-16 provides a 
summary of the predicted minimum amounts of savings required to induce 
indifference between the incumbent and each supplier type. Figure 4-7 shows, 
based on the MNL estimates and the most savings-sensitive group (α = α1), the 
probabilities of switching from an incumbent traditional retailer (well-known 
electricity company) to each new entrant type or other traditional competitor at 
various levels of savings. Recall that the MNL model failed the IIA test. The 
switching predictions based on subsets of the choice sets may not be reliable. We 
present the predicted probabilities for comparison purposes only. 
Based on the MNL model, the minimum monthly (annual) power bill savings 
required to induce indifference between an incumbent traditional retailer (well-
known electricity company) and a new entrant range from $24 ($288), for a 
traditional competitor, to $44 ($528), for a new non-electricity company. These 
savings are far above the average power bill savings available in the market, 
which may explain the current relatively low switching rates or observed 
‘stickiness’18. When prices are equal across retailers the probability of switching 
to a new entrant ranges from 0.1915 for a new non-electricity company to, 0.2388 
for a well-known non-electricity company, 0.2430 for a new electricity company, 
and 0.3159 for other traditional competitor. These probabilities are in line with the 
                                                          
18
 We refer to current rates as low relative to expectations based on the benchmark of price 
convergence or the law of one price.   
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21% switching rate observed for our sample and the 30% reported by the 
Electricity Authority (2013b) 
Table 4-16: Minimum savings required to induce a 50-50 chance of switching (NZ$(2014)) 
 Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
 
MNL  
24.00  
(288.00)
* 
34.50  
(414.00) 
36.00  
(432.00) 
44.00  
(528.00) 
Class 1 
Switch1  10.46  
(125.52) 
10.46  
(125.52) 
10.46 
(125.52) 
10.46  
(125.52) 
Switch2  12.50  
(150.00) 
12.50  
(150.00) 
12.50  
(150.00) 
12.50  
(150.00) 
Switch3  14.70  
(176.40) 
14.70  
(176.40) 
14.70 
(176.40) 
14.70 
(176.40) 
Switch4  19.50  
(234.00) 
19.50  
(234.00) 
19.50 
(234.00) 
19.50 
(234.00) 
Class 2 
Switch1  0.00  
 
0.00 
 
11.25  
(135.00) 
27.60  
(331.20) 
Switch2  0.00 
 
0.00 20.25  
(243.00) 
49.30  
(591.60) 
Switch3  0.00 0.00 21.60  
(259.20) 
52.75  
(633.00) 
Switch4  0.00 0.00 23.50  
(282.00) 
56.75  
(681.00) 
Class 3 
Switch1 122.00 
(1,464.00) 
WNS  122.00  
(1.464.00) 
WNS 
*Annual amounts are in parentheses, WNS denotes will not switch to this supplier type 
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Figure 4-7: Predicted probability of switching [MNL model (switch1, α = α1)] 
 
When the parameter estimates from the latent class model (M4) are used, we get a 
different picture for each market segment, reflecting a heterogeneity of 
preferences that is masked in the simpler MNL model. For class 1 respondents, 
representing 40% of the sample, the estimated minimum monthly (annual) savings 
required to induce indifference range from about $10.46 ($125.52) to about 
$19.50 ($234.00) depending on sensitivity to power bill savings. However, for 
each level of sensitivity to savings, the amount is the same across all supplier 
types and reflects inertia or SQ effects since respondents are indifferent over 
supplier types. Any supplier type approaching a typical customer of an incumbent 
traditional supplier with a matching price has a probability of success of 0.2587 
(see Figure 4-8). This indicates that the incumbent has considerable market 
advantage over competitors even when all attribute levels, including the price, are 
the same across suppliers. The savings estimated for this market segment (class 1) 
are within the range of achievable savings in the market. Since the status quo 
effects appear to significantly constrain switching, it would be worthwhile to 
target future policies at reducing the status quo effects in this market segment, 
after further investigation of its determinants.    
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Figure 4-8: Probability of switching to any competitor for bargain hunters (class 1) 
  
In class 2, where respondents have no loyalty to their incumbent but dislike non-
electricity companies, the minimum monthly (annual) savings required to induce 
indifference ranges from about $11.25 ($135.00) to about $52.75 ($681) for non-
electricity companies depending on sensitivity to savings, and is zero for 
electricity companies. These amounts reflect differences in preferences for 
supplier types. A new electricity company or other traditional supplier has a 50% 
chance of poaching a customer from a traditional incumbent if they match the 
price of the incumbent, ceteris paribus. However, a well-known non-electricity 
company has a 43% chance whilst a new non-electricity company has a 34% 
chance of poaching a customer from a traditional incumbent if they match the 
price. For new non-electricity companies, penetrating this market segment, which 
represents 46% of the market, would be extremely difficulty given that even the 
most savings-sensitive customers would require a minimum of $331.20 
($27.60x12) in annual savings to induce indifference. 
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Figure 4-9: Probability of switching to different supplier types [class 2 (switch1, α = α1)] 
 
 
Figure 4-10: Probability of switching to different supplier types [class 2 (switch2, α = α2)] 
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Figure 4-11: Probability of switching to different supplier types [class 2 (switch3, α = α3)] 
  
 
Figure 4-12: Probability of switching to different supplier types [class 2 (switch4, α = α4)] 
 
140 
 
The market segment represented by class 3 (captive and loyal patriots) accounting 
for about 14% of the sampled population is potentially a no-go area for all 
competitors as the minimum monthly (annual) savings required to induce 
indifference between staying with the incumbent and switching to a well-known 
competitor is $122.00 ($1,464.00). Respondents would not switch to an unfamiliar 
entrant at any reasonably achievable level of savings. When prices are equal the 
probability of poaching a customer from a traditional incumbent is 0.0724 for 
well-known competitors, 0.0395 for a new electricity company and 0.0165 for a 
new non-electricity company (see Figure 4-13).  
 
 
Figure 4-13: Probability of switching to different supplier types [class 3 (switch1, α = α1)] 
 
Given the forgoing, the high proportion of non-switchers under the prevailing 
price differences between retailers in the New Zealand electricity retail markets is 
understandable. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that the structure of 
consumer preferences for supplier types combined with positive preferences for 
the SQ makes it very difficult for new entrants to make a significant impact in 
terms of market share captured. Traditional incumbent retailers can afford to 
141 
 
ignore modest price discounts offered by new entrants without losing significant 
market share. The price differences currently prevailing in the market are in part 
driven by consumer preferences and may continue as an observed feature of the 
retail electricity markets as long as preferences do not change. 
4.7.4 Determinants of WTP for the attributes of electricity services 
To investigate the determinants of WTP for the attributes of electricity services, 
we first obtain individual-specific parameters based on the best switching model 
M4. Recall that M4 is a latent class model in which BI is used to sharpen class 
membership. In Chapter 2 the LC model was formally stated. Here, we briefly 
describe how the conditional individual-specific parameter estimates and the 
corresponding individual-specific WTP estimates are derived. The conditional 
individual-specific WTP estimates are then used as a dependent variable in an 
OLS regression on SDCs and other attitudinal variables.  
As presented in Chapter 2, the conditional choice probability of alternative j by 
individual n in choice situation s is 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑠|𝑐 and the class probability is 𝜋𝑛𝑐.The 
conditional and unconditional probabilities of the observed sequence of choices 
by individual n are, respectively, 
 Pjn|c = ∏ Pjns
S
s=1 |c,  and  
 𝑃𝑗𝑛 = ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 ∏ 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑠|𝑐
𝑆
𝑠=1  ,  c = 1, 2, 3 and s = 1, 2, …, 12      (4-3) 
Pjn is the term that enters the log likelihood for the estimation of the latent class 
model. Since ‘j’ indicates the choices that individual n actually made, Bayes’ 
theorem can be applied to Pjn to obtain a conditional (posterior) estimate of the 
individual-specific class probabilities as (Greene, 2012), 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐|𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠, 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) =
𝜋𝑛𝑐∏ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠|𝑐
12
𝑠=1
∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑐∏ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠|𝑐
𝑆
𝑠=1
3
𝑐=1
      (4-4) 
Equation (4-4) provides an individual-specific set of conditional estimates of the 
class probabilities (?̂?𝑛𝑐
∗ ) from which we can obtain individual-specific posterior 
parameters (Greene, 2012), by integrating out the class probabilities over class 
coefficients: 
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?̂?𝑛 = ∑ ?̂?𝑛𝑐
∗ ?̂?𝑐
3
𝑐=1              (4-5) 
We used NLOGIT software to generate the parameter estimates in equation (4-5) 
and the corresponding WTP estimates used in the OLS regression. The regression 
results are presented in Table 4-17. For each attribute we ran a regression using 
SDCs hypothesised to influence WTP as independent variables. Each regression is 
represented by a single column in Table 4-18. In all the regressions the model R
2
 
is very low, indicating that most variables are poor predictors of WTP. However, 
low R
2
 values in secondary regressions of this nature are not unusual given that 
most information about choices, which was used in the estimation of WTP, is not 
included in the regressions.  
The only variables that are found to be significant determinants of WTP (at least 
at the 10% level) are age, income, environmental attitude and behavioural 
intention. All the variables are dummy-coded except BI. The age variable was 
dummy-coded to capture WTP for young and old respondents relative to the 30-
59 years age group (middle aged). The results show that older respondents dislike 
all non-traditional suppliers and would require larger price reductions to switch to 
these supplier types compared to middle aged respondents. They also value fixed 
price guarantees less compared to middle aged respondents. The dummy variable 
indicating low income is significant for Ownership and ‘supplier types’, 
indicating that low income earners value local ownership and dislike non-
traditional suppliers more than high income earners. As expected, the dummy 
variable indicating higher environmental attitude score is positive and significant 
at the .05 level for Renewables. This indicates that on average, respondents with 
high environmental attitude scores are willing to pay more to secure an increase in 
renewables in their fuel mix. For example, they would be willing to pay $6.30 
more per month to secure a 10% increase in renewables compared to respondents 
with lower environmental scores. Behavioural intention (BI) influences WTP for 
all non-price attributes except local ownership of retailer. However, BI is only 
significant at the 10% level for supplier types.   
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Table 4-17: OLS regression results (t values are in parentheses) 
 Time Fixed Rewards Renewables Ownership New electricity 
company 
 
New non-electricity 
company 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
Constant -0.46      
(-0.60) 
0.22 
(0.36) 
0.46 
(0.60) 
-0.10  
(-0.25) 
-0.09  
(-0.19) 
1.02  
(0.12) 
2.92 
 (0.14) 
1.43 
 (0.18) 
Gender -0.5         
(-0.08) 
- 0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.07  
(-0.26) 
- - - - 
Age18_29 -1.15  
(-1.48) 
-0.94  
(-1.38) 
1.15 
(1.48) 
0.48  
(1.35) 
0.79  
(1.36) 
-18.71 
 (-1.25) 
-47.63  
(-1.33) 
-18.01  
(-1.35) 
Age_60+ -1.47 
(-1.82) 
-1.47 
 (-2.07) 
1.47 
(1.82) 
1.06 
 (2.87) 
1.26  
(2.08) 
-25.93  
(1.81) 
-63.79  
(-1.86) 
-24.07  
(-1.88) 
Low_Income -0.53  
(-0.82) 
-0.63  
(-1.11) 
0.53 
(0.82) 
0.23 
 (0.80) 
0.96  
(2.00) 
-25.93  
(2.07) 
-62.63 
(-2.08) 
-23.33 
 (-2.08) 
Child -0.78  
(-1.13) 
-0.57 
 (-0.93) 
0.78 
 ( 1.13) 
0.14  
(0.46) 
0.46  
(0.92) 
- - - 
Switched -0.65 
(0.88) 
0.57 
(0.88) 
-0.65 
 (-0.88) 
-0.49 
 (-1.45) 
-0.56 
 (-1.01) 
- - - 
Power Bill 0.52 
(0.82) 
0.35 
(0.63) 
-0.52 
 (-0.82) 
0.08 
 (0.28) 
- - - - 
Environmental attitude - - - 0.63  
(2.28) 
- - - - 
Bachelors+ - - - 0.03   
(0.09) 
0.06 
 (0.13) 
- - - 
BI 0.65 
(2.95) 
0.42 
(2.20) 
-0.65  
(-2.95) 
-0.22 -
(2.14) 
-0.23  
(1.39) 
7.20   
 (-1.72) 
17.03  
(1.69) 
6.35  
(1.69) 
R
2 
0.081 0.066 0.081 0.100 0.063 0.058 0.059 0.060 
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 4.8 Chapter summary 
The main objective of this chapter was to provide insight into residential 
consumer switching in the retail electricity markets in New Zealand. Customer 
switching plays an important role in the development of competitive retail 
electricity markets. The introduction of retail competition and the promotion of 
switching rely mainly on the belief that consumers are price sensitive and that 
only price matters. Consequently, switching in most jurisdictions, including New 
Zealand, has been promoted on the basis of welfare benefits in the form of power 
bill savings. However, results from previous studies on consumer switching in 
retail electricity markets show that a majority of consumers have not switched 
supplier even where significant power bill savings are achievable. Consumer 
inertia has continued even when consumers are provided information on prices 
and a simplified central system for switching is provided. This chapter provides a 
number of insights into consumer switching and shows that the belief that only the 
price matters may be misguided based on the results of econometric analysis 
applied on a choice data set generated using an online stated choice experiment.   
The results presented in this chapter show that price is not the only important 
determinant of switching as all non-price attributes included in the LC model are 
at least significant in one of the preference classes. This indicates a potential for 
product differentiation as retail companies may compete by offering different 
service packages. Three latent classes with clearly distinct preferences for the 
attributes were identified. Class 1 represents a market segment consisting of about 
40% of respondents who can be described as “bargain hunters” since they are 
mainly concerned about lowering their power bills. Since these respondents are 
indifferent to supplier type, they are more likely to switch to a competitor offering 
a lower price equivalent to at least $19.50 per month in power bill savings, ceteris 
paribus. This amount represents switching inertia for the least savings-sensitive 
respondents in this market segment (see Table 4-16). Class 2, representing about 
46% of the market consists of respondents who may be described as “mobile and 
discerning”. Respondents in this market segment exhibit no loyalty to the 
incumbent supplier. However, they have a dislike for non-electricity companies 
and this is worse still if the company is new. The least savings-sensitive 
consumers in this segment would only consider switching to a new non-electricity 
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company when they can achieve at least $56.75 per month in power bill savings. 
Class 3 accounts for about 14% of the market and may be described as “captive 
and loyal customers.” They have a strong preference for the status quo, dislike 
unfamiliar new electricity companies, and are most unlikely to switch, with some 
consumers not willing to switch supplier on the basis of savings.   
The results also suggest that when the value of non-monetary attributes of 
electricity services are taken into account, the current average level of savings 
may not be adequate to induce some respondents to switch from traditional 
suppliers to new entrants due to the relative negative preference for market 
entrants and preference for the status quo provider. These findings offer one 
possible explanation why, despite the increase in the number of new retailers, the 
five traditional retailers continue to dominate the retail market. The significance 
of the values of non-monetary attributes of electricity services may partly explain 
the perceived ‘stickiness’ or inertia in the electricity retail market where the price 
or the level of savings are assumed to be the only drivers for consumer switching.    
The inclusion of behavioural intention in the class membership sub-model 
improved both the characterisation of market segments and model fit, highlighting 
the importance of including attitudes in models of consumer switching. However, 
SDCs were found to be poor predictors of WTP for the attributes of electricity 
services. Income, age, environmental attitude and behavioural intention were the 
only variables that were significant at least at the 10% level.     
The main policy implication of the findings is that future campaigns targeted at 
promoting switching should also provide consumers with information on non-
price attributes. From a competition policy perspective, price dispersion should be 
seen as a natural aspect of a market where consumers have a preference for the 
status quo (traditional supplier) and a dislike for new entrants, particularly non-
traditional suppliers. Further research is required to find out why consumers prefer 
traditional suppliers and to dispel any perceptions about differences in reliability 
and security of supply. For retailers, the findings imply that they can differentiate 
their products and target specific market segments by offering packages designed 
to meet the specific tastes of customers in each segment.  
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Chapter 5. Attribute non-attendance and hypothetical 
bias in stated choice experiments for 
supplier choice 
 
“The manner in which attributes describing alternatives in discrete choice 
modelling settings are processed in order to form an outcome choice is now 
recognised as a worthy area of research.” (Hensher et al., 2012, p. 236).  
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we estimated WTP for non-price attributes of electricity 
services using choice data that was coded for attribute non-attendance (AN-A). 
The effect of failing to account for AN-A in model estimation was not 
investigated. In this chapter we use discrete choice models based on the random 
utility maximization (RUM) framework to investigate the influence of AN-A and 
response uncertainty or hypothetical bias on model fit and WTP estimates in the 
context of supplier choice in New Zealand’s residential retail electricity markets. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to contribute to research that enhances the 
validity of WTP estimates obtained from stated preference (SP) methods.   
Attribute non-attendance is an information processing strategy adopted by 
respondents in choice experiments (CEs), which involves ignoring one or more 
attributes of the alternatives presented in a series of choice tasks (Campbell et al., 
2008; Hensher et al., 2005b; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). On the other hand, 
hypothetical bias (HB) is the observed difference between people’s responses 
under hypothetical and real settings (Cummings & Taylor, 1999; List, 2001; Lusk, 
2003; Norwood, Lusk, & Boyer, 2008; Ready et al., 2010). Possible information 
processing strategies or attribute processing rules which respondents in this CE 
may have used in choosing their preferred alternatives are explored, and their 
effects on WTP for the attributes of electricity services and predicted market 
shares are examined. Sensitivity of WTP estimates to different cut-off points on 
the Likert scales for certainty statements is investigated. The same dataset used in 
Chapter 4 is used in this chapter.  
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In the next section we provide a brief background and formally state the research 
questions addressed in this chapter. A detailed background was provided in 
Chapter 1. Section 5.3 presents a brief literature review on AN-A and hypothetical 
bias. Section 5.4 presents an analysis of self-reported AN-A responses and reports 
on the effect of inconsistences between reported non-attendance and the choices 
made on model fit and WTP estimates. Section 5.5 presents the results of inferred 
AN-A. Section 5.6 presents the results of the analysis of the effect of response 
uncertainty on WTP estimates. Section 5.7 provides the chapter summary and 
conclusions.  
5.2 Brief background and research questions  
In previous chapters we have described the role of the Electricity Authority as that 
of providing regulatory oversight of the electricity sector. We have also described 
how customer switching in New Zealand retail electricity markets has been 
promoted, highlighting the reliance of the “What’s My Number” (WMN) 
campaign and associated programmes on the belief that consumers are price-
sensitive, and that they will switch to the cheapest available supplier. At the time 
of our survey, the WMN campaign had been in operation for almost three years, 
during which New Zealand achieved the highest switching rates in the world. We 
argued that if consumers value non-price attributes, then providing information on 
price differences only may not be the optimal strategy where consumers are 
expected to maximise welfare from switching.  
The experimental design (ED) used to generate choice sets for this CE recognizes 
the possible role of non-price attributes in supplier choice. The non-price 
attributes included in the ED were identified as important from focus groups, 
literature review and a pilot study. As opposed to switching promoted under the 
WMN campaign, respondents in the CE were asked to evaluate each supplier in a 
choice set in terms of all the attribute levels used to describe it. Given an 
environment where switching has been officially promoted on the basis of price 
comparisons only, how would consumers behave when additional information on 
important non-price attribute levels is also provided? Specifically, this motivates 
the following research question:  
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 Question 2: Do respondents consider all the attributes of alternatives in 
making their choices? If not, how does this affect model fit and WTP 
estimates?       
 
This question is broken down into five components as follows. 
(a) Are non-price attributes of electricity services ignored in choice 
 experiments on switching or supplier choice?  If so, which attributes are 
 ignored? 
(b) Are attributes ignored individually or in combinations? 
(c) Are the choice responses of respondents who claim to have ignored the 
 cost attribute consistent with their claim? If not, how does this affect 
 model fit and WTP estimates? 
(d) Do preferences of respondents who ignore an attribute differ from those 
 who consider it? 
(e) What are the effects of attribute non-attendance on WTP? 
A second question addressed in this chapter relates to the influence of 
respondents’ uncertainty about their choices, which has been highlighted in the 
literature as a source of HB in welfare estimates obtained from SP data.    
Question 3: What are the effects of response uncertainty on WTP estimates?    
Answers to these questions have important implications for the Electricity 
Authority and electricity suppliers. For example, knowledge of which attributes 
are mostly ignored in the decision-making process of supplier choice provides 
insight into which variables to target for policy purposes. On the other hand, 
knowledge of attributes that are considered by customers in choosing their retailer 
provides opportunities for retailers to focus their advertising campaigns on the 
relevant attributes and to improve their offers. Identifying groups of respondents 
with similar attribute processing strategies may allow both policy makers and 
electricity retailers to target specific groups. Furthermore, the effect of ignoring an 
attribute or subset of attributes has important implications for researchers where 
the objective is the estimation of monetary values for the attributes. Accounting 
for respondents’ choice uncertainty helps to reduce the gap between welfare 
estimates derived from revealed preference (RP) and SP methods. This increases 
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the validity, and hence, the acceptability of estimates based on the state-of-the-art 
SP methods such as the CE developed for this thesis.   
Different approaches to accounting for AN-A have been developed and applied in 
a number of valuation contexts (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2010; Hensher, 2004; 
Hensher et al., 2005b; Lockwood, 1999; Saelensminde, 2002; Scarpa, Gilbride, et 
al., 2009; Scarpa et al., 2010). Similarly, for HB, different approaches have been 
adopted in mitigating HB either ex-ante (e.g., Arrow et al., 1993; Cummings & 
Taylor, 1999) or ex-post (e.g., Blumenschein, Johannesson, Blomquist, Liljas, & 
O'Conor, 1998; Champ et al., 1997). However, in both cases, there is no general 
consensus on which approach is preferred. The differences in approaches are 
highlighted in the next section. 
We use three approaches to investigate AN-A and its effect on WTP estimates. In 
the first approach we investigate the consistency of self-reported AN-A by 
examining whether the choices made by respondents who claimed to have ignored 
the cost attribute (monthly power bill) are consistent with their claims. Previous 
studies adopting a somewhat similar approach, but in different contexts, include 
Lockwood (1999) and Saelensminde (2002). We focus on the cost attribute in 
view of its importance in the estimation of WTP for non-price attributes.  Ignoring 
the cost attribute implies a near zero or zero marginal utility of income for this 
group of respondents, which would result in implausibly high marginal WTP 
estimates for the attributes of electricity services. Furthermore, ignoring the cost 
attribute in the decision-making process does not mimic behaviour in real choice 
situations.  
Following Hensher et al. (2005b) and Campbell et al. (2008), the second approach 
involves the estimation of the MNL, LC and RPL-EC models using data that has 
been coded to account for self-reported AN-A and comparing the results (i.e., 
model fit, significance and signs of parameter estimates including class 
probabilities, and WTP estimates) with those from the models estimated with the 
data assuming full attendance. Information on self-reported AN-A (also referred 
to as stated AN-A) was collected in the survey as part of the debriefing process at 
the end of the series of choice tasks. Each respondent was asked to indicate the 
attributes that they ignored when making their choices. Using self-reported AN-A 
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in model estimation implies that the responses were made without error. Based on 
standard practice in previous studies, respondents who considered all attributes are 
identified as having continuous preferences, whilst those who based their 
decisions on a subset of attributes are identified as having discontinuous 
preferences with respect to these attributes (Campbell et al., 2008; Scarpa, 
Gilbride, et al., 2009). However, concerns have been raised on the reliability of 
responses to debriefing questions asking respondents to recall their attendance or 
non-attendance to attributes (Hensher, 2008; Hensher & Rose, 2009).  
Previous studies have incorporated AN-A in model estimation by either assigning 
zero weights to ignored attributes (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Hensher et al., 
2005b; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009), or assuming non-zero parameter estimates 
for ignored attributes (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2010). The former implies that 
preferences differ between respondents who consider an attribute and those who 
ignore it, whilst the latter allows the researcher to determine whether or not 
preferences differ between the two groups. An unresolved issue in the literature on 
stated AN-A is which of the two approaches is preferred. Therefore, we apply 
both approaches to the same dataset and explore whether preferences differ and 
whether or not it is reasonable to assign zero weights to ignored attributes in the 
context of supplier choice.   
The third approach recognizes the limitation of using stated AN-A and avoids 
using self-reported AN-A in model estimation. This approach employs a latent 
class framework developed by Scarpa, Gilbride, et al. (2009), and recently 
extended by Hensher et al. (2012), to infer different patterns of AN-A. Instead of 
relying on stated AN-A, this approach utilizes the capabilities of the LC model to 
statistically infer the number of latent classes of AN-A that are supported by the 
data. AN-A characterized in this way is referred to as inferred AN-A. A number 
of recent studies identify the role of AN-A through model inference rather than 
relying on stated AN-A (e.g., Hensher & Greene, 2010; Hensher et al., 2012; Hess 
& Hensher, 2010; Hole, 2011; Scarpa et al., 2010).  
To mitigate HB bias we use responses to certainty statements to identify 
respondents whose choice responses are likely to be the source of HB bias. 
Responses to certainty statements were collected as part of the debriefing process 
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at the end of the choice tasks. We estimate a base model using choice responses 
from all respondents and compare it with models estimated using different cut-off 
points for certainty scores. In the original and subsequent applications of certainty 
statements, particularly in dichotomous choice contingent valuation settings, 
respondents who are less certain about their choices are either dropped from the 
sample or their “yes” responses are recoded as “no” or status quo/opt-out choices 
prior to model estimation (e.g., Champ et al., 1997; Ethier, Poe, Schulze, & Clark, 
2000; Norwood, 2005). Either way, all information indicating the preferences of 
these respondents is completely lost. Furthermore, the treatment of certainty 
scores in this manner is open to criticism since the selection of the cut-off points 
is arbitrary and has no theoretical basis (Ready et al., 2010). Blumenschein, 
Blomquist, Johannesson, Horn, and Freeman (2008) point out that the issue of the 
cut-off level of certainty at which a hypothetical decision corresponds to a real 
decision has not been resolved.   
We avoid the above criticism by including all responses in model estimation in a 
second round of estimation. Instead of selecting a cut-off point for certainty scores 
and omitting or recoding all responses below the cut-off point, we use indicator 
variables for each level of certainty. The indicator variables are interacted with the 
cost attribute in model estimation. Previous literature indicates that respondents 
who are less certain about their choices are the source of HB. This implies that, on 
average, these respondents select alternatives that are more expensive than what 
they would choose in real payment situations. Therefore, in our application of the 
certainty statements, it is hypothesized that respondents with lower certainty 
scores are less sensitive to the cost attribute compared to respondents who are 
more certain. Different parameter estimates for the power bill are estimated for 
each level of certainty, where a sufficient number of observations are available, 
relative to the neutral score of 5 and below. This approach provides estimates of 
sensitivity to the cost attribute for each level of certainty score above 5 relative to 
5 and below (uncertain), which allows for the estimation of a measure of 
reduction in HB in the WTP estimates for each level of certainty. The author is 
not aware of this approach being applied elsewhere in non-market valuation 
literature.        
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5.3 A brief review of the literature on attribute non-attendance and 
hypothetical bias 
In this section we provide an overview of the literature on AN-A and HB in a 
number of contexts. Literature on AN-A and/or HB in the context of consumer 
switching in retail electricity markets is not currently available and this study 
makes a first contribution in this area.  
In consumer choice models, a simple theory of decision making is assumed. 
Consumers are hypothesized to approach choice situations with a predefined 
algebraic utility function which defines how the observed attribute levels of an 
alternative will be integrated to form an overall evaluation of desirability (Johnson 
& Meyer, 1984). Each alternative in a choice set is evaluated independently and 
the consumer chooses the alternative with the highest expected utility. This 
assumes that consumers have the capacity to process all the information about the 
attribute levels describing each alternative. However, literature suggests that 
consumers have bounded rationality due to limited capacity to process 
information among other constraints, and that choices are likely to be made using 
a variety of strategies which are contingent upon the characteristics of the choice 
alternatives. In the next two subsections, we provide definitions of AN-A and HB 
and review relevant literature. 
5.3.1 Attribute non-attendance 
Although AN-A has been investigated in stated CEs conducted in the fields of 
transportation, non-market valuation, marketing and health, it is still relatively 
unexplored in the literature that investigates consumer preferences for the 
attributes of electricity services in energy markets. Typically, respondents in CEs 
are asked to make a series of choices from a set of two or more alternatives 
described in terms of attribute levels. Respondents are assumed to consider all the 
information presented in each scenario in making their choice decisions. 
However, evidence from previous studies suggests that respondents in CEs may 
ignore a subset of attributes when evaluating the alternatives in choice tasks for a 
number of reasons which are explored later (e.g., Hensher et al., 2005b; Scarpa et 
al., 2010). Scarpa et al. (2010) describe two types of AN-A which they call “serial 
AN-A” and “choice task AN-A.” Serial AN-A is the information processing 
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strategy in which a respondent systematically ignores the same attribute(s) across 
all choice tasks, whereas choice task AN-A refers to a strategy in which AN-A 
varies from choice task to choice task. In this chapter we focus on the former.  
AN-A implies non-compensatory behaviour which violates the axiom of 
continuity or the assumption of unlimited substitutability between the attributes of 
alternatives in a choice set. As indicated earlier, respondents in CEs are assumed 
to evaluate all the attributes of alternatives and make trade-offs between all 
attributes within and between alternatives in a choice set, and select the most 
preferred alternative (Hensher et al., 2005b). When respondents adopt non-
compensatory behaviour, it is not possible to compensate for a reduction in the 
level of one attribute by increasing the level of one or more attributes if they are 
included in the subset of ignored attributes; that is, there is no trade-off between 
ignored attributes and those that are attended to (Lockwood, 1996; Saelensminde, 
2002; Spash, 2000).  
Non-compensatory behaviour creates a challenge for researchers as this behaviour  
results in discontinuous preference orderings that cannot be represented by a 
conventional utility function (Lancsar & Louviere, 2006). However, where 
respondents ignore an attribute because they are genuinely not willing to pay 
anything for a change in the attribute levels, the choices made are still a reflection 
of the true underlying preferences and theoretically do not violate the axiom of 
continuity. Whether respondents ignore an attribute or subset of attributes as a 
coping strategy or because they have zero WTP for the attribute(s), marginal rates 
of substitution can still be derived from the estimated parameters at the sampled 
population level but are not computable at an individual level for these 
respondents (Carlsson et al., 2010).   
There is accumulating empirical evidence that suggests the assumption of 
unlimited substitutability is often violated in CEs as respondents adopt non-
compensatory decision-making strategies to reduce the cognitive burden 
associated with processing information embedded within attributes defining 
alternatives in choice sets (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 2008; 
Carlsson, Kataria, & Lampi, 2009; Hensher, 2008; Hensher et al., 2005b; 
Lockwood, 1996; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). Reasons advanced for AN-A in 
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CEs include: that it results from a coping strategy involving ignoring specific 
attributes in an attempt to reduce the perceived complexity of the task; the cost of 
evaluating an attribute is perceived to be higher than the benefit; and irrelevance 
of some attributes to the choices being made (Hensher et al., 2005b).  
Results from studies investigating AN-A suggest that it is important to investigate 
its impact on welfare estimates (see, Campbell et al., 2011; Hensher, 2008; 
Hensher & Rose, 2009; Hensher et al., 2005b; Hensher et al., 2012; Hole, 2011; 
Johnson & Meyer, 1984; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009; Scarpa et al., 2010). For 
example, Campbell et al. (2011), Hensher and Greene (2010), and Hole (2011) 
find that WTP estimates based on the assumption of complete evaluation of 
attributes are statistically different from those based on incomplete evaluation of 
attributes. Given these findings, ignoring AN-A in model estimation where the 
objective is to quantify the welfare effects of a policy change may result in 
potentially wrong policy implications. However, Carlsson et al. (2010) warn 
against the direct comparison of WTP estimates from models with and without 
restriction of ignored attribute parameters to zero. They argue that this could be 
misleading since WTP is the average WTP for the whole sample where AN-A is 
not controlled for, while it is the average for the conditional sample of 
respondents who attended to the attribute where AN-A is controlled for. 
Studies that use stated AN-A assume that respondents do not vary their 
information processing strategies between alternatives and across all choice tasks 
(e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Carlsson et al., 2009; Gracia, Barreiro-Hurle, & Perez 
y Perez, 2012; Hensher et al., 2005b). The implicit assumption in these studies is 
that respondents provide accurate responses about their information processing 
strategies. Since stated AN-A is based on recall, some respondents may find it 
hard to provide accurate responses. For example, Hess and Hensher (2010) find 
inconsistencies between stated AN-A and inferred AN-A. On the other hand, 
Campbell (2007), Carlsson et al. (2010), and Gracia et al. (2012) find evidence 
that not all respondents who claim to have ignored an attribute did so and argue 
that such respondents seem to have put less weight on the attributes they claim to 
have ignored, rather than completely ignoring them. Another approach of 
identifying AN-A involves inspecting the pattern of choices to find out if a 
respondent consistently chose the alternatives that were best with respect to a 
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particular attribute (e.g., Lockwood, 1999; Saelensminde, 2002). Studies that use 
inferred AN-A analyze the observed choice response pattern using a statistical 
model with degenerate distributions of taste intensities at zero (Campbell et al., 
2011; Hensher et al., 2012; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). These models employ a 
latent class framework in which the utility function of an alternative takes into 
account the possibility, up to a probability, of an attribute being ignored (Scarpa, 
Gilbride, et al., 2009). Each latent class represents a specific attribute processing 
strategy that may have been adopted by respondents (Campbell et al., 2011). 
These attribute non-attendance classes are represented by specific restrictions 
imposes on the utility functions reflecting the hypothesized processing strategy for 
each class. The number of classes is based on the number of hypothesized 
attribute processing strategies, which is different from the normal use of latent 
class models that allows the number of classes to vary.  
5.3.2 Hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments 
Hypothetical bias is an important issue that researchers need to address when 
conducting CEs. Although a number of stated preference studies find significant 
differences between hypothetical and real WTP values in various contexts (e.g., 
Brownstone & Small, 2005; Champ & Bishop, 2001; Champ et al., 1997; 
Hensher, 2010; Isacsson, 2007; Ladenburg, Dahlgaard, & Bonnichsen, 2010; List 
et al., 2006), some find no significant differences (e.g., Carlsson & Martinsson, 
2001; Carson et al., 1996; Lusk & Schroeder, 2004). A meta-analysis of HB by 
List and Gallet (2001), using values from 29 SP studies, finds that on average 
respondents in hypothetical experiments overstate their preferences by a factor of 
about 3. Little and Berrens (2004) expand on the previous study by including 
more studies and find similar results. In another meta-analysis of HB, Murphy, 
Allen, Stevens, and Weatherhead (2005) use data from 28 SP valuation studies 
and find calibration factors ranging from 0.6 to 10 but also find that choice-based 
elicitation mechanisms reduce HB. Hensher et al. (2005a) argue that since WTP is 
calculated as a ratio between two parameters, it is sensitive to the attribute-level 
ranges used in the estimation of both parameters and the differences in WTP from 
SP and RP data may be accounted for in part, if not entirely, by differences in 
attribute-level ranges used in both data sets.  
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There is no theory of HB; hence there is no agreed calibration method. However, 
the general consensus in the literature is that HB stems from the hypothetical 
nature of the choice questions, and a lack of salient economic commitment in 
some survey responses, which may be mitigated by careful design and 
implementation of SP surveys (Norwood et al., 2008). Although CEs are incentive 
compatible, some previous studies find that HB can exist in CEs surveys (e.g., 
List et al., 2006; Lusk & Schroeder, 2004). Empirical evidence suggests that 
respondents who are unsure whether they would pay a specified amount to secure 
an increase in the provision of a public good tend to say “yes” to a DC contingent 
valuation question (Ready et al., 2010). Therefore, respondents who are uncertain 
about their responses are identified as the source of HB.  
Ex-ante and ex-post approaches have been adopted in previous SP studies to 
mitigate HB. Ex-ante mitigation is achieved through the careful design and 
implementation of the surveys, use of referendum format for the CVM,  and 
reminding respondents of the budgetary constraints and the availability of 
substitutes before posing the valuation question (Arrow et al., 1993). Another 
approach uses “cheap talk” (CT) scripts which make respondents aware of the 
problem of HB before they are presented with the valuation question (Cummings 
& Taylor, 1999). Studies investigating the effectiveness of CT scripts have 
produced mixed results (Blumenschein et al., 2008).  
Ex-post mitigation has been achieved through a debriefing approach developed by 
Champ et al. (1997) that uses certainty statements where respondents are asked to 
rate how certain they are of their choices on a 10-point Likert-type scale. 
Respondents who indicate low levels of certainty, usually below 7, are identified 
as the source of HB, and are either dropped from the sample used to estimate the 
model, or their “yes” responses are recoded as “no” responses (Champ & Bishop, 
2001; Champ et al., 1997). However, there is no consensus on the cut-off point at 
which hypothetical decisions would correspond to real decisions. To overcome 
this problem, a variant of this approach uses only two categories of certainty and 
asks respondents to indicate whether they are “probably sure” or “definitely sure” 
about their choices (Blumenschein et al., 2008; Blumenschein et al., 1998).  
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5.4 Stated attribute non-attendance 
In this section we address the first three parts of Questions 2:  
(a) Are non-price attributes of electricity services ignored in choice 
experiments on switching or supplier choice?  If so, which attributes are 
ignored? 
(b) Are attributes ignored individually or in combinations? 
(c) Are the choice responses of respondents who claim to have ignored the 
cost attribute consistent with their claim? If not, how does this affect 
model fit and WTP estimates?   
 
We analyze responses to survey questions and provide a summary of self-reported 
AN-A, explore the effect of inconsistent stated non-attendance to the cost attribute 
(monthly power bill), and the effect of AN-A on model fit, class probabilities, and 
WTP estimates. Information on stated AN-A was elicited as part of the debriefing 
after the completion of the choice tasks. Respondents were asked to indicate, by 
ticking the appropriate boxes, which attributes, if any, they ignored in making 
their choices. An option for “None”, indicating full attendance, was also provided 
to ensure that all respondents provided a response to the question. This is the 
information that we use in this section.  
5.4.1 Analysis of stated attribute non-attendance responses 
The distribution of stated AN-A to the attributes of electricity services is 
presented in Table 5-1. Of the 224 respondents who completed the choice tasks, 
only 26 (12%) reported having attended to all attributes. This means that only 
12% of the respondents provided choice responses that satisfy the axiom of 
continuity which is assumed to hold when models are estimated from choice data 
without taking into account AN-A. The choices made by these respondents reflect 
full compensatory behaviour, i.e. complete trade-offs between the attributes of the 
alternatives and these respondents are therefore identified as having continuous 
preferences for the attributes of electricity services. The low level of full 
attendance (12%) achieved in this CE suggest that assuming full attendance in 
model estimation would be unreasonable. Although none of the respondents 
ignored all attributes and therefore made random choices, 88% (198) of the 
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respondents ignored at least one attribute in making their choices, and are 
identified as having various degrees of discontinuous preferences.  
Table 5-1: Share of respondents who ignored a specific attribute 
Attribute ignored Responses % Rank 
Call waiting time (Time) 134 60% 1 
Supplier type  (Supplier type) 106 47% 2 
Loyalty rewards (Rewards) 98 44% 3 
100% New Zealand owned (Ownership) 92 41% 4 
Electricity supplied from renewable 
sources (Renewables) 
77 34% 5 
Fixed rate guarantee (Fixed) 74 33% 6 
Prompt payment discount (Discount) 27 12% 7 
Monthly power bill (Bill) 15 7% 8 
NONE 26 12%  
All 0 0%  
At least one attribute 198 88%  
 
The attribute least attended to is Time, which was ignored by 60% of the 
respondents followed by Supplier type and Rewards which were ignored by 47% 
and 44% of the respondents respectively. However these attributes were not 
mainly ignored individually but in combination with other attributes since only 
about 20% of the respondents ignored only one attribute (see Table 5-2). The 
attributes most attended to are Bill, Discount, and Fixed, which were ignored by 
only 7%, 12%, and 33% of the respondents respectively. It is interesting to note 
that these three attributes are the main attributes commonly used to describe 
standard electricity plans offered by electricity suppliers. Hence, it is not 
surprising that they are the most attended to as respondents are more likely to be 
familiar with making trade-offs between them.  
Highest attendance to the Bill followed by Discount is consistent with an 
environment where respondents have been conditioned to switching supplier on 
the basis of savings which are calculated based on price and discount. 
Furthermore, attendance to the Bill is expected to be high since power bills 
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constitute a significant proportion of personal incomes in New Zealand. For 
example the monthly power bill range of $150 to $350 used in the CE would be 
32-61% of gross weekly income for respondents on the minimum wage ($14.25 
per hour) and 14-32% of gross weekly income for respondents earning average 
income (27.55 per hour). It would therefore be unrealistic for respondents to 
ignore the monthly power bill in choosing their preferred supplier given that 
power bills are a long term commitment. The financial commitments implied in 
the choices made in the context of supplier choice are of a more indefinite nature 
compared to financial commitments in contexts where the payment is for a fixed 
period (typically 5-10 years for environmental conservation programmes).   
Renewables was ignored by 34% of the respondents indicating that the majority of 
respondents (66%) considered the environment when switching or choosing their 
preferred supplier. This is lower than non-attendance rates ranging from 84% to 
96% for renewable energy sources (wind, solar and biomass) reported in Gracia et 
al. (2012). At least 60% of the respondents considered both Renewables and the 
Bill in making their choices. This is in line with the findings of a study conducted 
by the Electricity Commission (2008) in which at least 50% of the respondents 
stated that they would consider the environment in choosing a retail electricity 
supplier and 17% stated they would ‘very seriously’ consider switching to a 
retailer which promotes itself as using renewable energy. Ownership is also a 
relatively important attribute as 59% of the respondents considered it in making 
their choices. This is consistent with TV3 polls which showed that 62% of New 
Zealanders were opposed to the sale of state-owned assets, which included energy 
companies (Garner, 2012).   
Table 5-2 provides additional information on the proportions of respondents who 
ignored specific numbers of attributes. About 20% of the respondents ignored 
only one attribute whilst about 15%, 22% and 13% ignored 2, 3, and 4 attributes 
respectively. However, smaller proportions of respondents (less than 9% in each 
case), ignored 5, 6, or 7 attributes. Few respondents (6.7%) based their choices on 
a single attribute, i.e. ignored seven out of eight attributes. Respondents who 
based their choices on the levels of a single attribute have lexicographic 
preferences for the respective attributes or had difficulties evaluating multiple 
attributes and therefore adopted an extreme simplifying strategy of evaluating 
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alternatives in terms of a single attribute. Only one respondent expressed 
lexicographic preferences for Renewables whilst 14 (6.3%) expressed 
lexicographic preferences for Bill. Lexicographic preferences for the cost attribute 
are not surprising given that power bills constitute a significant proportion of 
personal income in New Zealand. Responses from such respondents do not 
provide any information on trade-offs between the attributes describing the 
alternatives, hence the implicit marginal WTP estimates for non-price attributes 
cannot be calculated for these individuals. Although only a small share of 
respondents attended to all the attributes, most respondents (93%) attended to the 
cost attribute, which is important in the estimation of marginal WTP.  
Table 5-2: Share of respondents who ignored a specific number of attributes.  
Number of attributes ignored Number of respondents Percentage 
0 (full attendance) 26 11.61 
1 44 19.64 
2 34 15.18 
3 49 21.88 
4 29 12.95 
5 19 8.48 
6 8 3.57 
7 15 6.70 
       8 (all: random choices) 0 0.00 
 
Table 5-3 provides a summary of shares of respondents who jointly considered 
each attribute with the cost attribute (Bill), and therefore provided responses that 
include trade-offs between each attribute and Bill. The least trade-offs were 
between Time and Bill (35.71%) followed by Supplier Type and Bill (47.32%). 
Higher trade-offs were made between Discount and Bill (83.04%), Fixed and Bill 
(63.84%), and Renewables and Bill (60.27%). This suggests that it would be 
possible to estimate WTP for each attribute. However, the high level of stated 
AN-A highlights the importance of investigating and accounting for AN-A in CEs 
rather than assuming full attendance.  
We provide additional information on respondents who attended to specific 
combinations of attributes in Table 5-4. It shows that a fairly wide spread of 
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attribute processing rules were used by respondents in making their choices. The 
results also indicate that where more attributes were attended to, Bill was unlikely 
to be ignored. Further analysis of AN-A rules is provided in section 5.5.  
Table 5-3: Proportion of respondents attending to each attribute and jointly with Bill  
Attribute Attendance to attribute Joint attendance to attribute and Bill  
 Number of respondents % Number of respondents % 
Time  90 40.18 80 35.71 
Fixed  150 66.96 143 63.84 
Discount 197 87.95 186 83.04 
Rewards  126 56.25 116 51.79 
Renewables  147 65.63 135 60.27 
Ownership  132 58.93 121 54.02 
Supplier Type  118 52.68 106 47.32 
 
Table 5-4: Proportion of respondents attending to combinations of attributes    
Attributes and combinations of attributes attended to Number % 
Time, Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Renewables, Ownership, Supplier Type, Bill 26 11.61 
Time, Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Renewables, Ownership, Supplier Type 4  1.79 
Time, Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Renewables, Ownership, Bill 10 4.46 
Time, Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Renewables, Ownership 0 0.00 
Time, Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Renewables, Supplier Type 0 0.00 
Time, Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Supplier Type, Bill 3 1.34 
Time, Fixed, Discount, Bill 4 1.79 
Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Renewables, Ownership, Supplier Type, Bill 17 7.59 
Fixed, Discount, Renewables, Ownership, Bill 9 4.02 
Fixed, Discount, Renewables, Bill 4 1.79 
Discount, Renewables, Ownership, Bill 3 1.34 
Fixed, Discount, Bill 5 2.23 
Discount, Bill 4 1.79 
Time, Fixed, Rewards, Renewables, Ownership, Supplier Type, Bill 0 0.00 
 
5.4.2 How AN-A in this study compares with AN-A in other study contexts 
A summary of AN-A across a number of studies estimating WTP in different 
contexts is presented in Table 5-5 to provide a contrast with the levels of non-
attendance reported for this study. Although the share of respondents attending to 
all attributes is low in this study, it is within the range of other studies. However, 
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the proportion of respondents ignoring the cost attribute is relatively small in this 
study. For example, in some studies the cost attribute is ignored by a relatively 
large proportion of respondents - as high as 60% in Campbell et al. (2011) - whilst 
attendance to all attributes may be as low as 1% as reported by Scarpa, Gilbride, 
et al. (2009). One possible explanation could be that the good in this study is 
closer to a private good while those of other studies are public goods. 
A higher incidence of non-attendance to the cost attribute in studies dealing with 
environmental conservation or where rare species are involved may be explained 
in terms of respondents’ protest against making trade-offs between money and 
environmental protection or respondents expressing their belief that the 
environment should be protected irrespective of cost (e.g., Lockwood, 1999). It 
should be noted that some of the AN-A rates presented in Table 5-5 are based on 
inferred AN-A and caution should be exercised when making comparisons 
between studies.  
Possible reasons for the recorded rates of non-attendance for various attributes 
reported by respondents in this study may include: (1) unfamiliarity with making 
trade-offs between the attributes since only 21% of respondents have switched 
supplier before, and these may have switched on the basis of power bill savings as 
promoted by the WMN campaign; (2) some attributes may have been irrelevant or 
less important to some respondents, e.g., respondents who have never called their 
supplier may have found Time to be less important or irrelevant, hence the high 
incidence of non-attendance; and (3) choice task complexity, where some 
respondents might have found it difficult to process all the information in the 
decision-making process. 
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Table 5-5: Comparison of AN-A reported in previous studies.  
Study  Country Valuation Context  
(and model)  
Ignored 
Cost 
Attended 
to ALL 
Most ignored attribute Effect of accounting for 
AN-A on WTP  Attribute Share 
Carlsson et al. (2010)   Sweden Environmental quality 
objectives (RPL) 
24% 19% Cost 24% No difference 
Campbell et al. (2008) Ireland Rural landscape 
improvements 
31% 64% Cost 31% lower 
Campbell et al. (2011) Ireland Rural landscape 
improvements
*
 (LCM) 
60% 3.3% Cost 60% lower 
DeShazo and Fermo (2004) Costa Rica On-site services at a 
national park (MNL) 
- - - - higher 
Scarpa et al. (2009) Ireland Landscape
*
  (LCM) 7% 1% Farm tidiness 56% Lower 
Hensher and Rose (2009) Australia Choice of car routes (MNL) - - - - higher 
Hensher and Greene (2010) Australia Car travel
**
 (LCM) 16&28% 54% Running cost 28% higher 
Hensher et al. (2005b) Australia Travel time 
(RPL-EC) 
- - Uncertainty 
of time 
37% lower 
Hensher et al. (2012) Australia Car travel
* 
(LCM) 27% 20% Cost 27% higher 
Gracia et al. (2012) Spain WTP for renewable energy 
(RPL-EC) 
18% 4% Biomass 96% higher 
This study – Ndebele (2015) New Zealand Choice of retail electricity 
supplier 
7% 12% Time 60% higher (lower for 
Discount and Fixed) 
*
Estimates are based on inferred attribute non-attendance, 
**
Study includes common-metric attribute processing strategies, 
– 
Not provided  
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The next two sections specifically address research Question 2(c): Are the choice 
responses of respondents who claim to have ignored the cost attribute consistent 
with their claim? If not, how does this affect model fit and WTP estimates?  
5.4.3 Consistency of stated non-attendance with observed choices 
We consider whether respondents who state non-attendance to an attribute make 
choices that are consistent with their claim. Stated AN-A may be subject to 
reporting error and we explore possible errors or inconsistent responses by 
analysing the choices of respondents who claimed to have ignored the cost 
attribute to see if their choices are consistent with their claims. Responses of all 
respondents who claimed to have ignored the monthly power bill (Bill) are 
analysed and the frequency of selecting the cheapest alternative is recorded for 
each respondent. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5-6.  
Table 5-6: Characteristics of respondents who ignored the cost attribute 
ID Gender Age Income 
($000) 
Ethnicity Education Most recent 
power Bill 
Occasions cheapest 
alternative selected 
17 male 32 $22.5 Asian Masters 200 91% 
32 male 65+ - Asian Masters 100 91% 
48 female 62 22.5 NZ Euro High School 300 27% 
58 male 65+ $22.5 NZ Euro High School 300 82% 
60 female 32 $45.0 NZ Euro Diploma 60 18% 
79 female 57 <$15.0 Other High School 200 82% 
80 male 32 $45.0 NZ Euro Bachelors 200 55% 
88 male 47 $45.0 NZ Euro Diploma 200 64% 
89 male 57 $60.0 NZ euro High School 300 64% 
95 male 47 $22.5 Other Bachelors 100 82% 
109 male 65+ $45.0 Maori Trades 200 64% 
153 female 27 $22.5 NZ Euro High School 200 91% 
169 male 42 $35.0 Other Bachelors 200 82% 
206 male 22 $60.0 NZ Euro High School 200 82% 
210 male 22 <$15k Asian High School 200 55% 
 
Respondents stating that they ignored Bill are predominantly male (73%), and all 
ethnic groups are represented although Maori is the least represented (7%). Of the 
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15 respondents who indicated non-attendance to Bill, 13 (87%) are in the low 
income bracket and it is unrealistic to expect these respondents to ignore the cost 
of electricity in their choice of electricity supplier. One of the low income 
respondents, a male aged 65+ with a high school level of education (ID58) 
selected the status quo alternative throughout, which incidentally offers a lower 
level for power bill ($250) than his most recent power bill ($300) but does not 
offer the lowest level for Bill in all cases. Given this respondent’s age and low 
level of education, and that none of the alternatives presented in the choice tasks 
had a power bill level higher than his most recent power bill, the selection of the 
status quo alternative is consistent with satisficing behaviour in which the 
information processing strategy is to select the first alternative that reaches a 
certain minimum threshold and therefore avoid a complete trade-off which 
violates the strict assumption of utility maximisation. An alternative explanation 
might be that he did not take the survey seriously since the level of the power bill 
was lower than his most recent power bill 75% of the time as our ED had attribute 
level balance. 
A female respondent aged 32 years (ID60) with an annual income of $45,000 
selected the alternative offering the lowest price 18% of the time. Her most recent 
power bill is $60 which is only 40% of the lowest attribute level for monthly 
power bill of $150 used in the experimental design. Since all the levels offered for 
the power bill in all alternatives and choice situations are above the respondent’s 
monthly power bill, the cost element may have been viewed as unrealistic and 
thus ignored in choice selection. Another female respondent aged 62 (ID48) with 
an annual income of about $22,500 and only high school education selected the 
status quo eight times out of twelve. As in the case of respondent (ID58), the 
status quo power bill of $250 was lower than her most recent power of $300. She 
only selected the alternative with the lowest cost only 27% of the time, which 
incidentally represents the four occasions when she did not select the status quo. 
When other respondents’ choices are analysed, no compelling evidence is found 
to suggest that they ignored the cost attribute; in fact the evidence suggests that 
the cost element may not have been ignored all the time as the least expensive 
alternative was selected on average 72% of the time. On the whole, the evidence 
seems to suggest that, in the main, the majority of respondents reporting non-
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attendance to the monthly power bill may have actually considered the attribute in 
making their choices. This suggests possible reporting errors by some 
respondents. 
We compare the characteristics of respondents who ignored the cost attribute to 
those who considered it; the average statistics are presented in Table 5-7. It is 
interesting to note that compared to respondents who attended to the cost attribute, 
the group who ignored it has a larger proportion of men, lower average age and 
income, and higher reported most recent power bills. Respondents who ignored 
the cost attribute are less likely to have switched electricity supplier in the past 
two years compared to those who attended to it. The lower likelihood of switching 
may be explained by this group’s indifference to the cost, which has been used as 
a major tool in promoting switching. The group also consists of a large proportion 
of ‘Other’ ethnic group and a lower proportion of NZ-Europeans. However an 
ANOVA test for differences in the means of the two groups shows that the only 
significant differences at the 0.05 level are gender and ethnicity.   
Table 5-7: Characteristics of respondents who ignored or considered the cost attribute  
Characteristics Ignored 
power Bill 
(n = 15) 
Attended to 
power Bill         
(n = 209) 
Test for 
differences 
between groups     
(p-values) 
Gender (male) 73% 45% 0.0336 
Average Age (years) 44 45 0.8523 
Average Income (ZN$000) 38 45 0.3045 
Education (post high school) 60% 61% 0.9535 
 
Ethnicity 
NZ-European 47% 79% 0.0033 
Maori 7% 4% 0.6706 
Other 47% 16% 0.0031 
Switched supplier in the past 2 years 7% 22% 0.1601 
Most recent power bill (NZ$) 183 173 0.6249 
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5.4.4 The effect of inconsistent stated attribute non-attendance on model 
estimation 
To investigate the possible effects of inconsistent stated AN-A to the cost 
attribute, we estimate three LC models and compare the pattern of significant 
parameters, model fit, and class membership probabilities across the models. For 
the first model (M0) we use the original data and ignore all stated non-attendance; 
that is, we assume full compensatory behaviour or unlimited substitutability 
between the attributes. In the second model (M1) we use data that is coded to 
account for stated AN-A for all attributes, and in the third model (M2) we ignore 
all stated AN-A to the cost attribute whilst preserving stated AN-A for the other 
attributes.  
For each model we progressively increase the number of classes, noting the 
pattern and signs of significant parameters, and model fit until the model fails to 
converge at least once. M1 and M2 failed to converge when the number of classes 
was set at six or seven and we terminated the search. M0 converges beyond five 
classes but we terminate the search as the number of insignificant parameters 
including class probabilities increased. Based on all the information criteria, M0 
performs best followed by M2 for the estimated models with up to five classes. 
However, two classes (1 and 5) in M0 have insignificant parameters including 
class probabilities; hence M2 is the best model in terms of identifying segments 
with distinct preferences. This suggests that correcting for inconsistent stated AN-
A improves model fit since M2 performs better than M1 throughout. 
Determination of the number of latent classes 
To determine the number of classes to retain in our final models we use the 
information criteria discussed in Chapter 2. The use of the likelihood ratio test 
(LRT) statistic to determine the number of classes is problematic because it does 
not allow the number of latent classes to be separated as its distribution is 
unknown and may not follow a χ2 (McLachlan & Peel, 2000; Yang & Yang, 
2007). The disadvantage of using information criteria is that they do not produce a 
number that quantifies the confidence in the results, such as a p-value.  
Table 5-8 presents the criteria used to determine the number of classes. The 
bolded values indicate the minimum normalised information criteria for each 
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model. All information criteria are normalised by dividing the values for each by 
the number of observations (2688). For all the models, the LL, AIC and crAIC 
indicate the presence of up to five latent preference classes. However, M0 has two 
classes in which all parameters including class probabilities are insignificant, 
suggesting overfitting (see Table 5-9). Although the class probabilities for M1 and 
M2 are all significant at the 0.05 level, the models appear to be over-
parameterized. For example, very large standard errors are observed in some 
classes and the parameter for Bill is insignificant in one of the classes in both 
models. Retaining four classes is also problematic since class 3 probability is 
insignificant at the 0.05 level in M2 and two classes (3 and 4) have insignificant 
parameter estimates for the design attributes. In the latter case, no discernible 
differences in preferences between the two classes exist. 
The AIC3, CAIC, BIC and HQC indicate the presence of up to three classes 
across the three models. In this case LL, AIC and crAIC clearly exhibit the 
tendency to over-fit or over-parameterize the models as suggested in the literature. 
We observed that as more than three classes are estimated for each model, the 
number of insignificant parameters increases. Where a latent class model has two 
or more classes with no significant parameters, it is not clear how preferences 
differ across these classes and WTP estimates may not be estimated. Thus, based 
on AIC3, CAIC, BIC and HQC, we retain only three classes for the three models.  
The performance of the AIC3, CAIC, BIC and HQC in this study is consistent 
with findings from simulation studies investigating the performance of these 
criteria (e.g., Andrews & Currim, 2003a; Lin & Dayton, 1997; Yang & Yang, 
2007).  
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Table 5-8: Information criteria used to determine the number of classes 
Classes 
(pars)1 
lnL(LL) AIC crAIC AIC3 CAIC BIC HQC 
 M0 M1 M2 M0 M1 M2 M0 M1 M2 M0 M1 M2 M0 M1 M2 M0 M1 M2 M0 M1 M2 
1 (11) -2157 -2190 -2166 1.61 1.64 1.62 1.61 1.64 1.62 1.62 1.64 1.62 1.64 1.67 1.65 1.64 1.67 1.64 1.62 1.65 1.63 
2 (23) -1873 -1928 -1902 1.41 1.45 1.43 1.41 1.45 1.43 1.41 1.46 1.44 1.43 1.51 1.49 1.46 1.50 1.48 1.43 1.47 1.45 
3 (35) -1701 -1798 -1765 1.29 1.36 1.34 1.29 1.36 1.34 1.30 1.38 1.35 1.38 1.45 1.43 1.37 1.44 1.42 1.32 1.39 1.37 
4 (47) -1678 -1756 -1746 1.28 1.34 1.33 1.28 1.34 1.34 1.30 1.36 1.35 1.40 1.46 1.45 1.38 1.45 1.44 1.32 1.38 1.37 
5 (59) -1663 -1731 -1709 1.28 1.33 1.32 1.28 1.33 132 1.30 1.35 134 1.43 1.48 147 1.41 1.46 1.45 1.33 1.38 1.36 
 
6 (71) 
 
M1 & M2 failed to converge, M0 converged but 4 classes have insignificant parameters - search terminated 
7 (83) M1 and M2 failed to converge 
1
Denotes the number of parameters in the model  
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Table 5-9: Class probabilities 
Classes                         class Comments 
1 2 3 4 5    
 M0 0.60
c 
0.40
c 
       
2 M1 0.65
c 
0.35
c 
       
M2 0.62
c 
0.38
c 
       
 M0 0.48
c 
0.41
c 
0.11
c 
   
3 M1 0.56
c 
0.36
c 
0.08
c 
      
M2 0.53
c 
0.36
c 
0.11
c 
      
 M0 0.48
c 
0.41
c 
0.02
b 
0.09
c class 3: all β’s = 0, class 4: only ASC & Bill 
are significant 
4 M1 0.51
c 
0.08
c 
0.17
c 
0.24
c 
class 2: large standard errors for some 
parameters 
M2 0.53
c 
0.32
c 
0.04
a 
0.11
c class 3: all β’s = 0; class 4: β’s = 0 except 
ASC at 10% 
 M0 0.21 0.30
c 
0.13
c 
0.28
c 
0.08 class 1: all β’s = 0, class 5: all β’s = 0  
5 M1 0.48
c 
0.27
c 
0.10
c 
0.07
c 
0.08
c 
class 4: β_Bill is insignificant; large 
s.e’s in class 5 
M2 0.38
c 
0.03
c 
0.14
b 
0.34
c 
0.11
c 
class 2: β_Bill is insignificant 
6 & 7 M1 & M2 failed to converge; M0 converged but 4 out of 6 classes have 
insignificant parameters 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively 
Regression results 
Results for the three models M0, M1 and M2 are presented in Table 5-10. The 
models are all statistically significant based on the Chi-square, and fit the data 
very well with pseudo-R
2
 values ranging from 0.3913 for M1 to 0.4239 for M0. 
Hensher et al. (2005a, p. 338) argue that “a pseudo-R2 value of 0.3 represents a 
decent model fit for a discrete choice model. …… In fact pseudo-R2 values 
between the range of 0.3 and 0.4 can be translated as an R
2
 of between 0.6 and 0.8 
for the linear model equivalent.” All significant parameters have the expected 
signs except the parameter for Well-known non-electricity company, which is 
positive for classes 1 and 3 in M0 and M1 respectively. A positive parameter for 
this variable implies that respondents in these classes prefer a well-known non-
electricity company to a traditional electricity supplier – a possible and not 
worrisome outcome given the small class size in M1 and the fact that the 
parameter is only significant at the 10% level in the respective class in M0. This 
group represents consumers who are likely to consider buying electricity from one 
of their well-known companies; perhaps those currently providing good services 
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in areas such as telecom, insurance, and fuel etc., and would provide bundled 
services if they entered the retail electricity market.     
As indicated earlier, M0 performs best in terms of all IC and pseudo-R
2
. Although 
all three models identify three latent classes with clearly distinct preferences, for 
some attributes, preferences differ between the same classes across the three 
models. For example, class 1 differs across the models in terms of SQ effects and 
preferences for Renewables and Well-known electricity company, and class 2 
differs in terms of SQ effects and preferences for fixed term price guarantee, 
while class 3 differs in terms of preferences for Discount and Well-known non-
electricity company. In all three cases each parameter is insignificant in one or 
two models. It should be noted that this comparison is only in terms of significant 
versus insignificant parameter estimates as absolute values across the models are 
not directly comparable. WTP estimates, which are directly comparable across 
classes and models, will be used in the next section to test for differences across 
the models. 
The fact that M0, an unrestricted model, performs better than the other two 
models with restricted parameters for ignored attributes may not be surprising 
given the data requirements for estimating large numbers of parameters in latent 
class models and the relatively small sample size used in this analysis. However, 
M2 produces significant parameter estimates that are consistent with a priori 
expectations and is the preferred model.     
Class probabilities differ across the models. When AN-A is accounted for in 
model estimation, we observe a redistribution of probability mass from classes 2 
and 3 to class 1. Comparing M1 and M2, the net effect of correcting for 
inconsistent stated AN-A to the power bill in model estimation is a redistribution 
of the probability mass (about 6%) away from class 1. As a result, classes 2 and 3 
are larger in M2 than in M1 by about 2% and 41%, respectively, whilst class 1 is 
smaller by about 6%. In the next section we provide a test for differences in class 
probabilities across the models.        
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Table 5-10: Latent class model results (z-values are in parentheses) 
Variables M0 (original data) M1 (data coded for AN-A) M2 (Corrected inconsistent AN-A)
 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
ASCSQ 1.4315 
(2.56) 
0.0834 
(0.56) 
2.8755 
(5.22) 
0.0276 
(0.18) 
0.2792 
(2.31) 
6.758 
(4.14) 
0.4295 
(2.26) 
0.0858 
(0.69) 
3.1274 
(6.13) 
Time (minutes) -0.0350   
(-1.53) 
-0.0253 
(-3.62) 
-0.0142 
(-0.51) 
-0.0507 
(-3.39) 
-0.0369 
(-3.39) 
-0.0595 
(-0.72) 
-0.0433 
(-2.33) 
-0.0401 
(-3.37) 
-0.0501 
(-1.24) 
Fixed Term (months)  0.0092 
(0.89) 
0.0054 
(1.72) 
-0.0228 
(-1.67) 
0.0086 
(1.58) 
0.0027 
(0.69) 
-0.0388 
(-1.14) 
-0.0032 
(-0.50) 
0.0111 
(2.65) 
-0.0073 
(-0.53) 
Discount -0.0421   
(-1.49) 
0.0122 
(3.08) 
0.0621 
(3.04) 
0.0017 
(0.34) 
0.0211 
(4.58) 
0.0081 
(0.18) 
-0.0034 
(-0.54) 
0.0159 
(3.60) 
0.0539 
(2.77) 
Loyalty Rewards 0.9639 
(1.96) 
0.1709 
(2.11) 
0.3693 
(1.07) 
0.2680 
(2.07) 
0.4729 
(3.81) 
1.8706 
(1.87) 
0.3344 
(2.13) 
0.3740 
(3.13) 
0.4587 
(1.15) 
Renewables -0.0249   
(-1.57) 
0.0129 
(8.86) 
0.0068 
(1.10) 
0.0129 
(4.11) 
0.0120 
(5.80) 
-0.0049 
(-0.33) 
0.0051 
(1.24) 
0.0141 
(7.54) 
0.0031 
(0.46) 
NZ Ownership 0.0214 
(3.11) 
0.0124 
(6.61) 
0.0017 
(0.17) 
0.0068 
(2.67) 
0.0098 
(4.31) 
0.0479 
(1.86) 
0.0093 
(3.16) 
0.0107 
(4.97) 
0.0060 
(0.59) 
New Electricity Company  -0.5268   
(-1.29) 
-0.2267 
(-1.84) 
-0.5133 
(-1.02) 
0.3436 
(1.74) 
-0.1265 
(-0.79) 
1.6420 
(1.25) 
0.0052 
(0.03) 
-0.1110 
(-0.70) 
-0.4803 
(-0.83) 
New Non-Electricity Company  0.9089 
(1.08) 
-0.5556 
(-3.71) 
-1.0093 
(-1.49) 
-0.4228 
(-1.77) 
-0.7645 
(-3.94) 
1.4508 
(0.94) 
-0.4168 
(-1.43) 
-0.7633 
(-3.98) 
-1.3865 
(-1.65) 
Well-Known Non-Electric Company  2.0949 
(1.71) 
-0.2356 
(-1.59) 
-0.6637 
(-1.18) 
-0.2686 
(-1.13) 
-0.3610 
(-2.06) 
2.8896 
(1.99) 
-0.0192 
(-0.62) 
-0.4095 
(-2.35) 
-0.3784 
(-0.73) 
Monthly Power Bill -0.1024   
(-5.36) 
-0.0182 
(-11.00) 
-0.0143 
(-2.04) 
-0.0546 
(-16.44) 
-0.0145 
(-8.48) 
-0.0339 
(-2.07) 
-0.0581 
(-12.71) 
-0.0139 
(-8.20) 
-0.0126 
(-2.00) 
Probability of Class 0.4769 
(11.87) 
0.4089 
(10.24) 
0.1141 
(5.27) 
0.5575 
(13.24) 
0.3581 
(8.68) 
0.0844 
(4.53) 
0.5244 
(11.83) 
0.3637 
(8.14) 
0.1119 
(5.03) 
AIC 3472.5 3665.2 3600.1 
BIC 3678.9 3871.6 3806.5 
McFadden Pseudo-R
2 
0.4239 0.3913 0.4023 
Chi-square (35 d.f.) 2503.67 (p-value = .00001) 2310.89 (p-value = .00001)  2376.04 (p-value = .00001) 
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Willingness to pay  
Our main interest is how correcting for inconsistent stated AN-A to the power bill 
attribute influences WTP estimates and class probabilities or market 
segmentation. We compare WTP estimates and class probabilities between the 
models (e.g., M1 versus M2) to determine the effect of correcting for inconsistent 
stated AN-A, and M0 versus M2 to determine the influence of accounting for AN-
A in model estimation. The average marginal WTP estimates and the 
asymptotically normal test statistic (ANTS) results are presented in Table 5-11.  
Respondents in class 1 in M1 and M2 have a negative preference for call waiting 
time (Time) while those in M0 are indifferent. Recall that Time was the most 
ignored attribute, with 60% of respondents ignoring it. It would appear that 
accounting for non-attendance allows for greater precision in estimating the 
parameter and hence WTP for this attribute. Where WTP for an attribute is 
significant in class 1 across all the models (e.g., Rewards and Ownership), 
estimates obtained from M0 are higher compared to the other models. The 
opposite is true for class 2 in the case of Time, Discount, Rewards, Renewables 
and New Non-Electricity Company. However, WTP estimates are generally higher 
in M2 compared to M1 and M0, particularly for class 2. For example, class 2 
WTP estimates for all attributes except Discount and Rewards are between 1.04 
and 1.22 times higher in M2 compared to M1, and between 1.13 and 2.86 times 
higher in M2 compared to M0, except Fixed and New Electricity Company.  
Tests for differences in the estimated marginal WTP estimates reveal significant 
differences in some estimates across the three models. The last four columns in 
Table 5-11 report the results (absolute values) of the ANTS. The bolded values 
indicate significant differences at the 95% confidence level (values greater than 
1.96 indicate significant differences). A conclusion that may be drawn from these 
results is that correcting for inconsistent self-reported AN-A to the cost attribute 
in model estimation has a significant effect on WTP estimates, class probabilities, 
significance and signs of parameters for some attributes in this study. The 
implication for researchers is that it may be worthwhile investigating 
inconsistences in self-reported AN-A, particularly for the cost attribute as its 
coefficient is key in estimating marginal WTP for non-price attributes.  
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Table 5-11: Estimates of WTP for the attributes of electricity services (NZ$(2014))  
 M0 (original data) M1 (data coded for AN-A) M2 (Corrected inconsistent AN-A) | ANTS | 
   M1 vs M2 M0 vs M2 
Attribute Class1 Class2 Class3 Class1 Class2 Class3 Class1 Class2 Class3 Class1 Class2 Class1 Class2 
Time NS 
-1.39
c
 
(0.38) 
NS 
-0.93
c
 
(0.27) 
-2.55
c
 
(0.81) 
NS 
-0.74
b
 
(0.32) 
-2.88
c
 
(0.93) 
NS 1.08 0.73 2.31 1.76 
Fixed NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
0.80
b
 
(0.34) 
NS 0 3.03 0 2.33 
Discount NS 
0.67
c
 
(0.24) 
NS NS 
1.45
c
 
(0.40) 
NS NS 
1.15
c
 
(0.38) 
NS 0 2.41 0 1.61 
Rewards 
9.41
b
 
(4.50) 
9.38
b
 
(4.36) 
NS 
4.91
b
 
(2.39) 
32.61
c
 
(8.86) 
NS 
5.75
b
 
(2.69) 
26.88
c
 
(8.86) 
NS 0.67 36.24 1.01 2.27 
Renewables NS 
0.71
c
 
(0.10) 
NS 
0.24
c
 
(0.06) 
0.83
c
 
(0.17) 
NS NS 
1.01
c
 
(0.18) 
NS 3.41 2.98 0 1.99 
Ownership 
0.21
c
 
(0.05) 
0.68
c
 
(0.09) 
NS 
0.12
c
 
(0.05) 
0.68
c
 
(0.15) 
1.41
c
 
(0.63) 
0.16
c
 
(0.05) 
0.77
c
 
(0.15) 
NS 2.60 2.33 6.25 0.69 
New electricity 
company 
NS 
-12.93
a
 
(6.48) 
NS 
6.30
a
 
(3.57) 
NS NS NS NS NS 22.34 0 0 1.92 
New non-electricity 
company 
NS 
-30.48
c
 
(8.12) 
NS 
-7.75
a
 
(4.41) 
-52.72
c
 
(14.40) 
NS NS 
-54.88
c
 
(14.68) 
NS 0.23 0.76 0 2.00 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
20.45
b
 
(8.85) 
NS NS NS 
-24.90
b
 
(12.06) 
NS NS 
-29.44
b
 
(12.76) 
NS 0 1.09 2.31 2.31 
Segment size 47.7% 40.9% 11.4% 55.8% 35.8% 8.4% 52.4% 36.4% 11.2% 2.40 0.32 6.39 4.95 
Values in parentheses are the standard errors. ANTS for class 3 probabilities are 2.27 and 2.70 for M1 vs. M2 and M0 vs. M2 respectively 
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5.4.5 Alternative approaches for accounting for stated AN-A in model 
estimation   
In this section we use the MNL and RPL-EC models to analyze the data and 
extend the analysis carried out in the previous section by applying different 
approaches to accounting for stated AN-A in model estimation. The main 
objective is to examine and contrast the effect of adopting the alternative 
approaches on model fit and WTP. This addresses research Question 2(d, e) [(d) 
Do preferences of respondents who ignore an attribute differ from those who 
consider it? (e) What are the effects of attribute non-attendance on WTP?], and 
contributes to the debate on the unresolved methodological issue of how the 
parameters of ignored attributes should be treated in model estimation.  
For each model, three specifications for the utility functions of alternatives in a 
choice set are used. The first specification ignores all stated AN-A and the utility 
functions of the alternatives assume full attendance to the attributes (full 
compensatory behaviour). This specification implies that all the attributes used to 
describe the alternatives are relevant to all respondents. The specification for the 
utility of an alternative for the MNL and RPL-EC models is the same as specified 
in Chapter 2, except that the subscript s indicating choice task is omitted as we 
assume that the attribute processing rule is the same in all choice tasks. For 
models MNL1 and RPL1, the respective utility specifications for alternative i and 
for respondent n are:  
𝑈𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑘                  (5-1) 
𝑈𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑘 + 𝛼𝑠𝑞 + 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛 , 𝑖 =  𝑆𝑄, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐴, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐵  
 
where αsq equals zero for non-status quo alternatives and 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛 is zero for the 
status quo (SQ) alternative (Brownstone & Train, 1999). 
Following Hensher et al. (2005b) and Scarpa, Gilbride, et al. (2009), the second 
specification explicitly accounts for stated AN-A in the utility functions of the 
alternatives by restricting the parameters of ignored attributes to zero. The reason 
for assigning a zero weight for the taste intensities of attributes that are ignored by 
respondents is that the levels of these attributes did not influence the choices 
made. Although assigning zero weights to the parameters of ignored attributes is 
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equivalent to assigning zero levels for these attributes, it does not necessarily 
imply zero marginal WTP for these attributes. Respondents may have ignored 
these attributes because the benefit of full evaluation of the specific attributes is 
perceived to be less than the cost of evaluation (Carlsson et al., 2010; Hensher et 
al., 2005b). For models MNL2 and RPL2, the respective utility functions may be 
expressed as: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑛 = ∑ (𝛿𝑘𝛽𝑘)𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑘  
     𝑈𝑖𝑛 = ∑ (𝛿𝑘𝛽𝑛𝑘)𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑘 + 𝛼𝑠𝑞 + 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛 ,                                 (5-2)  
 
where 𝛿𝑘 is a dummy indicating attribute-processing rule and takes a value of 1 if 
attribute k is attended to and zero if it is ignored.  
The third specification allows for the testing of differences in preferences between 
respondents who attended to specific attributes and those who ignored them. This 
addresses research Question 2(d). We did not apply this specification to the latent 
class model estimated in the previous section because the model captures 
heterogeneity of preferences and any differences in preferences between 
respondents who attend to an attribute and those who do not are already captured 
in the latent classes. Following Carlsson et al. (2010) and Gracia et al. (2012), we 
create a dummy variable for each attribute indicating whether or not an attribute 
was ignored and include it in the utility function as an interaction with the levels 
of the respective attribute. We specify the utility function of an alternative for 
MNL3 and RPL3 models respectively as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑑𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛 +𝑘 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑘        
 𝑈𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑘𝑑𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑘 + 𝛼𝑠𝑞 + 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛 ,                    (5-3)  
 
where, dk is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if an attribute is not 
attended to and zero otherwise, and 𝛾𝑛𝑘 is respondent n’s taste intensity for the 
ignored k
th
 attribute. 
A significant parameter estimate of the interaction term indicates significant 
differences in preferences between those who attended to the attribute and those 
who ignored it. On the other hand, an insignificant parameter estimate suggests 
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that respondents who ignored an attribute and those who attended to it have 
similar preferences for the attribute (Carlsson et al., 2010; Gracia et al., 2012). 
This provides a test for the hypothesis that preferences for specific attributes differ 
between respondents who ignored the attributes and those who considered them. 
Alternatively it provides a test for whether or not the taste intensities or parameter 
estimates of ignored attributes are equal to zero.  
An alternative to the above approach, in the case of the RPL-EC model, is to 
establish whether attendance or non-attendance is systematically linked to 
heterogeneity across respondents by specifying the mean and standard deviations 
of each random parameter as functions of a dummy variable indicating non-
attendance (Campbell et al., 2008; Hensher et al., 2005b). 
Regression results 
The models estimated here correspond to the respective indirect utility 
specifications in equations (5-1) to (5-3). All RPL-EC models are estimated with 
simulated maximum likelihood using 300 Halton draws, which display better 
equi-dispersion properties than random draws (Hensher et al., 2005a; Train, 
2009). Train (2009) provides a detailed discussion of simulated maximum 
likelihood and Halton draws. To determine which parameters are specified as 
random, a series of preliminary estimations were conducted. Only parameters with 
significant standard deviations were specified as random with normal distribution 
assumed in the final model. We follow a common practice in similar studies and 
specify the parameter for the cost attribute (monthly power bill) as fixed to avoid 
the complications associated with estimating WTP as a ratio of two distributions 
(e.g., Goett, 1998; Revelt & Train, 2000).  
A summary of the results for the MNL and RPL-EC models is presented in Table 
5-12. The estimated models fit the data well with pseudo-R
2
 values ranging from 
0.263 to 0.382 for MNL2 and RPL3 respectively. All three specifications of the 
RPL-EC model outperform the MNL models based on the likelihood ratio test 
(LRT), LL, AIC, BIC and pseudo-R
2
. For example, the worst-performing RPL-EC 
model (RPL2) performs better than the best-performing MNL (MNL3) based on 
an LRT statistic of 379.6 which is greater than the critical χ2(5, 0.05) value of 11.07.  
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Table 5-12: Regression results for the MNL and RPL-EC models of supplier choice 
Attribute MNL1 MNL2 MNL3 RPL1 RPL2 RPL3 
ASCALT1  0.7221
c
  0.5152
c
  0.7627
c
  0.3315
a 
 0.6690
c 
 0.5250
c 
Time -0.0236
c
  -0.0484
c
 -0.0399
c
 -0.0348
c 
-0.0541
c 
-0.0486
c 
Fixed 0.0063
c
 0.0030 0.0049
b
  0.0050
a 
0.0057 0.0041 
Discount 0.0110
c
  0.0083
c
 0.0117
c
  0.0150
c 
0.0105
c
 0.0162
c 
Rewards 0.1226
b
  0.4175
c
 0.3618
c
  0.1399
b 
0.3628
c 
0.2814
c 
Renewables 0.0085
c
  0.0091
c
 0.0103
c
  0.0133
c 
0.0130
c 
0.0160
c 
Ownership 0.0036
c
   0.0068
c
 0.0077
c
  0.0087
c 
0.0090
c 
0.0166
c 
New electricity 
company 
-0.0942 -0.2758
c
 -0.2816
c
 -0.4157
c 
-0.1879 -0.5355
c 
New non-electricity 
company 
-0.3516
c
 -0.7243
c
 -0.5868
c
 -0.9448
c 
-0.8737
c 
-1.1056
c 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
-0.1911
a
 -0.4981
c
 -0.3647
c
 -0.7366
c 
-0.5803
c 
-0.8576
c 
Monthly power Bill -0.0252
c
 -0.0252
c
 -0.0264
c
 -0.0370
c 
-0.0333
c 
-0.0383
c 
ERC                                                                                        0.0 (Fixed Parameter) 
Ignored attributes   
Time  0.0271
c
   0.0244
b 
Fixed  0.0051   0.0013 
Discount -0.0058   -0.0151 
Rewards -0.5388
c
   -0.2862
b 
Renewables -0.0046
b
   -0.0082
c 
Ownership -0.0108
c
   -0.0164
c 
New electricity company 0.4292
c
    0.2393 
New non-electricity company 0.4974
c
    0.3116 
Well-known non-electricity company 0.4163
c
    0.2204 
Monthly power Bill 0.0078
c
    0.0125
c 
Standard deviations of random parameters 
Fixed  0.0166
c 
0.0275
c 
0.0159
c 
Discount  0.0215
c 
0.0191
c 
0.0146
b 
Renewable  0.0105
c 
0.0149
c 
0.0087
c 
Ownership  0.0178
c 
0.0169
c 
0.0140
c 
Ignored_Discount    0.0227
a 
Ignored_Renewable    0.0087
c 
Ignored_Ownership    0.0141
c 
ERC (σ)  1.8714c 1.7707c 2.0712c 
Model fit 
K (number of parameters) 11 11 21 16 16 28 
LL -2156.7 -2165.6 -2103.6 -1849.4 -1913.8 -1826.0 
AIC 4335.3 4353.1 4249.1 3730.9 3859.6 3708.1 
BIC 4400.2 4418.0 4373.0 3825.2 3954.0 3873.2 
Psuedo-R
2 
0.266 0.263 0.284 0.3737 0.352 0.382 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively. 
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All the estimated parameters have the expected signs confirming our prior beliefs 
about the marginal effects of the respective attributes on choice probabilities. 
Furthermore, the signs of all parameters are consistent across all models. Another 
noticeable consistency across the models is the positive and significant constant 
for the SQ which reveals significant preference for the SQ in the sampled 
population. The SQ represents a traditional incumbent retailer which is used as a 
base for supplier type. The negative coefficients of the other three supplier types 
imply that on average, customers prefer the traditional supplier to other types, 
which is consistent with the findings of Goett et al. (2000). Although the 
parameter for Fixed is insignificant at the .05 level across the three RPL-EC 
models, its standard deviation is highly significant, indicating heterogeneity of 
preferences for this attribute. The estimated standard deviation (σ) of the error 
component (ERC) is significant at the .01 level in all the RPL models which lends 
support to the indirect utility specifications with an error component for the mixed 
logit model in equations (5-1) to (5-3). The estimated total unobserved component 
of utility associated with the experimentally designed alternatives gives a total 
variance (σ2+π2/6) which ranges from 3.66 to 4.81 for RPL2 and RPL3 
respectively.  
The significance of the parameters indicates that on average all the attributes used 
in the experimental design were relevant to the choices made. The parameter 
estimate for the cost attribute (monthly power bill or Bill) is important given the 
objective of estimating and comparing WTP for the attributes of electricity 
services. This parameter is significant at the .01 level and has the expected 
negative sign, which allows for the estimation of meaningful WTP estimates. 
Recall that we assumed a fixed parameter for the cost attribute. We acknowledge 
that assuming a fixed parameter for this attribute could result in biased estimates 
where there is significant heterogeneity of tastes for the attribute. 
Restricting parameter estimates for the attributes that respondents claimed to have 
ignored to zero reduces model fit in both MNL2 and RPL2 compared to the 
respective unrestricted models estimated with original data. This suggests that 
assuming zero parameters for all ignored attributes may not be appropriate in this 
study context. We also note that the parameter estimate for Fixed becomes 
insignificant in both models, whilst the parameter for New electricity company 
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becomes significant in MNL2 but the opposite holds in the case of RPL2. With 
the exception of Discount, Fixed, and Bill, all the parameter estimates are 
relatively larger and have higher t-scores in MNL2 than in MNL1, indicating that 
based on the MNL model, restricting the parameter estimates of ignored attributes 
increases the magnitude and precision of estimates of taste intensities for the other 
attributes. Discount and Fixed differ from the other non-price attributes in that 
they are normally included with the price in most electricity plans currently on 
offer and respondents are most likely to be familiar with making trade-offs among 
them. Restricting the parameter estimates for these two attributes to zero for 
respondents who report having ignored them reduces the precision in estimating 
their parameters in both MNL2 and RPL2. 
The models specified with non-zero parameters for the ignored attributes, MNL3 
and RPL3, perform better than the respective base models MNL1 and RPL1 based 
on all information criteria. This indicates that the utility specifications used in 
MNL3 and RPL3 are better than those specified in equations (5-1) and (5-2). All 
significant coefficients of the interactions of the dummy variables indicating non-
attendance to specific attributes with the respective attribute levels have the 
opposite signs to those of the respective attributes. As discussed earlier, all 
significant interaction terms indicate significant differences in preferences 
between respondents who ignored an attribute and those who attended to it. Fixed 
and Discount have insignificant coefficients for the interactions in both models, 
suggesting that the preferences of respondents who reported non-attendance to 
these attributes are not significantly different from those who attended to the 
attributes. Whilst this indicates that restricting the parameters for these two 
attributes to zero based on stated non-attendance is inappropriate in this case, it 
also provides, with respect to these two attributes, a “NO” answer to research 
Question 2(d) [Do preferences of respondents who ignore an attribute differ from 
those who consider it?]. This offers a possible explanation of why MNL2 and 
RPL2 perform worse than MNL1 and RPL1, respectively, since MNL2 and RPL2 
turn out to be mis-specified by assuming zero values for the parameters of ignored 
attributes. Additionally, all interaction terms for the three supplier types are 
insignificant in RPL3, indicating no significant differences in preferences for 
respondents stating non-attendance and those reporting full attendance. What can 
be inferred from these results is that stated non-attendance to these attributes is 
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inconsistent with the respective respondents’ observed pattern of choice 
responses. A possible explanation is that some respondents may have made errors 
by checking the wrong boxes or had problems recalling which attributes they 
actually ignored.      
For the attributes with significant interaction terms, the taste intensities for 
respondents who ignored the attributes are obtained by adding the estimated 
parameter for the attribute to that of the respective interaction term. For example, 
based on MNL3, respondents who reported non-attendance to Time have a lower 
negative taste intensity (-0.03982+0.02702 = -0.0128) for this attribute compared 
to respondents who attended to it (-0.03982). Those who reported non-attendance 
to the power bill have a lower marginal disutility of income (-0.02636+0.00776 = 
-0.0186) compared to -0.02636 for those who attended to it. Since the coefficients 
of the interaction terms have opposite signs to those of the respective attributes, 
the taste intensities for respondents who ignored the attributes are lower than 
those who did not. This is consistent with suggestions that respondents who state 
non-attendance to specific attributes may have instead placed lower weights on 
the attributes rather than completely ignoring them (Carlsson et al., 2010; Gracia 
et al., 2012). This provides a “YES” answer to research Question 2(d) for these 
attributes.  
These results suggest that, other than for Fixed and Discount, an assumption of 
different preferences between respondents who ignored an attribute and those who 
attended to it is justified, but the assumption of zero taste intensities for 
respondents who ignored an attribute may not be justified in all cases as none of 
the taste intensities for respondents who ignored an attribute is zero.  These 
findings suggest that the attributes may have not been ignored because their value 
is zero but were ignored purely as a coping strategy, or that they were not 
completely ignored but less weight was placed on them. 
Estimates of WTP under different assumptions about the parameters of ignored 
attributes 
Willingness to pay for a specific attribute is estimated as a ratio of the partial 
derivative of the utility function with respect to the attribute to the negative of the 
partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the cost attribute. For 
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MNL1, MNL2, RPL1 and RPL2, the point estimates of WTP are simply the ratio 
of the coefficient of a non-price attribute (βk) to the negative of the coefficient of 
the cost attribute (-βc) since the models do not involve interaction terms. For 
MNL3 and RPL3 the partial derivatives contain additional coefficients multiplied 
by the dummy variable indicating non-attendance. The formulae for WTP 
estimates for the k
th
 attribute are shown in equations (5-4) and (5-5). 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 =
𝛽𝑘
−𝛽𝑐
                                                                                                  (5-4) 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 =
(𝛽𝑘+𝛾𝑘𝑑𝑘)
−(𝛽𝑐+𝛾𝑐𝑑𝑐)
                                                                                        (5-5) 
Equation (5-5) estimates WTP for four possible groups of respondents depending 
on the attribute processing rule adopted. (1) Full attendance: WTPk = 
𝛽𝑘
−𝛽𝑐
, where 
respondents attended to both attributes and dk and dc are equal to zero. (2) Ignored 
attribute: 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 =
(𝛽𝑘+𝛾𝑘𝑑𝑘)
−𝛽𝑐
, where only attribute k is ignored but the cost is not. 
(3) Ignored cost: 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 =
𝛽𝑘
−(𝛽𝑐+𝛾𝑐𝑑𝑐)
, where attribute k is attended to but cost is 
ignored. (4) Ignored both: 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 =
(𝛽𝑘+𝛾𝑘𝑑𝑘)
−(𝛽𝑐+𝛾𝑐𝑑𝑐)
 , where both attribute and cost are 
ignored.   
WTP estimates from the models estimated above are presented in Table 5-13. 
Based on MNL2 and RPL2, accounting for AN-A results in different WTP 
estimates. Accounting for stated AN-A in MNL2 and RPL2 produces generally 
higher values for most attributes, with the notable exception of Discount and 
Fixed whose values decline, becoming insignificant even at the 90% level of 
confidence in both models. On the other hand MNL3 and RPL3 provide WTP 
estimates corresponding to different attribute processing rules. With the exception 
of Discount and Fixed in both MNL3 and RPL3, and supplier type in RPL3, 
respondents who ignore a non-price attribute are found to have a lower WTP for 
the ignored attribute compared to those who considered it. In most cases, WTP for 
ignored attributes is significantly different from zero, with exceptions where joint 
non-attendance to an attribute and cost produces mixed results.  
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Table 5-13: Estimates of average marginal WTP for the attributes of electricity services based on MNL and RPL-EC models (NZ$(2014)) 
Attribute MNL1 MNL2 MNL3 RPL1 RPL2 RPL3 
 Assuming 
full 
attendance 
AN-A 
coded 
data 
Attended 
both 
Ignored 
attribute 
Ignored 
power 
bill 
Ignored 
both 
Assuming 
full 
attendance 
AN-A 
coded data 
Attended 
both 
Ignored 
attribute 
Ignored 
power 
bill 
Ignored 
both 
Time -0.94
c
 
(0.20) 
-1.92
c
 
(0.29) 
-1.51
c
 
(0.29) 
-0.49
b
 
(0.24) 
-2.15
c
 
(0.47) 
-0.69
b
 
(0.35) 
-0.94
c
   
(0.16) 
-1.62
c
 
(0.26) 
-1.27
c 
(0.23) 
-0.63
c 
(0.19) 
-1.88
c 
(0.39) 
-0.94
c 
(0.30) 
Fixed 0.25
c 
 
(0.08) 
NS 0.18
b
 
(0.09) 
0.18
b
 
(0.09) 
0.26
b
 
(0.13) 
0.26
b
 
(0.13) 
0.14
a
     
(0.07) 
NS NS NS NS NS 
Discount 0.44
c 
 
(0.11) 
0.33
c
 
(0.11) 
0.44
c
 
(0.11) 
0.44
c
 
(0.11) 
0.63
c
 
(0.18) 
0.63
c
 
(0.18) 
0.41
c
     
(0.10) 
0.32
c
  
(0.11) 
0.42
c 
(0.09) 
0.42
c 
(0.09) 
0.63
c 
(0.15) 
NS 
Rewards 4.86
b
  
(2.25) 
16.60
c
 
(2.74) 
13.73
c
 
(2.76) 
-6.72
c 
(3.04)
 
19.45
c
 
(4.46) 
-9.52
b
 
(4.44) 
3.78
b
    
(1.75) 
10.90
c
 
(2.50) 
7.35
c 
(2.23) 
NS 10.89
c 
(3.52) 
NS 
Renewables 0.34
c 
 
(0.04) 
0.36
c
 
(0.05) 
0.39
c
 
(0.05) 
0.22
c
 
(0.07) 
0.55
c
 
(0.09) 
0.31
c
 
(0.11) 
0.36
c
     
(0.04) 
0.39
c
  
(0.06) 
0.42
c 
(0.04) 
0.20
c
 
(0.06) 
0.62
c 
(0.09) 
0.30
c 
(0.10) 
Ownership 0.14
c 
 
(0.05) 
0.27
c
 
(0.05) 
0.29
c
 
(0.05) 
-0.12
a
 
(0.07) 
0.41
c
 
(0.09) 
NS 0.23
c
     
(0.06) 
0.27
c
  
(0.07) 
0.43
c 
(0.06) 
NS 0.64
c 
(0.11) 
NS 
New electricity 
company 
NS -10.97
c
 
(3.71) 
-10.69
c
 
(4.04) 
NS -15.14
c
 
(5.84) 
NS -11.23
c
 
(2.87) 
NS -13.98
c 
(3.39) 
-13.98
c 
(3.39) 
-20.72
c 
(5.30) 
-20.72
c 
(5.30) 
New Non-electricity 
company 
-13.94
c
 
(4.33) 
-28.80
c
 
(4.86) 
-22.27
c
 
(5.07) 
Ns -31.55
c
 
(7.91) 
NS -25.53
c
 
(3.63) 
-26.24
c
 
(4.92) 
-28.86
c 
(4.42) 
-28.86
c 
(4.42) 
-42.78
c 
(7.79) 
-42.78
c 
(7.79) 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
-7.58
a
 
(4.26) 
-19.81
c
 
(4.53) 
-13.84
c
 
(4.92) 
NS -19.61
c
 
(7.21) 
NS -19.90
c
 
(3.78) 
-17.43
c 
(4.70)
 
-22.39
c 
(4.45) 
-22.39
c 
(4.45) 
-33.19
c 
(7.25) 
-33.19
c 
(7.25) 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05, .1 level, respectively. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; NS denotes not statistically significant at the .1 level 
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Analysis of responses from the CE indicates that electricity consumers in New 
Zealand are willing to pay on average $3.15 to $9.40 per month to avoid an 
increase of 5 minutes in call waiting time. A supplier offering a 12-month fixed 
rate contract may charge up to $3.12 more per month compared to similar 
suppliers offering no fixed rate contracts without losing its customers to 
competitors. Offering a discount of 10% may allow a supplier to charge up to 
$6.30 per month above the monthly power bills charged by similar suppliers, 
others things being equal. Offering loyalty rewards may allow a supplier to charge 
up to $19.45 more per month, for respondents who are less sensitive to the price, 
compared to similar suppliers who do not offer loyalty rewards. Consumers have 
positive preferences for both local ownership of supplier and electricity generated 
from renewable energy sources and would be willing to pay on average up to 
$6.40 more per month to a supplier that has a 10% higher local ownership 
structure, and between $2.00 and $6.20 more to secure a 10% increase in 
electricity generated from renewable energy sources. Traditional electricity 
suppliers are preferred to any new entrants, including well-known companies 
diversifying into retail electricity. Entrants into the retail electricity market have to 
charge up to $42.78 less per month to attract respondents who are less sensitive to 
the cost depending on the type of entrant, ceteris paribus.   
To establish the effect of AN-A and the adoption of the alternative approaches for 
controlling for AN-A, the marginal WTP estimates are compared across the 
models. As indicated earlier, we observe a general upwards shift in WTP 
estimates when AN-A is accounted for in model estimation. To confirm this 
observation and also assess the statistical significance of the differences in WTP 
values we use the ANTS suggested by Campbell et al. (2008) to test for equality 
of the estimates. The test results and the ratios of WTP estimates are presented in 
Table 5-14. The results indicate, with the exception of Renewables, significant 
differences between WTP estimates obtained under MNL1 and MNL2. With the 
exception of Discount and Fixed, on average, MNL2 produces estimates that are 
1.07 to 2.94 times larger than MNL1. In the main, similar results are observed for 
RPL1 and RPL2. These results imply that estimating a model without accounting 
for AN-A results in significant bias in WTP estimates. In this study, where 
significant differences in WTP estimates are observed, the bias is downwards for 
all attributes except for Fixed and Discount, which have an upwards bias.  
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Table 5-14: Tests of equality of WTP estimates based on the MNL and RPL-EC models 
 MNL2 
vs 
MNL1 
MNL3
*
 
vs  
MNL1 
MNL3
* 
 vs  
MNL2 
RPL2  
vs               
RPL1 
RPL3
*
   
vs  
RPL1 
RPL3
*
  
vs  
RPL2 
Variables | ANTS | WTP 
ratio 
| ANTS | WTP 
ratio 
| ANTS | WTP 
ratio 
| ANTS | WTP 
ratio 
| ANTS | WTP 
ratio 
| ANTS | WTP 
ratio 
Time 4.57 2.05 2.74 1.62 9.07 0.79 3.22 1.73 2.04 1.35 2.56 0.78 
Fixed 4.93 0.48 1.89 0.73 2.77 1.54 1.91 - 1.91 0.78 - - 
Discount 3.99 0.75 0.34 1.02 3.30 1.35 2.36 0.78 0.74 1.04 2.42 1.33 
Rewards 7.48 3.42 5.51 2.83 8.14 0.83 3.99 2.88 2.58 1.94 3.15 0.67 
Renewables 1.02 1.07 2.39 1.16 11.82 1.09 0.73 1.09 2.97 1.16 0.74 1.07 
Ownership 6.83 1.92 6.31 2.07 1.44 1.08 1.08 1.15 15.91 1.84 4.76 1.61 
New electricity company 6.31 2.94 3.54 2.86 0.17 0.97 2.33 - 1.52 1.24 5.26 2.48 
New Non-electricity company 6.79 2.07 3.17 1.60 4.50 0.77 0.22 1.03 1.33 1.13 1.21 1.10 
Well-known Non-electricity company 7.86 2.61 2.54 1.82 3.11 0.70 0.89 0.88 1.05 1.12 3.31 1.28 
*WTP estimates are for respondents who attended to both attribute and power bill. NTS values of 1.96 and above indicate significant differences at the .05 level, 
and have been highlighted in bold. Missing values indicate that the ratio cannot be estimated where one of the WTP values is not significantly different from 
zero.
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 Apart from Discount and Fixed, these results are consistent with previous studies 
in various contexts that find a downward bias in marginal WTP values when AN-
A is not controlled for (e.g., Campbell, 2007; Hensher & Greene, 2010). However, 
some studies find an upwards bias in WTP values as in the case of Fixed and 
Discount in this study (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Hensher, 2004; Hensher et al., 
2005b). Recall that based on model MNL3 and RPL3, there are no significant 
differences in preferences between respondents who ignored Fixed and Discount 
and those who considered these attributes. Our results suggest that accounting for 
AN-A by imposing zero values on the parameters of ignored attributes, where 
preferences are not significantly different between those who ignore an attribute 
and those who consider it, results in lower WTP estimates, whilst the converse is 
true where preferences differ. The direction of the bias seems to depend on the 
differences in preferences of respondents who ignore an attribute and those who 
do not. 
The downward bias in WTP values obtained from MNL1 and RPL1 may be 
explained in terms of less weight being assigned to ignored non-price attributes 
and also the fact that the power bill (cost) was the least-ignored attribute. Studies 
that find an upward bias in WTP values report higher non-attendance to the cost 
attribute which results in a smaller parameter estimate for the cost variable, hence 
higher WTP, given that WTP is estimated as a ratio of parameters where the 
parameter for the cost variable is the denominator.   
5.5 Inferred attribute non-attendance 
In this section we explore possible attribute processing rules using statistical 
models rather than relying on stated AN-A. Reliance on self-reported non-
attendance has been criticized in previous studies because of reporting errors. This 
analysis provides additional answers to research Question 2(d) on whether or not 
attributes are ignored individually or in combinations. 
5.5.1 A probabilistic decision process model for inferred AN-A 
An alternative approach to the use of stated AN-A in model estimation employs 
probabilistic decision process models for AN-A (e.g., Hensher, 2008; Hensher & 
Rose, 2009; Hensher et al., 2012; Scarpa et al., 2010). In these models, inferred 
AN-A is modelled using a latent class framework to probabilistically capture 
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decision processes or attribute processing rules that respondents may have used to 
evaluate the alternatives presented in the choice tasks. Each latent class represents 
a group of respondents who adopted the same attribute processing rule and the 
number of latent classes depends on the number of hypothesized or pre-defined 
attribute processing rules and the number of attributes used to describe the 
alternatives. Specific restrictions are imposed on the utility expressions for each 
class, where the coefficients of ignored attributes are constrained to zero and the 
coefficients of attributes attended to are assumed to be the same across classes 
(Hensher et al., 2012; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). Hence each class is not 
defined by the attribute taking a value of zero within the class but by the 
corresponding coefficient taking the value of zero.  
A distinguishing feature between the latent class formulation used to infer AN-A 
and the standard latent class formulation is that, in the former the non-zero 
coefficients are the same across the classes and the classes have specific 
behavioural meaning in terms of attribute processing rules. The maximum number 
of all possible attribute processing rules, which includes all possible combinations 
of non-attendance to the attributes, depends on the number of attributes and, is 
equal to 2
k
, where k is the number of attributes (Hensher et al., 2012). In this study 
we have eight attributes, which gives a total number of possible attribute 
processing rules of 2
8
 or 256. This approach may be criticized for ignoring 
heterogeneity of preferences for the attributes that are attended to by imposing 
equality of taste intensities for each attribute across classes. Alternative 
approaches that allow for heterogeneity of preferences as well as AN-A specify 
distributions for taste intensities (e.g., Hess & Hensher, 2010; Scarpa, Gilbride, et 
al., 2009).   
5.5.2 Model specification 
We use the probabilistic decision process model described by Hensher et al. 
(2012) to investigate attribute non-attendance in our sample of respondents. The 
model accommodates attribute non-attendance by assuming that individuals are 
sorted into Q (q = 1, 2, 3, ….., Q) classes that are distinguished by what attributes 
were ignored or considered in their choice process. The probability that an 
individual n chooses alternative i conditional on class membership of class q 
which ignores a certain attribute or subset of attributes is a multinomial logit;  
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑛, 𝑖|𝑞) =
exp (𝜷𝑞
′ 𝒙𝑖𝑛)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷𝑞′ 𝒙𝑗𝑛)
𝐽
𝑗−1
                                                        (5 − 6) 
where βq is one of 2k possible vectors β in which m of the elements are zero and 
K-m are nonzero (Hensher et al., 2012). “Specifically, q can be thought of as a 
masking vector of the form (δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, …), where each δ takes the possible 
values 0,1. βq is then the ‘‘element for element product’’ of this masking vector, 
with the standard coefficient vector β, indicating that the masking vector interacts 
with the coefficient vector” (Hensher et al., 2012, p. 238). The unconditional 
probability of individual n choosing alternative i is obtained by averaging over 
classes as follows (Hensher et al., 2012); 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑛, 𝑖) = ∑𝜋𝑞
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷𝑞
′ 𝒙𝑖𝑛)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷𝑞′ 𝒙𝑗𝑛)
𝐽
𝑗=1
2𝑘
𝑞=1
                                                          (5 − 7) 
where ∑ 𝜋𝑞 = 1
2𝑘
𝑞=1  and πq is the prior class probability.    
A baseline MNL model estimated in section 5.4.4 assuming full attendance is 
used to provide a contrast for the hypothesized attribute processing strategies 
operationalized by imposing parameter restriction for ignored attributes. The 
estimation of an LC with 2
K
 classes, which is 256 classes in the case of the 8 
attributes used in this study, is beyond the current capabilities of NLOGIT 
software used in the estimation, and would make the analysis tedious.   
To overcome this problem we use two approaches to investigate AN-A. In the 
first approach we estimate Model 1 assuming ten latent classes of attribute 
processing rules. The first seven classes represent non-attendance to a specific 
attribute (partial non-attendance). Class 8 represents joint non-attendance to the 
power bill and discount as it is unlikely that a respondent who ignores the power 
bill attends to the discount. Therefore we assume, for the eight classes, that each 
of the eight attributes used to describe an alternative in a choice set, except power 
bill, is ignored on its own. For example classes 1, 2 and 3 represent non-
attendance to Time, Fixed and Discount, respectively. Classes 9 and 10 represent 
full attendance and non-attendance to all attributes or total non-attendance, 
respectively. In this model, each vector βq (q = 1, 2, 3, 4, .… 7) consists of only 
one zero restriction and seven nonzero attribute coefficients representing seven 
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classes which ignored a specific attribute each; vector β8 consists of two zeros (for 
discount and power bill) and six nonzero attribute coefficients; vector β9 consists 
of eight nonzero attributes coefficients representing full attendance; and vector β10 
consists of ten zero coefficients representing total non-attendance where all 
respondents in class 10 ignored all attributes and therefore made random choices.  
Although supplier type is represented by four categorical levels, we assume that 
non-attendance is at an attribute level, i.e., a respondent either attends to all the 
levels of supplier type or ignores supplier type altogether. Table 5-15 illustrates 
the attribute processing rule latent class structure described above. This approach 
exploits the capability of the latent class model to explore hypothesised attribute 
processing rules. Including a class assignment model may provide clues as to who 
applied which attribute processing rule and possibly why.  
Table 5-15: Structure of inferred attribute non-attendance classes 
Behaviourally 
defined latent 
classes 
Time Fix Dis Rew Ren Own Supplier Type Bill 
Class 1 0 βf βd βrew βren βo βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3 βb 
Class 2 βt  0 βd βrew βren βo βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3  βb 
Class 3 βt βf  0 βrew βren βo βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3  βb 
Class 4 βt βf βd 0 βren βo βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3  βb 
Class 5 βt βf βd βrew 0 βo βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3  βb 
Class 6 βt βf βd βrew βren 0 βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3  βb 
Class 7 βt βf βd βrew βren βo 0 0 0 0 βb 
Class 8 βt βf 0 βrew βren βo βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3  0 
Class 9 βt βf βd βrew βren βo βs0 βs1 βs2 βs3  βb 
Class 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*Fix, Dis, Rew, Ren, and Own denote Fixed, Discount, Rewards, Renewables, and 
Ownership, respectively 
In the second approach we estimate Model 2A where we investigate a number of 
possible patterns of AN-A based on suspected attribute processing rules consisting 
of ignoring subsets of attributes. This differs from Model 1 in that it recognises 
the possibility that attributes may not have been ignored individually but in pairs 
or subsets, which is highly likely given the pattern of stated AN-A reported earlier 
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in section 5.4.1 (Table 5-2). Scarpa, Gilbride, et al. (2009) and Hess and Hensher 
(2010) find evidence that some respondents ignore a subset of attributes. Based on 
this approach a number of LC models based on different combinations of ignored 
attributes were estimated and compared, and the best model was selected on the 
basis of model fit.  
The selection of ignored subsets is based on the attributes that respondents 
reported to have ignored the most. Since Time was reported to have been ignored 
by nearly 60% of the respondents, we include it in each subset of ignored 
attributes to reflect this high incidence of stated non-attendance to the attribute. A 
variant of the best-performing model (Model 2B) is estimated with class 
membership conditioned on respondent’s rating of how easy the choice tasks were 
during the CE. As part of the debriefing process, each respondent was asked to 
rate how easy it was to make choices in all twelve choice tasks presented to them 
in the CE. Responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert-type scale with the end 
points marked as “very difficult”, coded as 1, and “very easy” coded as 7. The 
mid-point of the scale was marked as “neutral”, and coded as 4. We create a 
dummy variable, which we call “Easy 1”, which takes on the value of 1 if a 
respondent’s score is greater than 4, and zero otherwise. This is the variable used 
in the class membership model to sharpen class membership. This variable is 
selected to investigate any link between the attributes attended to and the self-
reported cognitive burden. 
5.5.3 Results 
Table 5-16 presents a summary of the results for three LC models used to infer 
AN-A. The models are compared to the base MNL model estimated in section 
5.4.4. Model 1 assumes ten attribute processing rules, while Model 2A and Model 
2B assume five classes. The data fits all the models well, and all significant 
parameters have the expected signs. Based on R
2
, LL, AIC and BIC, the models 
accounting for AN-A perform better than the base MNL which assumes full 
compensatory behaviour. Model 1 performs better than models 2A and 2B in 
terms of the above criteria. Visually, the parameter estimates differ across the 
models, but the signs of significant parameters are robust across the models. 
However, it should be noted that a direct comparison of parameter estimates 
between the MNL and the LC models is not possible due to different scaling of 
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the parameter estimates that is related to the scale factor of the random Gumbel 
error component (Campbell et al., 2011).  
The results for Model 1 indicate that the data does not contain evidence of 
attribute processing rules involving ignoring a single attribute, except Rewards, 
which has a 0.6551 probability of being ignored individually. Finding evidence of 
an attribute processing rule involving ignoring Rewards alone may not be 
surprising given that this attribute is the third most ignored after Time and supplier 
type. Results of previous analysis of self-reported non-attendance responses 
indicate that only 20% of respondents may have systematically ignored a single 
attribute, and these are likely to be included in the class inferred to have ignored 
Rewards. Although Time, Renewables, Ownership and supplier type had the 
highest self-reported non-attendance rates (60%, 34%, 41% and 47% 
respectively), inferred AN-A results indicate that they were not ignored 
individually, which supports the assertion that attributes may be ignored in pairs 
or subsets (Hess & Hensher, 2010; Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). Despite the fact 
that none of the respondents reported having ignored all the attributes, we find 
evidence supporting total non-attendance by approximately 24% of respondents. 
This may indicate that respondents who made random choices did not answer the 
debriefing question honestly. Joint non-attendance to Discount and Bill is 
significant and has a probability of 0.0992, which is slightly higher than the self-
reported non-attendance to Bill (7%). Although 12% of respondents reported full 
attendance, this is not supported by the results for Model 1. 
Given the number of attributes in this study (eight), it may not be surprising that, 
in the main, a strategy of systematically ignoring a single attribute is not 
supported by the data. Evidence of systematic non-attendance to a single attribute 
has been found in previous studies where fewer attributes are used to describe the 
alternatives in choice sets (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 2008; 
Scarpa, Gilbride, et al., 2009). In these previous studies, where only four non-
price attributes are used, ignoring a single attribute as a coping strategy is more 
likely to reduce the cognitive burden substantially compared to a situation where 
eight attributes are used to describe an alternative, as in our study. 
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Table 5-16: Comparison of attribute processing rules 
 MNL (full attendance) Model 1: 10 classes Model 2A Model 2B 
 beta (z) beta (z) Probability (z) beta (z) beta (z) 
ASCALT1 0.7221 (6.95)   1.6105 (6.99) - 0.7524 (3.88) 0.7305 (3.72) 
Time  -0.0236 (-4.74)   0.0004 (0.04) 0.0001 (0.00) -0.1756 (-5.64) -0.1785 (-5.72) 
Fixed  0.0063 (3.16)   0.0034 (0.87) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0185 (3.55) 0.0182 (3.45) 
Discount 0.0110 (4.03)   0.0180 (2.75) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0014 (0.36) 0.0016 (0.41) 
Rewards 0.1226 (2.15)   1.7935 (3.90) 0.6551 (9.79) 0.7640 (2.22) 0.7647 (2.18) 
Renewables  0.0085 (7.71)   0.0115 (3.83) 0.0019 (0.02) 0.0494 (12.24) 0.0471 (12.27) 
Ownership 0.0036 (2.83)   0.0032 (1.23) 0.0001 (1.00) 0.0386 (7.05) 0.0382 (7.12) 
New Electricity Supplier -0.0942 (-1.05)   0.2828 (1.30) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.1353 (0.93) 0.1093 (0.74) 
New non-electricity company -0.3516 (-3.22)   0.1751 (0.65) 0.0001 (0.00) -0.3402 (-1.53) -0.3730 (-1.67) 
Well-known non-electricity company -0.1914 (-1.77) -0.0191 (-0.07) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.1105 (0.51) 0.0846 (0.38) 
Monthly power BILL    -0.0252 (-29.12) -0.0511 (-22.25) 0.0992 (3.15) -0.0457 (-25.86) -0.0454 (-26.32) 
Attended to all (TA)   0.0001 (0.00)   
All attributes ignored (TNA)   0.2434 (7.42)   
Class membership models for Model 2A and Model 2B 
 Class 1 
(attended to all 
attributes) 
Class 2 (ignored Time, Fixed, 
Discount & Rewards) 
Class 3 (ignored Time, 
Fixed, Renewables, & 
Ownership) 
Class 4 (ignored Time, 
Rewards, Renewables 
& Ownership) 
Class 5 (ignored 
all attributes) 
Model 2A Class probability 0.0612 (2.28) 0.0544 (1.94) 0.1499 (1.91) 0.4522 (5.02) 0.2823 (8.62) 
Model 2B Class probability 0.061 0.06 0.146 0.454 0.279 
Constant -1.3534 (-2.17) -1.5776 (-2.21) -1.5042 (-1.73) -0.2778 (-0.72) 0.0 (Fixed par) 
Easy 1 -0.2835 (-0.33) 0.08317 (0.10) 1.1905 (1.36) 1.0778 (2.54) 0.0 (Fixed par) 
k 11 20 15 19 
Pseudo-R
2 
0.266 0.368 0.344 0.346 
LL -2156.66 -1867.74 -1936.4 -1930.4 
AIC 4335.3 3775.5 3902.8 3898.9 
BIC 4400.2 3893.4 3991.3 4010.9 
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The five classes in Model 2A and Model 2B have statistically significant 
probabilities at least at the .1 level. The two models suggest that about 6% of 
respondents attended to all attributes (class A), and about 28% (class E) ignored 
all attributes. The use of “Easy1” to sharpen class membership in Model 2B 
improves model fit. Respondents who rated the choice tasks as “easy” have a 
higher likelihood of belonging to class D. Class D, accounting for about 45% of 
the sampled population, represents respondents who only considered the discount, 
fixed rate contract, supplier type, and monthly power bill in making their choices. 
These attributes are included in standard electricity pricing plans and respondents 
are likely to be familiar with making trade-offs among them, hence exclusively 
attending to these attributes made the choice tasks easier. The results based on 
models 2A and 2B provide evidence that attributes may have been ignored in 
combinations instead of individually.  
Based on inferred AN-A results from the above LC models, the attribute 
processing rule involving ignoring attributes individually is unlikely to have been 
adopted by respondents, except for Renewables. However, evidence of attribute 
processing rules involving ignoring subsets of attributes, and ignoring all 
attributes is supported. Inconsistences between stated and inferred AN-A are 
observed. A possible explanation is that the differences may be due to errors in 
self-reporting the attribute processing rules used by respondents. This finding 
lends support to concerns raised about the reliability of self-reported attribute 
processing rules (Hensher, 2008; Hensher & Rose, 2009). Previous studies also 
find inconsistences between stated AN-A and inferred AN-A (e.g., Carlsson et al., 
2010; Hess & Hensher, 2010). 
The marginal WTP estimates based on the models discussed above are presented 
in Table 5-17. Where WTP estimates are significant, Model 2A and Model 2B 
produce values that are between 1.6 and 6.1 times larger than those obtained from 
the MNL model.  In Model 1, only Discount, Rewards, and Renewables have 
significant WTP estimates. However, the WTP estimate for Rewards is more than 
7 times the estimate based on the base MNL model. Finding insignificant WTP 
estimates for most attributes may not be surprising for a model based on attribute 
processing rules that are not supported by the data. 
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Table 5-17: WTP estimates for the MNL and LC models (NZ$(2014) /month)  
          MNL Model 1A Model 2A Model 2B 
 Full attendance 10 classes 5  non-attendance classes 
Time  -0.94
c
  
(0.20) 
NS -3.84
c
  
(0.64) 
-3.93
c
  
(0.65) 
Fixed  0.25
c 
  
(0.08) 
NS 0.40
c
  
(0.11) 
0.40
c
  
(0.11) 
Discount 0.44
c 
  
(0.11) 
0.35
c
  
(0.13) 
NS NS 
Rewards 4.86
b
   
(2.25) 
35.12
c
  
(9.01) 
16.72
c
  
(7.50) 
16.83
b
  
(7.66) 
Renewables  0.34
c 
  
(0.04) 
0.23
c
  
(0.06) 
1.08
c
  
(0.07) 
1.04
c
  
(0.06) 
Ownership 0.14
c 
  
(0.05) 
NS 0.85
c
  
(0.11) 
0.84
c
  
(0.11) 
New electricity company NS NS NS NS 
New non-electricity 
company 
-13.94
c
  
(4.33) 
NS NS -8.21
a
  
(5.00) 
Well-known non-electricity 
company 
-7.58
a
  
(4.26) 
NS NS NS 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively. NS denotes not statistically 
significant. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
5.6 Hypothetical bias in choice experiments 
In this section we explore the influence of respondents’ certainty about their 
choices on model fit and WTP estimates. As stated previously, the main objective 
of this analysis is to explore how WTP estimates are influenced by the level of 
certainty of choice responses. At the end of the choice tasks, respondents were 
asked to rate how sure they were that they would have made the same choices 
they made in the 12 choice scenarios if they were faced with the same choice 
situations in real life. A Likert-type scale with endpoints marked as “very unsure” 
(0) and “very sure” (10), and the midpoint marked as “neither sure or unsure” (5) 
was used to elicit responses.  
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5.6.1 Distribution of responses to the certainty statement 
We present a summary of the responses in Figure 5-1.  
 
Figure 5-1: Distribution of certainty scores 
The sample average score for certainty of 7.07 with a standard deviation of 1.70 
indicates that respondents are fairly certain about their choices. Only 3.6% of 
respondents have certainty scores of less than 5, whilst 63.8% have a score of at 
least 7, indicating that a majority of respondents in this CE were quite certain 
about their responses. The sub-sample sizes for individual points of 0 to 4 on the 
certainty scale are insufficient for model estimation. To overcome this problem, 
we combine all responses with a score of 5 or less to represent a level we label as 
‘uncertain’, and use this as the reference point in the appropriate models. If 
respondents who are uncertain about their responses (score of 5 or less) are the 
source of HB, then we expect to obtain lower average marginal WTP estimates for 
respondents with higher scores.  
5.6.2 Models    
To explore the effect of different cut-off points on the certainty scale on model fit 
and WTP estimates, we estimate a series of MNL models starting with a full 
sample and then progressively dropping respondents with lower scores, starting 
with 4 or less. WTP estimates are then computed for each model and the results 
compared to the base model. In the second round of estimations the MNL and 
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RPL-EC models are estimated. These models include interaction terms: 
Certainty6_Bill, Ceratainty7_Bill, Certainty8_Bill and Certainty9&10_Bill 
created by interacting the dummy variables indicating the levels of 6, 7, 8, and 
9&10, respectively, on the certainty scale with Bill.  This allows us to explore the 
effect of the level of certainty on sensitivity to the cost. From this we test the 
hypothesis that respondents who are less certain about their choices tend to select 
more expensive alternatives; that is, respondents who are less certain about their 
choices are less sensitive to the cost of the alternatives chosen.  
5.6.3 Regression Results  
The results of the MNL models in which we progressively drop respondents with 
lower certainty scores from the sample are presented in Appendix 5 (see Tables 
A5-1 to A5-3). The results indicate a general improvement in model fit as we 
move from the full sample model (M0) to the model estimated for respondents 
with certainty scores of 9 and above (M5(8)). The normalised AIC and BIC 
indicate cut-off points of 7 and 8, respectively. This is consistent with the practice 
in previous studies that have found that these cut-off points result in equivalence 
between hypothetical and real WTP (e.g., Champ & Bishop, 2001; Ethier et al., 
2000; Poe et al., 2002). The main drawback for our study is the lack of external 
validity criteria against which the WTP estimates can be compared. Therefore we 
restrict our analysis to comparison of WTP estimates at different cut-off points 
with estimates from the full sample, which highlights the effect of failing to 
account for uncertainty in model estimation on WTP estimates.  
Figure 5-2 presents a plot of WTP estimates at different cut-off points on the 
certainty scale. The point 0 corresponds to the model estimated with the full 
sample. WTP estimates are presented in two groups based on relative magnitudes. 
Progressively dropping respondents with lower certainty scores seems to have 
different effects on WTP estimates for groups of attributes. Generally, model 
M5(8), with a cut-off point of 8, produces some of the highest estimates, but the 
model suffers from reduced sample size, and three parameter estimates are not 
significant at the .05 level. This may indicate the effect of reduced sample size 
and loss of information. The absolute values of WTP estimates for supplier types 
increase up to the cut-off point of 6 and decline thereafter, whereas WTP for 
Rewards declines initially and rises after the cut-off point of 5. For Time, the 
197 
 
absolute value of marginal WTP tends to increase throughout. On the other hand, 
WTP estimates for Fixed, Ownership, Renewables and Discount follow different 
patterns depending on the cut-off point and no general conclusion may be drawn 
in terms of single direction of the effect. Estimates of WTP for Discount rise 
noticeably after the cut-off point of 4, clearly indicating that respondents with 
higher certainty scores are more sensitive to the discount rates offered by retailers. 
This suggests that respondents with higher certainty scores are more sensitive to 
the cost attribute since the discount directly determines how much a customer 
actually pays on his/her power bill. Renewables follows a somewhat similar but 
less pronounced upwards increase as Discount, where respondents who are more 
certain about their choices have slightly higher WTP for the attribute.   
 
 
Figure 5-2: WTP estimates at various cut-off points on the certainty scale 
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WTP estimates for Ownership generally fall as the certainty cut-off points 
increase suggesting that respondents with lower scores are responsible for an 
upwards bias in WTP, which is consistent with the assertion that respondents who 
are less certain about their choices are the source of hypothetical bias. However, 
respondents who are less certain about their choices may have been expressing 
their concern about local ownership rather than a WTP. WTP for Fixed shows a 
peculiar pattern in that it is only statistically significant at the cut-off point of 6, 
suggesting a downward bias due to respondents with certainty score below 6, and 
the effect of sample size after this cut-off point i.e., the number of observations 
may be insufficient to estimate the independent influence of Fixed on choice.       
The above results suggest that hypothetical bias may be either positive or negative 
depending on the nature of the attributes involved. However, we have no 
theoretical explanation for the differences in the direction of hypothetical bias 
other than that the differences reflect the underlying preferences for respondents 
who are more certain about their choices. For example, a comparison of the 
parameter estimates across the models reveals that sensitivity to all attributes is 
low when responses of respondents with scores less than 6 are included in model 
estimation, which may explain the pattern of WTP estimates presented above.   
Now we turn to the results of the MNL and RPL-EC models (MNL1 and RPL1) 
estimated with different coefficients for respondents with different levels of 
certainty relative to the “uncertain” level, which we have specified as a certainty 
score of 5 or less. For comparison purposes we also estimate the base models 
MNL0 and RPL0 where certainty scores are not included in the models. The 
regression results are presented in Table 5-18. The results indicate that the models 
incorporating certainty scores perform better than the base models. For example, 
MNL1 performs better than MNL0 based on AIC, BIC, pseudo-R
2
 and an LRT 
statistic of 43.4 with 4 degrees of freedom, which is greater than the critical value 
(χ2(4, .05) = 9.49). RPL1 performs better than RPL0 based on all the criteria and a 
LRT statistic of 42 with 4 degrees of freedom, which is greater than the critical 
value (χ2(4, .05) = 9.49). Furthermore, RPL1 performs better than MNL1 based on 
AIC, BIC, pseudo-R
2
 and an LRT statistic of 502.2 with 5 degrees of freedom, 
which is greater than the critical value (χ2(5, .05) = 11.07). 
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Table 5-18: Regression results for MNL and RPL-EC models  
 MNL0 MNL1 PRL0 RPL1 
ASCALT1  0.5152
c
 
(7.01) 
0.5383
c
 
(7.26) 
0.6690
c
 
(4.51) 
0.5706
c
 
(3.88) 
Time -0.0484
c
     
(-6.61) 
-0.0458
c
 
(-6.25) 
-0.0541
c
      
(-6.12) 
-0.0512
c 
(-5.84) 
Fixed 0.0030 
(1.41) 
0.0037
a
 
(1.72) 
0.0057  
(1.64) 
0.0055 
(1.62) 
Discount 0.0083
c
 
(3.09) 
0.0089
c
 
(3.31) 
0.0105
c
 
(3.10) 
0.0113
c
 
(3.41) 
Loyalty Rewards 0.4175
c
 
(6.00) 
0.4017
c
 
(5.75) 
0.3628
c
 
(4.32) 
0.3444
c
 
(4.10) 
Renewables 0.0091
c
 
(7.29) 
0.0093
c
 
(7.42) 
0.0130
c
 
(6.67) 
0.0126
c
 
(6.39) 
Local Ownership 0.0068
c
 
(5.05) 
0.0072
c
 
(5.29) 
0.0090
c
 
(3.99) 
0.0092
c
 
(4.12) 
New electricity company -0.2758
c
     
(-2.91) 
-0.2678
c
 
(-2.81) 
-0.1879       
(-1.50) 
-0.1846 
(-1.48) 
New non-electricity company -0.7243
c
     
(-5.98) 
-0.7138
c
 
(-5.86) 
-0.8737
c
      
(-5.33) 
-0.8534
c
 
(-5.26) 
Well-known non-electricity company -0.4981
c
      
(-4.35) 
-0.4621
c
 
(-4.02) 
-0.5803
c        
 
(-3.69) 
-0.5404
c
 
(-3.47) 
Certainty6_Bill  -0.0069
c
 
(-3.33) 
 
-0.0056
a
 
(-1.91) 
Certainty7_Bill  -0.0086
c
 
(-4.67) 
 -0.0091
c
 
(-3.40) 
Certainty8_Bill  -0.0105
c
 
(-5.49) 
 -0.0108
c
 
(-3.97) 
Certainty9&10_Bill  -0.0106
c
 
(-5.18) 
 -0.0138
c
 
(-4.50) 
Monthly Power Bill -0.0252
c
     
(-31.13) 
-0.0182
c
 
(-13.82) 
-0.0333
c
      
(-29.36) 
-0.0256
c
 
(-13.65) 
Standard deviations of random parameters 
Fixed   0.0275
c
 
(6.09) 
0.0261
c
 
(6.00) 
Discount   0.0191
c
 
(3.260 
0.0162
c
 
(2.71) 
Renewables   0.0149
c
 
(6.47) 
0.0148
c
 
(6.79) 
Ownership   0.0169
c
 
(6.83) 
0.0165
c
 
(6.65) 
ERC (σ)   1.7707c 
(13.98) 
1.5995
c
 
(13.66) 
LL -2165.6 -2143.9 -1913.8 -1892.8 
AIC 4353.1 4317.8 3859.6 3825.7 
BIC 4418.0 4406.2 3954.0 3943.6 
Pseudo R
2 
0.2633 0.2708 0.3519 0.3590 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively. z values are in parentheses 
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All the parameter estimates have the expected signs. Of particular interest are the 
signs and relative magnitudes of the parameter estimates for the interaction terms 
Certainty6_Bill to Certainty9&10_Bill. These parameters measure the sensitivity 
to the power bill for respondents with the corresponding certainty scores relative 
to the ‘uncertain’ level. All these parameters have negative signs indicating that 
respondents with higher certainty scores have higher disutility of expenditure and 
are more sensitive to the cost attribute compared to respondents who are uncertain 
about their choices. Furthermore, the absolute values of the parameter estimates 
increase with the level of certainty, indicating increasing responsiveness to the 
cost attribute as certainty increases. This provides empirical evidence in support 
of the assertion that respondents who are less certain about their choices tend to 
choose more expensive alternatives. The results of this analysis also show that 
respondents who are uncertain about their choices are less sensitive to the cost of 
the alternatives chosen, and are therefore more likely to be the source of 
hypothetical bias. Certainty levels 9 and 10 were combined in the final models 
presented here as preliminary estimation revealed no statistical differences in the 
two parameter estimates. This means that relative to the ‘uncertain’ level, 
certainty levels 9 and 10 are the same. 
To obtain WTP estimates for the attributes of electricity services, the partial 
derivative of the systematic component of indirect utility with respect to each non-
monetary attribute is divided by the partial derivative with respect to the power 
bill and its interaction terms. These partial derivatives turn out to be the parameter 
estimates presented in the previous table (Table 5-18). For each level of certainty, 
the denominator is the sum of the parameter estimate for the power bill and the 
parameter estimate for the respective interaction term. For the ‘uncertain’ level, 
the denominator is the parameter of the power bill.  
The WTP estimates are presented in Table 5-19. The sub-column headings, ≤ C5, 
C6, ……, ≥ C9,  under the MNL1 and RPL1 models indicate the certainty levels 
for which WTP estimates have been calculated based on these models, while C0 
under the MNL0 and RPL0 models indicates that WTP estimates are based on the 
full sample without accounting for uncertainty.  For each model, all marginal 
WTP estimates fall as certainty scores increase confirming the hypothesis that 
respondents who are uncertain about their choices tend to choose expensive 
201 
 
alternatives or are less sensitive to the cost attribute. The column under “≤ C5” 
lists marginal WTP estimates for respondents with certainty scores of 5 or less, 
and clearly shows that the WTP estimates for these respondents are consistently 
higher; between 1.26 and 1.53 times across the models where the estimates are 
statistically significant.  
In Table 5-20 we present tests of equality between WTP estimates using ≤ C5 as 
the reference to highlight any significant differences in WTP for respondents with 
higher certainty scores. Significant differences, at least at the 0.1 level, are 
observed for all attributes except Fixed, Discount, and New Electricity Company, 
suggesting that some attributes are more prone to the effects of uncertainty than 
others. The ANTS increases with the level of certainty for all attributes with 
significant WTP estimates across the models, indicating that the differences 
become larger the more certain respondents are about their choices. Comparing 
the ANTS across the models we observe that the MNL produces a higher number 
of significant differences in WTP. This suggests that the effect of uncertainty on 
WTP estimates may be sensitive to model specification. It is interesting to note 
that the RPL model generally produces lower WTP estimates compared to the 
MNL, so we conjecture that the lower estimates from the RPL model and the fact 
that the model estimates a distribution rather than a fixed estimate for WTP 
attenuates HB.                           
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Table 5-19: WTP for respondents with different levels of certainty about their choices (NZ$(2014) /month) 
Attributes MNL0 MNL1 RPL0 RPL1 
Cut-off points C0 ≤ C5 C6 C7 C8 ≥ C9 C0 ≤ C5 C6 C7 C8 ≥ C9 
Time 
-1.92
c
 
(0.29) 
-2.52
c
 
(0.43) 
-1.83
c
 
(0.31) 
-1.71
c
 
(0.29) 
-1.60
c
 
(0.27) 
-1.59
c
 
(0.27) 
-1.62
c
 
(0.26) 
-2.00
c 
(0.36) 
-1.64
c
 
(0.30) 
-1.47
c
 
(0.26) 
-1.40
c
 
(0.25) 
-1.30
c
 
(0.24) 
Fixed NS 
0.20
a
 
(0.12) 
0.15
a
 
(0.09) 
0.14
a
 
(0.08) 
0.13
a
 
(0.08) 
0.13
a
 
(0.08) 
NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Discount 
0.33
c
 
(0.11) 
0.49
c
 
(0.16) 
0.35
c
 
(0.11) 
0.33
c
 
(0.08) 
0.31
c
 
(0.10) 
0.31
c
 
(0.10) 
0.32
c
  
(0.10) 
0.44
c 
(0.14) 
0.36
c
 
(0.11) 
0.33
c
 
(0.10) 
0.31
c
 
(0.09) 
0.29
c
 
(0.09) 
Loyalty Rewards 
16.60
c
 
(2.74) 
22.09
c
 
(4.00) 
16.02
c
 
(2.94) 
15.00
c
 
(2.68) 
14.02
c
 
(2.50) 
13.97
c
 
(2.52) 
10.90
c
 
(2.50) 
13.45
c 
(3.32) 
11.06
c
 
(2.79) 
9.91
c
 
(2.45) 
9.45
c
 
(2.33) 
8.74
c
 
(2.18) 
Renewables 
0.36
c
 
(0.05) 
0.51
c
 
(0.08) 
0.37
c
 
(0.06) 
0.35
c
 
(0.05) 
0.32
c
 
(0.05) 
0.32
c
 
(0.05) 
0.39
c
  
(0.06) 
0.49
c 
(0.08) 
0.41
c
 
(0.07) 
0.36
c
 
(0.06) 
0.35
c
 
(0.06) 
0.32
c 
(0.05) 
Local Ownership 
0.27
c
 
(0.05) 
0.39
c
 
(0.08) 
0.29
c
 
(0.05) 
0.27
c
 
(0.05) 
0.25
c
 
(0.05) 
0.25
c
 
(0.05) 
0.27
c
  
(0.07) 
0.36
c 
(0.09) 
0.30
c
 
(0.07) 
0.27
c
 
(0.06) 
0.25
c
 
(0.06) 
0.23
c 
(0.06) 
New electricity company 
-10.97
c
 
(3.71) 
-14.73
c
 
(5.22) 
-10.68
c
 
(3.78) 
-10.00
c
 
(3.52) 
-9.34
c
 
(3.31) 
-9.32
c
 
(3.33) 
NS NS NS NS NS NS 
New non-electricity company 
-28.80
c
 
(4.86) 
-39.25
c
 
(7.19) 
-28.47
c
 
(5.18) 
-26.65
c
 
(4.72) 
-24.90
c
 
(4.42) 
-24.83
c
 
(4.50) 
-26.24
c
 
(4.92) 
-33.33
c 
(6.64) 
-27.40
c
 
(5.50) 
-24.57
c
 
(4.82) 
-23.42
c
 
(4.62) 
-21.66
c 
(4.35) 
Well-known non-electricity company 
-19.81
c
 
(4.53) 
-25.41
c
 
(6.43) 
-18.43
c
 
(4.69) 
-17.25
c
 
(4.33) 
-16.12
c
 
(4.07) 
-16.07
c
 
(4.10) 
-17.43
c 
(4.70)
 
-21.11
c 
(6.12) 
-17.35
c
 
(5.10) 
-0.51
c
 
(0.16) 
-14.83
c 
(4.34) 
-13.72
c 
(4.05) 
c
, 
b
,
 a
 Indicate significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level respectively; NS denotes not statistically significant even at the .1 level. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses
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Table 5-20: Test of equality of WTP based on the asymptotically normal test statistic (ANTS)
1
  
Attributes MNL0 MNL1 RPL0 RPL1 
 C0 C6 C7 C8 C9&10 C0 C6 C7 C8 C9&10 
Time 1.90 2.39 2.54 2.76 2.79 1.56 1.86 2.17 2.33 2.60 
Fixed 1.70 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Discount 1.41 1.22 1.34 1.45 1.46 1.42 0.99 1.23 1.32 1.47 
Loyalty Rewards 1.88 2.24 2.39 2.58 2.61 1.17 1.32 1.58 1.69 1.88 
Renewables 2.52 2.56 2.74 2.98 3.02 1.71 1.84 2.20 2.37 2.67 
Local Ownership 2.23 2.07 2.21 2.42 2.46 1.53 1.28 1.54 1.67 1.86 
New electricity company. 1.02 1.12 1.23 1.33 1.35 NS NS NS 0.62 0.69 
New non-electricity company 1.97 2.16 2.32 2.53 2.57 1.59 1.60 1.92 2.08 2.33 
Well-known non-electricity company 1.23 1.59 1.72 1.87 1.89 0.94 1.11 3.37 1.45 1.61 
1 The ANTS is calculated for each level of certainty with ≤ C5 (‘uncertain’) used as the reference point. Bolded values indicate statistically significant differences 
at least at the 0.1 level. Absolute values for ANTS are reported
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5.7 Summary 
In this chapter we investigated attribute non-attendance and hypothetical bias in 
choice experiments for supplier choice in retail electricity markets. Accounting for 
AN-A and mitigating HB in CEs enhances the validity and acceptability of 
welfare estimates derived from SP data. The analysis carried out in this chapter is 
based on both self-reported and inferred AN-A, and self-reported certainty of 
choices. Concern has been raised in the literature on AN-A about the reliability of 
self-reported AN-A as these responses may be subject to reporting error. 
Furthermore, previous studies have found evidence that points to inconsistences 
between self-reported AN-A and the choices made by respondents in CEs. Two 
main approaches to incorporating AN-A in model estimation have been used in 
previous studies. In the most frequently used approach, the parameters of ignored 
attributes are restricted to zero, whilst in the other approach different parameters 
are estimated for ignored attributes. In the case of HB, previous studies have used 
different cut-off points on the certainty scale in calibrating hypothetical choices to 
align them with real choices. The main findings of this chapter are summarized 
below. 
Question 2(a): Are non-price attributes of electricity services ignored in choice 
experiments on switching or supplier choice?  If so, which attributes are ignored? 
(b) Are attributes ignored individually or in combinations? 
To answer the above questions we relied on both self-reported and inferred AN-A 
to identify non-price attributes that respondents claim to have ignored, and 
assumed that the responses were reported without error. The results indicate that 
no single attribute was considered by all respondents. Based on self-reported AN-
A, only 12% of the respondents considered all the attributes in making their 
choices. About 20% of the respondents claimed to have ignored one out of eight 
attributes, and about 7% claimed to have ignored 7 attributes. None of the 
respondents reported total non-attendance; that is, ignored all the attributes. The 
most- and least-ignored attributes were Time (60%) and Bill (7%), respectively. 
Contrary to self-reported AN-A, inferred AN-A analysis suggests that none of the 
respondents attended to all the attributes; instead, about 24% of the respondents 
are predicted to have ignored all the attributes. Furthermore, inferred AN-A 
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suggests that none of the respondents who claimed to have considered all the 
attributes did so. Inferred AN-A results suggest that respondents who ignored all 
the attributes, and therefore made random choices, and those who claimed to have 
considered all the attributes did not answer the question truthfully. This indicates 
inconsistences between self-reported AN-A and the pattern of observed choices as 
reported in other studies (e.g., Hess & Hensher, 2010). Both self-reported and 
inferred AN-A results indicate that the attributes were ignored in subsets rather 
than individually. 
Question 2(c): Are the choice responses of respondents who claim to have ignored 
the cost attribute consistent with their claim? If not, how does this affect model fit 
and WTP estimates?    
Results presented in this chapter suggest that it is worthwhile for researchers to 
investigate and control for any inconsistences in stated AN-A, particularly self-
reported non-attendance to the cost attribute, where the objective is to estimate 
WTP for non-price attributes. Only 15 respondents (7%) claimed to have ignored 
the power bill in making their choices. An inspection of the choices of these 
respondents showed that the cheapest alternatives were selected, on average, 72% 
of the time. This indicates inconsistences between the respondents’ claims and the 
choices they made. Furthermore, some low income respondents claimed to have 
ignored the power bill. This is unrealistic given that power bills are a long-term 
commitment and constitute a significant proportion of weekly income, especially 
for low income groups in NZ. We find that, in a latent class framework, correcting 
for inconsistent stated AN-A to the monthly power bill results in improved model 
fit, expected signs of parameter estimates, and significant differences in class 
probabilities and WTP estimates. Inconsistent stated AN-A to the power bill was 
corrected for by assuming full attendance to the attribute.  
Question 2(d): Do preferences of respondents who ignore an attribute differ from 
those who consider it? 
Based on MNL and RPL-EC model results, preferences of respondents who claim 
to have ignored an attribute differ from those who considered it, except Discount 
and Fixed, and Supplier type in the RPL-EC model. The results from these models 
do not support the assumption behind assigning zero weights to the attributes that 
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respondents claim to have ignored. For example, there are no significant 
differences in preferences between respondents who claim to have ignored 
Discount and Fixed and those who considered these attributes. For the other 
attributes, we find that respondents who claim to have ignored an attribute may 
not have done so, but may have placed less weight on it. All the parameter 
estimates for ignored attributes were significantly different from zero and had the 
expected signs. Our results are consistent with the findings by Carlsson et al. 
(2010) and Gracia et al. (2012). If AN-A to Discount and Fixed is controlled for 
by imposing a zero restriction on the parameters of these attributes, significantly 
lower WTP estimates are obtained, which may indicate that the model is 
misspecified. Furthermore, the results indicate that restricting the parameters of 
ignored attributes to zero reduces model fit. On the other hand, controlling for 
AN-A to the other attributes by restricting the parameters of ignored attributes to 
zero produces mainly significantly higher (1.07 to 3.42 times) WTP estimates 
based on the MNL model. 
Question 2 (e): What are the effects of attribute non-attendance on WTP? 
LC model results show that accounting for AN-A results in significant differences 
in WTP for some attributes, particularly in Class 2 where most WTP estimates are 
significantly higher. Based on the MNL and RPL-EC models, except for Discount 
and Fixed, failing to account for AN-A results in a downward bias in WTP 
estimates for most attributes. Accounting for AN-A produces WTP estimates that 
are between 0.88 and 3.42 times higher based on the MNL model, and between 
1.03 and 2.88 times for the RPL-EC model. For Discount and Fixed, WTP 
estimates are between 0.48 and 0.78 times lower. The extent of the bias differs 
across the attributes, with Discount and Fixed having a positive bias and the rest a 
negative bias. 
Question 3: What are the effects of response uncertainty on WTP estimates? 
We find evidence in support of the assertion that respondents who are less certain 
about their choices are less sensitive to the cost of the alternatives chosen. The 
results show that respondents with certainty scores less than 6 were willing to pay, 
on average, 1.26 to 1.53 times more compared to respondents with higher 
certainty scores. These results are within the range of findings from meta-analysis 
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studies (e.g., List & Gallet, 2001; Little & Berrens, 2004; Murphy et al., 2005). 
Where respondents with low certainty scores are omitted from the sample in 
model estimation, WTP estimates are sensitive to the cut-off point selected. 
However, we find that the cut off points of 7 or 8 results in better model fit for our 
data. This finding is consistent with previous studies that compare real and 
hypothetical WTP estimates in various contexts (e.g., Champ & Bishop, 2001; 
Ethier et al., 2000; Poe et al., 2002).    
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Chapter 6. Environmental attitudes, altruism and the 
   demand for green electricity  
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to estimate WTP for green electricity in the 
context of supplier choice, and to explain preference heterogeneity using 
psychological constructs based on the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale and 
the norm activation theory (NAT). Unobserved heterogeneity of preferences is 
captured through the LC model and heterogeneity within and across latent classes 
is explained using environmental attitudes (EA), which enters the systematic 
component of the utility function as an interaction with the attribute measuring the 
proportion of renewables (Renewable) in the fuel mix. The RPL-EC model is also 
used to capture unobserved heterogeneity of preferences for green electricity, and 
the interaction of the NAT constructs [awareness of a behaviour’s consequences 
(AC), and ascription of responsibility (AR)] with the random parameter for 
Renewable are used to explain heterogeneity around the mean parameter. The 
sensitivity of WTP estimates to use of the shorter versions of the NEP Scale to 
measure EA is explored.  
Environmental attitudes are defined as a psychological tendency expressed by 
evaluating the natural environment with some degree of favour or disfavour 
(Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010). Although the NEP Scale was originally developed to 
measure environmental concern (Dunlap et al., 2000), it has been used extensively 
in the social sciences as a measure of EA (Dunlap, 2008). AC and AR activate 
personal norms which determine altruistic behaviour (Schwartz, 1977). By 
incorporating psychological constructs in discrete choice models, this chapter 
contributes to the literature that advances the use of psychological constructs in 
explaining choice behaviour.    
The main questions addressed in this chapter are: 
Question 4: (a) How much are electricity consumers willing to pay for green  
  electricity and how can differences in WTP be explained? 
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  (b) Does the use of shorter versions of the NEP Scale influence 
WTP estimates?  
This chapter contributes to the limited literature on preferences for green 
electricity in the context of supplier choice or switching and extends on these 
studies by exploring the influence of EA, AC and AR on environmentally-related 
WTP. Unlike some previous studies that appear to use arbitrary constructs to 
measure EA, we use the NEP Scale, which is grounded in social psychology 
theory (Dunlap, 2008; Stern et al., 1995), to measure EA.  Furthermore, we use 
the LC model, which allows us to identify market segments with homogeneous 
preferences, and the results provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first WTP 
estimates for green electricity in the New Zealand electricity market based on 
CEs. We are not aware of any previous studies that have applied the LC model in 
the context of supplier choice to estimate WTP for green electricity.  
Studies that employ the multinomial logit (NML) model focus on the average 
taste intensity for each attribute, which assumes that respondents have 
homogeneous preferences with respect to each attribute (e.g., Zhang & Wu, 
2012). On the other hand, studies employing the mixed logit or random parameter 
logit (RPL) model focus on the means and variances of continuous distributions of 
taste intensities (e.g., Amador et al., 2013; Goett et al., 2000), which assumes that 
an individual’s taste intensity lies somewhere in the estimated distribution. The 
LC model applied in this chapter estimates a discrete distribution with a small 
number of support points (Kamakura & Russell, 1989) in which preference 
heterogeneity is captured by membership in distinct classes with homogeneous 
preferences or taste intensities. This allows us to identify classes with distinct 
preferences for green electricity.  
Random utility theory and discrete choice experiments are linked to social 
psychology through the early contributions of Manski (1977) and  Thurstone 
(1994) in the development of the random utility maximization (RUM) model. 
Despite this link, it would appear that most researchers in environmental 
economics or non-market valuations in general have failed to look to social 
psychology for guidance in constructing attitudinal questions that are based on 
valid attitude-behaviour theories, hence the proliferation of different measures of 
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the same construct. As noted by Dunlap (2008), how EA has been measured in 
some previous studies is a good case in point.  
The next section provides an overview of the background and a literature review. 
Section 6.3 presents an analysis of responses to the NEP Scale statements used to 
measure New Zealanders’ EA. Section 6.4 presents an analysis of responses to 
questions measuring the NAT constructs. In sections 6.5 and 6.6 we explain 
heterogeneity of preferences for green electricity using EA and NAT constructs, 
respectively. In section 6.7 we explore the effect of using shorter versions of the 
NEP Scale on WTP. Section 6.8 presents the chapter summary and conclusions  
6.2 Background and literature review 
Since the mid-1980s, New Zealand (NZ) has embarked on a series of electricity 
market reforms aimed at promoting a competitive and efficient electricity market. 
A discussion of the reforms was provided in Chapter 3. Residential consumers are 
free to choose their preferred retail supplier from the 8 to 18 retail brands 
available, depending on the region (Electricity Authority, 2013a, 2013c). 
Although electricity is traded via a “pool” system, most customers should be able 
to associate their retailers, especially ‘gentailers’, with the main energy sources 
used to generate electricity due to the high degree of vertical integration between 
generation and retail.  
In 2014 electricity generation from renewable sources, hydro (57.1%), geothermal 
(16.2%), wind (5.2%), and bioenergy (1.5%), accounted for nearly 80% of total 
generation and is set to grow (MBIE, 2015). Although the New Zealand Energy 
Strategy 2011-2021 sets a target for renewables at 90% by 2025 (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2011a), it does not specify how renewables will be 
supported. The only available support for renewables in NZ is indirect via the 
emissions trading scheme, which currently provides a negligible level of support 
as carbon prices are very low. In the absence of direct policy support such as 
subsidies and feed-in tariffs, consumer-driven renewable energy development 
through green marketing is one possible future option for NZ. Green marketing 
has been used in countries like the USA, UK, and Australia to support the 
development of electricity generation from renewable energy sources. Given a 
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history of some policy alignment with these countries, green marketing is a 
potential renewable energy development support mechanism in NZ.  
According to an NZ study by the Electricity Commission (2008), nearly 50% of 
respondents indicated that they would consider the environment when choosing an 
electricity retailer, whilst 17% indicated they would ‘very seriously’ consider 
switching to a retailer which promotes itself for using renewable resources. This 
indicates a potential for green marketing in NZ. Livengood and Bisset (2009) 
assess the potential of various mechanisms that could be used to facilitate 
consumer-driven renewable power development in NZ, and identify renewable 
energy certificates (RECs) as the most appropriate mechanism for the NZ market. 
They review international literature to identify existing mechanisms for promoting 
consumer-driven renewable power development, and assess the suitability of each 
mechanism in terms of ease of implementation and accessibility in the context of 
NZ electricity markets. The study also notes the scarcity of research on consumer 
preferences in the NZ electricity markets. This chapter addresses this issue by 
providing the first in-depth study of consumer preferences for green electricity in 
the context of supplier choice in NZ using CEs.  
Consumer preferences for green electricity have been investigated in a number of 
international studies (e.g.,Batley, Colbourne, Fleming, & Urwin, 2001; Batley, 
Fleming, & Urwin, 2000; Bollino, 2009; Borchers et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2003; 
Ek & Soderholm, 2008; Hansla, Gamble, Juliusson, & Gärling, 2008; Kotchen & 
Moore, 2007; Oliver, Volschenk, & Smit, 2011; Zarnikau, 2003; Zhang & Wu, 
2012; Zoric & Hrovatin, 2012). Studies investigating WTP for green electricity 
have used SDCs and attitudes to explain differences in WTP. In some studies 
income has been found to be a significant determinant of WTP (e.g., Batley et al., 
2001; Batley et al., 2000; Bollino, 2009; Clark et al., 2003; Kotchen & Moore, 
2007; Zoric & Hrovatin, 2012), whilst in others it is not (e.g., Ek & Soderholm, 
2008). Other factors that have been found to influence WTP are: social status 
(Batley et al., 2001); environmental awareness/concern, attitude towards green 
energy and experience (Batley et al., 2000; Borchers et al., 2007; Kotchen & 
Moore, 2007; Oliver et al., 2011; Zoric & Hrovatin, 2012); altruism (Kotchen & 
Moore, 2007), age (Borchers et al., 2007; Zoric & Hrovatin, 2012); and gender 
(Bollino, 2009). Evidence of the influence of age, income and gender on WTP is 
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inconclusive as the coefficients of these variables are found to be insignificant in 
some studies (Bollino, 2009; Borchers et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2003; Kotchen & 
Moore, 2007; Zoric & Hrovatin, 2012), suggesting that these variables may be 
sensitive to the study context.  
Interest in exploring the importance of attitudes and perceptions in explaining 
heterogeneity of preferences has increased over the years, highlighting increased 
realization that  preference heterogeneity is, at least in part, due to underlying  
attitudes and convictions (e.g., Alvarez-Daziano & Bolduc, 2009; Ben-Akiva et 
al., 2002; Ek & Soderholm, 2008; Fielding et al., 2008; Hess & Beharry-Borg, 
2011; Johansson, Heldt, & Johansson, 2006; Morey et al., 2008; Nocella et al., 
2012). Hess and Beharry-Borg (2011) contend that the guiding philosophy behind 
this development is that incorporating attitudes in discrete choice models leads to 
more behaviourally realistic representations of the choice process. This is in 
contrast with the approach based on neoclassical economic theory which has 
traditionally used income, price, and other SCDs to explain preference 
heterogeneity (Aldrich et al., 2007; McFadden, 1999). 
 However, the growing interest in incorporating attitudes and perceptions in 
economic models has resulted in the proliferation of different measures of the 
same latent construct, with studies adopting different approaches in developing 
survey questions used to elicit attitudinal responses. Dunlap and Jones (2002) 
estimate the number of different measures of EA to be at least several hundred 
(Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010). Furthermore, different approaches on how responses 
to attitudinal questions are treated in the modeling process have been adopted
19
. A 
concern with this proliferation of different measures of EA is that most of these 
measures are arbitrarily constructed and are not properly grounded in attitude-
behaviour theories such as the NEP Scale. An important question for researchers 
is to what extent the different measures of the same latent construct influence the 
results, especially where the objective is to estimate environmentally-related WTP 
such as WTP for green electricity. Kotchen and Reiling (2000) argue that the 
unsystematic measurement of EA raises another concern as it limits comparability 
                                                          
19
 See section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 for a discussion of approaches used to incorporate latent 
constructs in discrete choice models. 
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of studies, thereby limiting our understanding of the relationship between EA and 
environmentally-related WTP responses.  
Although the NEP Scale provides a reliable way to assess EA and is one of the 
instruments most frequently used by social scientists to measure EA (Dunlap, 
2008; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010), only a few studies in non-market valuation and 
environmental economics have used it. For example, Meyerhoff (2006) notes the 
limited use of the NEP Scale in contingent valuation studies. Dunlap (2008), and 
Hawcroft and Milfont (2010) contend that a number of studies that make 
reference to the NEP Scale do not actually use it, and that some who use it only 
use a subset of the items. This suggests that, despite awareness among some 
researchers of the existence of the NEP Scale, for some reason the uptake is very 
low. One possibility for the low uptake, especially in online CEs surveys, is the 
length of the scale, which consists of 15 statements. 
 Long surveys may lead to high drop-out rates and low data quality as respondents 
rush though the survey, and fatigue may result in respondents making mistakes or 
inconsistent choices.  The length of the survey also determines the cost of the 
survey, which is an important consideration, especially for research projects with 
small budgets. For example, for this research the quotations for a sample size of 
200 were $1,600 and $1,900 for 10-15 minute and 15-25 minute surveys, 
respectively. In a trade-off between shorter survey questionnaires and the need to 
accurately measure EA, some researchers have used shorter versions of the NEP 
Scale with 5-10, and 12 items instead of the full 15-item NEP Scale (e.g., 
Bartczak, 2015; Clark et al., 2003; Kotchen & Moore, 2007; Liebe et al., 2011; 
Meyerhoff, 2006; Stern et al., 1995). To our knowledge the effect of using these 
subscales or shorter versions of the NEP Scale in model estimation where the 
objective is to estimate environmentally-related WTP has not been investigated.  
6.2.1 The demand for green electricity 
Electricity generated from various energy sources such as hydro, gas, coal, wind, 
geothermal, nuclear, diesel, and solar is perfectly homogeneous in that a kWh 
generated from one source and delivered to the end user is the same as that 
generated from any other source. However the generation of electricity from each 
energy source is associated with specific environmental impacts. For example, 
214 
 
electricity generated from non-renewable sources is generally associated with 
higher negative environmental impacts such as CO2 pollution and depletion of 
non-renewable resources compared to generation from renewable sources. Based 
on environmental impacts associated with generation from each energy source, 
consumers with preferences for the environment may perceive electricity as a 
differentiated product. For these consumers electricity generated with relatively 
low environmental impacts may be preferred to that generated with relatively 
higher environmental impacts and their “green” preferences may be revealed 
through a premium paid for electricity generated from preferred “clean” energy 
sources.  
Electricity suppliers in countries such as the USA, Sweden, Spain, and UK offer 
their customers a choice to buy electricity labelled “green” or electricity generated 
from specific renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and hydro. A number 
of international studies have been conducted to estimate the premiums or support 
for generic “green” or renewable (e.g., Bollino, 2009; Borchers et al., 2007; 
Kotchen & Moore, 2007; Roe, Teisl, Levy, & Russell, 2001; Zhang & Wu, 2012; 
Zoric & Hrovatin, 2012), and specific energy sources such as wind (e.g., Borchers 
et al., 2007; Dimitropoulos & Kontoleon, 2009; Ek, 2005; Gracia et al., 2012; 
Hanley & Nevin, 1999), solar (e.g., Borchers et al., 2007), and hydro (e.g., Hanley 
& Nevin, 1999).  
Preferences for green electricity may also be revealed in a different manner from 
the above. For example, in a deregulated market, consumers are free to switch 
supplier and preferences for the environment may be revealed by switching to a 
supplier perceived to be supplying electricity generated from renewable sources. 
In this case, instead of paying a premium without having to switch supplier, which 
is the target of most studies cited above, respondents make trade-offs between the 
desired environmental attribute and other attributes of electricity suppliers 
including the price and switch to the supplier with the highest expected utility. 
Unlike the previous case, limited literature has estimated WTP for green 
electricity in the context of switching or choice of electricity supplier (e.g., 
Amador et al., 2013; Cai et al., 1998; Goett et al., 2000; Kaenzig et al., 2013). 
Estimating WTP for green electricity in the context of consumer switching 
provides additional information on the trade-offs or marginal rates of substitution 
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between the attributes of electricity suppliers, and the important determinants of 
switching. This information may inform competition policy targeted at promoting 
switching in the retail electricity market, allow retailers to structure their offerings 
to attract or retain customers, and provide valuable input for new entrants.   
In a USA study, Cai et al. (1998) use double bounded questions on price discounts 
on a sample of 400 residential customers and 400 business customers to estimate 
the share of customers that would switch to a competitor under various discounts 
and service attributes such as renewables, reliability, energy conservation 
assistance and customer service. The double bounded questions were used to 
estimate threshold discounts at which consumers would switch to a competitor 
assuming that all other attributes were the same for incumbent and competitor. 
Follow-up questions were then used to elicit responses that provided information 
on consumers’ preferences for renewables and other attributes. For example, when 
a respondent indicated they would switch at a certain discount, they were asked if 
they would still switch if the competitor did not offer renewables. Results from 
this study show that renewables are not highly rated in terms of importance 
compared to the other attributes. Only 40% of the respondents stated that they 
would not switch if the competitor did not offer renewables compared to 76% who 
would not switch if the competitor had more power outages, and 50% in the case 
of a competitor offering fewer services.  
Another USA study by Goett et al. (2000) uses a sample of small and medium 
businesses to investigate customers’ choice among retail electricity suppliers 
based on a set of 40 attributes of suppliers, which include the proportion of wind, 
hydro and generic renewables in the supplier’s portfolio of sources of electricity 
generation. Results suggest that whilst on average consumers were willing to pay 
an extra $14.60 per month for a supplier that has 25% hydro compared to a 
supplier that has no renewables, they would only pay an extra $1.80 per month for 
a supplier that has 50% hydro compared to a supplier that has 25% hydro, 
indicating very limited sensitivity to scope. A similar finding outside the context 
of green electricity is reported in a contingent valuation study by Desvousges et 
al. (1993), where the difference in WTP pay to prevent the accidental death of 
2000, 20,000, and 200,000 birds was found to be statistically insignificant.  This 
highlights one of the problems in non-market valuation of environmental goods, 
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which involves the lack of scope sensitivity of stated WTP. Under these 
conditions it has been argued that respondents are merely conveying their concern 
for the environment instead of stating WTP for the specific change in 
environmental quality presented in the survey questionnaire (Diamond & 
Hausman, 1994).  
Amador et al. (2013) use a mixed logit panel model with error components to 
analyse choice responses from a sample of Spanish households to estimate WTP 
for a number of attributes including the proportion of renewables in the fuel mix. 
Results indicate that education, concern for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and 
engaging in energy saving actions have a positive effect on WTP for green 
electricity. Environmental concern is measured using stated concern about GHG 
emissions. Systematic heterogeneity in preferences for renewables is investigated 
by introducing interactions of non-design attributes with the levels of renewables. 
For average income earners, graduates are willing to pay 10% of their monthly 
power bill to increase the share of renewables by 10%, compared to 6.6% for non-
graduates. Kaenzig et al. (2013) use a hierarchical Bayes model to examine 
consumer preferences for the attributes of electricity products in German, which 
included fuel mix. Results indicated that fuel mix is the most important non-price 
attribute. WTP for green electricity was estimated at €12 per month which was 
equivalent to about 16% of the average household power bill.  
6.2.2 How the NEP Scale has been used in previous studies. 
 As noted earlier, in much of  the previous research on EA and their influence on 
consumer preferences for products whose production or consumption is associated 
with environmental outcomes, researchers have constructed measures of EA in a 
rather arbitrary manner (Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010). In such cases, each study has 
produced a new measure of EA. Hawcroft and Milfont (2010) review 69 studies 
from 36 countries that used the NEP Scale. They employ meta-analysis to 
investigate how the use of various versions of the NEP Scale may have affected 
the results in terms of measurement of EA. Results show considerable variation in 
the way the NEP Scale has been used, particularly with regards to the number of 
items used and the number of points on the Likert scale employed. Their weighted 
regression analysis reveals that variations in sample type and scale length have a 
significant effect on NEP scores. Participants scored higher on 6-item versions of 
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the scale than on the revised 15-item version, and lower on other versions of the 
scale. The study strongly recommends the use of the 15-item scale. 
 The motives and criteria for selecting a version of the NEP Scale differ across 
studies. For example, Stern et al. (1995) used 7 items from the original 12-item 
scale based on item-total correlation – a measure of internal consistency of the 
scale. Clark et al. (2003) used 10 items based on the same criteria as Stern et al. 
(1995) to reduce the length of the survey. Kotchen and Moore (2007) used only 5 
items, but the motivation behind the use of a shorter version of NEP and the 
criteria for the selection of items used are not stated. However, an inspection of 
the items reveals that one item was selected from each of the 5 so-called ‘facets’ 
of ecological worldview to maintain balance between anti- and pro-NEP 
statements. Both Stern et al. (1995) and Clark et al. (2003) used item-total 
correlations from previous studies in selecting their items. The implicit 
assumption of their approach is that the populations sampled have the same 
underlying environmental preferences, which might be incorrect, especially across 
populations with different cultures and traditions. Liebe et al. (2011) combined 3 
items from the NEP Scale with 2 other questions to measure environmental 
concern and provide no reasons for this approach. Meyerhoff (2006) restricts the 
number of items in a modified version of the NEP Scale to eight due to limited 
interview time and cites an earlier study that used six items as a basis for the 
modified scale. Table 6-1 provides a summary of some recent studies that use 
different versions of the NEP Scale.  
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Table 6-1: Recent studies that use the NEP Scale 
Study Context Comments 
Dimitris (2015) Cycling Only 4 items are used: 2 pro- and 2 anti-NEP to reduce length of survey. 
Kaltenborn et al. (2015) Management of wild reindeer 6 items are used. Argue that studies have shown that it is possible to achieve 
sufficient inter-item reliability and validity with fewer items. Statements are 
rephrased. 
van Rijnsoever et al. (2015) Acceptance of energy technologies Use 11 items excluding items 1, 2, 6 and 9:  no reason given for selection of items. 
Pienaar et al. (2015) Context dependence of NEP Scale scores Use all 15 items.  
Cooper et al. (2015) Hunting, birdwatching  Only 2 items are used and no reasons are given for adopting a short version of the 
NEP Scale 
Rhodes et al. (2015) Support for a low carbon fuel standard Authors state that the NEP Scale is used but no details are provided. 
Longstaff et al (2015) Acceptability of renewable fuels policy Use 6 items and state that for decades shorter versions of the NEP Scale have been 
used. Items used are not specified. 
Ahlheim et al. (2015) Replacing rubber plantations with rain 
forest 
Mention the use of statements based on NEP Scale but construct their own 
statements. 
Bartczak (2015) The role of social and environmental 
attitudes in non-market valuation 
To reduce the length of the survey instrument only 9 items tapping 3 facets (eco-
crisis, anti-anthropocentrism and balance) are used as they were the most relevant 
to the topic. Argue that it is common practice to use subscales of NEP or to revise 
some statements to reflect the particular focus of the study.  
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6.3 New Zealanders’ environmental attitudes  
In this section we present the results of the analysis of responses to the NEP Scale 
used to measure New Zealanders’ EA. First, we present and discuss results based 
on the full NEP Scale to allow for comparison with previous studies. Next, we 
explore the factors that influence New Zealanders’ EA and identify latent classes 
of EA. Last, we construct sub-scales of the NEP Scale and test them for internal 
consistency to ensure that they meet the minimum standard criteria recommended 
in previous studies, and compare them with the full scale. The NEP Scale was 
discussed in section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2. 
6.3.1 Analysis of responses to the NEP Scale statements 
During the survey each respondent was asked to indicate on a 5-point scale how 
far they agreed or disagreed with each item of the NEP Scale. The response 
categories for each item are “Strongly Agree” (SA), “Mildly Agree” (MA), 
“Neither Agree Nor Disagree” (NAND), “Mildly Disagree” (MD) and “Strongly 
Disagree” (SD). Agreement with eight odd-numbered items and disagreement 
with the seven even-numbered items indicates pro-NEP responses or positive 
environmental attitudes (Dunlap et al., 2000). Table 6-2 and Figure 6-1 present a 
summary of the responses to the 15 items of the NEP Scale. 
The percentage distribution of responses to the NEP Scale items indicates that 
respondents tend to have pro-NEP attitudes with respect to most items. For 
example, 71% of respondents mildly or strongly agree with the statement “When 
humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences” (NEP3), 
68% mildly or strongly agree that “the balance of nature is very delicate and 
easily upset” (NEP13), and 79% mildly or strongly agree with the statement 
“Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature” 
(NEP9). Only 20% agree with the anti-NEP statement “The balance of nature is 
strong enough to cope with the impact of modern industrial nations” (NEP8). 
Despite the tendency for pro-NEP attitude, substantial heterogeneity in 
environmental attitudes is displayed within the sample as responses are distributed 
across all response categories. The general pattern of the distribution of responses 
to the NEP Scale items reported in Table 6-2 is similar to that found in other 
studies using the NEP Scale such as Aldrich et al. (2007), Clark et al. (2003), 
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Cooper et al. (2004), Dunlap et al. (2000), Ek and Soderholm (2008), and Kotchen 
and Reiling (2000).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, response categories are coded as follows: strongly 
disagree = 1, mildly disagree = 2, neither agree nor disagree = 3, mildly agree = 4 
and strongly agree = 5. All negative statements (even-numbered) are reverse 
coded. Based on this coding structure, each item or statement has a possible score 
that ranges from 1 to 5 (see Dunlap et al., 2000). Since an individual’s NEP Scale 
score is the sum of the scores of all 15 NEP Scale items, it ranges from 15 to 75. 
However, our sample scores range from 23 to 72 and exclude the boundaries for 
the possible score range. The mean score and standard deviation are 52.2 and 8.3 
respectively.  
The mean scores for the individual items shown under column three of Table 6-2 
indicate that each negative statement is, on average, consistently scored lower 
than the preceding and subsequent positive (odd numbered) statements except 
NEP12 (see Figure 6-2). A similar pattern is observed in a USA study by Aldrich 
et al. (2007) – a plot of the average item scores is included in Figure 6-2 to 
highlight the similarities. This suggests that respondents evaluate negative 
environmental statements differently compared to positive ones. In our sample, 
respondents selected “neither agree nor disagree” more frequently (52.3% of the 
time) to the negative statements compared to the positive statements. Respondents 
may have found it relatively difficult to evaluate negative statements and therefore 
frequently select the neutral midpoint of the scale as a coping strategy. The 
implication for researchers, especially where researchers formulate their own 
attitudinal questions, is that caution should be exercised as the way questions are 
cast may influence the intensity of responses in a particular direction. The full 
NEP Scale overcomes this problem by the near balance between negative and 
positive statements.    
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Table 6-2: Mean scores, percentage distribution of responses and item-total correlations (ri-t) for the NEP Scale items  
Code Item or statement* Mean score** SA*** MA NAND MD SD ri-t 
NEP1 1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. 
(Limits) 
3.41 (1.07) 14.7 36.6 28.1 15.6 4.9 0.35 
NEP2 2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. 
(Anti-anthropocentrism) 
3.35 (1.15) 4.0 23.7 23.7 30.4 18.3 0.51 
NEP3 3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous 
consequences. (Balance) 
3.79 (1.07) 26.3 44.6 15.6 8.9 4.5 0.48 
NEP4 4. Human ingenuity will ensure that we do not make the earth unlivable. (Anti-
exemptionalism) 
2.94 (1.10) 6.7 33.0 29.5 21.0 9.8 0.41 
NEP5 5. Humans are severely abusing the environment. (Eco-crisis) 3.88 (1.07) 31.7 40.2 16.5 7.6 4.0 0.49 
NEP6 6. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop 
them. (Limits) 
2.30 (1.02) 22.8 39.7 25.4 8.9 3.1 0.10 
NEP7 7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.                          
(Anti-anthropocentrism) 
4.14 (1.06) 49.1 27.2 14.7 6.3 2.7 0.31 
NEP8 8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations. (Balance) 
3.54 (1.05) 1.8 18.3 22.8 37.9 19.2 0.57 
NEP9 9. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature. 
(Anti-exemptionalism) 
4.09 (0.83) 33.9 45.5 16.5 3.6 0.4 0.39 
NEP10 10. The so-called ‘ecological crisis’ facing human kind has been greatly 
exaggerated. (Eco-crisis) 
3.16 (1.10) 4.9 24.6 34.4 22.3 13.8 0.56 
NEP11 11. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. (Limits) 3.42 (1.00) 11.6 40.2 30.8 12.9 4.5 0.46 
NEP12 12. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. (Anti-anthropocentrism) 3.54 (1.20) 6.3 14.3 25.0 28.1 26.3 0.39 
NEP13 13. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. (Balance) 3.85 (0.93) 25.9 42.4 24.1 5.8 1.8 0.42 
NEP14 14. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to 
control it. (Anti-exemptionalism) 
3.20 (1.13) 5.4 22.8 35.3 19.6 17.0 0.34 
NEP15 15. If things continue on their present course we will soon experience a major 
ecological catastrophe. (Eco-crisis) 
3.55 (1.04) 18.8 35.7 32.1 8.9 4.5 0.60 
*Facet of ecological worldview in parentheses; **standard deviations in parentheses. ***SA, MA, NAND, MD, and SD denote strongly agree, mildly agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, mildly disagree, and strongly disagree. Note: percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding 
222 
 
1. We are approaching the limits 
of the number of people the earth 
can support. 
 
2. Humans have the right to 
modify the natural environment 
to suit their needs. 
 
3. When humans interfere with 
nature it often produces 
disastrous consequences. 
 
4. Human ingenuity will insure 
that we do not make the earth 
unlivable. 
 
5. Humans are severely abusing 
the environment. 
 
 
6. The earth has plenty of natural 
resources if we just learn how to 
develop them. 
 
7. Plants and animals have as 
much right as humans to exist. 
 
 
8. The balance of nature is 
strong enough to cope with the 
impacts of modern industrial 
nations. 
 
9. Despite our special abilities 
humans are still subject to the 
laws of nature. 
 
10. The so-called ‘ecological 
crisis’ facing human kind has 
been greatly. 
 
11. The earth is like a spaceship 
with very limited room and 
resources. 
 
12. Humans were meant to rule 
over the rest of nature. 
 
 
13. The balance of nature is very 
delicate and easily upset.                          
 
 
14. Humans will eventually learn 
enough about how nature works 
to be able to control it. 
 
 
15. If things continue on their 
present course we will soon 
experience a major ecological 
catastrophe. 
 
Figure 6-1: Distribution of responses to the NEP Scale statements
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Figure 6-2: Average item scores 
 
6.3.2 Internal consistency of the NEP Scale statements 
Before combining the responses to the 15 items of the NEP Scale into a single 
measure of EA, we establish whether a high degree of internal consistency exists 
among the items. As indicated in Chapter 2, the internal consistency of the NEP 
constructs is tested using the corrected item-total correlation (ri-t), Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha (α), and principal components analysis (PCA) (see, Aldrich et 
al., 2007; Clark et al., 2003; Dunlap et al., 2000; Ek & Soderholm, 2008). To 
recap; corrected item-total correlation is the correlation coefficient between each 
item’s score and the sum of the scores of the other 14 items. Cronbach’s alpha is a 
coefficient of reliability used to test whether items are sufficiently inter-related to 
justify their combination in an index. Previous literature suggests that values of 
0.30 for ri-t and α ≥ 0.70 are acceptable (Aldrich et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2003; 
Dunlap et al., 2000).  
The sample item-total correlation ranges from a low 0.10 for NEP6 (The earth has 
plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them) to a high of 0.60 
for NEP15 (If things continue on their present course we will soon experience a 
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major ecological catastrophe). All but one corrected item-total correlations are 
higher than 0.30 and statistically significant at the 5% level (see Table 6-2). 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha is 0.81 and this does not change much (only 
increases to 0.82) when NEP6 is dropped from the list of items on the scale 
suggesting that although the correlation of NEP6 with the rest of the items is low, 
its inclusion does not significantly reduce the reliability of the scale. In Dunlap et 
al. (2000), 59.2% of the respondents mildly or strongly agreed with NEP6 whilst 
in this study the corresponding response to this item is 62.5%. The main 
difference is that in this study only 12% of the respondents mildly or strongly 
disagreed with the statement and 25.4% neither agreed nor disagreed with it 
compared to 29.4% and 11% respectively in Dunlap et al.  In Kotchen and Reiling 
(2000), 16.8% of respondents mildly or strongly disagreed with the statement and 
15.7% neither agreed nor disagreed with it. This may suggest possible changes in 
attitudes since then, due to technological advances which have expanded our 
production possibility frontiers thus reducing the constraints on the limits to 
economic growth. We note that of all seven anti-NEP statements (NEP2, NEP4, 
NEP6, NEP8, NEP10, NEP12, and NEP14), only NEP6 has more than 40% of 
respondents mildly or strongly agreeing with it.  However, on the whole our 
results compare favourably with those of Dunlap et al. (2000) and other previous 
studies despite a relatively smaller sample size (see Table 6-3). 
Table 6-3: Comparison of corrected item-total correlation (ri-t) and Cronbach’s alpha  
Study and country N Target population ri-t (range) Cronbach’s 
alpha (α) 
Kotchen and Reiling 
(2000). USA 
635 Maine residents 0.38 to 0.71 0.83 
Dunlap et al. (2000). USA 676 Washington households 0.33 to 0.61 0.83 
Ek and Soderholm (2008). 
Sweden 
655 Swedish households 0.12 to 0.55 0.79 
Cooper et al. (2004). USA 200 University students 0.34 to 0.55 0.72 
Clark et al. (2003). USA 900 Customers of a retailer 0.32 to 0.59 0.80 
This Study (2015). New 
Zealand 
224 Power bill payers in NZ 0.10 to 0.60 0.81 
 
The results of the principal components analysis (PCA) presented in Table 6-4 
show that all 15 items of the NEP Scale (except NEP6) load heavily (from 0.42 to 
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0.71) on the first unrotated factor. The first factor has an eigenvalue of 4.359 and 
explains 29.06% of the total variance among the items compared to the second 
factor extracted which has an eigenvalue of 1.724 and only explains 11.49% of the 
variance among the items. The findings suggest the presence of one major factor 
which we take to represent environmental attitude or ecological worldview as 
proposed by Dunlap et al. (2000). The pattern of eigenvalues (4.359, 1.724, 1.351, 
1.045 and 0.948), the relatively high item-total correlations, and an alpha equal to 
0.81 indicate a high degree of internal consistency for the scale. Consistent with 
the findings of previous studies these results indicate an adequate level of internal 
consistency of the NEP Scale and support the assertion that the NEP Scale forms 
an internally consistent instrument for measuring environmental attitudes.  
Table 6-4: Factor loadings for NEP Scale items 
 Code  Facet of ecological worldview F1*
 
F2 F3 F4 F5 
NEP 1  Limits to growth 0.46 -0.21 0.60 -0.08 -0.22 
NEP 2  Anti-anthropocentrism 0.59 0.35 -0.27 0.01 -0.01 
NEP 3  Frugality of nature’s balance 0.62 -0.32 0.01 0.25 0.19 
NEP 4  Anti-exemptionalism 0.46 0.46 0.25 0.50 -0.04 
NEP 5  Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.62 -0.27 0.05 -0.23 0.35 
NEP 6  Limits to growth 0.11 0.58 0.48 -0.13 -0.22 
NEP 7  Anti-anthropocentrism 0.44 -0.30 -0.45 -0.09 -0.46 
NEP 8  Frugality of nature’s balance 0.66 0.27 -0.09 -0.07 -0.18 
NEP 9  Anti-exemptionalism 0.49 -0.20 -0.24 0.57 -0.24 
NEP 10  Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.65 0.26 -0.07 -0.37 0.00 
NEP 11  Limits to growth 0.57 -0.19 0.44 0.14 -0.07 
NEP 12  Anti-anthropocentrism 0.46 0.43 -0.35 -0.17 -0.15 
NEP 13  Frugality of nature’s balance 0.56 -0.37 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 
NEP 14  Anti-exemptionalism 0.42 0.39 -0.13 0.17 0.58 
NEP 15  Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.71 -0.26 0.13 -0.31 0.06 
Eigen value 4.359 1.724 1.351 1.045 0.948 
Variability (%) 29.06 11.93 9.00 6.97 6.32 
Cumulative (%) 29.06 40.54 49.55 56.52 62.84 
Cronbach’s alpha   0.81 0.45 0.03   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)**    0.82     
*Unrotated factors, **This is a measure of sampling adequacy: 0.75 represents an 
adequate sample size.  
A summary of the results of the investigation of the dimensionality of the NEP 
Scale is presented in section 6.1 of Appendix 6. Although evidence suggests the 
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presence of four dimensions of the NEP Scale, we follow Dunlap et al. (2000, p. 
435), who argue that they are not inclined to create four NEP subscales “because 
all 15 items load heavily on the first unrotated factor, have strong item-total 
correlations and yield an alpha of 0.83 when combined into a single scale.” 
Furthermore, our interest is not in the dimensionality of the NEP Scale but in the 
use of shorter versions versus the full scale in measuring EA.  
6.3.3 Heterogeneity in environmental attitudes 
In the previous two sections we analysed and tested responses to the NEP Scale 
statements for internal consistency, and concluded that the NEP Scale forms an 
internally consistent instrument for measuring EA. In this section we use the 
responses to the NEP Scale statements in exploring the factors that influence New 
Zealanders’ EA and identifying latent classes of EA.     
6.3.3.1 Methods 
A panel ordered probit model, which takes into account the categorical nature of 
the dependent variable is used to estimate the marginal effects of SDCs on EA. To 
identify heterogeneity in EA, a panel ordered latent class attitudinal (LCA) model 
is fitted to the NEP data. We specify a LCA model with covariates in both the 
class membership model and EA model to allow class probabilities and EA to 
vary with these variables. A small but growing number of studies have estimated 
LCA models based on responses to attitudinal questions to identify groups with 
distinct preferences (e.g., Aldrich et al., 2007; Morey et al., 2006; Morey et al., 
2008; Scarpa, Thiene, et al., 2009; Thiene, Galletto, Scarpa, & Boatto, 2013; 
Ward et al., 2008).   
In the LCA model we assume that individuals in the same class have similar EA 
and that their response patterns to the NEP statements are more correlated within 
each class than across classes. Conditional on class membership, an individual’s 
responses to all the NEP statements are independent, that is, the correlation is 
completely induced by the latency of class membership (Breffle et al., 2011). We 
also assume that an individual’s environmental attitude (yi*) is a continuous latent 
variable and the scores (yi) on the NEP Scale items represent indicators of the 
underlying environmental preference. Following Greene (2008), the link between 
the observed NEP Scale item responses (yi) and the latent environmental attitude 
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index (yi*) is assumed to be of the ordered probit type. We specify a latent 
regression for yi* as (Greene, 2008; Greene, 2012): 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝜀𝑖~𝐹(𝜀𝑖|𝜃),   𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑧𝑖) = 0, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖|𝑧𝑖) = 1        (6-1) 
where zi are the characteristics of respondent i, and yi takes on the values of the 
NEP Scale categories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (re-coded as 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) according to the 
following scheme (Greene, 2008): 
 𝑦𝑖 =
{
 
 
 
 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜇0,         
1 𝑖𝑓 𝜇0 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜇1,
2 𝑖𝑓 𝜇1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜇2,
3 𝑖𝑓 𝜇2 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜇3,
4 𝑖𝑓     𝑦𝑖
∗ > 𝜇3      
           (6-2) 
where μj are unknown threshold parameters to be estimated with β. The thresholds 
(μj’s) partition the real line into a series of regions corresponding to the ordinal 
response categories for NEP Scale statements. For identification purposes, μ0 is 
normalised to zero and μj’s for j = 1, 2, 3 are estimated.  
The set of probabilities for ordinal outcomes (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) that enter the log 
likelihood may be expressed as (Greene, 2012): 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝒛𝒊) = Φ(−𝜷
′𝒛𝒊) 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝒛𝒊) = Φ(𝜇1 − 𝜷
′𝒛𝒊) − Φ(𝜇0 − 𝜷
′𝒛𝒊)                                                                      
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 2|𝒛𝒊) = Φ(𝜇2 − 𝜷
′𝒛𝒊) − Φ(𝜇1 − 𝜷
′𝒛𝒊)                                         (6-3)                                                          
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 3|𝒛𝒊) = Φ(𝜇3 − 𝜷
′𝒛𝒊) − Φ(𝜇2 − 𝜷
′𝒛𝒊)                                                                     
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖 = 4|𝒛𝒊) = 1 − Φ(𝜇3 − 𝜷
′𝒛𝒊) 
For all probabilities to be positive, 0 < 𝜇1 < 𝜇2 < 𝜇3 (Greene, 2008). 
Following Aldrich et al. (2007), Boxall and Adamowicz (2002), Morey et al. 
(2006), Morey et al. (2008), and Scarpa, Thiene, et al. (2009), the probability of 
observing an individual’s response pattern (xi) given his/her characteristics (zi) can 
be considered as part of a discrete mixture of C multinomials specified as:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑖: 𝑧𝑖) =  ∑Pr (𝑐: 𝑧𝑖)
𝐶
𝑐=1
𝑃𝑟(𝑥𝑖|𝑐) =  ∑Pr (𝑐: 𝑧𝑖)
𝐶
𝑐=1
∏∏(𝜋𝑞𝑠|𝑐)
𝑥𝑖𝑞𝑠  (6 − 4)
4
𝑠=0
15
𝑞=1
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where Pr(𝑐: 𝑧𝑖) =
exp (𝛼𝑐
′𝑧𝑖)
∑ exp (𝛼𝑐
′𝑧𝑖)𝐶
, 𝛼𝐶 = 0, is the unconditional probability that 
individual i belongs to class c as a function of his/her covariates, q = (1, 2, …. , 
15) are the NEP Scale statements (NEP1 to NEP15), s = (0, 1,2, 3, 4) are the re-
coded response categories (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 𝜋𝑞𝑠|𝑐 is the probability that an individual 
in class c selects response category s for statement q, and 𝑥𝑖𝑞𝑠 is an indicator 
variable that takes on the value of 1 if individual i answers s to statement q, and 
zero otherwise. 
With a sample size of 224 respondents, the log-likelihood for a model with C 
classes is specified as:  
 𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑛224𝑖=1 [∑ 𝑃(𝑐: 𝑧𝑖)
𝐶
𝑐=1 ∏ ∏ (
4
𝑠=0 𝜋𝑞𝑠|𝑐)
𝑥𝑖𝑞𝑠]15𝑞=1                              (6-5)  
subject to ∑ 𝜋𝑞𝑠|𝑐 = 1
4
𝑠=0  and, ∑ 𝑃(𝑐: 𝑧𝑖) = 1
𝐶
𝑐=1 . The 𝜋𝑞𝑠|𝑐 that maximise the 
above log likelihood function are now specified as (Morey et al., 2006): 
 𝜋𝑞𝑠|𝑐 =
∑ 𝑃(𝑐:𝑧𝑖|𝑥𝑖)𝑥𝑖𝑞𝑠
224
𝑛=1
∑ Pr (𝑐:𝑧𝑖|𝑥𝑖)
224
𝑛=1
          (6-6) 
The denominator in equation (6-6) estimates the number of individuals in class c, 
whereas the numerator estimates the number of individuals in class c that 
answered s to statement q (Morey et al., 2006). Since 𝜋𝑞𝑠|𝑐 depends on the 
conditional membership probabilities, which are unknown, there is insufficient 
information to maximise the likelihood function. Typically this problem is 
handled by using the E-M (expectation-maximization) algorithm, an iterative 
technique that can be used to obtain maximum likelihood estimation in the 
presence of missing data or incomplete information (Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 
1977), or “when standard procedures are numerically difficult or infeasible” as in 
the case of the estimation of a large number of parameters (Train, 2009, p. 347). 
In the E-M algorithm unobserved or missing information is replaced with their 
expected values which are used as starting values in a search for the maximum of 
the log likelihood function. The process is reiterated, each time updating the 
original expectations, until a convergence criterion is reached (Dempster et al., 
1977). The LCA model is estimated using NLOGIT 5 software. Although 
previous studies suggest that the EM method is preferable, Greene (2012, p. 449) 
advocates for the direct maximisation of the log-likelihood function using 
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NLOGIT’s generalised optimization package. The starting values for iterations are 
obtained by assuming equal class probabilities and class-specific parameters 
which differ slightly from the MNL estimates (Greene, 2012).  
6.3.3.2 Results 
Table 6-5 shows the frequencies of the response categories of the NEP Scale. The 
response category with the highest frequency is “mildly agree” followed by 
“neither agree nor disagree” and the least frequently selected category is “strongly 
disagree”, which reflects a tendency by respondents to express pro-NEP attitudes.  
Table 6-5: Frequencies and proportions of self-reported levels of environmental concern  
Response categories for NEP Scale statements            Frequency* 
Category Description Response variable 
(y) 
 Count Percent 
1 Strongly disagree 0  177 5.3% 
2 Mildly disagree 1  551 16.4% 
3 Neither agree nor 
disagree 
2  839 25.0% 
4 Mildly agree 3  1077 32.0% 
5 Strongly agree 4  716 21.3% 
*This is the number of times a specific category is selected 
The coefficients and marginal effects for the ordered probit model are presented in 
Table A6-3 in Appendix 6 and Table 6-6, respectively. The coefficients reported 
in Table A6-3 are the effects of the covariates on the cumulative normal function 
of the probabilities that the response variable equals one, and do not show the 
complete picture implied by the estimated model as in the case of coefficients 
from OLS regression. Greene (2008, p. 833) suggests caution in interpreting the 
coefficients of the ordered probit model because “without a fair amount of extra 
calculation, it is quite unclear how the coefficients in the ordered probit model 
should be interpreted.” Our main interest is in the marginal effects of SDCs, 
which we report on next.  
The marginal effects reported in Table 6-6 measure the partial effects of the 
covariates on the probabilities of the outcomes (see Table A6-4 in Appendix 6 for 
full table of regression results). For example, males are more likely to select 
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response categories 1, 2, and 3 compared to females, who are more likely to select 
categories 4 and 5. Specifically, being male increases the probabilities of response 
categories 1, 2 and 3 by 1.1%, 1.9%, and 1.0% respectively, and reduces the 
probabilities of categories 4, and 5 by 1.1% and 2.9% respectively. This implies 
that, on average, males tend to have lower environmental scores compared to 
females. An increase in age decreases the probability of response categories 1, 2, 
and 3 and increases that of 4 and 5, whilst an increase in income has the opposite 
effect, ceteris paribus. Having dependent children in the household and/or 
belonging to the NZ-European ethnic group have no significant effect on response 
probabilities. Compared to the “Other” ethnic group, Maori are less likely to 
select lower categories of the response variable, but are more likely to select 
response categories 4 and 5. Respondents with higher educational qualifications 
(at least a bachelor’s degree) are more likely to respond 4 and 5 to the NEP 
statements compared to respondents with lower qualifications.  
Table 6-6: Marginal effects of respondents’ SDCs on NEP Scale responses* 
Response 
category 
Gender Age Child lnIncome NZ_Euro Maori Education 
1 0.0107
c
         
(2.58) 
-0.0004
c
 
(-3.09) 
0.0027 
(0.63) 
0.0084
c
 
(3.15) 
0.0003 
(0.06) 
-0.0176
b
  
(–2.24) 
-0.0087
a
 
(-1.92) 
2 0.0186
c
 
(2.60) 
-0.0008
c
 
(-3.10) 
0.0047 
(0.63) 
0.0146
c
 
(3.17) 
0.0006 
(0.06) 
-0.0342
c
   
(-2.01) 
-0.0155
a
 
(-1.88) 
3 0.0104
c
    
(2.61) 
-0.0004
c
 
(-3.07) 
0.0026 
(0.64) 
0.0082
c
 
(3.14) 
0.0003 
(0.06) 
-0.0229
a
   
(-1.72) 
-0.0090
a
 
(-1.81) 
4 -0.0108
b
    
(-2.56) 
0.0004
c
 
(3.06) 
-0.0027   
(-0.63) 
-0.0085
c
 
(-3.12) 
-0.0003 
(-0.06) 
0.0159
c
 
(2.71) 
0.0086
a
 
(1.94) 
5 -0.0289
c
         
(-2.60) 
0.0012
c
 
(3.08) 
-0.0073   
(-0.63) 
-0.0227
c
 
(-3.16) 
-0.0009 
(-0.06) 
0.0589
a
 
(1.81) 
0.2457
a
 
(1.84) 
a
, 
b
, and 
c
 denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
*
t-values are in 
parentheses  
The results of the LCA model are presented in Table 6-7. Up to three classes of 
EA - weak (10%), moderate (61%) and strong (29%) environmental groups are 
supported by the data. A number of models were estimated with different 
combinations of covariates in the class membership model and the model 
presented here provided the best fit to the data. Of the covariates used in the class 
membership sub-model, only age has a significant and positive influence on class 
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membership of the strong environmental group compared to the reference group 
(weak). This suggests that on average older respondents have a higher likelihood 
of belonging to the strong group compared to the weak group. However, gender 
and education have no significant influence on the probability of belonging to the 
strong or moderate group compared to the weak group. Respondents with high 
incomes are less likely to belong to the strong environmental group, whilst Maori 
and respondents with minor children living at home are more likely to belong to 
the moderate environmental group. Overall, our findings are consistent with 
previous studies supporting the notion that on average men are less pro-
environmental than women and that respondents with higher incomes tend to be 
less pro-environmental (Clark et al., 2003; Ek & Soderholm, 2008).       
Table 6-7: Regression results for the ordered LCA model (N = 224)  
Variables Environmental group 
 Strong Moderate weak 
 Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z 
Constant  1.7149*** 12.06  1.8870*** 17.89  2.7859*** 3.29 
Gender -0.1438*** -2.58  0.0004   0.01 -0.2479 -0.87 
Age -0.0019 -0.73 -0.0015 -1.10 -0.0079 -0.48 
Child -0.1432** -2.55  0.0976**   2.43 -0.7399** -2.18 
Income/1000 -0.0042*** -4.37 -0.0008 -1.10 -0.0033 -0.57 
NZ_European -0.1128 -1.34  0.1059*   1.78  0.1014 0.14 
Maori  0.4310 0.07  0.3618***   3.13  0.9863 0.07 
Education  0.0042 0.07  0.0569   1.35 -0.0828 -0.16 
μ1  0.3901*** 9.24  1.2061***  22.58  1.0275*** 7.36 
μ2  0.6406*** 12.22  1.9095*** 32.91  3.4761*** 19.07 
μ3  1.2745*** 26.21  3.1687*** 47.53  4.7644*** 6.63 
  Class membership model  
Constant -1.38887 -1.20  1.07081   1.01  0.0 (fixed parameter) 
Age  0.05442**  2.50  0.01670   0.83  0.0 (fixed parameter) 
Gender -0.30221 -0.39 -0.12089 -0.16  0.0 (fixed parameter) 
Education  0.63508  0.72  0.30534   0.37  0.0 (fixed parameter) 
Class Probability  0.28778  0.61564  0.09659 
LL -4564.35      
AIC  9201.7      
BIC  9461.6      
***, **, * Significant at the .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively 
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6.3.4 Constructing and testing subscales of the NEP Scale  
To address research Question 4(b) we need to construct subscales of the NEP 
Scale from the responses to the full scale. In constructing the subscales of the NEP 
Scale we consider important issues addressed by Dunlap et al. (2000) when they 
revised the old 12-item NEP Scale to form the 15-item NEP Scale. These issues 
include:  (a) an equal number of items or statements measuring each facet of 
ecological worldview, (b) a balance or near balance between pro-and anti-NEP 
items - ideally equal numbers but this is not possible even for the full scale with 
an odd number of items forming the scale, and (c) the internal consistency of the 
items as measured using the item-total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha is 
sufficiently high to justify combining the items into a single index measuring 
environmental attitude, and/or factor analysis confirming that all items load 
heavily on a single factor.  
Taking into account the above issues, only subscales with 5 and 10 items meet the 
condition of equal representation of the five facets. We refer to these as the 5-item 
and 10-item subscales. There are many combinations of 5 or 10 items that can be 
drawn from the fifteen items that constitute the full NEP Scale. The 5-item 
subscale can either have two pro- and three anti-NEP items or vice versa and the 
10-item subscale should have an equal number of pro- and anti-NEP items. A 
convenient strategy that we adopt for drawing items for the 5-item subscales is to 
take the first five (NEP1 to NEP5), or middle five (NEP6 to NEP10), or last five 
(NEP10 to NEP15) items of the full NEP Scale as this meets the condition of 
equal representation and near balance between pro- and anti-NEP items. Using the 
same strategy of drawing items in blocks of five, there are three possible 10-item 
subscales that can be constructed by drawing the first ten items (NEP1 to NEP10), 
the last ten items (NEP6 to NEP15), and combining the first five and the last five 
items (NEP1 to NEP5 and NEP11 to NEP15). However the latter results in an 
unbalanced subscale with six pro-NEP and four anti-NEP items. These six 
subscales are tested for internal consistency to determine which two sub-scales are 
used in further analysis. 
Table 6-8 presents the item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for each of the 
sub-scales. Although Cronbach’s alpha and item-total correlation indicate that the 
10-item subscale constructed from the first five (first 5) and last five (last 5) items 
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of the NEP Scale has the highest level of internal consistency, it does not meet the 
condition of balance between pro- and anti-NEP items. The other two 10-item 
subscales have the same acceptable Cronbach’s alpha equal to 0.73, but the 
subscale constructed from the last ten items is preferred as it has only one item 
(NEP 6) with an item-total correlation less than 0.30. Of the three 5-item 
subscales, the one constructed from the first five items of the NEP Scale has the 
highest Cronbach’s alpha (0.61) and is also better in terms of item-total 
correlation. Therefore, the two sub-scales that we select for use in further analysis 
are the 5-item (first 5) and the 10-item (last 10) which are mutually exclusive in 
terms of items as they split the full NEP Scale into two parts. We refer to these 
subscales as the 5-item NEP Scale and the 10-item NEP Scale from now on.     
Table 6-8: Item-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha for the sub-scales of the NEP 
Scale 
Item 15-item 
NEP 
Scale 
10-item 
(first 10) 
10-item 
(last 10) 
10-item (first 
5 plus last 5) 
5-item 
(first 5) 
5-item 
(centre) 
5-item 
(last 5) 
NEP 1 0.35 0.32  0.36 0.29   
NEP 2 0.51 0.47  0.44 0.33   
NEP 3 0.48 0.46  0.48 0.47   
NEP 4 0.41 0.40  0.37 0.33   
NEP 5 0.49 0.43  0.50 0.42   
NEP 6 0.10 0.09 0.07   0.03  
NEP 7 0.31 0.28 0.30   0.21  
NEP 8 0.57 0.58 0.53   0.51  
NEP 9 0.39 0.36 0.35   0.26  
NEP 10 0.56 0.52 0.56   0.47  
NEP 11 0.46  0.37 0.48   0.35 
NEP 12 0.39  0.41 0.30   0.27 
NEP 13 0.42  0.40 0.42   0.38 
NEP 14 0.34  0.30 0.35   0.30 
NEP 15 0.60  0.55 0.59   0.50 
α*  0.81 0.73 0.73 0.86 0.61 0.51 0.60 
* Cronbach’s alpha 
We estimate two LCA models based on equations (6-4) to (6-5) using the 
preferred subscales described previously, and compare the results with those 
obtained using the full NEP Scale to determine the accuracy of the subscales in 
terms of classifying respondents into the same latent classes as the full scale. 
Table 6-9 presents the results for the subscales alongside those of the full NEP 
Scale. The models estimated using the subscales suggest, as in the case of the full 
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scale, the presence of up to three classes of environmental attitude which we refer 
to as strong, moderate and weak as in the previous estimation. The class sizes 
obtained using the subscales are different from the respective classes obtained 
using the full NEP Scale. The 10-item subscale seems to assign more respondents 
to the weak environmental class, and less to the strong and moderate classes 
compared to the full scale. The 5-item scale seems to have the opposite effect as it 
assigns fewer respondents to the weak class and more to the moderate and strong 
classes compared to the full scale. This is similar to findings by Hawcroft and 
Milfont (2010), indicating that respondents scored higher on a 6-item subscale and 
lower on other subscales compared to the full NEP Scale. 
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Table 6-9: LCA model results for the full NEP Scale and constructed 10- and 5-item sub-scales 
 15-item NEP Scale 10-item NEP Scale 5-item NEP Scale 
 Strong moderate Weak Strong Moderate Weak Strong Moderate Weak 
 Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Constant  1.715
c
  1.887
c
  2.786
c
  1.778
c
  1.701
c
  2.159
c
  1.685
c
  2.134
c
  3.717
b
 
Gender -0.144
c
 0.001 -0.247 -0.145
a
 -0.059 -0.204 -0.181  0.055 -0.471 
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001  0.004  0.006  0.000  -0.084
b
 
Child -0.143
b
  0.098
b
 -0.739
b
 -0.131  0.154
b
 -0.034 -0.221  0.140 -0.514 
Income/1000 -0.004
c
 -0.001 -0.003  -0.004
b
 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002  0.026 
NZ-Euro -0.113  0.106
a
  0.101 -0.212  0.198
a
 -0.097 -0.143 -0.112  0.219 
Maori  0.431  0.362
c
  0.986  0.445  0.664
b
  0.278 -0.133   0.165 -0.155 
Education  0.004 0.057 -0.082 -0.019 0.088 -0.023 -0.017    0.198
a
 -0.878 
μ1   0.390c 1.206c  1.027c  0.378c  1.087c  1.064c  0.516c    1.470c  0.163 
μ2   0.641c 1.909c  3.476c  0.631c  1.698c  2.850c  0.703c    2.158c  2.822c 
μ3   1.275c 3.169c  4.764c  1.117c  2.940c  3.827c  1.519c    3.596c  3.922c 
          
 Class membership model 
Constant -1.389  1.071 0.(fixed) -2.754
c
 0.(fixed) -0.536  1.391
a 
0.(fixed) -0.682 
Age  0.054
b
  0.017 0.(fixed)  0.040
b
 0.(fixed) -0.008  0.016 0.(fixed) -0.037
a 
Gender -0.302 -0.121 0.(fixed) -0.115 0.(fixed) -0.238 -0.072 0.(fixed)  0.001 
Education 0.635  0.305 0.(fixed)  0.618 0.(fixed)  0.094  0.095 0.(fixed)  0.593 
Class Prob. 0.288  0.616 0.097  0.239 0.559  0.202  0.313 0.617  0.070 
    
LL -4564.35496 -3095.00920 -1529.85154 
AIC 9201.7 6272.0 3141.7 
BIC 9461.6 6506.3 3347.6 
Accuracy
1 
100% 83.93% 81.25% 
1
We assume that the full or 15-item NEP Scale is 100% accurate since it is used as a reference point.  
a
, 
b
, 
c
 Denote significance  at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively 
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With an appropriate command NLOGIT 5 estimates individual specific posterior 
or conditional class probabilities. We use these individual posterior class 
membership probabilities to compare the two sub-scales with the full NEP Scale. 
We estimate the accuracy of each subscale as the number of times a subscale 
assigns a respondent to the same class as the full NEP Scale as a percentage of 
sample size. Based on these criteria, the 10-item scale has an accuracy of 84%, 
whilst the 5-item sub-scale has and accuracy of 81%. This indicates that the 
accuracy of the subscales declines as they become shorter.  
Table 6-10 presents the characteristics and environmental attitude scores of 
respondents in the weak, moderate and strong environmental groups for the three 
scales. For all three scales the weak classes have the lowest average age and 
income, whilst the strong classes have the highest average age, implying that the 
scales are consistent in assigning relatively younger respondents to the weak class 
and relatively older respondents to the strong class. For the 5-item scale, the weak 
class is weaker and the moderate class is less moderate than the respective classes 
based on the longer scales.  However, the average item score for the strong class 
is significantly higher for the 5-item NEP Scale compared to the longer scales (the 
t scores for the differences in means are -2.33 and -2.16 for the 15-item and 10-
item NEP Scales, respectively, which are higher the critical value of 1.96 at α = 
0.05) . Hawcroft and Milfont (2010) find a similar result from a meta-analysis of 
studies that used different scale lengths in measuring environmental attitude.  The 
10-item NEP Scale produces significantly higher average scores for the moderate 
class compared to the 15-item NEP Scale (t = -2.12). 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the results discussed above is that using 
shorter sub-scales of the NEP scale comes at a cost in the form of reduced 
accuracy in classifying respondents into groups with homogeneous environmental 
preferences. If the use of a shorter version of the NEP Scale cannot be avoided, 
then the 10-item subscale is recommended as no significant differences in the 
average scores are found in the strong and weak classes. In section 6.7 we test the 
effect of using shorter versions of the NEP Scale on WTP for green electricity. 
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Table 6-10: Characteristics of respondents in the weak, moderate and strong environmental classes 
Variable Weak  Moderate Strong 
 15-item 10-item 5-item 15-item 10-item   5-item 15-item 10-item 5-item 
Class size 10% 20% 8% 60% 54% 63% 30% 26% 29% 
Mean NEP Scale score* 43.5 30.0 (45.7) 13.2 (43.0) 50.4 34.6 (51.8) 16.5 (49.8) 58.5 38.9 (58.1) 20.6 (60.1) 
mean item score  2.90 3.00 2.64 3.36 3.46 3.29 3.90 3.90 4.12 
Gender (male) 45% 39% 42% 46% 47% 47% 49% 53% 48% 
Average Income ($000) 39.4 41.0 41.7 46.1 46.1 45.5 44.5 45.8 44.8 
Average Age (years)    39       40       36      43       43        44    50          51       49 
Ethnicity NZ Euro 73% 70% 69% 78% 82% 76% 76% 74% 83% 
 Maori                    9% 9% 5% 5% 3% 4% 3% 4% 5% 
Other 18% 22% 26% 17% 15% 20% 21% 22% 12% 
Education ** 27% 33% 47% 31% 28% 29% 31% 34% 28% 
Dependent children 41% 48% 42% 43% 42% 44% 37% 33% 33% 
*Scores in parentheses are based on all 15 items of the NEP Scale. **At least Bachelors 
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6.4 Analysis of responses to questions based on the norm activation 
theory  
Responses to questions measuring psychological constructs based on the norm 
activation theory (NAT) are used in section 6.6 to explain heterogeneity in 
preferences for green electricity. In this section we analyse these responses to 
determine whether questions measuring the same construct may be combined into 
a single index. NAT and the construction of statements used to measure the 
respective psychological constructs were discussed in Chapter 2. Two statements 
are used to assess respondents’ “awareness of consequences” (AC) of switching to 
a supplier that produces electricity from renewables, and another two statements 
are used to assess “ascription of responsibility” (AR). Responses are measured on 
a five-point Likert scale with response categories “Strongly Agree” (SA), 
“Somewhat Agree” (SWA), “Neither Agree Nor Disagree” (NAND), “Somewhat 
Disagree” (SWD), and “Strongly Disagree” (SD). These are coded from 1 (SD) to 
5 (SA).  
Responses to the statements measuring the NAT constructs are spread over all 
response categories (see Table 6-11). This indicates considerable individual 
heterogeneity in terms of awareness of the environmental benefits of supporting a 
supplier that produces electricity from renewable sources, and the feeling of 
personal responsibility for reducing pollution. However, the percentage 
distribution of responses shows that respondents have a relatively higher positive 
evaluation of “awareness of consequences” (AC) compared to “ascription of 
responsibility” (AR) statements. For example, 66.5% of the respondents believe 
that switching to a supplier producing electricity from renewable sources is good 
for the environment, compared to only 27.7% who feel morally obliged to switch 
to a supplier that generates most of its power from renewable sources. This 
suggests that, for the majority, other incentives may be required to induce a 
switch.   
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Table 6-11: Percentage distribution of responses to AC and AR statements (N = 224) 
Statement Response categories 
SA SWA NAND SWD SD 
Awareness of the consequences of a behaviour (AC) 
AC1: I believe that switching to a supplier 
that produces electricity from renewable 
sources would be good for the 
environment. 
18.30 48.21 28.57 3.57 1.34 
AC2: My switching to a supplier that 
generates electricity from renewable 
sources will not make a difference to the 
environment. 
4.91 17.86 37.50 26.79 12.95 
Ascription of responsibility (AR) 
AR1: I feel personally responsible for 
helping to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
by switching to a supplier that generates 
electricity from clean energy sources. 
7.14 29.91 33.48 22.77 6.70 
AR2: I feel morally obliged to switch to a 
supplier that generates most of its power 
from renewable sources. 
6.25 21.43 39.29 24.11 8.93 
 
Internal consistency of the AC and AR statements is tested using the correlations 
among the items and the results are presented in Table 6-12. Principal components 
analysis is not performed as only two statements were used for each construct. 
Correlation between the AC statements is 0.38 whilst that of the AR statements is 
0.71. The relatively low correlation between the AC statements may be due to the 
fact that AC2 is a negative statement. As we saw in the case of the NEP scale, 
respondents tend to select the neutral point for negative statements. However, both 
correlations are significant at the 5% level suggesting that each pair of statements 
may be combined into a single index measuring the construct.  
To obtain an index for each construct, the scores for each pair of statements are 
averaged. The sample means for the AC and AR scores are 3.52 and 3.00 
respectively. The mean score for AR indicates that, on average, respondents are 
neutral with respect to assigning personal responsibility for engaging in switching 
behaviour for environmental reasons. Some previous studies have combined AC 
and AR into a single index measuring altruism (e.g., Clark et al., 2003; Cooper et 
al., 2004), which may be justified in terms of the high correlations between all 
items. 
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Table 6-12: Summary statistics and the correlation matrix (Pearson (n)) for the NAT 
constructs 
Variables Min Max Mean Std. dev.  AC1 AC2 AC AR1 AR2 AR 
Awareness of the consequences of a behaviour (AC) 
AC1 1 5 3.79 0.83 1 0.38 0.78 0.52 0.48 0.54 
AC2 1 5 3.25 1.05 0.38 1 0.87 0.33 0.25 0.31 
AC 1 5 3.52 0.78 0.78 0.87 1 0.50 0.42 0.50 
Ascription of responsibility (AR) 
AR1 1 5 3.08 1.04 0.52 0.33 0.50 1 0.71 0.93 
AR2 1 5 2.92 1.03 0.48 0.25 0.42 0.71 1 0.92 
AR 1 5 3.00 0.96 0.54 0.31 0.50 0.93 0.92 1 
 
In the sections that follow we explore the effect of the psychological constructs on 
WTP for green electricity.  
6.5 Environmental attitudes and WTP for green electricity 
Although our hypothesis is that respondents expressing higher environmental 
concern are expected to consider renewables in choosing their power company, 
and that their choices would reflect a willingness to pay for green electricity, there 
are a number of reasons why higher environmental scores may not translate to a 
WTP. First, responses to the NEP Scale statements tell us nothing about an 
individual’s ability to pay, but only about their environmental attitude. Second, an 
individual’s WTP for green electricity may depend on a number of factors such as 
income, current electricity prices (or monthly power bill), environmental attitude, 
beliefs and perceptions about whether supporting electricity generation from 
renewable energy sources by paying more for green electricity would be an 
effective way of reducing CO2 emissions, and the perceived property rights. 
Therefore, it is possible for a respondent to express high concern for the 
environment and a zero WTP for green electricity if they cannot afford, or don’t 
believe that paying for green electricity is an effective strategy for addressing CO2 
emission and resource depletion by the electricity sector, or that electricity 
generators have no right to pollute and the government is responsible for ensuring 
that electricity generators pay for their CO2 emissions. 
241 
 
The analysis that follows addresses research Question 4: (a) How much are 
electricity consumers willing to pay for green electricity and how can differences 
in WTP be explained? 
6.5.1 Methods 
To find the model that best fits the data, the MNL, RPL-EC and LC models 
described in Chapter 2 are estimated. EA enters the utility function as an 
interaction with Renewable. We recognise the three classes of environmental 
attitudes identified in section 6.4.2 and also follow an approach adopted in 
previous studies by coding the NEP scores using a dummy coding structure with 
three levels representing weak, moderate and strong environmental attitudes (e.g., 
Aldrich et al., 2007; Cooper et al., 2004; Kotchen & Reiling, 2000). Each level is 
interacted with Renewable to form WNEP_Renewable, MNEP_Renewable and 
SNEP_Renewable, but only the last two interaction terms enter the utility 
functions of alternatives as weak  is used as a reference level.  
We use the Wald test for linear restrictions to test whether the slopes of the 
dummy interaction terms described above are equal in the MNL model (Hensher 
et al., 2005a). Details of how the dummy variables are created under each version 
of the NEP Scale are provided in Table 6-13. The dummy variables created for the 
subscales of the NEP Scale are used in estimation at a later stage. The sample 
sizes differ slightly across the scales as we avoid splitting respondents with the 
same score. All the attributes including interaction terms enter the systematic 
component of utility linearly in all the models estimated.  
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Table 6-13: Description of NEP score levels 
Scales WNEP (weak NEP) MNEP (moderate NEP) SNEP (strong NEP)  
15-item NEP 
Scale 
 = 1 if score < 47, 
otherwise 0. (n = 70) 
= 1 if 48 ≤ score ≤ 55, 
otherwise 0. (n = 77) 
 = 1 if score >55, 
otherwise 0. (n = 77) 
10-item NEP 
Scale 
= 1 if score ≤ 31, 
otherwise 0. (n = 69) 
= 1 if 32 ≤ score ≤ 36, 
otherwise 0. (n = 72) 
 = 1 if score > 36, 
otherwise 0. (n = 83) 
5-item NEP 
Scale 
= 1 if score ≤ 15, 
otherwise 0. (n = 66) 
= 1 if 16 ≤ score ≤ 18, 
otherwise 0. (n = 78) 
= 1 if score > 18, 
otherwise 0. (n = 80) 
 
The models that include interaction terms described above are suffixed with a 
number indicating the number of items in each version of the NEP Scale used. For 
example for the MNL we have MNL_15, MNL_10, and MNL_5 for the models 
using 15, 10, and 5 items of the NEP Scale. The specification of random 
parameters in the RPL-EC model is tested through alternative specifications. Only 
parameters with significant standard deviations are specified as random in the 
final models. For example, preliminary estimation of the RPL-EC model 
suggested that the parameters for Renewable, Loyalty Rewards and the dummies 
indicating supplier type should be treated as non-random. A random parameter 
specification for these variables turned out insignificant estimates of the standard 
deviations.   
To avoid the complications associated with estimating WTP as a ratio of two 
random parameters with the same or different distributions, we assume a non-
random (fixed) parameter for Monthly Power Bill. This allows the distribution of 
marginal WTP to take the same form as that assumed for the respective 
parameters scaled by the parameter for Monthly Power Bill (Goett et al., 2000; 
Hensher et al., 2005a; Revelt & Train, 1998). Revelt and Train (1998) and Goett 
et al. (2000) mention that using a fixed parameter for the cost attribute allows an 
easy derivation and interpretation of the distribution of WTP. Hensher et al. 
(2005a) and Goett et al. (2000) discuss problems such as unreasonable and 
extremely high WTP estimates associated with applications in which a random 
parameter is specified for the cost attribute, where the cost parameter takes on a 
value arbitrarily close to zero. To allow for comparability of results, we follow the 
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practice in most previous studies estimating WTP for the attributes of electricity 
services by assuming that random parameters or taste intensities are normally 
distributed in the sampled population (e.g., Goett et al., 2000; Gracia et al., 2012; 
Hensher et al., 2014). Specifying a normal distribution, which has support on each 
side of zero, implies that for each attribute some respondents would like it, whilst 
others would dislike it (Goett et al., 2000). 
6.5.2 Results 
Preliminary estimations of the LC model with covariates and/or EA in the class 
membership model revealed that these variables are poor predictors of 
membership of preference class in the context of supplier choice based on our 
choice dataset. For EA, this finding is not surprising since the NEP scores are only 
expected to affect preferences for Renewable, yet the identified classes are based 
on preferences for all the attributes used in describing the alternatives in choice 
sets. To ovoid over-parameterisation, the class membership model in the final LC 
model is specified as a base model suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984), in 
which class verification is based on class-specific constants.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, we rely on information criteria, pattern of significant 
parameters and relative signs, ease of interpreting the results and the need for 
parsimony in determining the number of classes to retain. In all estimations of the 
LC model, we start with a single class and progressively increase the number of 
classes, each time observing changes in information criteria and parameter 
estimates.  
Information criteria presented in Table 6-14 indicate the presence of up to three or 
five preference classes, and Figure 6-3 presents a visual display of changes in 
information criteria as the number of classes is increased. Based on CAIC and 
BIC, only three classes should be retained compared to five indicated by AIC, and 
AIC3
20
. The performance of CAIC and BIC in identifying fewer classes compared 
to AIC and AIC3 is consistent with findings in previous studies investigating the 
performance of information criteria (e.g., Andrews & Currim, 2003a). Therefore, 
we retain three classes for the LC model. The LC model with three classes 
identifies market segments with clearly distinct preferences for the attributes. 
                                                          
20
 HQC and crAIC (not reported in Table 6-14) also indicate up to five preference classes. 
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Table 6-14: Information criteria used to determine the number of latent classes 
Number of classes CAIC BIC AIC3 AIC 
1 4423 4410 4346 4333 
2 4011 3984 3851 3824 
3 3863 3822 3621 3580 
4 3929 3874 3604 3549 
5 3986 3917 3579 3510 
6 4084 4001 3595 3512 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Information criteria used to determine the number of classes 
 
Regression results for the final models are presented in Table 6-15. Overall the 
data fits all the models well with pseudo-R
2
 values ranging from 0.267 for 
MNL_15 and 0.408 for the LC_15. All significant parameters have the expected 
signs across the three models, indicating the robustness of the results.  
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Table 6-15: Regression results 
Variable MNL_15 RPL_15 LC_15 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
ASCALT1  0.5759
c
 
(0.0744) 
0.6171
c
 
(0.1503) 
0.5170
c 
(0.1887) 
0.0956 
(0.1276) 
3.2536
c
 
(0.4867) 
Time -0.0431
c
 
(0.0074) 
-0.0479
c
 
(0.0101) 
-0.0385
b
 
(0.0175) 
-0.0342
c
 
(0.0118) 
-0.0419 
(0.0351) 
Fixed 0.0046
b
 
(0.0021) 
0.0079
b
 
(0.0035) 
0.0056 
(0.0066) 
0.0104
b
 
(0.0045) 
-0.0033 
(0.0129) 
Discount 0.0096
c
 
(0.0027) 
0.0127
c
 
(0.0033) 
0.0054 
(0.0057) 
0.0158
c
 
(0.0044) 
0.0516
c
 
(0.0188) 
Loyalty Rewards 0.3696
c
 
(0.0695) 
0.2907
c
 
(0.0839) 
0.2720
a
 
(0.1527) 
0.3601
c
 
(0.1222) 
0.4899 
(0.3833) 
Renewable 0.0031 
(0.0024) 
0.0061
b
 
(0.0030) 
0.0019 
(0.0061) 
0.0079
b
 
(0.0036) 
-0.0042 
(0.0106) 
MNEP_Renewable 0.0066
b
 
(0.0030) 
0.0068
a
 
(0.0039) 
0.0074 
(0.0067) 
0.0055 
(0.0051) 
0.0230
a
 
(0.0136) 
SNEP_Renewable 0.0105
c
 
(0.0029) 
0.0125
c
 
(0.0047) 
0.0144
a
 
(0.0081) 
0.0099
b
 
(0.0045) 
-0.0002 
(0.0141) 
Local Ownership 0.0082
c
 
(0.0014) 
0.0112
c
 
(0.0022) 
0.0134
c
 
(0.0029) 
0.0122
c
 
(0.0022) 
0.0056 
(0.0095) 
New Electricity Company -0.3333
c
 
(0.0953) 
-0.2742
b
 
(0.1259) 
-0.0889 
(0.2089) 
-0.1842 
(0.1620) 
-0.4429 
(0.5264) 
New Non-electricity Company -0.7405
c
 
(0.1223) 
-0.8812
c
 
(0.1647) 
-0.3076 
(0.2793) 
-0.8090
c
 
(0.1957) 
-1.5438
a
 
(0.8389) 
Well-known Non-electricity 
Company 
-0.4248
c
 
(0.1146) 
-0.4993
c
 
(0.1568) 
-0.0572 
(0.2946) 
-0.3968
b
 
(0.1796) 
-0.2898 
(0.5048) 
Monthly Power Bill -0.0255
c
 
(0.0008) 
-0.0337
c
 
(0.0011) 
-0.0569
c
 
(0.0039) 
-0.0138
c
 
(0.0017) 
-0.0147
b
 
(0.0061) 
Class Probabilities   0.5382
c
 
(0.0435) 
0.3471
c
       
(0.0429) 
0.1148
c
 
(0.0219) 
Standard Deviations of Random Parameters 
Time  0.0416
c
 (0.0150)  
Fixed  0.0266
c
 (0.0045) 
Discount  0.0152
b
 (0.0069) 
MNEP_Renewable  0.0074
a
 (0.0044) 
SNEP_Renewable  0.0204
c
 (0.0036) 
Local Ownership  0.0165
c
 (0.0025) 
Error component  1.5979
c
 (0.1329) 
LL           -2153.59 -1887.98 -1748.95 
AIC         4333.2 3818.0 3579.9 
BIC     4409.8    3933.9        3821.7 
Pseudo-R
2 
    0.2669   0.3607        0.4078 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05 and .1 level, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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A comparison of the models in terms of model fit shows that LC_15 performs best 
with highly significant LRT statistics of 809.28 and 278.06 against MNL_15 and 
RPL-15, respectively. An LRT statistic of 12.02  for MNL_15 versus the base 
MNL model against a χ2 critical value of 5.99 (𝜒(2) 0.05
2 ) confirms that including 
the interaction terms between Renewable and the NEP Scale score in model 
estimation improves goodness-of-fit. Furthermore, the Wald test for linear 
restrictions (𝜒(3) 
2 = 2.19) in the MNL model has a p-value of .139, which is 
greater than .05. The null hypothesis that the slopes of the interaction terms are 
equal is rejected at the 95% level of confidence. This suggests that the NEP score 
has a non-linear effect on the utility of Renewable, that is, a unit increase in the 
NEP score does not have a constant effect on utility at all levels of the NEP score.    
Although all the parameter estimates in Table 6-15 provide considerable insight 
into the preferences for the attributes, we focus mainly on the parameter estimates 
for the Renewable, MNEP_Renewable SNEP_Renewable, and Monthly Power Bill 
variables which are most relevant to the research Question 4 (a). The coefficient 
of Renewable is insignificant at the .05 level in MNL_15 and in classes 1 and 2 of 
LC_15, suggesting indifference towards Renewable by respondents in the weak 
environmental group. The coefficients of MNEP_Renewable, and 
SNEP_Renewable, which capture the systematic effect of moderate and high NEP 
scores on the utility of Renewable are significant, at least at the .1 level in 
MNL_15 and RPL-15 indicating heterogeneity in preferences for Renewable. 
These significant coefficients indicate that, on average, respondents belonging to 
the moderate and strong environmental groups have stronger preferences for 
Renewable compared to respondents in the weak environmental group.  
In LC_15, MNEP_Renewable is insignificant in class 2 indicating that 
respondents in the weak and moderate environmental groups have similar 
preferences for Renewable. The significance of SNEP_Renewable varies across 
the three classes in LC_15, indicating heterogeneity of preferences for Renewable 
across the classes. Significant heterogeneity exists within class 2 at the .05 level, 
with respondents in the strong environmental group exhibiting higher sensitivity 
to Renewable than the groups with lower NEP Scale scores. All standard 
deviations of random parameters including the error component are significant at 
least at the .1 level, indicating heterogeneity around the sampled population mean 
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parameters for the variables and significant correlations in the error structure of 
the non-status quo alternatives. 
WTP estimates 
Estimates of marginal WTP for the non-price attributes of electricity services are 
presented in Appendix 6 (Table A6-5), and a summary of WTP for green 
electricity is presented separately in Table 6-16. Based on MNL_15, respondents 
in the weak environmental group are not willing to pay any significant amount for 
green electricity, whist those belonging to the moderate and strong environmental 
groups are willing to pay on average $2.60 ($0.26x10) and $4.10 ($0.41x10) per 
month, respectively, to secure a 10% increase in green electricity. WTP for 
respondents with high NEP Scale scores is about 1.6 times that of respondents 
with moderate or average scores. Estimates based on RPL_15 reveal no 
significant differences in WTP between respondents in the weak and moderate 
environmental groups at the .05 level. However, respondents belonging to the 
strong environmental group are willing to pay, on average, $5.50 per month to 
secure a 10% in green electricity, which is about 3 times that of respondents in the 
weak and moderate environmental groups.   
Table 6-16: WTP for a 1% increase in generation from renewable energy sources 
(NZ$(2014) / month) 
Environmental group MNL_15 RPL_15 LC_15 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Weak NS 0.18
b
 
(0.089)
 
NS 0.57
b
 
(0.27) 
NS 
Moderate 0.26
b
 
(0.118) 
0.18
b1
  
(0.089) 
NS 
 
0.57
b
 
(0.27) 
NS 
Strong 0.41
c
 
(0.117) 
0.55
c
 
(0.109) 
0.25
a 
 
(0.14) 
1.29
c
 
(0.26) 
NS 
Class size   53.82% 34.70% 11.48% 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05 and .1 level, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. NS denotes not statistically different from zero. 
1
WTP increases to $0.38 
(0.077) if the estimate of $0.20 which is only significant at 0.1 level is included.  
WTP varies both within and across the three latent classes identified in LC_15, 
except class 3 where WTP is zero for all environmental groups. Respondents in 
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class 3, representing about 11% of the sampled population, have a zero WTP for 
green electricity; hence EA does not influence WTP in this class. In classes 1 and 
2, EA helps in explaining differences in WTP for green electricity. For example, 
in class 2 which accounts for about 35% of the sample, respondents belonging to 
the weak and moderate environmental groups are willing to pay on average $5.70 
per month for a 10% increase in green electricity, whilst respondents belonging to 
the strong environmental group are willing to pay on average $12.90 per month to 
secure the same increase. On the other hand, for respondents in class 1, 
representing about 54% of the sampled population, WTP differences between 
environmental groups are only discernible at the .1 level. Respondents in the weak 
and moderate environmental groups have a zero WTP, whilst those in the strong 
environmental group have a WTP of $2.50 per month for a 10% increase in green 
electricity. 
Based on LC_15, there is a potential for green marketing in New Zealand, where 
electricity retailers may be able to sell green electricity to about 35% of the retail 
customers. In this market segment, WTP to secure a 10% increase in green 
electricity represents between 3 and 7% of the sample average monthly power bill 
($174) depending on the environmental group. Although the WTP estimates 
discussed above are not directly comparable to those in the studies reviewed in 
section 6.2.1 due to differences in the framing of the choice questions, they are 
however, of the same order.  
The next section extends on the analysis conducted so far in addressing research 
Question 4 (a) by exploring the influence of the psychological constructs based on 
the norm activation theory (NAT) on WTP for green electricity.   
6.6 Altruism and the demand for green electricity 
In this section we estimate a model of supplier choice that integrates the 
psychological constructs based on the NAT with Lancaster’s characteristic theory 
of demand and random utility theory. The general framework for integrating 
psychological constructs with stated choice was described in detail in Chapter 2, 
and a summary of the analysis of responses to the questions measuring the NAT 
constructs, ‘awareness of a behaviour’s consequences’ (AC), and ‘beliefs about 
personal responsibility or ascription of responsibility’ (AR), was presented earlier 
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in section 6.6. The main objective of this analysis is to determine whether AC and 
AR, the antecedents of altruistic behaviour, play any systematic role in explaining 
heterogeneity of preferences for Renewable (green electricity). We test the null 
hypothesis that AC and AR do not explain heterogeneity of preferences for green 
electricity.   
To achieve the above objective we utilize the mixed logit model’s ability to 
determine possible sources of heterogeneity by revealing preference heterogeneity 
around the mean of a random parameter (Hensher et al., 2005a). Specifically, we 
use a panel mixed logit model with error components to determine whether AC 
and AR are possible sources of heterogeneity around the mean of the random 
parameter for Renewable, and estimate WTP for green electricity at different 
levels of AC and AR. The random parameter for Renewable is interacted with AC 
and AR in a RPL-EC model estimated using NLOGIT 5 software. The interaction 
terms decompose any heterogeneity observed within the parameter of Renewable, 
and offer an explanation for differences in preferences for the attribute (Hensher 
et al., 2005a). A significant standard deviation parameter for Renewable confirms 
heterogeneity in respondents’ preferences for green electricity. On the other hand, 
statistically significant interaction terms confirm that differences in the marginal 
utilities for Renewable may be explained, in part, by differences in AC and AR 
scores. For example, respondents reporting higher AC and AR scores are expected 
to be more sensitive to Renewable, hence the parameter estimates for the 
interaction terms are expected to be positive and significant when the null 
hypothesis does not hold.  
Following Hensher et al. (2005a), heterogeneity around the mean parameter for 
Renewable explained by AC and AR is included in the marginal utility (MU) of 
Renewable as follows: 
     𝑀𝑈𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝛽𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽𝐴𝑅 ∗ 𝐴𝑅 + 𝜎𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∗ 𝑁                (6-7)  
were, βmeanRenew and σRenew are the mean and standard deviation parameter 
estimates for Renewable, βAC and βAR are the heterogeneity in mean parameter 
estimates for AC and AR, respectively, and N is a random variate with a standard 
normal distribution. The MU of Renewable is then included in the utility function 
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of an alternative i for respondent n, defined in equation 5.1, as shown in the 
following equation. 
𝑈𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑘 + (𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝛽𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑛 + 𝛽𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑅𝑛 + 𝜎𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑁𝑛)𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑛 +𝑘
𝛼𝑠𝑞 + 𝜇𝑛
′ 𝑧𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛            (6-8) 
6.6.1 Regression results 
Regression results presented in Table 6-17 show that the overall model is 
statistically significant with a χ2 statistic of 2142.67 against a χ2 critical value of 
28.87 (with 18 degrees of freedom at alpha equal to 0.05). A pseudo-R
2
 of 0.36 is 
acceptable for a choice model. This model performs better than the base RPL-EC 
model estimated in the previous chapter (Table 5-12 on page 178) in terms of a 
LRT (χ2(df = 2) = 64.20), log likelihood, information criteria and pseudo-R
2
. This 
indicates that a model accounting for heterogeneity around the mean parameter for 
Renewables provides a better fit for the data. All parameter estimates are 
significant at the 0.05% level. Given the objective of this analysis, we focus on the 
mean and standard deviation parameters for Renewable, and the heterogeneity in 
mean parameter estimates for AC and AR reported under the sub-heading 
‘Heterogeneity in mean (Parameter:Variable)’ in the results table.  
The heterogeneity in mean parameter estimates for AC and AR are positive and 
statistically significant, which confirms that the variations in respondents’ 
preferences for Renewable or green electricity are, in part, explained by personal 
norms. Furthermore, these estimates indicate a stronger influence of AR on 
preferences compared to AC. This implies that the feeling of personal 
responsibility for considering the environment in choosing a supplier explains 
more variation in preferences for green electricity than awareness of the 
consequences of doing so.  
Since the heterogeneity in mean parameter estimates are all significant at the 
0.05% level, we reject the null hypothesis that AC and AR do not play any 
systematic role in explaining differences in preferences for green electricity. 
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Table 6-17: RPL-EC model regression results 
Variables Coefficient Std. 
Error 
| z | p-value 95% CI 
LB UB 
Random parameters in utility functions 
Time -0.0458
c
 0.0086 5.29 .0000 -0.0627   -0.0288 
Fixed 0.0079
b
  0.0035 2.26 .0239 0.0010   0.0147 
Discount 0.0128
c
 0.0034 3.75 .0002 0.0061   0.0194 
Renewable -0.0353
c
 0.0088 3.99 .0001 -0.0527   -0.0179 
Ownership 0.0106
c
 0.0023 4.61 .0000 0.0061   0.0151 
ERC 0.0 ……. (Fixed Parameter)..... 
Nonrandom parameters in utility functions 
ASCALT1 0.6768
c
 0.1511 4.48 .0000 0.3806   0.9730 
Rewards 0.2934
c
 0.0843 3.48 .0005 0.1282   0.4586 
New electricity company -0.2664
b
  0.1269 2.10 .0358 -0.5151   -0.0177 
New non-electricity 
company 
-0.8925
c
 0.1651 5.41 .0000 -1.2162   -0.5689 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
-0.5038
c
 0.1574 3.20 .0014 -0.8122   -0.1953 
Monthly power Bill -0.03401
c
 0.00116 29.35 .0000 -0.0363   -0.0317 
Heterogeneity in mean (Parameter:Variable) 
Renewable:AC      0.0062
b
 0.0026   2.36 .0182 0.0011    0.0114 
Renewable:AR      0.0082
c
 0.0023   3.47 .0005 0.0035    0.0128 
Standard deviations of random parameters 
NsTime 0.0458
c
 0.0086   5.29 .0000 0.0288    0.0627 
NsFixed 0.0268
c
 0.0043   6.29 .0000 0.0184    0.0351 
NsDiscount 0.0187
c
 0.0059   3.18 .0015 0.0072   0.0303 
NsRenewable 0.0102
c
 0.0024   4.18 .0000 0.0054    0.0149 
NsOwnership 0.0171
c
 0.0024   6.99 .0000 0.0123   0.0219 
NsERC 1.6995
c
 0.1259 13.50 .0000 1.4528   1.9462 
LL -1881.73      
AIC 3799.5      
BIC 3905.6      
Pseudo-R
2 
0.3628      
χ2(18 d.f) [p-value] 2142.67 [.00001]     
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Denote significance at the .01, .05, and .1 level, respectively 
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6.6.2 WTP for green electricity 
WTP for green electricity is estimated by dividing the marginal utility of 
Renewable expressed in equation (6-7) by the parameter estimate for Monthly 
power bill (βBill) as follows.  
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = (𝛽𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 + 𝛽𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑅 + 𝜎𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∗ 𝑁)/−𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙     (6-9) 
The parameter estimates in the expression for MU of Renewable are the 
unconditional parameter estimates that are representative of the entire sampled 
population. Unconditional individual-specific parameter estimates are simulated 
by creating a hypothetical sample of 10,000 individuals, and randomly assigning 
each to a point on the distribution of the random parameter for Renewable by 
taking random draws (rnn) from a standard normal distribution. For each 
hypothetical individual, rnn replaces N in equation (6-9), and individual-specific 
WTP estimates are computed. The distribution of the random draws used and the 
simulated WTP distribution are presented in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5, 
respectively. Additional WTP estimates are calculated at different combinations 
of the AC and AR scores to highlight sensitivity to the scores. The estimated 
mean and standard deviation of the WTP distribution are reported in Table 6-18. 
When evaluated at the sample mean scores for AC and AR, average WTP for a 
10% increase in Renewable is $3.20 per month. When AC is high (5) and AR is 
low (1), WTP is predicted to be low, highlighting the strong influence of AR on 
preferences for Renewable.     
 
Figure 6-4: Histogram of randomly drawn normal distribution with mean zero and 
standard deviation one 
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Figure 6-5:  Histogram of the sampling distribution of WTP for green electricity 
 
Table 6-18: WTP to secure a 1% increase in green electricity (NZ$(2014) /month) 
Scores  Mean Std. Dev 
AC = 3.52, AR =3 (average) 0.32 0.29 
AC = 3, AR =3 (neutral) 0.22 0.29 
AC = 4, AR = 4 (high) 0.65 0.29 
AC =5, AR =1 (mixed: high AC, low AR) 0.12 0.29 
 
6.7 The influence of shorter versions of the NEP Scale on WTP 
estimates 
In this section we conduct the econometric analysis required to answer research 
Question 4 (b): Does the use of shorter versions of the NEP Scale influence WTP 
estimates? In models estimated in section 6.5, EA was measured using the full 
NEP Scale. The latent class model LC_15 was identified as the best model. To 
achieve our objective, two additional LC models, LC_10 and LC_5, are estimated 
and the results compared with LC_15.The additional models, LC_10 and LC_5, 
use EA scores based on the 10- and 5-item subscales of the NEP Scale, 
respectively. The subscales were discussed in detail in section 6.5. The variables 
Fr
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  - 1. 033    - . 435     . 163     . 762    1. 360
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used in LC_10 and LC_5 are the same as those defined previously for LC_15. We 
also estimate MNL_10, MNL_5, RPL_10, and RPL_5 to allow for more precise 
comparison of WTP estimates since the sample sizes are the same for all pairs of 
WTP estimates that are compared for each logit specification.  
6.7.1 Regression results  
The regression results and discussion for MNL_10, MNL_5, RPL_10, and RPL_5 
are presented in Appendix (6.4). As in the previous estimation of the LC model 
we use information criteria to determine the number of classes. Based on the more 
stringent CAIC and BIC, and the pattern of significant parameters we retain three 
preference classes across all the models. The information criteria used to 
determine the number of preference classes are presented in Table 6-19. The 
bolded values indicate the minimum values for the criteria.  
Table 6-19: Criteria for the number of classes 
No. of 
Classes 
LCM_15 LCM_10 LCM_5 
AIC AIC3 CAIC BIC AIC AIC3 CAIC BIC AIC AIC3 CAIC BIC 
1 4333 4346 4423 4410 4332 4345 4422 4409 4329 4342 4418 4406 
2 3824 3851 4011 3984 3820 3847 4006 3979 3813 3840 4000 3973 
3 3580 3621 3863 3822 3592 3633 3875 3834 3596 3637 3879 3838 
4 3549 3604 3929 3874 3540 3595 3920 3865 3568 3623 3947 3892 
5 3510 3579 3986 3917 3509 3577 3984 3915 3535 3604 4011 3942 
6 3512 3595 4084 4001 3475 3558 4048 3965 3505 3588 4078 3995 
 
The LC model regression results are presented in Table 6-20. All significant 
parameters have the expected signs, and the parameter for Monthly Power Bill is 
highly significant in all classes, indicating sensitivity to the cost element. The 
model using the full NEP Scale (LC_15) performs better than the models using 
shorter versions of the NEP Scale in terms of LL, CAIC, BIC and pseudo-R
2
. 
LC_5 performs worse than the other two models.  
The significance of the coefficients of Renewable, and the interaction terms 
MNEP_Renewable and SNEP_Renewable varies across classes and models 
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revealing both homogeneity and heterogeneity of preferences for renewables both 
within and across classes among respondents with weak, moderate and strong 
NEP scores. For example, under LC_15, all candidate coefficients are 
insignificant at the .05 level in classes 1 and 3 irrespective of the NEP score level, 
revealing homogeneity within and across classes, whilst in class 2 the coefficients 
of Renewable and SNEP_Renewable are significant at the .05 level, revealing 
heterogeneity within the class. In LC_10 none of the candidate coefficients in 
class 2 are significant at the .05 level but instead SNEP_Renewable is significant 
in class 3, which represents a much smaller segment. This implies that the use of 
the 10-item scale instead of the 15-item scale would lead to the prediction of a 
significantly smaller market segment (9% versus 35%) in which only respondents 
with strong NEP scores have positive and significant taste intensities for green 
electricity. On the other hand, the use of the 5-item scale leads to the prediction of 
two market segments, classes 2 and 3, in which respondents with strong and 
moderate NEP scores respectively, have a positive preference for renewables. 
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Table 6-20: LC model results for supplier choice with dummy coded levels for NEP scores 
 LCM_15 LCM_10 LCM_5 
Attribute Class1 Class2 Class3 Class1 Class2 Class3 Class1 Class2 Class3 
ASCALT1 0.5170
c
 0.0956 3.2536
c
 0.4454
b
 0.1552 4.8890
c
 0.4513
b
 0.2471
a
 3.5267
c
 
Time -0.0385
b
 -0.0342
c
 -0.0419 -0.0442
c
 -0.0355
c
 -0.0902 -0.0411
b
 -0.0330
c
 -0.0715 
Fixed 0.0056 0.0104
b
 -0.0033 0.0112
b
 0.0038 -0.0079 0.0082 0.0102
b
 -0.0174 
Discount 0.0054 0.0158
c
 0.0516
c
 0.0055 0.0178
c
 -0.0183 0.0054 0.0165
c
 0.0487
b
 
Loyalty Rewards 0.2720
a
 0.3601
c
 0.4899 0.3210
b
 0.4458
c
 1.7674
b
 0.2976
b
 0.4249
c
 0.7215 
Renewable 0.0019 0.0079
b
 -0.0042 0.0037 0.0069
a
 0.0147 0.0078 0.0035 0.0024 
MNEP_Renewable 0.0074 0.0055 0.0230
a
 0.0103 0.0041 -0.0043 0.0002 0.0058 0.1462
c
 
SNEP_Renewable 0.0144
a
 0.0099
b
 -0.0002 0.0088 0.0082
a
 0.0460
b
 0.0064 0.0167
c
 -0.0016 
Ownership 0.0134
c
 0.0122
c
 0.0056 0.0140
c
 0.0104
c
 0.0603
c
 0.0135
c
 0.0106
c
 0.0206
b
 
New electricity company -0.0889 -0.1842 -0.4429 -0.0641 -0.2446 -1.2673 -0.0955 -0.1153 -0.2708 
New non-electricity company -0.3076 -0.8090
c
 -1.5438
a
 -0.2524 -0.8876
c
 -0.9128
a
 -0.3065 -0.7863
c
 -1.0780 
Well-known non-electricity company -0.0572 -0.3968
b
 -0.2898 -0.0864 -0.4486
c
 0.2016 -0.1064 -0.3243
a
 -0.0892 
Monthly Power Bill -0.0569
c
 -0.0138
c
 -0.0147
b
 -0.0560
c
 -0.0132
c
 -0.0244
b
 -0.0550
c
 -0.0125
c
 -0.0163
b
 
Estimated latent class probabilities 0.5382
c
     0.3471
c
    0.1148
c
 0.5476
c
 0.3635
c
 0.0889
c
 0.5558
c
 0.3392
c
 0.1050
c
 
Model Fit          
LL -1748.95 -1755.05 -1757.10 
Pseudo R-squared   0.4078 0.4057 0.4049 
AIC 3579.9 3592.1 3596.2  
BIC 3821.7 3833.9 3838.0 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05 and .1 level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses 
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WTP estimates are presented in Table 6-21. Based on LC_15, respondents in 
classes 1 and 3 are not willing to pay any significant amount for renewables, at 
least at the .05 level of confidence, whilst respondents in class 2 are willing to pay 
$5.70 (0.57x10) or $12.90 (1.29x10) per month to secure a 10% increase in 
renewables depending on the level of NEP score. In LC_10, only class 2 
respondents with strong NEP scores are willing to pay $11.40 (1.14x10) per 
month to secure a 10% increase in renewables whilst the rest are predicted to have 
zero WTP at the .05 level of significance. LC_5 is the only model producing two 
classes with statistically significant WTP estimates for renewables at the .05 level. 
However, the WTP estimate of $89.90 (8.99x10) per month for a 10% increase in 
renewables by respondents with moderate NEP scores in class 3 is rather high, but 
this only applies to a subgroup in a small market segment of less than 11% of the 
market. It is interesting to note that this subgroup belongs to a class that 
considered Renewable, Ownership, Discount and Monthly power bill in making 
their choices. This suggests that these respondents may have been expressing 
strong support for renewables by selecting alternatives offering higher levels for 
Renewable, and placed less weight on other non-price attributes or ignored them 
altogether. 
WTP estimates based on the MNL and RPL-EC models are presented in Table 
6A-7 in Appendix (6.4).  
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Table 6-21: WTP with Dummy coded levels for NEP score 
 LCM_15 LCM_10 LCM_5 
Attribute Class 1 Class2 Class 3 Class 1 Class2 Class 3 Class 1 Class2 Class 3 
Time -0.68
b 
(0.31) 
-2.47
c
 
(0.90) 
NS    -0.79
c
 
(0.29) 
-2.68
c
 
(0.85) 
NS -0.75
b
 
(0.31) 
-2.63
c
 
(0.96) 
NS 
Fixed NS 0.75
b
 
(0.35) 
NS     0.20
b
  
(0.10) 
NS NS NS 0.81
b
 
(0.38) 
NS 
Discount NS 1.14
c
 
(0.38) 
NS NS 1.35
c
 
(0.39) 
NS NS 1.31
c
 
(0.44) 
NS 
Loyalty Rewards 4.78
a
 
(2.68) 
26.05
c
 
(9.23) 
NS    5.74
b
  
 (2.47) 
33.68
c
 
(9.28) 
72.31
a
 
(38.48) 
5.41
b
 
(2.56) 
33.96
c
 
(10.45) 
NS 
 
 
Renewable 
(Weak NEP) NS 0.57
b
 
(0.27) 
NS NS 0.52
a
 
(0.31) 
NS NS NS NS 
(Moderate NEP) NS 
 
0.57
b
 
(0.27) 
NS NS 0.52
a
 
(0.31) 
NS NS NS 8.99
b
  
(3.72) 
(Strong NEP) 0.25
a
 
(0.14) 
1.29
c
 
(0.26) 
NS NS 1.14
c
 
(0.25) 
1.88
a
   
(1.02) 
NS 1.33
c
 
(0.49) 
NS 
Ownership 0.24
c
 
(0.05) 
0.89
c
 
(0.17) 
NS     0.25
c
 
(0.05) 
0.79
c
 
(0.16) 
2.47
c
 (0.76) 0.25
c
 
(0.05) 
0.84
c
 
(0.19) 
1.27
a
  
(0.68) 
New electricity company NS NS NS NS -18.48
a
 
(11.19) 
NS NS NS NS 
New non-electricity company NS -58.53
c
 
(15.27) 
NS NS -67.05
c
 
(15.77) 
NS NS -62.85
c
 
(17.71) 
NS 
Well-known non-electricity 
company 
NS -28.71
b
 
(13.39) 
NS NS -33.89
b
 
(13.24) 
NS NS -25.92
a
 
(14.87) 
NS 
          
Market segment size 53.82% 34.70% 11.48% 54.76% 36.35% 8.89% 55.58% 33.92% 10.50% 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05 and .1 level, respectively. NS denotes not statistically significant. Standard errors are in parentheses
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We compare WTP for green electricity across the three models using the 
asymptotically normal test statistic (ANTS)
21
 and present the results in Table 6-
22. There are no significant differences in WTP for green electricity for class 1 
across all models since none of the WTP estimates are significant at the .05 level. 
For class 2, LC_15 and LC_10 only produce WTP estimates that are not 
significantly different for weak and moderate NEP score levels when WTP 
estimates that are significant at the .1 level are considered for LC_10. The 
difference is also significant at the .1 level for the strong NEP score level. 
Significant differences are found between WTP estimates based on LC_15 and 
LC_5 at weak and moderate NEP score levels. For class 3, significant differences 
exist between WTP estimates based on LC_15 and LC_5 at moderate and strong 
NEP score levels, and also between LC_10 and LC_5 at moderate NEP scores. 
These results suggest that the choice of the version of the NEP Scale used in 
model estimation matters depending on the level of the NEP score at which WTP 
for green electricity is evaluated. However, the 10-item subscale is preferred to 
the 5-item scale based on the ANTS results, at least at the .1 level. 
Table 6-22: Test for equality of WTP for green electricity using ANTS
1
  
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
  Ratio
2 
| ANTS | Ratio | ANTS | Ratio | ANTS | 
 
Weak NEP score 
level 
LC_15 vs. LC_10 - NS 1.11 216 - NS 
LC_15 vs. LC_5 - NS - 2.16 - NS 
LC_10 vs. LC_5 - NS - 0.52 - NS 
 
Moderate NEP 
score level 
LC_15 vs. LC_10 - NS 1.11 2.16 - NS 
LC_15 vs. LC_5 - NS - 2.16 - -2.42 
LC_10 vs. LC_5 - NS - 1.69 - 2.42 
 
Strong NEP score 
level 
LC_15 vs. LC_10 - 1.80 1.13 1.94 - 1.85 
LC_15 vs. LC_5 - 1.80 0.97 0.11 - 2.74 
LC_10 vs. LC_5 -   NS 0.85 0.47 - 0.61 
1 
ANTS = 1.96 indicates statistically significant differences between each pair of WTP 
estimates. All bolded values are significant at the .1 level. 
2
This is the ratio of WTP 
estimates obtained from the two competing models. ‘–‘Dashes indicate that the ratio 
cannot be estimated as at least one of the estimates is equal to zero. NS denotes not 
statistically significant. 
                                                          
21
 The formula for the ANTS is presented in Chapter 2 as: 𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑆 =
(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
1−𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
2)
√(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
1)−𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘
2))
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A comparison of class probabilities for corresponding classes across the models 
indicates that LC_10 and LC_5 produce statistically different class probabilities 
for class 1 and that LC_15 and LC_10 also produce statistically different class 
probabilities for class 3, which further supports the assertion that the choice of the 
version of the NEP Scale matters as it affects the sizes of the market segments.    
Table 6-23: Comparison of estimated prior probabilities 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
 Ratio
2 
| ANTS |
1 
Ratio | ANTS | Ratio | ANTS | 
       
LC_15 vs. LC_10 0.98 -0.55 0.95 -0.93 1.29 2.45 
LC_15 vs. LC_5 0.97 -1.70 1.02 0.97 1.09 0.92 
LC_10 vs. LC_5 0.99 -40.51 1.07 1.54 0.85 -1.92 
1 
ANTS = 1.96 indicates statistically significant differences between each pair of WTP 
estimates. All bolded values are significant at the .1 level. 
2
This is the ratio of WTP 
estimates obtained from the two competing models.   
A summary of the marginal WTP for Renewable based on the MNL and RPL-EC 
models is presented in Table 6-24. The results show that respondents with weak 
NEP scores are not willing to pay any significant amount for power generated 
from renewable energy sources except under model RPL_15 where the estimated 
WTP is $1.80 per month for a 10% increase in Renewable. Based on RPL_15, 
respondents with weak and moderate NEP scores have the same WTP for 
Renewable. Estimates based on the other models indicate that respondents with 
moderate NEP scores are willing to pay amounts ranging from $2.60 to $4.10 for 
a 10% increase in Renewable depending on the model, while respondents with 
strong NEP scores have even higher WTP, ranging from $4.10 to $4.50 to secure 
the same increase in Renewable.  
In Table 6-25 we provide a comparison and tests for differences in WTP estimates 
obtained using the three versions of the NEP Scale. Although WTP estimates 
based on the MNL model are not statistically different across all the scales for 
respondents with weak NEP scores, estimates based on RPL_15 are significantly 
different from those obtained using RPL_10 and RPL_5 for this score level. For 
moderate NEP scores, models using shorter versions of the NEP scale produce 
higher WTP estimates as all ratios are less than 1; e.g., the 5- and 10-item scales 
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produce WTP estimates that are 1.58 and 1.19 times that of the full NEP Scale, 
respectively, based on the MNL model and 1.56 and 1.50 times based on the RPL 
model. However, the RPL model produces higher WTP estimates with longer 
scales for strong NEP scores. Tests for equality show significant statistical 
differences in WTP estimates with the 5-item scale in the MNL model compared 
to the longer scales. The MNL model produces higher WTP estimates at moderate 
and strong NEP scores with the 5-item scale compared to the longer scales, while 
the RPL model produces higher and lower WTP estimates with longer scales for 
strong and moderate NEP scores respectively. Specifically, MNL_15 and RPL_15 
produce significantly different WTP estimates at the .05 level than MNL_5 and 
RPL_5, respectively, for strong NEP scores.  
Table 6-24: WTP for a 1% increase in green electricity (NZ$(2014) /month)   
Environmental attitude 
group 
MNL_15 MNL_10 MNL_5 RPL_15 RPL_10 RPL_5 
Weak NS NS NS 0.18
b
 
(0.089)
 
NS NS 
Moderate 0.26
b
 
(0.118) 
0.31
b
 
(0.120) 
0.41
c
 
(0.118) 
0.18
b1
  
(0.089) 
0.27
b
 
(0.123) 
0.28
b
 
(0.124) 
Strong 0.41
c
 
(0.117) 
0.43
c
 
(0.119) 
0.45
c
 
(0.118) 
0.55
c
 
(0.109) 
0.45
c
 
(0.138) 
0.41
c
 
(0.132) 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05 and .1 level, respectively. 
 1
This increases to 0.38 (0.077) 
if the estimate of 0.20 significant at 10% is included. Standard errors are in parentheses 
Table 6-25: Comparison and test for equality of WTP estimates 
Comparison Environmental attitude group 
Weak NEP  Moderate NEP  Strong NEP  
Ratio | ANTS | Ratio | ANTS | Ratio | ANTS | 
MNL_15 vs. MNL_10 - NS 0.83 2.29 0.95 1.06 
MNL_15 vs. MNL_5 - NS 0.63 97.11 0.92 4.13 
MNL_10 vs. MNL_5 - NS 0.76 4.22 0.96 0.91 
RPL_15 vs. RPL_10 - 2.03 0.67 1.05 1.23 1.19 
RPL_15 vs. RPL_5 - 2.03 0.65 1.14 1.36 1.97 
RPL_10 vs. RPL_5 - NS 0.97 0.60 1.11 1.07 
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6.8 Chapter summary 
The main objective of this chapter was to estimate WTP for green electricity and 
explain preference heterogeneity using EA and constructs based on the NAT. We 
also assessed the implications of measuring EA using shorter versions of the NEP 
Scale on environmentally-related WTP.   
Three classes of environmental attitudes, weak, moderate and strong were 
identified for New Zealanders. The average EA scores for the three groups were 
43, 50, and 58 respectively; whilst the sample mean score was 52 (standard 
deviation = 8). Gender, age, income, ethnicity and education were found to be 
significant determinants of EA. These results provide insight into New 
Zealanders’ EA. A conclusion drawn from these results was that SDCs of 
respondents explain differences in EA. 
Based on the MNL and RPL-EC models using the full NEP Scale, EA was found 
to be a significant determinant of WTP for green electricity. Results from these 
models showed that respondents with strong EA are willing to pay more for green 
electricity compared to respondents with weak and moderate EA. The LC model 
identified three preference classes for the attributes of electricity services. 
Respondents in classes 1 and 2, accounting for 65% of the sampled population, 
were predicted to have a zero WTP for green electricity. For these respondents, 
EA scores are irrelevant as there is no relationship between EA and WTP. 
However, EA helps in explaining differences in WTP among respondents in class 
2. WTP for respondents with strong EA was estimated to be $12.90 per month for 
a 10% increase in green electricity compared to $5.70 for respondents with weak 
and moderate EA. These estimates represent, on average, between 3 and 7% of 
monthly power bills, which indicates a potential for green marketing in New 
Zealand. Furthermore, these estimates are within the range of premiums paid for 
green electricity reported in the literature.  
Results for the RPL-EC model indicated that both AC and AR play a systematic 
role in explaining heterogeneity of preferences for green electricity. The positive 
and significant heterogeneity in mean parameters for AC and AR indicate that 
respondents who are aware of the consequences of supporting renewables and feel 
responsible for supporting renewables have stronger preferences for green 
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electricity than those who are not. When evaluated at the sample mean scores for 
AC and AR, WTP for green electricity is estimated to be $3.20 per month for a 
10% increase in green electricity.  
Two short versions of the NEP Scale were constructed from the 15 statements 
constituting the revised NEP Scale. The construction of the short scales or 
subscales consisting of 5 and 10 statements was based on equal representation of 
the five facets of ecological worldview (Limits, Balance, Eco-crisis, Anti-
anthropocentrism, and Anti-exemptionalism), balance between pro- and anti-NEP 
statements, principal components analysis, and generally accepted levels of 
internal consistency of the scales, such as 0.3 for item-total correlations and α ≥ 
0.7 for Cronbach’s alpha. The subscales were first tested for accuracy in 
classifying respondents into groups with homogeneous environmental preferences 
before being applied to the demand for green electricity. The internal consistency 
of the NAT constructs was tested using correlations among the items. All the 
scales for the psychological constructs used in this chapter met the minimum 
internal consistency criteria recommended in the literature.  
The subscales were found to be less accurate in classifying respondents into 
groups with homogeneous environmental preferences. The 5-item NEP Scale had 
the least accuracy, and produced significantly higher average scores for the strong 
EA group and lower average scores for the weak and moderate environmental 
attitude groups compared to the longer scales. Although the 10-item NEP Scale 
produced significantly higher average scores for the moderate environmental 
group compared to the 15-item NEP Scale, no significant differences in the mean 
scores were found across the two scales for the weak and strong environmental 
groups. These findings suggest that the use of shorter versions of the NEP Scale 
compromises precision in the measurement of EA. However, where the use of a 
shorter version of the NEP Scale is unavoidable, the 10-item NEP Scale is 
recommended over the 5-item NEP Scale.  
A comparison of models estimated using different versions of the NEP Scale 
revealed significant differences, mainly between the 5-item scale and the longer 
scales, in terms of predicted class probabilities and WTP estimates. The model 
using the full NEP Scale also produced the best fit for the data. However, the 10-
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item NEP Scale tended to produce similar results as the full NEP Scale, except for 
strong EA. These findings demonstrate that the version of the NEP Scale used, 
particularly the 5-item NEP Scale, affects the estimates of marginal WTP for 
green electricity. As such the use of the 5-item scale should be avoided as its use 
may produce misleading results.    
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Chapter 7. Summary and conclusion 
 
This thesis has described and analysed consumer preferences for the various 
attributes of electricity services with a particular emphasis on non-price attributes. 
The findings improve our understanding of the demand for green electricity and 
consumer switching behaviour in retail electricity markets and offer valuable 
insights for policy and marketing decisions.   
A choice experiment was designed and used to generate the data for the MNL, 
RPL-EC and LC models that were used to analyse the choice data to provide 
answers to the research questions. These questions were addressed in chapters 4 to 
6 of this thesis, and the main findings and conclusions are summarized in this 
chapter. The first research question challenged the notion that consumers perceive 
all suppliers to be the same except for the price. This idea appears to have had a 
pervasive influence on the way switching is promoted, as price differences are the 
main focus of switching campaigns. Evidence from most jurisdictions indicates 
reluctance by most consumers to switch supplier despite the availability of price 
comparison websites, suggesting that other factors are at play.  The second and 
third research questions dealt with methodological issues concerning attribute 
non-attendance and hypothetical bias (HB), which have been shown, in the stated 
preference literature, to influence model fit and WTP estimates. The fourth 
research question investigated the potential for green marketing in NZ and the 
ways in which the use of shorter versions of the NEP Scale to measure 
environmental attitude may influence estimates of WTP for green electricity.  
Chapter 3 contributes to the debate on the competitiveness of retail electricity 
markets in NZ by providing evidence that, based on the benchmark of price 
conversion (see, Electricity Authority, 2010), some retail electricity markets in NZ 
are not competitive. For a selected number of markets, we showed that over the 
period 2012-2015, most new entrants were not the lowest-priced as expected 
under a competitive market model. Given that promoting retail competition was 
the main objective of the Electricity Authority’s “What’s My Number” consumer 
switching campaign over the period 2011-2014, our findings suggest that the 
success of the campaign was limited, at least in the markets covered by this 
analysis.  
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The importance of non-price attributes. In this thesis we have demonstrated that 
non-price attributes are important determinants of supplier choice; hence, 
consumers do not perceive suppliers to be the same except for price – Research 
Questions (RQ) 1 & 1a. We identified three distinct consumer types based on their 
preferences for the attributes of electricity services, and found that non-price 
attributes were important for all classes. Although respondents in class 3 (41%), 
described as “bargain hunters,” had the strongest preference for price, they also 
had: strong preferences for the status quo, fixed price guarantees and local 
ownership of supplier; and the strongest dislike for call waiting time. Therefore, 
they did not make their choices based on price alone. The other two preference 
classes exhibited less sensitivity to price and valued most non-price attributes, 
suggesting that their choices were also not based on price alone. 
WTP estimates showed considerable heterogeneity of preferences across the three 
preference groups. Respondents with higher sensitivities to power bill savings 
were predicted to have higher WTP for the non-price attributes both within and 
across preference groups. Overall, “bargain hunters” had the lowest WTP for non-
price attributes, while the “captive and loyal customers” had the highest. WTP 
estimates presented in Chapter 4 are reasonable and of the same order of 
magnitude as those obtained in other studies, which lends validity to the results.  
Determinants of WTP for non-price attributes. We found that estimates of WTP 
for most attributes were sensitive to age, income, and behavioural intention and 
that environmental attitude had a significant influence on WTP for Renewables. 
Overall, socio-demographic characteristics (SDCs) of respondents were found to 
be poor predictors of WTP for the non-price attributes (RQ 1b). 
Individual-specific WTP estimates from the LC model were regressed on SDCs 
and attitudes using OLS to identify the determinants of WTP. As expected, the 
model fit for this secondary regression was poor since the information on choices 
that was used to derive the WTP estimates was omitted from the regression.  
Preferences for power bill savings. We found that respondents had different bill 
savings thresholds at which they would switch supplier (RQ 1c). Tests for linear 
restrictions showed that the taste intensities of respondents with different bill 
savings thresholds were not represented by the same slope, indicating significant 
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differences in preferences. Respondents with lower bill savings thresholds were 
more likely to switch to a new supplier from another sector. For example, the 
minimum bill savings ($10.46/month) required to induce indifference among 
“bargain hunters” between staying with their incumbent traditional supplier and 
switching to a well-known company from another sector was within the range 
currently available in the market. The implication of these findings is that policies 
targeted at lowering the thresholds may be used to promote switching. 
Furthermore, 62% of respondents indicated that they would switch if they could 
save $100 per year, yet only 31% actually switched supplier when average bill 
savings of $150 per year were attainable. This suggests that convincing consumers 
that the advertised bill savings are real may increase switching rates in NZ. 
Attitudes towards switching and preference heterogeneity. Respondents who 
expressed positive behavioural intentions towards switching were predicted to be 
more likely to belong to the “discerning and mobile” preference group (class 2) or 
the “bargain hunters” group (class 1) compared to the “captive and loyal” 
customer group (class 3). These groups had distinct preferences for the attributes 
that behavioural intention helps to explain.  
WTP estimates obtained from stated choice experiments have been shown to be 
affected by attribute non-attendance (AN-A) and HB. The effects of these 
methodological issues on model fit and WTP estimates were specifically 
addressed in Question 2, which is discussed next.  
Attribute non-attendance. Based on both self-reported and inferred AN-A, we 
showed that respondents ignored subsets of attributes, and that attribute-
processing rules involving ignoring individual attributes were not supported by 
the choice data, except for Rewards, which had a 65% probability of being 
ignored individually (RQ 2a).  
Attributes which are normally not specified in standard electricity plans were the 
most ignored, e.g., call waiting time, loyalty rewards and supplier type. However, 
none of the attributes were exempt from AN-A, as only 12% of respondents 
claimed to have considered all the attributes, while inferred AN-A suggested that 
24% of the respondents made random choices. Thus we found evidence 
suggesting inconsistencies between self-reported and inferred AN-A, which casts 
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doubt on the reliability of self-reported AN-A. Similar inconsistencies have been 
noted in previous studies investigating AN-A in different contexts (e.g., Hess & 
Hensher, 2010). An important issue when using self-reported AN-A is whether or 
not respondents accurately report their attendance to the cost attribute, since its 
coefficient is included as the denominator in all computations of WTP.  
Only 15 respondents (7%) reported that they ignored the cost of the alternatives 
when making their choices. Compared to other studies that investigate AN-A, the 
proportion of respondents ignoring the cost attribute in this study was relatively 
small. We found inconsistencies between stated AN-A and the choices that these 
respondents made (RQ 2c). 
For example, the cheapest alternative was selected 72% of the time, suggesting 
that the cost of the alternatives may not have been ignored, and that some 
reporting errors may have been made. Furthermore, some respondents with low 
incomes reported having ignored the power bill, which would be unrealistic in real 
choice situations, given that the power bill in NZ constitutes a significant 
proportion of weekly income for these respondents. Ignoring self-reported AN-A 
for the power bill but preserving stated non-attendance to the other attributes 
resulted in improved model fit, expected signs of parameter estimates, and 
significant differences in class probabilities and WTP estimates. These results 
suggest that it is important to inspect stated AN-A for inconsistencies, particularly 
for the cost attribute, and ignore any claims that are found to be inconsistent with 
the choices.  A related question that we address next is whether respondents who 
claimed to have ignored an attribute had different preferences from those who 
considered it.   
Preferences of respondents who attend to or ignore attributes. We found that the 
preferences of respondents who attended to an attribute differed from those who 
ignored it, except for Discount and Fixed. We note that because these two 
attributes are included in standard electricity plans in NZ, respondents were more 
likely to have prior experience making trade-offs involving these attributes and 
therefore should have found it relatively easy to process this information. It is 
possible, therefore, that non-attendance could have been reported to signify that 
less effort was involved in processing information on the levels of these attributes 
(RQ 1d).  
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We reached the above finding by fitting MNL and RPL-EC models to the choice 
data and testing whether preferences differed between respondents who claimed to 
have ignored an attribute and those who attended to it. The systematic component 
of the indirect utility function was specified with an additional term for each 
candidate attribute to capture the marginal utility for respondents who claimed to 
have ignored it relative to respondents who considered the attribute.  
Although significant differences in preferences were found for the other attributes, 
none of the estimated parameters suggested zero taste intensities for the attributes 
that respondents claimed to have ignored. This questions the validity of the 
standard practice of restricting the parameters of attributes to zero for respondents 
who claim to have ignored the attributes. Our results suggest that respondents may 
have placed lower weights on the attributes reported as having been ignored, 
rather that completely ignoring them. These results are consistent with findings in 
previous studies (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2010; Gracia et al., 2012). Restricting the 
parameters of ignored attributes to zero produced significantly higher WTP 
estimates except for Discount and Fixed, which had significantly lower WTP 
estimates. The direction of the bias seems to depend on the nature of the attributes 
involved. The next question explored the effect of AN-A on WTP.   
The effects of attribute non-attendance on WTP. Failing to account for AN-A in 
the latent class model produced significantly lower estimates of WTP for some 
attributes, particularly in Class 2. The MNL and RPL-EC models produced 
similar results to the LC model except that WTP estimates for Discount and Fixed 
were significantly higher when AN-A was not accounted for in model estimation.  
Compared to the MNL and RPL-EC models, the LC model produced mixed 
results with significantly lower WTP for Fixed and lower but no significant 
difference for Discount in class 2. For significant WTP estimates, AN-A resulted 
in significantly higher estimates in class 1 and significantly lower estimates in 
class 2. The direction of the bias seems to depend on the preference class, 
suggesting that the LC model is able to capture the differential effect of AN-A 
across groups with heterogeneous preferences. Since respondents in class 1 only 
care about a few attributes and therefore put more weight on these attributes in 
making their choices, the bias is positive. On the other hand, respondents in class 
2 care about all the attributes and considered them in making their choices leading 
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to negative bias because assuming full attendance in model estimation includes 
choices of respondents with lower or zero WTP for the ignored attributes. 
Accounting for AN-A produced WTP estimates that were between 0.88 and 3.42 
times higher under the MNL model, and between 1.03 and 2.88 times higher 
under the RPL-EC model. The direction of the bias seemed to depend on the 
nature of the attributes. For Discount and Fixed the bias caused by AN-A was 
positive while for the rest of the attributes it was negative (RQ 2e). 
These findings were reached by estimating WTP using MNL, RPL-EC and LC 
models with and without accounting for AN-A. In the first instance original data 
was used, which assumed full attendance to all attributes. In the second, the 
standard practice of restricting parameters of ignored attributes to zero was 
employed and the estimates were tested for differences using the ANTS. 
Approaches to accounting for AN-A. The results presented in Chapter 5 show 
that the taste intensities of respondents who claimed to have ignored an attribute 
were significantly different to zero, indicating that the ‘ignored’ attributes 
influenced the choice probabilities. This finding does not support the standard 
practice of assumption zero weights for ‘ignored’ attributes, which implies that 
‘ignored’ attributes have no influence on choice probabilities. Assuming non-zero 
taste intensities for ‘ignored’ attributes in model estimation improves model fit. 
To the extent that these results may be generalised to other contexts, we 
recommend that researchers should avoid the standard practice of assuming zero 
weights for ‘ignored’ attributes, and estimate different parameters for these 
attributes.  
The effect of response uncertainty on WTP estimates. We found that respondents 
who were less certain about their choices tended to select more expensive 
alternatives, which induced an upwards bias in WTP. Respondents with certainty 
scores less than 6 are predicted to have WTP that is 1.26 to 1.53 times higher 
compared to respondents with higher scores. The results indicated that the 
responses of respondents with lower certainty scores were the likely source of 
hypothetical bias, as generally held in the literature. This justifies the standard 
practice of omitting responses for respondents with certainty scores below 7 or 8. 
At these cut-off points we obtained better model fit for our data. Our findings are 
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consistent with previous studies, suggesting that the certainty statements were 
properly applied in the analysis carried out for this thesis (RQ 3). 
This question was addressed using respondents’ responses to certainty statements. 
Instead of recoding or omitting responses of respondents reporting certainty 
scores below an arbitrary cut-off point, we avoided this criticism and the issue of 
how to recode these responses by estimating parameters for each level of 
certainty. Respondents with a certainty score less than 6 were grouped together 
and used as the reference point for the other levels.  
The last research question that was addressed in this thesis relates to consumer 
demand for green electricity and how differences in WTP among respondents can 
be explained.  
Willingness to pay for ‘green’ electricity. The 35% of New Zealanders in the 
“discerning and mobile class” were willing to pay, on average, $5.70 to $12.90 
per month to secure a 10% increase in electricity generated from renewable 
energy sources (based on latent class analysis). We argue that this indicates the 
potential for green marketing in New Zealand, which could be used as a 
mechanism for promoting consumer-driven renewable power development. Based 
on these results we assert that gentailers could attract and retain these consumers 
by providing information on the proportion of renewables in their fuel mix.  
The RPL-EC model produced WTP estimates that ranged from $1.80 to $5.50 per 
month for a 10% increase in green electricity, depending on environmental 
attitudes (EA) group. Based on the RPL-EC model results, aggregate WTP for a 
10% increase in electricity generated from renewable energy sources was 
estimated at $54.7 million per year. This was obtained by multiplying WTP for 
each EA group, weighted by predicted EA class probability, by the total number 
of residential power bill accounts to obtain an annual estimate (RQ 4a). 
Environmental attitudes and norm activation theory explain preference 
heterogeneity. Based on the sample NEP Scale scores, we showed that New 
Zealanders tend to express positive EA. Gender (male) and income had a negative 
influence on environmental attitudes, while age had a positive influence. Having 
dependent children and higher educational qualifications (at least a university 
degree) had no significant influence on EA.  
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New Zealanders can be classified into three EA groups – weak, moderate and 
strong, accounting for 10%, 61% and 29% of the sampled population, 
respectively. The average EA scores for these groups were 44, 50 and 58, where 
the possible scores ranged from 15 to 75. We also showed that the NAT 
constructs (awareness of the consequences [AC] and ascription of responsibility 
[AR]) played a systematic role in explaining heterogeneity of preferences for 
green electricity. Respondents with higher AC and AR had a higher WTP for 
green electricity. However, AR had a stronger influence on WTP than AC, which 
makes intuitive sense as consumers who feel morally obliged to support green 
electricity would be expected to express a higher WTP than respondents with 
higher AC and lower AR scores (RQ 4a). 
Use of shorter versions of the NEP Scales influences WTP estimates. When 
shorter versions of the NEP Scale were used to measure EA, estimates of WTP for 
green electricity were sensitive to the version of the scale (RQ 4b). Significant 
differences in WTP estimates and class probabilities were obtained when EAs 
measured using shorter versions of the NEP Scale were used in model estimation. 
The 5-item NEP Scale generally produced WTP estimates that were consistently 
significantly different from those obtained with longer versions of the NEP Scale. 
The 10-item NEP Scale produced WTP estimates that were statistically different 
from those obtained with the full NEP Scale less often compared to the 5-item 
NEP Scale. Based on our findings we recommend that researchers use the full 
NEP Scale to measure EA. However, where shorter versions cannot be avoided, 
we recommend the use of the 10-item NEP Scale. 
Use of information criteria in determining the number of preference classes. Of 
the six information criteria (IC) used to determine the number of classes in the LC 
models estimated in this thesis, AIC, and crAIC consistently indicated more 
preference classes compared to the other IC. Specifically, we find that CAIC and 
BIC consistently identify the smallest number of preference classes, while AIC3 
and HQC mostly identify an intermediate number of classes. These findings are 
consistent with the literature investigating the performance of IC (e.g., Andrews & 
Currim, 2003a; Lin & Dayton, 1997; Yang & Yang, 2007).     
Promoting switching and future research. Given the results summarized in this 
chapter, we conclude that New Zealanders do value the non-price attributes of 
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electricity services. Our findings on the importance of these attributes can be used 
to increase switching rates, the uptake of ‘green electricity’ and potentially the 
level of competition in the retail electricity sector. Future areas of research may be 
extended to include CEs involving real choices, where respondents are presented 
with real supplier choice situations and asked to complete a switch if a competitor 
is preferred to the incumbent retailer. The results from such research would 
provide external validity for the results presented in this thesis. On the question of 
green marketing, a future area of research worth pursuing would be the estimation 
of WTP for electricity generated from specific energy sources. This would 
provide more accurate measures of consumer support for specific renewables than 
for the generic Renewable estimated in this thesis.  
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Appendix 1. Final survey questionnaire  
Q1. What do you consider when choosing your electricity supplier?   
Purpose  
The purpose of this survey is to collect information on what people consider when 
choosing their electricity supplier. This kind of information is important and your 
participation will assist in developing policies that reflect electricity consumers’ 
preferences, and also help electricity suppliers in providing services that meet consumers’ 
needs.    
The Waikato Management School Ethics Committee has approved this study.   
What are we asking you to do?  
We ask that you agree to answer some questions about electricity retailers and the 
services they provide. There are also a few general questions about you - this will help us 
in relating your answers to questions on electricity retailers to your characteristics. We 
expect that the survey will take 15-20 minutes.   
Who is the researcher?  
Tom Ndebele, a PhD student in the Department of Economics at the University of 
Waikato. My chief supervisor is Dr. Dan Marsh.   
Researcher’s contact details  
Phone 07 8431132  
Cell 0211810693  
Email tn73@waikato.ac.nz   
Chief supervisor’s contact details  
Dr. Dan Marsh  
Phone 07 8384950  
Email dmarsh@waikato.ac.nz   
What will happen to the data?  
The information that you provide will be combined with that provided by others for the 
purposes of analysis. The information you provide will be treated confidentially and will 
only be accessible to the researcher and supervisors. Your name will not appear with the 
information that we are collecting ensuring anonymity. What are your rights as 
participants? Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to take part, you 
have the right to refuse to answer any particular question; to stop filling in this survey at 
any time; to ask any further questions about the study that occur to you during your 
participation and be given access to a summary of the findings of this study when it is 
complete.   
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Your Consent 
 Yes  No  
Do you agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out above?     
Are you at least 18 years old?     
Q2. Are you responsible for paying the electricity bill or do you have a say in 
choosing which supplier your household buys electricity from? 
 YES  
 NO 
Q3. What is your gender? 
 Male  
 Female  
Q4. Which age group do you belong to? 
 19 and Under  
 20-24   
 25-29   
 30-34   
 35-39  
 40-44  
 45-49  
 50-54  
 55-59  
 60-64  
 65+   
Q5. Which of the following categories best describes your personal annual income 
before tax? 
 Zero - $15 000 
 $15 001 - $30 000  
 $30 001 - $40 000  
 $40 001 - $50 000  
 $50 001 - $70 000  
 $70 001 - $100 000  
 $100 000 and above  
 I prefer not to answer this question  
Q6. Which ethnic group do you most closely identify with? 
 NZ European  
 Maori 
 Asian  
 Pacific Island  
 Other  
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Q7. Where do you live? 
 Auckland    
 Bay of Plenty  
 Canterbury  
 Gisborne/Poverty Bay  
 Hawke's Bay  
 Manawatu-Wanganui  
 Marlborough  
 Nelson  
 Northland  
 Otago  
 Southland  
 Taranaki  
 Waikato  
 Wellington  
 West Coast  
Q8. Approximately how long have you lived at your current address? 
 Less than 6 months  
 1 year  
 2 year  
 3 years  
 4 years and over  
Q9. What best describes your living situation? 
 Own  
 Rent  
Q10. How many people usually live with you? 
 0  1 2  3  4 5  6  7  8  9 10 or more  
Children under the age of 18                        
Adults 18 years and over                        
 
Q11. Apart from secondary school qualifications, do you have another completed 
qualification? 
 Yes  
 No 
Answered if Yes is selected in Q11 
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Q12. What is your highest qualification? (Don't include qualifications that take less 
than 3 months of full-time study to get) 
 Vocational/Trades  
 Diploma or Certificate  
 Bachelors 
 Honours Degree/PG Certificate 
 Masters or PhD  
Q13. What is the name of the company (electricity supplier) that you pay your 
monthly electricity bills to? 
 Auckland Gas Company  
 Bay of Plenty Energy  
 Bosco Connect  
 Contact Energy  
 Empower   
 Energy Direct NZ   
 Energy Online    
 Genesis Energy  
 Just Energy    
 King Country Energy    
 Mercury Energy    
 Meridian Energy    
 Nova Energy    
 Opunake Hydro    
 Payless Energy  
 Powershop    
 Pulse Energy    
 Tiny Mighty Power   
 TrustPower   
 Not sure/Other 
Q14. What were your reasons for choosing this company? Please select all relevant 
reasons from the list below. 
 Approached by supplier  
 Recommended by friends or family  
 Well-known power company  
 Offered a better package of price and service  
 Responded to an advertisement or visited a price comparison website  
 Power company was already supplying power to the premises  
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
Q15. Have you switched electricity supplier in the past 24 months? 
 Yes  
 No  
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Answered if Yes is selected in Q15 
Q16. How many times have you switched supplier in the past 24 months? 
 1 (once)  
 2 (Twice)  
 3 (Thrice) 
 4 or more times  
 Not sure  
Answered if No is selected in Q16 
Q17. Please indicate which of the following reasons for not switching in the past 24 
months apply to you. 
 Applies  Does not Apply 
1. Happy with price of current retail supplier plus current 
supplier will match any deals 
    
2. Happy with service from current retail supplier      
3. Did not trust there would be real gains from switching      
4. Too busy to investigate the best deals available     
5. Switching seemed too much hassle      
6. Was already locked into a contract      
 
Q18. Would you have switched supplier in the past 24 months if it could have saved 
you $100 per year on your power bills? 
 Yes  
 No  
If Yes is selected, then skipped to Q22 
Q19. Now suppose you could have saved $200 per year, would you have switched 
supplier in the past 24 months? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (0) 
If Yes is selected, then skipped Q22 
Q20. How about a saving of $300 per year, would you have switched supplier in the 
past 24 months? 
 Yes  
 No  
If Yes is selected, then skipped to Q22 
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Q21. What about saving $400 per year, could this have been enough to make you 
switched supplier in the past 24 months? If not please state the minimum amount of 
savings per year that would have been enough to persuade you to switch. 
 Yes  
 No ____________________ 
Q22. How often do you look for opportunities to switch supplier? 
 Never  
 Once a month  
 Once every six months  
 Once a year  
 Once every two years or more  
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Q23. Below is a list of reasons often given for switching electricity supplier. Please rate how important each reason would be for you if 
you were to consider switching supplier. 
Reasons for switching supplier  Not at all 
important 
Not really 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Quite 
important  
Very 
important 
A financial incentive from other electricity suppliers            
High electricity bills            
Poor customer service            
To have a gas and electricity account with the same company            
Fixed power rates offered by other electricity suppliers            
To have other services e.g. broadband services with the same electricity supplier            
Prompt payment and/or on-line payment discounts offered by other electricity 
suppliers 
          
Prefer to buy from a retailer producing electricity from sustainable sources            
Electricity supplier is 100% NZ owned            
 
 
Q24. Please indicate how satisfied you are with your current electricity supplier in terms of the following: 
 Very 
Satisfied  
Quite 
Satisfied  
Somewhat 
Satisfied  
Neither Satisfied 
nor Dissatisfied  
Somewhat 
Dissatisfied  
Quite 
Dissatisfied  
Very Dissatisfied 
General overall service               
Value for money                
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Q25. Now we are interested in your beliefs and attitude towards switching electricity 
supplier. The questions that follow make use of rating scales and you are to click on 
the option that best describes your opinion. Some of the questions or statements may 
appear to be similar, but they address somewhat different issues or test for 
consistency in your responses. Please read each question carefully. 
Q26. How likely or unlikely is it that you will switch to a supplier offering a better 
package of price and services in the next 12 months? 
 Extremely Likely  
 Quite Likely  
 Slightly Likely  
 Neither Likely nor Unlikely 
 Slightly Unlikely  
 Quite Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
Q27. For me switching to a supplier offering a better package of price and services 
would be 
 Extremely Good  
 Quite Good  
 Slightly Good  
 Neither Good nor Bad  
 Slightly Bad  
 Quite Bad  
 Extremely Bad  
Q28. How likely is it that most people who are important to you think that you 
should switch to a supplier offering a better package of price and services? 
 Extremely Likely  
 Quite Likely  
 Slightly Likely 
 Neither Likely nor Unlikely  
 Slightly Unlikely  
 Quite Unlikely  
 Extremely Unlikely  
Q29. For me switching to a supplier offering a better package of price and services 
would be 
 Extremely Rewarding  
 Quite Rewarding  
 Slightly Rewarding  
 Neither Rewarding nor Punishing 
 Slightly Punishing  
 Quite Punishing  
 Extremely Punishing  
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Q30. How likely or unlikely is it that most people who are important to you would 
approve if you switch to a supplier offering a better package of price and services? 
 Extremely Likely  
 Quite Likely  
 Somewhat Likely  
 Neither Likely nor Unlikely 
 Somewhat Unlikely  
 Quite Unlikely  
 Extremely Unlikely  
Q31. I intend to switch to a supplier offering a better package of price and services 
in the next 12 months. 
 Strongly Agree  
 Quite Agree  
 Slightly Agree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Slightly Disagree  
 Quite Disagree  
 Strongly Disagree  
Q32. I believe that I can switch to a supplier offering a better package of price and 
services if I want 
 Strongly Agree  
 Quite Agree 
 Slightly Agree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Slightly Disagree 
 Quite Disagree  
 Strongly Disagree 
Q33. For me switching to a supplier offering a better package of price and services 
would be 
 Extremely Easy  
 Quite Easy  
 Somewhat Easy  
 Neither Easy nor Difficult  
 Somewhat Difficult  
 Quite Difficult  
 Extremely Difficult  
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Q34. How far do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree 
I feel morally obliged to switch to a supplier that generates most of its power from renewable sources.            
I believe that switching to a supplier that produces electricity from renewable sources would be good for 
the environment.  
          
I feel personally responsible for helping to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by switching to a supplier 
that generates electricity from clean energy sources.  
          
My switching to a supplier that generates electricity from renewable sources will not make a difference 
to the environment.  
          
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Q35. Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the environment. For each statement please indicate how far you agree or 
disagree with it 
 Strongly 
agree 
Mildly 
Agree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Mildly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support.            
2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs.            
3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.           
4. Human ingenuity will ensure that we do not make the earth unlivable.            
5. Humans are severely abusing the environment            
6. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them.            
7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.            
8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.           
9. Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature.           
10. The so-called ‘ecological crisis’ facing human kind has been greatly exaggerated.           
11. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.            
12. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature.           
13. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.            
14. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.            
15. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe.            
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Q36. What do you consider in choosing your electricity supplier?   
In this section of the survey you will be presented with 12 scenarios in which three 
hypothetical electricity suppliers are described in terms of a number of ASPECTS which 
include their characteristics and what they offer. These ASPECTS are described in detail 
in the table below. We are using these scenarios to understand how people would choose 
their electricity supplier under different conditions where information on competing 
suppliers is available.  
You are probably aware that the government is promoting competition among electricity 
suppliers by encouraging consumers to shop around for better deals. Electricity suppliers 
compete for customers in a number of ways. For example, by offering discounts on bills 
paid on time or on-line, fixed price guarantees, improved customer service, loyalty 
rewards, and promoting themselves as New Zealand owned or supplying electricity 
generated from renewable sources.  
In each scenario we would like you to compare ‘Supplier A’ and ‘Supplier B’ with the 
supplier indicated as ‘Your Current Supplier’. We would like you to imagine that the 
supplier indicated as ‘Your Current Supplier’ is your current supplier. In all the scenarios 
the characteristics and services offered by ‘Your Current Supplier’ remain the same 
whilst those of ‘Supplier A’ and ‘Supplier B’ change. What we want to know is: If the 
conditions described in each scenario were to occur would you switch from ‘Your 
Current Supplier’ to either ‘Supplier A’ or ‘Supplier B’. 
Please read the following information carefully. You will need it to understand the 
scenarios that will be presented to you.         
ASPECT   DESCRIPTION 
Call waiting time This is the average time it takes for telephone calls to be 
answered by a customer service representative. 
Fixed rate guarantee This is the length of time over which fixed electricity 
prices are guaranteed. The customer is locked in a 
contract over this period and breaking it incurs 
termination fees.        
Prompt payment discount This refers to the discount that customers get for paying 
their electricity bills on time including on-line prompt 
payments. The discount does NOT apply if the bills are 
paid after the due date.        
Loyalty rewards Refers to Fly Buys, Brownie points, annual prize draws, 
and annual account credits (excludes annual network 
dividends)        
Electricity supplied from 
renewable sources 
This is the proportion of electricity generated from 
wind, hydro, geothermal, bioenergy and solar.        
Supplier type Indicates the type of supplier in terms of whether they 
are well-know or new and whether they are an 
electricity company or not.        
NZ Ownership Indicates the percentage local (NZ) ownership of 
supplier        
Monthly electricity bill This is the average monthly electricity bill you would 
pay under each supplier before any discounts. The net 
amount after discount is indicated in brackets    
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Before we present you with the scenarios, we would like to find out how you rate your 
ACTUAL current electricity supplier in terms of the above aspects. The next few 
questions will take you through this process. 
Q36. This is a timing question not visible to participants. This is used to monitor how 
much time respondents spend reading the instructions 
First Click  
Last Click  
Page Submit 
Click Count  
Q37. Approximately how much was your most recent monthly power bill (before 
discount if any)? Select an amount that closely matches your power bill or select the 
last option and state the amount. 
 $100  
 $200  
 $300  
 $400  
 Other (specify)  ____________________ 
Q38 For your current supplier please approximate 
 25%  50% 75%  100% Not 
sure 
How much of the electricity it supplies is generated 
from renewable sources 
          
Its local ownership (what percentage is owned by 
Kiwis)  
          
 
Answered if in the previous question respondent indicated that they were not sure about 
how much electricity their supplier generates from renewable sources.  
Q39. In the previous question you indicated that you are not sure about how much 
electricity your supplier generates from renewable sources. We are now interested 
in your best guess 
 25%  50%  75%  100% 
How much of the electricity it supplies is generated from 
renewable sources  
        
 
Answered if in the previous question respondent indicated that they were not sure about 
the ownership of their supplier 
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Q40. In the previous question you indicated that you are not sure about your 
supplier’s local ownership. We are now interested in your best guess 
 25%  50% 75%  100% 
Its local ownership (what percentage is owned by Kiwis) (1)         
 
Q41. Does your supplier offer loyalty rewards such as Fly Buys, Brownie points, 
annual prize draws, annual account credits, etc? 
 Yes 
 No 
Q42. From the list below select the discount rate that closely matches the one offered 
by your supplier 
 No discount  
 10%  
 15%  
 20%  
 Other (specify)  ____________________ 
Q43. You would describe your supplier as a: 
 New electricity company 
 New non-electricity company  
 Well-known non-electricity company 
 Well-known electricity company  
Q44. Which fixed rate plan are you on? 
 Not on fixed rate plan 
 12 months fixed rate plan  
 24 months fixed rate plan  
 36 months fixed rate plan  
 Other (specify)  ____________________ 
Q45. Thinking of occasions when you called your supplier, on average how long 
would you say you were made to wait in a phone queue before you were attended to 
by a customer service representative? 
 5 minutes  
 10 minutes 
 15 minutes  
 20 minutes 
 Other (specify) ____________________ 
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Q46. AN EXAMPLE OF A COMPLETED QUESTION  
We provide an example of how to answer the questions under the scenarios that will 
be presented to you.             
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time 15 minutes 15 minutes 0 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 24 months 0 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 20% 20% 
Loyalty rewards no yes no 
Electricity supplied from renewable 
sources 
50% 50% 100% 
NZ ownership 50% 100% 75% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
Monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$300    ($240 
after discount) 
$300    ($240 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer? ○ ○ ● 
 
In this example the consumer switches from his/her current supplier to Supplier B even if 
it is more expensive. Possible reasons could be that they put more value on local 
ownership, electricity generation from renewable sources, higher discount, and less call 
waiting time which Supplier B offers. Although the monthly bill is the same under 
Supplier A and Supplier B, the customer prefers Supplier B because they think it’s too 
risky to deal with a new company and they are prepared to forgo the fixed price 
guarantee, loyalty rewards, and higher local ownership offered by Supplier A. 
Q46.This is a timing question to show how much time respondents spent on the example 
of a completed choice task 
First Click  
Last Click  
Page Submit  
Click Count  
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Q47. In the scenarios that follow please only consider the information provided in 
deciding whether to switch supplier or not. Assume that any information not 
provided is the same for the three suppliers.    
SCENARIO 1 of 12   
Please indicate below which supplier you would prefer?               
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time 5 minutes 0 minutes 15 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 0 months 36 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 10% 30% 
Loyalty rewards Yes Yes No 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 50% 75% 
NZ ownership 50% 25% 100% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill  $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$150    ($135 
after discount) 
$200 ($160 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you choose?       
 
Q48. SCENARIO 2 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer               
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time 5 minutes 0 minutes 15minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee         0 months 12 months 24 months 
Prompt payment discount  10% 30% 0% 
Loyalty rewards  Yes No Yes 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 25% 100% 
NZ ownership 50% 100% 25% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company 
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$250    ($175 
after discount) 
$150    ($150 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you choose?        
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Q49. SCENARIO 3 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                  
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier  
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time   5 minutes   0 minutes   15 minutes               
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months  36 months 0 months               
Prompt payment discount 10%  20% 0%               
Loyalty rewards Yes  No  Yes               
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50%  75%  75%               
NZ ownership 50%  25% 100%              
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company           
Average monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$200    ($160 
after discount) 
$200    ($200 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer?        
 
Q50. SCENARIO 4 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                   
 Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B 
Call waiting time 5 minutes 5 minutes 10 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 24 months 12 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 0% 20% 
Loyalty rewards Yes Yes No 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 75% 25% 
NZ ownership 50% 50% 25% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250 ($225 
after discount) 
$250    ($250 
after discount) 
$250    ($200 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer?        
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Q51. SCENARIO 5 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer 
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier  
Supplier A Supplier B  
Call waiting time 5 minutes 5 minutes 5 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 36 months 0 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 30% 20% 
Loyalty rewards Yes Yes No 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 100% 25% 
NZ ownership 50% 100% 50% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$300    ($210 
after discount) 
$150    ($120 
after discount)    
Which supplier would you prefer?       
 
Q52. SCENARIO 6 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer  
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A Supplier B  
Call waiting time 5 minutes  15 minutes  0 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 24 months 12 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 0% 30%  
Loyalty rewards Yes No Yes 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 50% 100% 
NZ ownership 50% 75% 50% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$200    ($200 
after discount) 
$200    ($140 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer?        
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Q53. SCENARIO 7 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                   
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A  Supplier B  
Call waiting time 5 minutes 10 minutes 10 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 12 months 24 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 10% 10% 
Loyalty rewards Yes Yes No 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50%  75% 50% 
NZ ownership 50% 50% 50% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$300    ($270 
after discount) 
$300    ($270 
after discount)  
Which supplier would you prefer?        
 
Q54. SCENARIO 8 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                   
 ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A  Supplier B  
Call waiting time 5 minutes 10 minutes 5 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 24 months 12 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 10%  10% 
Loyalty rewards Yes No  Yes 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50%  50%  50% 
NZ ownership 50% 50% 25% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$300    ($270 
after discount) 
$300    ($270 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer?        
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Q55. SCENARIO 9 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                   
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A  Supplier B  
Call waiting time 5 minutes 5 minute 10 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 0 months 36 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 0% 30% 
Loyalty rewards Yes No Yes 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 100% 50% 
NZ ownership 50% 100% 75%  
Supplier type  Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill  $250  ($225 
after discount) 
$200  ($200 
after discount)  
$250   ($175 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer?        
 
Q56. SCENARIO 10 of 12  
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                   
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A  Supplier B  
Call waiting time 5 minutes 10 minutes 5 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months  36 months 0 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 20% 20%  
Loyalty rewards Yes Yes No 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 25% 100% 
NZ ownership 50% 75% 75% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$150  ($120 
after discount) 
$300 ($240 
after discount)  
Which supplier would you prefer?       
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Q57. SCENARIO 11 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                   
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier 
Supplier A  Supplier B  
Call waiting time 5 minutes 15 minutes  0 minutes 
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 12 months 24 months 
Prompt payment discount  10% 20% 10% 
Loyalty rewards Yes No Yes 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50% 100% 25% 
NZ ownership 50% 25% 100% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company 
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill  $250    ($225 
after discount) 
$150    ($120 
after discount) 
$250    (225 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer?        
 
Q58. SCENARIO 12 of 12   
Indicate below which supplier you would prefer                   
ASPECT Your Current 
Supplier  
Supplier A  Supplier B 
Call waiting time 5 minutes 15 minutes 0 minutes  
Fixed rate guarantee 0 months 0 months 36 months 
Prompt payment discount 10% 30% 0% 
Loyalty rewards Yes Yes No 
Electricity supplied from RENEWABLE 
sources 
50%  25% 75% 
NZ ownership 50% 75% 75% 
Supplier type Well-known 
electricity 
company 
Well-known 
electricity 
company 
New electricity 
company 
Average monthly electricity bill $250   ($225 
after discount) 
$250   ($175 
after discount) 
$150   ($150 
after discount) 
Which supplier would you prefer?        
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Q59. Please indicate which of the following you IGNORED, if any, in choosing your 
preferred electricity supplier in Scenarios 1 to 12. 
 Call waiting time  
 Fixed rate guarantee  
 Prompt payment discount  
 Loyalty rewards  
 Electricity supplied from renewable sources 
 100% NZ owned  
 Supplier type  
 Monthly electricity bill  
 NONE  
Q60. On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 is very unsure and 10 means very sure, please 
indicate how sure you are that you would have made the same choices you made in 
SCENARIOS 1 to 12 if you were faced with the same choice situations in real life. 
 Very Unsure 0 
 1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 Neither Sure nor Unsure 5  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 Very Sure 10 
 
Q61. Please rate your understanding of the SCENARIOS 1 to 12 and the tasks you 
were asked to do. 
 Did not understand at all 0  
 1  
 2 
 3  
 4  
 Fair 5 
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 Understood completely 10  
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Q62. How easy was it to make your choices in SCENARIOS 1 to 12? 
 Very Difficult  
 Difficult  
 Somewhat Difficult  
 Neutral  
 Somewhat Easy  
 Easy  
 Very Easy   
Q63. Any comments 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Q64. Thank you very much for participating in this survey. If you would like to get a 
summary of the results please type your e-mail address in the space provided. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 2. Pilot survey results 
2.1. Analysis of responses to the NEP Scale statements  
Table A2-1 summarises the responses to the 15 items of the NEP Scale obtained 
from the pilot survey. The percentage distribution of responses to the NEP Scale 
items indicated that respondents tend to have pro-NEP attitude with respect to 
most items. For example, 73.3% of respondents “mildly or strongly agree” with 
the statement that “when humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous 
consequences”, whilst only 14.1% agree with the statement that “the balance of 
nature is strong enough to cope with the impact of modern industrial nations.” The 
general pattern of the distribution of responses to the NEP Scale items reported in 
Table A2-1 is similar to that found in other studies using the NEP Scale (e.g., 
Aldrich et al., 2007; Dunlap et al., 2000; Ek & Soderholm, 2008). The response 
categories were coded as follows: SD = 1, MD = 2, NAND = 3, MA = 4 and SA = 
5, giving a range for a possible score for each item of 1 to 5. An individual’s NEP 
Scale score is the sum of the scores of all NEP Scale items and ranges from 15 to 
75. The sample minimum and maximum scores were 26 and 72 respectively. The 
mean score was 53.72 with a standard deviation of 9.8. Before we combined the 
responses to the 15 items of the NEP Scale into a single measure of environmental 
attitude, the existence of a high degree of internal consistency among the items 
was examined. 
Internal consistency of the NEP constructs was tested, based on practice in 
previous studies, using the corrected item-total correlation (ri-t), Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha (α), and principal components analysis (PCA) (e.g., Clark et al., 
2003; Dunlap et al., 2000; Kotchen & Reiling, 2000). Internal consistency 
describes the extent to which all the 15 items of the NEP Scale measure the same 
concept or construct. The corrected item-total correlation is the correlation 
coefficient between each item’s score and the sum of the scores of the other 14 
items. A good candidate for inclusion in the final index should correlate well with 
the item-total score. Although there is no rule on the acceptable level of ri-t 
literature suggests that a minimum value of 0.3 is acceptable. Cronbach’s alpha is 
a coefficient of reliability used to test whether items are sufficiently inter-related 
to justify their combination in an index. Previous literature suggests that α ≥ 0.70 
can be taken to indicate “acceptable” reliability (e.g., Clark et al., 2003). 
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Reasonably strong corrected item-total correlations ranging from 0.26 to 0.76 and 
a high Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 0.87 indicated a high degree of internal 
consistency for the NEP Scale. However, the item-total correlation of 0.26 for 
NEP6 is insignificant at the 5% level indicating that this item correlated poorly 
with other items. Removing this item from the scale resulted in a slight 
improvement in Cronbach’s alpha from 0.87 to 0.876 suggesting that its inclusion 
did not severely reduce the internal consistency of the scale. These results 
compare favourably with those of Dunlap et al. (2000) with an item-total 
correlations range of 0.33 to 62 and an alpha of 0.83. Table A2-2 presents a 
comparison of these results with those of previous studies. 
Table A2-1: Summary statistics, percentage distributions, corrected item-total 
correlations and factor loadings for the NEP Scale items (N = 70) 
 Mean Std.dev. SA  MA  NAND MD  SD  ri-t Factor loading
* 
F1 F2 
NEP1 2.5 1.3 23.9 33.8 18.3 15.5 8.5 0.54 0.62 -0.13 
NEP2 2.7 1.2 4.2 28.2 21.1 23.9 22.5 0.53 0.59 0.37 
NEP3 1.9 1.0 43.7 29.6 19.7 5.6 1.4 0.45 0.55 -0.17 
NEP4 2.8 1.2 7.0 22.5 28.2 23.9 18.3 0.41 0.46 0.69 
NEP5 2.2 1.2 36.6 29.6 16.9 9.9 7.0 0.40 0.51 -0.47 
NEP6 3.6 1.2 23.9 39.4 16.9 14.1 5.6 0.22 0.26 0.43 
NEP7 1.9 1.1 49.3 23.9 16.9 7.0 2.8 0.58 0.69 -0.17 
NEP8 2.3 1.1 2.8 11.3 29.6 29.6 26.8 0.75 0.81 0.15 
NEP9 1.8 0.8 45.1 32.4 22.5 0.0 0.0 0.39 0.48 -0.12 
NEP10 2.8 1.3 9.9 21.1 28.2 21.1 19.7 0.55 0.62 0.12 
NEP11 2.5 1.0 14.1 38.0 31.0 14.1 2.8 0.52 0.61 -0.36 
NEP12 2.3 1.3 7.0 12.7 22.5 23.9 33.8 0.61 0.68 0.12 
NEP13 2.0 0.9 32.4 42.3 22.5 1.4 1.4 0.76 0.84 -0.25 
NEP14 2.6 1.1 4.2 15.5 38.0 19.7 22.5 0.48 0.52 0.57 
NEP15 2.4 1.0 16.9 40.8 26.8 11.3 4.2 0.55 0.65 -0.31 
Eigenvalue  5.559  
Variability (%)  37.06  
Cronbach’s alpha            0.87        
*Unrotated factors. SA, MA, NAND, MD, SD and ri-t denote strongly agree, mildly 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, mildly disagree, strongly disagree, and item-total 
correlation, respectively 
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Table A2-2: Comparison of corrected ri-t and Cronbach’s alpha from previous studies 
Study ri-t (range) Cronbach’s alpha (α) 
Kotchen and Reiling (2000) 0.38 to 0.71 0.83 
Dunlap et al. (2000) 0.33 to 0.61 0.83 
Ek and Soderholm (2008) 0.12 to 0.55 0.79 
Cooper et al. (2004) 0.34 to 0.55 0.72 
Clark et al. (2003) 0.32 to 0.59 0.80 
Current Study 0.26 to 0.76 0.87 
 
Results of PCA presented in Table A2-3 showed that all but one items of the NEP 
Scale loaded heavily (from 0.46 to 0.84) on the first unrotated factor with 11 of 
the items loading heaviest on this factor. The first unrotated factor had an 
eigenvalue of 5.559 and explained 37.1% of the total variance among the items 
compared to the second factor extracted which had an eigenvalue of 1.777 and 
only explained 11.9% of the variance among the items. The pattern of eigenvalues 
(5.559, 1.777, 1.568, and 1.015), the relatively high item-total correlations for 14 
items, and an alpha equal to 0.87 indicated a high degree of internal consistency 
for the scale. 
The dimensionality of the NEP Scale was investigated by employing Varimax 
rotation to create orthogonal dimensions. The three limits-to-growth items (1, 6, 
11) and item 12 (anti-anthropocentrism) loaded heaviest on the first rotated factor 
(or dimension D1) with two balance-of-nature items (8, 13) having strong cross-
loadings on this dimension. All three ecocrisis items (5, 10, 15) and two balance 
of nature items (8, 13) loaded heaviest on the fourth rotated factor (D4). Two anti-
exemptionalism items (4, 14) and item 2 (anti-anthropocentrism) loaded heaviest 
on the second factor (D2). Item 3 (balance-of-nature), item 7 (anti-
anthropocentrism) and item 9 (anti-exemptionalism) loaded heaviest on the third 
dimension (D3). D1, D2 and D4 mainly captured limits-to-growth, anti-
exemptionalism and ecocrisis/balance-of-nature facets respectively whilst D3 
mainly captured a mix of facets. These results suggested the existence of four 
NEP subscales. Although Dunlap et al. (2000 p.435) find similar evidence they 
argue that they are not inclined to create four NEP subscales “because all 15 items 
load heavily on the first unrotated factor, have strong item-total correlations and 
yield an alpha of 0.83 when combined into a single scale.” It seems reasonable to 
adopt the same approach for this study since our results are similar to theirs. 
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Table A2-3: Principal components analysis of NEP items with Varimax rotation (N =70) 
Item Facet of ecological worldview Factor Loadings 
F1 F2 F3 F4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
NEP1  Limits to growth 0.62 -0.13 0.39 0.15 0.65  0.09 0.07 0.38 
NEP2:  Anti-anthropocentrism 0.59  0.37 -0.19 -0.07 0.11  0.63 0.24 0.24 
NEP3 Frugality of nature’s balance 0.55 -0.17 -0.53 -0.04 -0.03  0.21 0.71 0.27 
NEP4  Anti-exemptionalism 0.46  0.69 -0.22 -0.13 -0.05  0.86 0.07 0.11 
NEP5  Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.51 -0.47 0.02 -0.16 0.21 -0.18 0.36 0.54 
NEP6 Limits to growth 0.26  0.43 0.59 0.29 0.60  0.36 -0.43 -0.03 
NEP7 Anti-anthropocentrism 0.69 -0.17 -0.25 0.08 0.27  0.21 0.59 0.32 
NEP8 Frugality of nature’s balance 0.81  0.15 0.15 -0.25 0.32  0.48 0.13 0.65 
NEP9 Anti-exemptionalism 0.48 -0.12 -0.56 0.33 0.15  0.22 0.77 -0.07 
NEP10 Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.62  0.12 0.37 -0.45 0.22  0.33 0.17 0.75 
NEP11 Limits to growth 0.61 -0.36 0.32 0.46 0.82 -0.12 0.29 0.20 
NEP12 Anti-anthropocentrism 0.68  0.12 0.14 0.24 0.56  0.37 0.22 0.23 
NEP13 Frugality of nature’s balance 0.84 -0.25 -0.22 0.06 0.48  0.17 0.50 0.52 
NEP14 Anti-exemptionalism 0.52  0.57 -0.01 0.16 0.19  0.77 0.21 -0.03 
NEP15 Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.65 -0.31 0.05 -0.42 0.12 0.03 0.28 0.78 
Eigenvalue 5.559 1.777 1.568 1.015 5.559 1.777 1.568 1.015 
Variability (%) 37.06 11.85 10.45 6.77 15.74 16.98 15.84 17.56 
Cumulative (%)  37.06 48.91 59.36 66.13 15.74 32.72 48.56 66.13 
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To explore heterogeneity in environmental attitude cluster analysis 
(Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering)
22
 was applied to the NEP data to 
determine the number of clusters or classes. Agglomerative Hierarchical 
Clustering (AHC) is an iterative classification method which involves calculating 
dissimilarity (Euclidian distance) between N respondents, clustering two 
respondents if a given agglomeration criterion (Ward’s method) is minimised, and 
repeating the process until all respondents have been clustered. The analysis 
suggested the existence of three classes of pro-environmental attitude which we 
described as weak (class 2), moderate (class 1) and strong (class 3). A profile plot 
showing the mean item scores for the three classes is depicted in Figure A2-1. It’s 
interesting to note that the mean item score for NEP 6 was the lowest across all 
three classes.  Class 1 consists of 52.9% of respondents with a mean total NEP 
Scale score of 55.7 whilst classes 2 and 3 have 28.6% and 18.5% of respondents 
respectively with mean total NEP Scale scores of 41.8 and 66.5 respectively. 
Previous studies have used responses to the NEP Scale items to identify three 
classes (weak, moderate and strong) of pro-environmental attitude (Aldrich et al., 
2007; Cooper et al., 2004; Kotchen & Reiling, 2000). Kotchen and Reiling (2000) 
create the three classes in an arbitrary way by allocating respondents in roughly 
equal proportions across classes. Our results suggest that respondents are 
distributed unevenly between classes with 52.9%, 28.6%, and 18.5% of the 
respondents in classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This suggests that it might be 
unreasonable to assume that respondents’ environmental attitudes are evenly 
distributed between the three classes. In a study assessing the importance and 
robustness of cluster analysis and latent class analysis as methods to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity Aldrich et al. (2007) assume, based on Kotchen and 
Reiling (2000), the existence of three classes. 
                                                          
22
 XLSTAT 2013.4.03 was used for this analysis. 
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Figure A2-1: Profile plot showing mean item scores for each class 
 
2.2. Analysis of responses to the TPB statements – pilot survey 
 
Table A2-4 shows the distribution of responses to the statements measuring TBP 
constructs obtained in the pilot survey (N = 70). A correlation analysis was carried 
out to assess correlation of each pair of statements measuring the same construct 
(see Table A2-5). The pairs of scores measuring ATT, SN, PBC, and BI were 
found to have correlations ranging from 0.438 for the SN items to 0.74 for the 
ATT items and were all significant at the 5% level. The high correlation for ATT 
and PBC items suggested that each pair could be combined into a single index for 
each construct. Although the correlation between the SN items was statistically 
significant, it was rather low. This was addressed by changing the evaluative 
semantic differential scale in the final survey. To improve the correlation between 
the scores for the BI items the second statement was refined in the final survey.  
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Table A2-4: Percentage distribution of responses to the TPB statements (N = 70) 
Variable Response categories coded on a 7-point scale from -3 to 3 Mean 
Score -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
ATT1 0% 0% 3% 6% 10% 38% 44%  2.15 
ATT2 0% 0% 1% 11% 13% 48% 27%  1.89 
SN1 6% 11% 6% 28% 14% 23% 13%  0.53 
SN2 0% 0% 1% 48% 6% 28% 17%  1.12 
PBC1 0% 4% 3% 10% 20% 32% 31%  1.66 
PBC2 0% 3% 14% 14% 27% 24% 18%  1.09 
BI1 10% 24% 6% 23% 28% 10% 0%  -0.36 
BI2 1% 3% 3% 10% 30% 27% 27%  1.53 
 
Table A2-5: Correlation matrix (Pearson (n)) for the TPB constructs (N = 70) 
Variables ATT1 ATT2 SN1 SN2 PBC1 PBC2 BI1 BI2 
ATT1 1.000 0.740 0.228 0.320 0.438 0.505 0.417 0.761 
ATT2 0.740 1.000 0.404 0.488 0.398 0.416 0.374 0.715 
SN1 0.228 0.404 1.000 0.438 0.087 0.029 0.331 0.234 
SN2 0.320 0.488 0.438 1.000 0.313 0.354 0.059 0.364 
PBC1 0.438 0.398 0.087 0.313 1.000 0.595 0.384 0.459 
PBC2 0.505 0416 0.029 0.354 0.595 1.000 0.429 0.455 
BI1 0.417 0.374 0.331 0.059 0.384 0.429 1.000 0.492 
BI2 0.761 0.715 0.234 0.364 0.492 0.455 0.492 1.000 
 
To test the relationship postulated in TPB as applied to this study we examined 
the correlation of ATT, SN, and PBC with BI, and performed linear regression 
using responses from the pilot survey. The correlations of ATT, SN and PBC with 
BI were 0.687, 0.340, and 0.557 respectively and were all significant at the 5% 
level. Linear regression results of BI on ATT, SN and PBC are presented in Table 
A2-6. The results indicated that only ATT was a significant determinant of BI, 
whilst PBC and SN were marginally significant and insignificant respectively. 
The significance of each construct depends on the context (Ajzen, 2005). The 
model R
2 
of 0.816 indicated an acceptable level of model fit. We interpreted the 
insignificance of SN and PBC as indicating a weak influence in determining 
behavioral intentions and hence switching. When SN and PBC were replaced with 
the individual items (SN1, SN2, PBC1, and PBC2) all were statistically 
significant at the 5% level except PBC2 although R
2
 decreased to 0.556. This 
suggested that these items could be treated as individual scales in model 
estimation. The pilot results indicated that respondents may have provided 
reasonable responses to the statements as all the TPB constructs had the expected 
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signs. However, inspection of individual responses identified some inconsistent 
responses which we address below. 
Table A2-6: Linear regression results for BI on ATT, SN, and PBC (N = 70) 
  Coefficients Std. 
Error 
t Stat P-value Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
ATT 0.7027 0.0956 7.3*** 0.0001 0.5119 0.8936 
SN 0.0308 0.0932 0.33 0.7420 -0.1553 0.2169 
PBC 0.14864 0.1037 1.43 0.1566 -0.0584 0.3557 
R
2
 = 0.816    Adj.R
2
 = 0.796 
 
Regressing BI on individual items except ATT 
Interc
ept 
-1.1720 0.2649 -4.42*** 0.0001 -1.7012 -0.6428 
SN1 0.1693 0.0684 2.47** 0.0159 0.0326 0.3060 
SN2 -0.2333 0.1014 -2.30** 0.0246 -0.4358  -0.0308 
PBC1 0.1581 0.0988 1.59 0.1147 -0.0394 0.3555 
PBC2 0.2054 0.0981 2.09** 0.0403   0.0093 0.4015 
ATT 0.7160 0.1436 4.98*** 0.0001   0.4291 1.0029 
R
2
 = 0.579         Adj.R
2
 = 0.546 
***significant at .0001, **significant at .05 
The low correlations in some of the item scores may have been a result of 
inconsistent responses due to some respondents not understanding the statements 
well or did not take the survey seriously and provided random responses. For 
example, some respondents provided opposite answers on the two evaluative 
semantic differential scales for to the same statement. This issue was raised with 
Research Now NZ, the marketing company providing the online panel, who 
promised that the panel would be advised against this practice as they are paid to 
take surveys. This produced improved results on the second survey (energy 
sources sample) where all correlations between pairs of statements measuring the 
same constructs were high and statistically significant at the 5% level and a linear 
regression of BI on ATT, SN, and PBC had an R
2
 of 0.854 (correlation and 
regression results for the energy source sample are provided in the appendix). 
Factor analysis of the scores measuring ATT, SN, and PBC showed that all three 
measures loaded heaviest on F1 (the first unrotated factor) (see Table A2-7). 
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However, SN loaded equally (0.688) on the first and second unrotated factors 
which was not surprising given that the two item scores used to construct SN were 
not highly correlated. F1 had an eigenvalue of 1.81; accounted for 60.32% of the 
variance among the constructs; and appeared to represent BI which is postulated 
under TPB to be a function of ATT, SN and PBC. However, a Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.665, which was lower than the minimum level of 0.70 recommended in 
previous literature (e.g., Clark et al., 2003), indicated that the constructs could not 
be combined into a single index. However, when the factors are subjected to 
Varimax rotation, the TPB constructs loaded heavily onto different dimensions. 
ATT loaded heaviest onto D3 and SN and PBC loaded heaviest on D2 and D1 
respectively. This justified the use of these constructs as subscales in the TPB.    
Table A2-7: Principal components analysis of TPB constructs with Varimax rotation 
 Variables F1 F2 F3 D1 D2 D3 
ATT 0.871 -0.063 0.487 0.279 0.232 0.932 
SN 0.688 0.688    -0.233 0.088 0.975 0.206 
PBC 0.760 -0.550 -0.347 0.962 0.090 0.256 
Eigenvalue 1.810 0.779 0.411    
Variability % 60.323 25.962 13.715 33.725 33.714 32.562 
Cumulative% 60.323 86.285 100.000 33.725 67.438     100.000 
2.3 Analysis of responses to the NAT statements – pilot survey 
Responses to the AC and AR statements were spread over all possible response 
categories indicating considerable individual heterogeneity in terms of “awareness 
of consequences” and “ascription of responsibility”. However, the percentage 
distribution of responses showed that respondents tended to have a more positive 
evaluation of “awareness of consequences” compared to “ascription of 
responsibility”. For example, about 72% of the respondents “strongly or 
somewhat agree” that switching to a supplier that produces electricity from 
renewable sources would be good for the environment whilst only 7% disagreed. 
Respondents seemed to exhibit low levels of self-efficacy as 27% “somewhat 
agree or strongly agree” with AC2 to the effect that their behaviour won’t make 
any difference to the environment whilst only 46% “somewhat disagree or 
strongly disagree with it.The majority of respondents provided neutral responses 
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to the two AR questions. For example only 34% of respondents at least agreed 
with AR2 and 42% provided neutral responses. 
The internal consistency of the AC and AR statements (or items) was tested using 
the correlations among the items. To obtain an index for each construct, the two 
scores for the relevant statements are averaged to obtain a score. Principal 
components analysis was not performed as only two statements were used for 
each construct. Summary statistics and correlations for the AC and AR constructs 
are provided in Table 2-4.  Correlation between the AC statements is 0.285 whilst 
that of the AR statements is 0.704. Both correlations are significant at the 5% 
level. However a higher level of correlation between the AC statements is 
required and this was considered in refining the statements for inclusion in the 
final survey. Some previous studies have combined AC and AR into a single scale 
measuring altruism (e.g., Clark et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2004). Examining the 
correlations between AC2 and the two AR statements showed that an attempt to 
combine the items into a single scale would be problematic as some of the 
correlations are small and statistically insignificant. 
Table A2-8: Summary statistics and Correlation matrix (Pearson (n) for AC and AR 
items* (N = 70) 
Variables   Min Max Mean Std. dev AC1 AC2 AR1 AR2 
AC1   1 5 3.843 0.927 1 0.285 0.476 0.501 
AC2   1 5 3.214 1.006 0.285 1 0.099 0.161 
AR1   1 5 3.071 1.012 0.476 0.099 1 0.704 
AR2   1 5 3.043 1.013 0.501 0.161 0.704 1 
*All correlations in bold are significant at the 5% level 
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Appendix 3. Chronology of market reforms 
3.1 NZ electricity market reforms 
Table A3-1: Key dates in the development of the New Zealand electricity industry 
Date Event 
1886 
The first high-voltage electricity transmission line is built, running between 
Skippers Canyon in Central Otago and a mining company 6 kilometers away 
1888 
Reefton is the first town in the southern hemisphere to have a public electricity 
supply 
1903 The Water Act empowers the Crown to use water for generating electricity 
1911 The Hydro-Electric Branch of the Public Works Department is established 
1914 The first major state hydro scheme at Coleridge begins generating power 
1923 
Government calls tenders for Arapuni, which is commissioned 6 years later, 
initiating hydro development on the Waikato River. 
1949 
Commencement of Roxburgh dam construction starts the development of the 
Clutha River hydro system 
1958 
The State Hydro-Electric Department becomes the New Zealand Electricity 
Department (NZED). 
1965 
The North and South Islands are linked by seafloor electricity cables across Cook 
Strait 
1987 
NZED is corporatised as the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ), 
which trades for a time as Electricorp 
1994 
ECNZ’s transmission business is split off as Transpower. The electricity industry 
establishes the Metering and Reconciliation Information Agreement (MARIA) to 
facilitate the bilateral trading of electricity between buyers and sellers 
1996 
ECNZ is split again, with a new generation business, Contact Energy, being 
formed. A wholesale spot electricity market, the New Zealand Electricity Market 
(NZEM), is established. Like MARIA, the NZEM is industry self-governed 
1998 
Industry Reform Act 1998 provides for the setting up of a  profiling system that 
would enable consumers to switch electricity retailers easily  
1999 
Contact Energy is privatised. The remainder of ECNZ is split, with the major 
assets divided between Mighty River Power, Genesis and Meridian Energy, and 
the minor assets sold off 
2003 The Electricity Commission is established to manage the NZ electricity market 
2009 
A Ministerial Review into the performance of the electricity market determines 
that the full benefits of retail competition have not been realised and recommends 
the setting up a of switching fund to promote the benefits of comparing and 
switching electricity retailer 
2010 
The Electricity Commission is replaced by the Electricity Authority, tasked with 
governing the electricity market under the new Electricity Industry Act 2010. 
2011 
The Authority reports completion of priority matters specified in the Act: 
compensation to consumers and a floor on spot prices during electricity shortages; 
a mechanism to help manage price risk caused by transmission constraints; 
facilitating active responses by large users to wholesale market conditions; more 
standardisation of distribution tariff structures and terms; and improving 
electricity hedge market liquidity 
2011 
Electricity Authority launches “Whats My Number” campaign in terms of the 
2009 Ministerial Review 
2013 
Mighty River Power and Meridian Energy are partially privatized: government 
sells off 49% of the stake 
2014 Genesis Energy is partially privatized: government sells off 49% of the stake 
Source: Adapted from Electricity Authority (2011) 
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3.2 How the wholesale spot market price is determined  
In this section we describe how the wholesale spot price is determined. Any 
increases in wholesale spot prices are directly passed onto consumers as a 
component of the retail price.  
The wholesale spot price of electricity is determined by the forces of supply and 
demand. An equilibrium price is determined at a level that clears the market. 
Generators connected to the national grid, retailers and some large industrial 
consumers participate in the wholesale market through a platform called the 
wholesale and information trading system (WITS). Each generator competes for 
the supply of electricity by submitting offer schedules for each trading period 
(half-hour period) through the WITS. An offer schedule indicates a generator’s 
intention to sell a specific quantity of electricity at a particular location called a 
node or grid injection point, at a particular price and time. Each offer schedule 
consists of a series of tranches each specifying the volume (in megawatts - MW) 
and price (in $/MWh). 
The tranches are based on generators’ specific plants, that is, plant capacity and 
marginal cost, and indicate the minimum price at which a generator is willing to 
supply a given quantity of electricity. Generation capacity from plants that are 
expensive to shut down and take long to restart (referred to as ‘must-run plant’) is 
usually offered first at prices close to zero or even negative prices (NZX Ltd, 
2014) and usually provide the base load. This is followed by tranches that are 
offered at progressively higher prices reflecting increasing cost of supply, with the 
smallest and usually most expensive gas-coal thermal plants offered last or as 
peaking plant. This is consistent with the standard upward sloping supply curve 
which reflects increasing marginal cost of progressive plants offered for dispatch. 
Each generator’s offer schedule is therefore its supply curve. To obtain the supply 
curve for the market, the individual generators’ offer schedules are aggregated 
(see Figure A3-1).  
Retailers and large industrial consumers submit bid schedules that indicate 
intention to buy specific quantities of electricity at particular locations (nodes), at 
particular prices and times. The bid schedules consist of a series of tranches 
whose prices progressively decrease and each price represents the maximum 
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amount a retailer is willing to pay to secure a particular quantity of electricity. The 
aggregate of all bid schedules at each node during a given trading period form the 
market demand curve for that node. The offers and bids are then used by NZX 
Energy, as pricing manager, to determine the market clearing price for each 
trading period at each node. A scheduling, pricing, and dispatch (SPD) model is 
used to calculate optimal dispatch and clearing price at each node. The model 
minimizes the cost of generation plus the cost of reserves for any given level of 
demand subject to system constraints. Dispatch involves ranking generators’ 
offers from the least to the most expensive to form an offer stack for each node. 
Usually the least expensive offers are dispatched first except where there are 
constraints in transmission. The offer stack determines the short run marginal cost 
curve for the market. In a competitive wholesale market where each generator 
assumes that they are not the marginal plant, the optimal offer for each generator 
is the true marginal cost of generation (NZX Ltd, 2014). 
 For each half-hour trading period, demand is not responsive to the wholesale spot 
price and is vertical. One reason for the non-responsiveness of demand to half-
hourly spot market prices is that most consumers cannot see the fluctuations in 
half-hourly prices. However, demand varies during the course of the day peaking 
during the morning, early afternoon and early evening. This induces volatility in 
the wholesale spot price as supply and demand is matched in each half-hour 
trading period. In a hypothetical example presented in Figure 3-2, the market 
clearing price is $60 per MWh. All generators dispatched at this node are paid the 
same price ($60) for all the units supplied irrespective of the lower prices offered 
on non-marginal plants. This is commonly referred to as “uniform pricing” or 
marginal cost pricing where all units supplied are priced at the marginal cost of 
the last unit supplied. 
The marginal plant that clears the market determines the wholesale spot price. 
Assuming that the wholesale market is competitive, the difference between the 
wholesale spot market price and the offers for non-marginal plant at each node 
would reflect “scarcity rents” which allow firms to recover capital costs and act as 
signals for the location and type of new capacity generation investments. The 
scarcity rents also provide incentives for generators to increase efficiency hence 
no need for regulations on efficiency and investments in new capacity. However, 
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if the market is less competitive as argued by the critics of the current market 
structure, the Big 5 collude and exercise market power to push wholesale spot 
prices up resulting in excess profits which is not in the long term benefit of 
consumers. Based on current market shares, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for 
the NZ wholesale market is around 0.2036 which indicates a highly concentrated 
market, hence a potential for the exercise of market power. However, whether the 
Big 5 have been able to exercise market power is debatable and is difficult to 
measure. 
The wholesale electricity market in New Zealand is an energy-only market in 
which “the distribution of electricity prices over time, including peak, off-peak, 
and fuel-shortage periods must not only fund the operational costs involved in 
producing electricity, but also provide capital cost recovery to cover the cost of 
maintaining and expanding capacity” (Evans, Hogan, & Jackson, 2012, p. 3). 
There are no side payments made to generators to compensate them for any losses 
or incentives to invest in new capacity to meet future demand. However, the 
emissions trading scheme increases the competitiveness of plants which use 
renewable energy for generation.  
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Figure A3-1: Offer stack and demand (Source: NZX Ltd, 2014) 
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Appendix 4. Supplementary tables for Chapter 4 
 
Table A4-1: MNL results and WTP estimates 
Variable  Coef Std err p-value WTP Std 
err   
p-
value 
ASCALT1 .6124
c
 .0756  .0000    
Time -.0404
c
 .0072  .0000 1.49
c
 0.27 .0000 
Fixed .0055
b
 .0021  .0106 -0.20
b 
0.08 .0111 
Rewards .3839
c
 .0703  .0000 -14.14
c
 2.57 .0000 
Renewable .0089
c 
.0012  .0000 -0.33
c
 0.05 .0000 
Ownership .0092
c
 .0014  .0000 -0.34
c
 0.05 .0000 
New electricity company -.3557
c
 .0947  .0002 13.10
c
 3.42 .0001 
New non-electricity company -.6744
c
 .1228  .0000 24.84
c
 4.56 .0000 
Well-known non-electricity 
company 
-.3891
c
 .1139  .0006 14.33
c
 4.18 .0006 
Savings .0272
c
 .0008  .0000    
       
K 10    
LL -2136.9601    
AIC 4293.9    
BIC 4352.9    
McFadden Pseudo-R
2 
0.2731    
a 
Significant at 0.1, 
b 
Significant at 0.05, 
c
 Significant at 0.01 
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Table A4-2: RPL-EC regression results 
Variable Coefficient S.E. p-value SD S.E.   p-value 
ASCALT1  .4489 .1887 .0174    
Time -.0313 .0056 .0000 .0117 .0158 .4577 
Fixed .00644** .0026 .0121 .0184*** .0039 .0000 
Rewards .1691*** .0641 .0083 .0340 .1213 .7790 
Renewable .0105*** .0014 .0000 .0101*** .0019 .0000 
Ownership .0114*** .0021 .0000 .0165*** .0021 .0000 
New electricity company -.4496*** .1070 .0000 .0385 .2203 .8613 
New non-electricity 
company 
-.9336*** .1413 .0000 .0493 .1585 .7559 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
-.7079*** .14127 .0000 .0341 .1387 .8056 
Switch100-Savings  .0428*** .00168 .0000    
Switch200-Savings  .0329*** .00209 .0000    
Switch300-Savings  .0274*** .00305 .0000    
Switch400-Savings  .0282*** .00309 .0000    
Error Component (EC)    0.0 ...(Fixed Parameter)…. 2.0391*** .1435 .0000 
K 22    
LL -1848.6881    
AIC 3741.4    
BIC 3871.1    
McFadden Pseudo-R
2 
.374    
* 
Significant at 0.1, 
** 
Significant at 0.05, 
***
 Significant at 0.01. S.E and SD are the 
standard error and standard deviation, respectively 
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Table A4-3: Predicted probabilities of switching to different supplier types 
Savings 
per month 
(NZ$) 
Well-known 
electricity company 
New 
electricity 
company 
Well-  known      
non-electricity 
company 
New non-
electricity 
company 
-55 0.0818 0.0583 0.0571 0.0437 
-50 0.0818 0.0583 0.0571 0.0437 
-45 0.0951 0.0681 0.0666 0.0511 
-40 0.1102 0.0793 0.0776 0.0597 
-35 0.1274 0.0921 0.0902 0.0697 
-30 0.1468 0.1069 0.1047 0.0811 
-25 0.1687 0.1236 0.1211 0.0943 
-20 0.1930 0.1426 0.1398 0.1093 
-15 0.2199 0.1639 0.1607 0.1264 
-10 0.2494 0.1877 0.1842 0.1457 
-5 0.2815 0.2140 0.2102 0.1674 
0 0.3159 0.2430 0.2388 0.1915 
5 0.3525 0.2745 0.2700 0.2183 
10 0.3909 0.3085 0.3036 0.2477 
15 0.4306 0.3446 0.3395 0.2796 
20 0.4714 0.3827 0.3773 0.3139 
25 0.5124 0.4222 0.4166 0.3504 
30 0.5534 0.4628 0.4571 0.3886 
35 0.5936 0.5038 0.4981 0.4284 
40 0.6326 0.5448 0.5391 0.4690 
45 0.6699 0.5852 0.5796 0.5101 
50 0.7052 0.6245 0.6191 0.5511 
55 0.7382 0.6622 0.6571 0.5913 
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Appendix 5. Supplementary results for Chapter 5 
  
Table A5-1: Regression results for MNL models estimated with different cut-off points 
on certainty scale 
 M0 M1(4) M2(5) M3(6) M4(7) M5(8) 
ASCALT1  0.515 
(7.01) 
0.505 
(6.71) 
0.378 
(4.47) 
0.382 
(4.09) 
0.385 
(3.38) 
0.397 
(2.40) 
Time -0.048     
(-6.61) 
-0.051     
(-6.79) 
-0.049 
(-5.69) 
-0.058     
(-5.72) 
-0.075     
(-5.00) 
-0.098      
(-4.05) 
Fixed 0.003 
(1.41) 
0.003 
(1.49) 
0 .004 
(1.59) 
0.006 
(2.02) 
0.005 
(1.32) 
-0.002     
(-0.33) 
Discount 0.008 
(3.09) 
0.008 
(2.85) 
0.009 
(3.11) 
0.014 
(4.06) 
0.015 
(3.32) 
0.021 
(3.00) 
Loyalty Rewards 0.417 
(6.00) 
0.424 
(5.96) 
0.398  
( 5.00) 
0.422 
(4.73) 
0.468 
(4.09) 
0.715 
(3.83) 
Renewable 0.009 
(7.29) 
0.009 
(6.93) 
0.009 
(6.75) 
0.009 
(5.97) 
0.010 
(4.71) 
0.011 
(3.11) 
Local Ownership 0.007 
(5.05) 
0.006 
(4.67) 
0.008 
(5.15) 
0.007 
(3.82) 
0.007 
(3.12) 
0.006 
(1.65) 
New electricity company -0.276     
(-2.91) 
-0.301     
(-3.13) 
-0.367 
(-3.32) 
-0.401     
(-3.18) 
-0.293     
(-1.75) 
-0.039     
(-0.15) 
New non-electricity 
company 
-0.724     
(-5.98) 
-0.736     
(-6.01) 
-0.915 
(-6.47) 
-0.966     
(-5.97) 
-0.891     
(-4.07) 
-0.710     
(-1.95) 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
-0.498      
(-4.35) 
-0.529     
(-4.55) 
-0.651 
(-4.89) 
-0.696     
(-4.56) 
-0.564     
(-2.76) 
-0.549     
(-1.56) 
Monthly Power Bill -0.025    
(-31.13) 
-0.025  
(-30.58) 
-0.027  
(-28.68) 
-0.027  
(-25.91) 
-0.028  
(-21.20) 
-0.028    
(-14.36) 
       
LL -216.6 -2083.5 -
1620.5 
-
1300.8 
-820.5 -361.2 
AIC [AIC/N] 4353.1 
[1.62] 
4188.9 
[1.62] 
3263.1 
[1.55] 
2623.6 
[1.52] 
1663.1 
[1.49] 
744.4 
[1.48] 
BIC [BIC/N] 4418.0 
[1.64] 
4253.4 
[1.64] 
3325.3 
[1.57] 
2683.6 
[1.55] 
1718.3 
[1.54] 
790.9 
[1.57] 
Pseudo-R
2 
0.2633 0.2653 0.2945 0.3066 0.3199 0.3385 
Sample size 224 216 176 144 93 42 
z-scores are in round brackets. M0, M1(4), M2(5), M3(6), M4(7), M5(8) are MNL 
models – number in brackets indicates the cut-off point on the certainty scale. 
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 Table A5-2: WTP estimates based on different cut-off points on the certainty scale
1 
    M0  M1(4)  M2(5)   M3(6)   M4(7) M5(8) 
Time -1.92
c
 
(0.29) 
-2.02
c
       
(0.30) 
-1.85
c
 
(0.33) 
-2.13
c
 
(0.37) 
-2.69
c
 
(0.54) 
-3.46
c
 
(0.86) 
Fixed NS NS  NS 0.21
b
 
(0.10) 
NS NS 
Discount 0.33
c
 
(0.11) 
  0.30
c
 
(0.11) 
0.35
c
 
(0.12) 
0.51
c
 
(0.13) 
0.52
c
 
(0.16) 
0.76
c
 
(0.26) 
Loyalty Rewards 16.60
c
 
(2.74) 
 16.80
c
 
(2.79) 
14.83
c
 
(2.93) 
15.56
c
 
(3.25) 
16.80
c
 
(4.06) 
25.36
c
 
(6.54) 
Renewable 0.36
c
 
(0.05) 
  0.35
c
 
(0.05) 
0.36
c
 
(0.05) 
0.35
c
 
(0.06) 
0.36
c
 
(0.08) 
0.39
c
 
(0.13) 
Local Ownership 0.27
c
 
(0.05) 
  0.25
c
 
(0.05) 
0.30
c
 
(0.05) 
0.24
c
 
(0.06) 
0.25
c
 
(0.08) 
0.22
a
 
(0.13) 
New electricity company -10.97
c
 
(3.71) 
-11.91
c
 
(3.74) 
-13.67
c
 
(4.03) 
-14.77
c
 
(4.56) 
-10.54
a
 
(5.95) 
NS 
New non-electricity 
company 
-28.80
c
 
(4.86) 
-29.16
c
 
(4.90)
 
 
-34.08
c
 
(5.31) 
-35.64
c
 
(6.03) 
-32.00
c
 
(7.93) 
-25.17
a
 
(12.85) 
Well-known non-electricity 
company 
-19.81
c
 
(4.53) 
-20.96
c
 
(4.58) 
-24.26
c
 
(4.92) 
-25.66
c
 
(5.58) 
-20.26
c
 
(7.24) 
NS 
1 
Cut-off points are 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8; 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 denote significance at the .01, 00.5, and .1 level 
respectively 
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Table A5-3: Test for equality of WTP estimates  
     M0 vs. M1 (4)    M0 vs. M2 (5)   M0 vs. M3 (6)  M0 vs. M4 (7) M0 vs. M5 (8) 
 Ratio ANTS Ratio ANTS Ratio ANTS Ratio ANTS Ratio ANTS 
Time 1.05 1.51 0.96 -0.53 1.11 0.90 1.40 1.69 1.80 1.89 
Fixed - NS - NS - 2.00 - NS - 1.41 
Discount 0.91 0.98 1.06 -0.59 1.55 -2.54 1.58 -1.61 2.30 -1.80 
Loyalty Rewards 1.01 -0.37 0.89 1.69 0.94 0.59 1.01 -0.07 1.53 -1.47 
Renewable 0.97 1.45 1.00 -0.01 0.97 0.16 1.00 0.02 1.08 -0.28 
Local Ownership 0.93 1.72 1.11 -1.32 0.89 0.82 0.93 0.37 0.81 0.40 
New electricity company 1.09 1.97 1.25 1.71 1.35 1.44 0.96 -0.09 - -1.08 
New non-electricity company 1.01 0.58 1.18 2.46 1.24 1.92 1.11 0.51 0.87 -0.30 
Well-known non-electricity company 1.06 1.75 1.22 2.33 1.30 1.80 1.02 0.08 - -0.03 
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Appendix 6. EA and WTP for green electricity: 
supplementary results 
6.1 Analysis of responses to the NEP Scale statements: Supplementary 
analysis 
6.1.1 Facets of ecological worldview 
The mean scores for the individual facets of ecological worldview presented in 
Table 6A-1 show that respondents have the lowest average score (9.12) for 
“Limits” (NEP1, NEP6, NEP11). This is due to the weakest pro-environmental 
attitudes associated NEP6.  On the other hand, respondents have the highest 
average score (11.19) for “Balance” (NEP3, NEP8, NEP13). The scores for the 
individual facets are bounded between 3 and 15 and our results show that overall, 
respondents have a positive attitude with respect to all the facets of ecological 
worldview. ANOVA suggests that at least one of the mean scores for the facets is 
statistically different from the other scores. Tests for pairwise differences in 
means using the t-test indicate that the mean scores for all the facets are 
statistically different from each other except for ‘Anti-anthropocentrism’ and 
‘Balance’. This suggests that an attempt to reduce the length of the survey 
questionnaire by using a single facet of ecological worldview to measure 
environmental attitudes may not be appropriate. Each facet is measured using only 
three items (see Table 6-2).  
Table A6-1: Average total scores for individual facets of ecological worldview* 
Facet of ecological worldview Items Average 
score 
Variance 
Limits to growth (Limits)  1, 6, 11 9.12 4.55 
Human domination of nature (Anti-anthropocentrism) 2, 7, 12 11.03 6.09 
Frugality of nature’s balance (Balance) 3, 8, 13 11.19 4.96 
Human exemption from the constraints of nature (Anti-
exemptionalism) 
4, 9, 14 10.23 4.63 
Possibility of an ecological crisis (Eco-crisis) 5, 10, 15 10.59 6.29 
*Possible score range is 3 to 15 
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6.1.2 The dimensionality of the NEP Scale 
The dimensionality of the NEP Scale is investigated by employing Varimax 
rotation to create orthogonal dimensions or uncorrelated factors. The results are 
presented in Table A6-2. When the four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 
are subjected to Varimax rotation, five items load heaviest on the first rotated 
factor D1 with two other items cross-loading heavily on this factor. The items that 
load heaviest or cross-load heavily on D1 tap three facets of ecological 
worldview: ‘reality of limits to growth’ (items 1 and 11), ‘fragility of nature’s 
balance’ (items 3 and 13), and ‘possibility of an eco-crisis’ (items 10 and 15). All 
three anti-anthropocentrism items (2, 7 and 12); all eco-crisis items (5, 10 and 15); 
one balance of nature item (8) and one ‘rejection of exemptionalism’ item (14) 
load heaviest or cross-load heavily on the second rotated factor D2.  
The items that tap the ‘rejection of exemptionalism’ facet (items 4, 9, and 14) load 
heaviest or cross-load heavily on the third rotated factor D3 whilst two items (6 
and 11) that tap ‘limits to growth’ facet also cross-load heavily on this factor. 
Only one item (4) loads heaviest on the third factor D3 but four other items (6, 9, 
11, and 14) cross-load heavily on it. None of anti-anthropocentrism items (2, 7 
and 12) and exemptionalism items (4, 9 and 14) either load heaviest or cross-load 
heavily on D1. Five items (3, 6, 7, 9, 13), one from each facet, load heaviest or 
cross-loads heavily on the forth rotated factor D4.  
Most items have substantial cross loadings (more than 0.30) on one or two other 
factors. These results suggest that the first major factor D1 taps limits to growth, 
eco-crisis and balance of nature facets heavily but weakly taps the remaining two 
facets, anti-anthropocentricism and anti-exemptionalism which are mainly 
captured in D2 and D3. These results also suggest the existence of four NEP 
subscales.  
Although Dunlap et al. (2000 p.435) find similar evidence they argue that they are 
not inclined to create four NEP subscales “because all 15 items load heavily on 
the first unrotated factor, have strong item-total correlations and yield an alpha of 
0.83 when combined into a single scale.” It seems reasonable to adopt the same 
approach for this study since our results are similar to theirs.  
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Table A6-2: Principal components analysis of NEP items with Varimax rotation 
Item Facet of ecological worldview Factors (or Dimensions) 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
NEP 1 Limits to growth 0.75 -0.07 0.19 -0.10 
NEP 2 Anti-anthropocentrism 0.06 0.66 0.27 0.18 
NEP 3 Frugality of nature’s balance 0.48 0.12 0.20 0.51 
NEP 4 Anti-exemptionalism 0.11 0.19 0.83 0.05 
NEP 5 Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.60 0.32 -0.09 0.20 
NEP 6 Limits to growth 0.12 0.18 0.43 -0.60 
NEP 7 Anti-anthropocentrism 0.17 0.37 -0.25 0.52 
NEP 8 Frugality of nature’s balance 0.27 0.60 0.26 0.10 
NEP 9 Anti-exemptionalism 0.12 0.08 0.36 0.72 
NEP 10 Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.35 0.71 0.06 -0.07 
NEP 11 Limits to growth 0.67 -0.01 0.33 0.13 
NEP 12 Anti-anthropocentrism -0.06 0.73 0.12 0.04 
NEP 13 Frugality of nature’s balance 0.49 0.19 -0.05 0.42 
NEP 14 Anti-exemptionalism -0.03 0.44 0.41 0.11 
NEP 15 Possibility of an ecocrisis 0.72 0.37 -0.09 0.14 
Eigenvalue  5.149 1.548 1.318 1.129 
Variability (%) 18.40 14.74 10.23 10.94 
Cumulative (%)  18.40 33.15 43.37 54.31 
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6.2 Panel ordered probit model 
Table A6-3: Regression results for the panel ordered probit model (N=224) 
Variable  Coefficient S.E z Prob.|z|>Z 95% CI 
LB UB 
                                      Index function for probability 
Constant 2.289
c
 0.255 8.99 .0000 1.791 2.789 
Gender (male = 1) -0.099
c
 0.038 -2.60 .0093 -0.175 -0.026 
Age (years) 0.004
c
 0.001 3.10 .0020 0.002 0.007 
Child (1 if respondent has 
dependent children, otherwise 0) 
-0.025 0.039 -0.63 .5271 -0.103 0.053 
lnIcome -0.078
c
 0.025 -3.17 .0015 -0.127 -0.03 
NZ European -0.003 0.053 -0.06 .9507 -0.106 0.099 
Maori 0.191
a
 0.099 1.92 .0545 -0.004 0.385 
Education (at least bachelors) 0.084
a
 0.045 1.87 .0616 -0.004 0.171 
                            Threshold parameters for index 
μ1 0.838
c
 0.022 37.78 .0000 0.794 0.881 
μ2 1.539
c
 0.021 73.24 .0000 1.498 1.581 
μ3 2.425
c
 0.026 93.87 .0000 2.374 2.476 
       
LL -4998.7      
AIC 10019.3       
BIC 10086.6      
Chi-squared (7 d.f.) 29.96631 [p-value = .0001]   
c 
Significant at 0.01 level, 
b 
Significant at 0.05 level, 
a 
Significant at 0.10 level. CI denotes 
confidence interval 
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Table A6-4: Marginal effects of respondents’ SDCs on NEP Scale responses 
Variable  Partial 
effect 
Elasticity | z |  Prob.|z|>Z 95% confidence 
interval 
LB UB 
                                      Partial effects on Prob[Response category = 1] 
GENDER (male = 1) 0.0107
c
 0.2119 2.58 .0099 0.0025 0.0188 
AGE (years) -0.0004
c
 -1.3892 3.09 .0020 -0.0007 -0.0001 
CHILD 0.0026 0.0532 0.63 .5287 -0.0056 0.0110 
lnINCOME 0.0084
c
 1.7365 3.15 .0016 0.0031 0.0135 
NZ_EURO 0.0003 0.0068 0.06 .9506 -0.0105 0.0112 
MAORI -0.0176
b
 -0.3490 2.24 .0254 -0.0330 -0.0021 
BACHELORS’ -0.0087a -0.1719 1.92 .0554 -0.0175 0.0002 
                            Partial effects on Prob[Response category = 2] 
GENDER (male = 1) 0.0186
c
 0.1159 2.60 .0093 0.0045 0.0325 
AGE (years) -0.0008
c
 -0.2140 3.10 .0019 -0.0012 -0.0002 
CHILD 0.0046 0.0291 0.63 .5273 -0.0098 0.0191 
lnINCOME 0.0146
c
 0.9547 3.17 .0015 0.0055 0.0236 
NZ_EURO 0.00060 0.0037 0.06 .9507 -0.0185 0.0197 
MAORI -0.0343
b
 -0.2136 2.01 .0446 -0.0676 -0.0008 
BACHELORS’ -0.0155a -0.0965 1.88 .0600 -0.0316 0.0006 
                                       Partial effects on Prob[Response category = 3] 
GENDER (male = 1)  0.0104
c
  0.0419 2.61 .0092 0.0025 0.0182 
AGE (years) -0.0004
c 
-0.0779 3.07 .0022 -0.0007 -0.0001 
CHILD  0.0026  0.0105 0.64 .5253 -0.0054 0.0107 
lnINCOME  0.0082
c
  0.3477 3.14 .0017 0.0030 0.0133 
NZ_EURO  0.0003  0.0013 0.06 .9508 -0.0105 0.0111 
MAORI -0.0229
a 
-0.0924 1.72 .0849 -0.0490 0.0031 
BACHELORS’ -0.0090a -0.0364 1.81 .0697 -0.0188 0.0007 
                                     Partial effects on Prob[Response category = 4] 
GENDER (male = 1) -0.0108
b
 -0.0334 2.56 .0105 -0.0191 -0.0025 
AGE (years)  0.0004
c
  0.0613 3.06 .0022 0.0001 0.0007 
CHILD -0.0027 -0.0084 0.63 .5296 -0.0112 0.0057 
lnINCOME -0.0084
c
 -0.2736 3.12 .0018 -0.0137 -0.0031 
NZ_EURO -0.0003 -0.0010 0.06 .9506 -0.0113 0.0107 
MAORI  0.0159
c
  0.0490 2.71 .0067 0.0043 0.0273 
BACHELORS’  0.0086a  0.0266 1.94 .0522 -0.0000 0.0173 
                                     Partial effects on Prob[Response category = 5] 
GENDER (male = 1) -0.0289
c
 -0.1330 2.60 .0093 -0.0506 -0.0071 
AGE (years)  0.0012
c
  0.2464 3.08 .0021 0.0004 0.0019 
CHILD -0.0072 -0.0334 0.63 .5263 -0.0297 0.0152 
lnINCOME -0.0227
c
 -1.0991 3.16 .0016 -0.036 -0.0086 
NZ_EURO -0.0009 -0.0043 0.06 .9507 -0.0308 0.0289 
MAORI  0.0589
a
  0.2717 1.81 .0699 -0.0047 0.1226 
BACHELORS’  0.2457*  0.11322 1.84 0.0652 -0.0015 0.0506 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at .01, .05, and .1 level respectively 
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6.3 WTP for green electricity  
Table A6-5: Marginal WTP estimates (NZ$(2014)/month) 
Attribute MNL_15 RPL_15 LC_15 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Time -1.69
c
       
(0.29) 
-1.42
c
 
(0.30) 
-0.68
b 
(0.31) 
-2.47
c
 
(0.90) 
NS 
Fixed 0.18
b
 
(0.08) 
0.23
b
 
(0.10) 
NS 0.75
b
 
(0.35) 
NS 
Discount 0.38
c
 
(0.11) 
0.38
c
 
(0.10) 
NS 1.14
c
 
(0.38) 
NS 
Loyalty Rewards 14.49
c
 
(2.71) 
8.64
c 
(2.48) 
4.78
a
 
(2.68) 
26.05
c
 
(9.23) 
NS 
 
 
Renewable 
Weak NEP 0.18
b
 
(0.09) 
NS 
 
NS 0.57
b
 
(0.27) 
NS 
Moderate NEP 0.18
b
 
(0.09) 
0.25
a
 
(0.14) 
NS 
 
0.57
b
 
(0.27) 
NS 
Strong NEP 0.55
c
 
(0.11) 
0.24
c
 
(0.05) 
0.25
a
 
(0.14) 
1.29
c
 
(0.26) 
NS 
Local ownership 0.32
c
 
(0.05) 
0.33
c
 
(0.06) 
0.24
c
 
(0.05) 
0.89
c
 
(0.17) 
NS 
New electricity company -13.06
c
      
(3.66) 
-8.15
b
 
(3.69) 
NS NS NS 
New non-electricity company -29.01
c
     
(4.83) 
-26.18
c
 
(4.89) 
NS -58.53
c
 
(15.27) 
NS 
Well-known non-electricity 
company 
-16.66
c
     
(4.48) 
-14.84
c
 
(4.64) 
NS -28.71
b
 
(13.39) 
NS 
c
, 
b
,
 a
 Significant at .001, .05,  and .1 level, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. NS = not statistically significant at .1 level 
 
6.4 The influence of shorter versions of the NEP Scale on WTP 
estimates 
6.4.1 Regression results for MNL and RPL-EC  
When the dummy codding structure with three levels for the NEP score, weak, 
moderate and strong, is used we are able to estimate and compare WTP for 
Renewable for three groups of environmental attitude. The regression results are 
presented in Table A6-6. The Wald test for linear restrictions in all the MNL 
models has a probability value greater than .05 and the null hypothesis that the 
slopes of the interaction terms are equal is rejected at the 95% level of confidence. 
This suggests that the NEP score has a non-linear effect on the utility of 
Renewable.   
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The coefficient of Renewable is insignificant at the .05 level in the MNL models 
and RPL_10 suggesting indifference towards Renewable by respondents with low 
NEP scores based on these models. The coefficients of the interaction terms 
MNEP_Renewable, and SNEP_Renewable capturing the effect of moderate and 
high NEP scores on the utility of Renewable are significant at the .05 level except 
in RPL_15 where MNEP_Renewable is only significant at the .10 level. 
Marginal WTP estimates are presented in Table A6-7. The results show that 
respondents with low NEP scores are not willing to pay any significant amount 
for power generated from renewables except under model RPL_15 where the 
estimated WTP is $1.80 per month for a 10% increase in Renewable. Based on 
RPL_15, respondents with low and moderate NEP scores have the same WTP for 
Renewable. Estimates based on the other models indicate that respondents with 
moderate NEP scores are willing to pay amounts ranging from $2.60 to $4.10 for 
a 10% increase in Renewable depending on the model, whilst respondents with 
high NEP scores have even higher WTP ranging from $4.10 to $5.50 to secure the 
same increase in Renewable.  
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Table A6-6 MNL and RPL models of supplier choice (NEP scores coded as weak. 
moderate and strong) 
Variable MNL_15 MNL_10 MNL_5 RPL RPL_15 RPL_10 RPL_5 
ASCALT1  0.576
c
 
(.074) 
0.577
c 
(.074) 
0.579
c
 
(.074) 
0.590
c
 
(.147) 
0.617
c
 
(.150) 
0.625
c
 
(.146) 
0.633
c
 
(.148) 
Time -0.043
c
 
(.007) 
-0.043
c 
(.007) 
-0.043
c
 
(.007) 
-0.050
c
 
(.010) 
-0.048
c
 
(.010) 
-0.049
c
 
(.010) 
-0.049
c
 
(.010) 
Fixed 0.005
b
 
(.002) 
0.005
b
 
(.002) 
0.005
b
 
(.002) 
0.009
b
 
(.004) 
0.008
b
 
(.003) 
0.007
b
 
(.004) 
0.008
b
 
(.003) 
Disc 0.009
c
 
(.003) 
0.009
c
 
(.003) 
0.009
c
 
(.003) 
0.015
c
 
(.004) 
0.013
c
 
(.003) 
0.013
c
 
(.003) 
0.013
c
 
(.003) 
Loyalty Rewards 0.369
c
 
(.069) 
0.369
c 
(.069) 
0.369
c
 
(.069) 
0.291
c
 
(.085) 
0.291
c
 
(.084) 
0.290
c
 
(.085) 
0.295
c
 
(.085) 
Renewable 0.003 
(.002) 
0.002
 
(.002) 
0.001 
(.002) 
0.012
c
 
(.002) 
0.006
b
 
(.003) 
0.005 
(.003) 
0.005
c
 
(.003) 
MNEP_Renewable 0.006
b
 
(.003) 
0.008
b
 
(.003) 
0.010
c
 
(.003) 
- 0.007
a
 
(.004) 
0.009
b
 
(.004) 
0.009
b
 
(.004) 
SNEP_Renewable 0.010
c
 
(.003) 
0.011
c 
(.002) 
0.011
c
 
(.003) 
- 0.012
c
 
(.005) 
0.015
c
 
(.005) 
0.014
c
 
(.004) 
Local ownership 0.008
c
 
(.001) 
0.008
c
 
(.001) 
0.008
c
 
(.001) 
0.010
c
 
(.002) 
0.011
c
 
(.002) 
0.010
c
 
(.002) 
0.010
c
 
(.002) 
New electricity 
company 
-0.333
c
 
(.095) 
-0.332
c
 
(.095) 
-0.332
c
 
(.095) 
-0.298
b
 
(.128) 
-0.274
b
 
(.126) 
-0.265
b
 
(.127) 
-0.271
b 
(.126) 
New non-electricity 
company 
-0.740
c
 
(.122) 
-0.738
c
 
(.122) 
-0.739
c
 
(.121) 
-0.954
c
 
(.168) 
-0.881
c
 
(.165) 
-0.879
c
 
(.165) 
-0.895
c
 
(.1654) 
Well-known non-
electricity company 
-0.425
c
 
(.115) 
-0.422
c
 
(.115) 
-0.424
c
 
(.115) 
-0.532
c
 
(.158) 
-0.499
c
 
(.157) 
-0.479
c
 
(.157) 
-0.499
c
 
(.157) 
Power Bill -0.025
c
 
(.001) 
-0.025
c
  
(.001) 
-0.025
c
 
(.001) 
-0.034c 
(.001) 
-0.034
c
 
(.001) 
-0.034
c
 
(.001) 
-0.034
c
 
(.001) 
Standard Deviations of Random Parameters 
Time  0.041
c
 
(.015) 
0.042
c
 
(.015) 
0.047
c
 
(.015) 
0.048
c
 
(.014) 
Fixed  0.027
c
 
(.004)      
0.027
c
 
(.004) 
0.028
c
 
(.004) 
0.027
c
 
(.004) 
Discount  0.022
c
 
(.005) 
0.015
b
 
(.007) 
0.019
c
 
(.005) 
0.017
c
 
(.006) 
Renewable  0.016
c
 
(.004) 
   
MNEP_Renewable  - 0.007
a
 
(.004) 
0.011
c
 
(.004) 
0.013
c
 
(.003) 
SNEP_Renewable  - 0.020
c
 
(.003) 
0.020
c
 
(.003) 
0.018
c
 
(.004) 
Ownership  0.020
c
 
(.005) 
0.016
c
 
(.003) 
0.018
c
 
(.003) 
0.017
c
 
(.002) 
Error component  1.482
c
 
(.263) 
1.598
c
 
(.133) 
1.561
c
 
(.127) 
1.622
c
 
(.130) 
LL -2153.6 -2153.1 -2151.4 -1872.3 -1887.9 -1883.8 -1886.5 
AIC 4333.2 4332.1 4328.8 3808.7 3818.0 3807.9 3813.0 
BIC 4409.8 4408.8 4405.5 3997.4 3933.9 3925.5 3930.9 
Pseudo R
2 
0.2669 0.2671 0.2677 0.3659 0.3607 0.3621 0.3612 
Wald [p-value] 2.19 
[.139] 
1.42 
[.234] 
0.16 
[.688] 
    
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, 0.5 and .1 level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table A6-7 WTP for the attributes of electricity services 
Attribute MNL_15 MNL_10 MNL_5 RPL RPL_15 RPL_10 RPL_5 
Time -1.69
c
       
(0.29) 
-1.69
c
 
(0.29) 
-1.69
c
 
(0.29) 
-1.49
c
 
(0.30) 
-1.42
c
 
(0.30) 
-1.46
c
 
(0.31) 
-1.45
c
 
(0.31) 
Fixed 0.18
b
 
(0.08) 
0.18
b
 
(0.08) 
0.18
b
 
(0.08) 
0.27
b
 
(0.11) 
0.23
b
 
(0.10) 
0.22
b
 
(0.10) 
0.23
b
 
(0.10) 
Discount 0.38
c
 
(0.11) 
0.38
c
 
(0.11) 
0.38
c
 
(0.11) 
0.43
c
 
(0.11) 
0.38
c
 
(0.10) 
0.38
c
 
(0.10) 
0.38
c
 
(0.10) 
Loyalty 
Rewards 
14.49
c
 
(2.71) 
14.44
c
 
(2.71) 
14.45
c
 
(2.71) 
8.60
c
 
(2.51) 
8.64
c 
(2.48) 
8.54
c
 
(2.48) 
8.68
c
 
(2.48) 
Renewable - - - 0.36
c
 
(0.06) 
- - - 
Weak NEP NS NS NS - 0.18
b
 
(0.09) 
NS NS 
Moderate NEP 0.26
b
 
(0.12) 
0.31
b
 
(0.12) 
0.41
c
 
(0.12) 
- 0.18
b
 
(0.09) 
0.27
b
 
(0.12) 
0.28
b
 
(0.12) 
Strong NEP 0.41
c
 
(0.12) 
0.43
c
 
(0.12) 
0.45
c
 
(0.12) 
- 0.55
c
 
(0.11) 
0.45
c
 
(0.14) 
0.41
c 
(0.13) 
Local 
ownership 
0.32
c
 
(0.05) 
0.32
c
 
(0.05) 
0.32
c
 
(0.05) 
0.31
c
 
(0.07) 
0.33
c
 
(0.06) 
0.30
c
 
(0.07) 
0.31
c
 
(0.07) 
New electricity 
company 
-13.06
c
      
(3.66) 
-13.00
c
 
(3.66) 
-13.01
c
 
(3.66) 
-8.80
c
 
(3.76) 
-8.15
b
 
(3.69) 
-7.80
b
 
(3.71) 
-7.98
b
 
(3.69) 
New non-
electricity 
company 
-29.01
c
     
(4.83) 
-28.90
c
 
(4.83) 
-28.95
c
 
(4.82) 
-28.18
c
 
(4.97) 
-26.18
c
 
(4.89) 
-25.87
c
 
(4.86) 
-26.32
c
 
(4.84) 
Well-known 
non-electricity 
company 
-16.66
c
     
(4.48) 
-16.53
c
 
(4.48) 
-16.61
c
 
(4.48) 
-15.71
c
 
(4.66) 
-14.84
c
 
(4.64) 
-14.09
c
 
(4.62) 
-14.68
c
 
(4.59) 
c
, 
b
, 
a
 Significant at the .01, .05 and .1 level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
